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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Germain Grisez
1.1.1 Grisez’s life and works
Germain Grisez, a married Catholic layman and philosopher-theologian, is currently the 
Flynn Professor of Christian Ethics in Mount St. Mary’s University, Emmitsburg, 
Maryland, USA. He was born 30th Sept 1929 in Cleveland.1 Whilst a student in 
Cleveland's John Carroll University, Grisez became very enthusiastic about the 
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, on whose work he did his bachelor thesis. From 
1950-51, he was a nonresident postgraduate student at the Dominican College of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, River Forest, Illinois, receiving both a Master of Arts and a Pontifical 
Licentiate in Philosophy, summa cum laude. He married Jeannette Selby in June 1951. At 
the University of Chicago, he selected as his dissertation topic "Basic Oppositions in 
Logical Theory." At this point it was metaphysics in which he was most interested. His 
first published work was “References to Beauty in St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman, 29 
(1951): 43-44. In 1957, he began an assistant professorship in ethical theory in
1 This short outline o f Grisez’s life is based on R. Shaw, “Pioneering the Renewal in Moral Theology” in 
R.P. George, ed. Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of 
Germain Grisez (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 241-271. It also draws on 
information found in the bibliographies appended to two articles: G. Grisez, G. J. Boyle, and J. Finnis, 
“Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Endsf  American Journal o f Jurisprudence, 32 (1987): 99- 
151, at 148-151, and G. Grisez, “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics,” Moral Philosophy: Historical and 
Contemporary Essays, ed. William C. Starr and Richard C. Taylor (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1989), 125-43, at 139-143. I am indebted to Professor Grisez for sending me a comprehensive 
bibliography of his works.
2Georgetown University. From then onwards, it was ethics in which he specialized. In 
1963-64, Grisez took a sabbatical, received tenure, was promoted to associate professor, 
and was awarded a Lilly postdoctoral fellowship. It was at this time that he began to 
develop his moral theory in earnest.
His first major work was an exegesis of a very important article in Summa Theologiae 
about the foundations of the natural law, according to St Thomas. This was “The First 
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2,” in Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965),2 in which Grisez analysed 
Aquinas’s theory of practical reasoning and criticised Neo-Scholastic Thomism.
In the context of the birth-control debate of the early 1960s, Grisez began to develop his 
own ethical theory, one focused on “basic human goods” and free choice, inspired by and 
influenced by the natural law theory of Aquinas, though not simply a modern 
presentation of it. In January, 1965, Grisez’s Contraception and the Natural Law was 
published. This marks the beginning of Grisez’s development of his philosophical natural 
law theory in detail and as his own. In this book, Grisez offers a new philosophical 
defense of the Church’s rejection of contraception. Following the release of Humanae 
Vitae in 1968, Grisez took leave of absence from Georgetown to act as principal
2 All bibliographical details for publications o f Grisez’s mentioned in this section are found in the 
Bibliography below. Many of the works are analysed in detail in the following chapters. The present work 
begins its analysis of Grisez’s writings with Contraception and the Natural Law and not his article on 
Aquinas to emphasise the point that Grisez does not see his work as exegesis of Aquinas, nor as mainly a 
reaction to neo-scholasticism, but as his (Grisez’s) own constructive theory. Grisez’s main points in the 
article are found also in his first book (1965), as indicated and analysed below in s. 2.1 (i.e. section 2, part 
1). A detailed list of the present work’s contents can be found in Appendix Five below.
theological advisor on matters pertaining to the birth control controversy in Washington, 
assisting Cardinal Patrick O'Boyle.
In “Man, the Natural End o f’, published in the New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967), 
Grisez outlined various approaches to the issue of what man’s ultimate natural end is, 
including a critical section on Aquinas’s views, and the beginnings of an outline of his 
own position on man’s ultimate end. This was to be a constant and developing theme in 
his work.
In 1970 Grisez turned his attention to another controversial moral issue in a lengthy 
philosophical analysis: Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. He moved 
to Campion College, part of the University of Regina, Saskatchewan and worked there 
from 1972-78. During this time, Grisez wrote many works, often co-authoring. One was a 
popular presentation of his natural law theory, written with Russell Shaw: Beyond the 
New Morality: The Responsibilities o f Freedom, (first edition 1974, revised edition 1980, 
and third edition 1988). Another was his own presentation of a cosmological argument 
for God’s existence and an analysis of the issues involved in religious language: Beyond 
the New Theism: A Philosophy o f Religion (1975), which was reprinted with a new 
preface in 2005 as God: A Philosophical Preface to Faith. He also wrote, with Joseph 
Boyle and Olaf Tollefsen, a philosophical defense of free choice: Free Choice: A 
Self-Referential Argument (1976). Boyle, who was a graduate student of Grisez’s at
4Georgetown in late 60s and who has taught in St. Michael’s College, University of 
Toronto since 1986, is one of Grisez’s closest collaborators.
Around this time, Grisez began to see the need for a renewed moral theology in light of 
Vatican II, a philosophically sound and well-worked out theology, one faithful to the 
Church’s teaching. He co-wrote four chapters on morality in The Teaching o f Christ: A 
Catholic Catechism for Adults, edited by R. Lawler, D.W. Wuerl, and T.C. Lawler 
(1976). He worked on this project with John Finnis, whom he had met in 1974. Finnis is 
now professor of jurisprudence at Oxford and of law at Notre Dame and another of 
Grisez’s closest collaborators. One of Grisez’s first major theological publications was 
“Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” co-written with 
John C. Ford, S.J., for Theological Studies, 39 (1978), in which he presented an argument 
that the Church’s teaching on contraception was infallibly taught by the ordinary 
magisterium of the Church. Grisez has been a strong defender of the magisterium and 
also a fierce opponent of dissenting, revisionist theologians. He has been especially 
critical of proportionalism: for example, in his “Against Consequentialism,” American 
Journal o f Jurisprudence, 23 (1978): 21-72.
In 1978, he was offered and accepted the Rev. Harry J. Flynn chair of Christian Ethics in 
Mount St. Mary’s University in Maryland. An important part of Grisez’s work, and one
3 The work of Grisez’s collaborators, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, is examined in chapter seven below. 
Their natural law theory, although it is sometimes called the Grisez-Finnis theory, should in fairness be 
called the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle theory. As this present work is focused on Grisez, who originally developed 
the theory and who alone has fully developed its theological aspect (which this work argues is an essential 
part of the moral theory), it is treated as Grisez’s theory here. This also avoids the constant repetition of the 
rather cumbersome phrases “the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle moral theory”, “as Grisez-Finnis-Boyle say”, and so 
on. I am confident that everything spoken of in this work as Grisez’s theory is or was held fully by him.
5which he welcomed, was lecturing in the seminary there. Although Grisez now was 
beginning to focus more and more on theology, he continued to write philosophical 
ethics. For example, the following year, a book analyzing another important moral issue 
(once again, to do with life) was published: Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A 
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate, co-written with Joseph Boyle (1979).
Grisez’s main work has been his four volume moral theology project, which he calls The 
Way o f the Lord Jesus. Its first volume, Christian Moral Principles, appeared in 1983. 
Grisez worked on this first volume with several others: Boyle, Finnis, Basil Cole, John A. 
Geinzer, Jeannette Grisez (his wife), Robert G. Kennedy, Patrick Lee, William E. May, 
and Russell Shaw. This book presented a detailed account of Grisez’s natural law theory 
and his fundamental moral theology. Grisez tends to regard all earlier accounts of his 
ethical theory as either too simple or flawed, and so it is Christian Moral Principles that 
marks the real beginning of his moral theory at its best.4
Grisez continued to write philosophical ethics and to develop his natural law theory. 
Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, co-written with Finnis and Boyle, appeared 
in 1987. So too did a very important presentation of Grisez’s philosophical ethical theory, 
again co-written with Boyle and Finnis: “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate 
Ends” (1987). In this work, some of the criticisms of Grisez’s work were addressed and
4 This is why a full chapter is devoted to this book below. In the bibliography below, the three volumes of 
The Way o f  the Lord Jesus are all listed as written by Grisez “with others” . The full list o f contributors is 
not given, both for simplicity’s sake and to emphasise that these works are primarily works by Grisez.
various aspects clarified.5 Grisez himself wrote a short account of his moral theory the 
following year, “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics”.
The first volume of The Way o f the Lord Jesus was somewhat difficult and perhaps even 
forbidding in its length and academic rigour and ambition.6 In 1991, Grisez, along with 
Shaw, wrote a shorter and simpler presentation of its theory: Fulfillment in Christ: A 
Summary o f Christian Moral Principles. Soon after, the second volume of the moral 
theology project was published, again with many collaborators helping: The Way o f the 
Lord Jesus, vol. 2, Living a Christian Life (1993). This book, like its predecessor a very 
substantial work, developed some of the fundamental moral theology themes of the first 
volume, but mainly focused on specific moral issues on which the Church has taught. 
Grisez has always been very concerned to defend the Church and her teachings, 
especially with regard to the very controversial issues.7 When Pope John Paul II issued 
his encyclical on moral theology, Veritatis Splendor, in 1993, Grisez was one of those 
who supported it and defended it, for example in his “Veritatis Splendor in focus: 1: 
Revelation versus dissent,” Tablet (London), 16 October 1993.
Grisez was also concerned to show how his moral theory could address issues not 
specifically taught by the Church or issues of some complexity and difficulty. The third
5 Again, as this is so important a work in the development of Grisez’s theory, the best part of a chapter is 
devoted to it below. A short appendix to the chapter deals with the following work (from 1989).
6 Shaw reports a reviewer of the second volume of Grisez’s project saying o f Christian Moral Principles 
that the person asked to review it for New Blackfriars was simply overwhelmed by it and so it was not 
reviewed there: see Shaw, “Pioneering the Renewal”, 245.
7 For example, a major article, co-written with Boyle and Finnis, and W.E. May, appeared in 1988: ‘“ Every 
Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life’: Toward a Clearer Understanding,” Thomist 52 (1988), 365- 
426.
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volume of his moral theology project, which appeared in 1997 as The Way o f the Lord 
Jesus, vol. 3, Difficult Moral Questions, did just that. The fourth volume has not yet 
appeared, but will address issues in relation to the priesthood and religious life.
Grisez has always written in dialogue or dialectic with other theologians and critics. One 
of the earliest and most substantial criticisms of his work was R. Hittinger, A Critique o f 
the New Natural Law Theory (1987) to which Grisez replied in the following year with 
“A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s Book, A Critique o f the New Natural Law”. Another 
example of Grisez in dialogue with critics is found in the book edited by Robert P. 
George, Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work 
o f Germain Grisez (1998). In it, Grisez and Boyle offer clarifications and defences of 
their theory: “Response to Our Critics and Our Collaborators”.
In the present decade, Grisez has continued to develop his moral theory in three 
important articles: “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment” (2001), “The 
Doctrine of God and the Ultimate Meaning of Human Life” (2006), and “The True 
Ultimate End of Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone” (2008). He has also 
written a book in popular style with Shaw, which presents one of his central themes: 
Personal Vocation: God Calls Everyone by Name (2003). Grisez’s wife, Jeanette, died in 
2005. Grisez married again the following year. He continues to write philosophy and 
theology, in particular working on the fourth and final volume of The Way o f the Lord 
Jesus.
7
1.1.2 Critical treatments o f Grisez’s work
Grisez’s work has received critical attention.8 The earliest major criticism was by 
Hittinger in 1987, as mentioned above. Another substantial negative criticism, similar to 
Hittinger’s, was presented in Fulvio Di Blasi, God and the Natural Law: A Rereading o f 
Thomas Aquinas (2006). A mainly favourable judgment was found in Rufus Black: 
Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel (2000). And 
one with mixed opinions was N. Biggar and R. Black (eds.), The Revival o f Natural Law: 
Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (2000). 
These books deal at length with Grisez’s theory from outsiders’ perspectives.9
Grisez’s work has also received attention from his collaborators. Finnis’s and Boyle’s 
works are treated below (in chapter seven), but here we must mention William E. May, 
whose An Introduction to Moral Theology in each of its editions (1991 and 2003) has 
summarised and defended Grisez’s theory in detail. Also to be mentioned is Robert P. 
George, who has applied Grisez’s theory to public policy issues and defended Grisez’s 
theory against its critics: see his Making Men Moral (1993) and In Defense o f Natural 
Law (1999). As already mentioned, George also edited a book devoted to Grisez’s work, 
with contributions from several critics, both positive and negative: Natural Law and 
Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work o f Germain Grisez (1998).
8 We do not look here at all aspects of the critical attention Grisez’s work has received. Nor is this intended 
to be a fully comprehensive list of all works dealing with Grisez’s theory in general.
9 Hittinger’s, Di Blasi’s and Black’s criticisms are treated in detail in chapter eight below and aspects of the 
criticisms from Biggar and Black’s anthology are mentioned in footnotes in various places in the text.
Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle have written frequently for The American Journal o f 
Jurisprudence. This journal devoted most of one of its issues (no. 46, 2001) to Grisez’s 
work, with contributions from nine scholars responding to Grisez’s work in general and 
to his own substantial article in that issue in particular.10
Grisez’s work has received only a little attention from revisionist or proportionalist 
theologians. One exception to this is the book-length discussion of Grisez’s work in T. 
Salzman, What Are They Saying About Catholic Ethical Method? (2003).11
Grisez’s work has also been treated in parts of books, especially those concerned with 
natural law theory. One notable example is J. Goyette, M.S. Latkovic and R.S. Myers
(eds.), St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives
12 * •(2004). One major modern Thomistic scholar, whose work is similar in many ways to
Grisez’s, is Martin Rhonheimer, who discusses Grisez’s work briefly as part of the
presentation of his own theory of natural law in his books Natural Law and Practical
9
10 This present work treats Di Blasi’s article in this issue of American Journal o f  Jurisprudence in some 
detail in chapter eight below, and aspects o f the other criticisms found therein in footnotes at various places 
in the text.
11 Salzman has also treated Grisez’s ethical method in several articles. However, his work, like that of other 
revisionist/proportionalist theologians, does not deal directly with religion or offer much in the way of 
criticisms relevant to our focus in this present work, and so we do not discuss it here.
12 Interestingly, Fergus Kerr mentions briefly the work of Grisez and Finnis in his After Aquinas: Versions 
ofThomism  (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), but does not treat it in any detail, saying that it is “one more 
version ofThomism, much contested and regrettably much too large a subject to be discussed here” (228). 
Perhaps Kerr is another example o f a scholar who is overwhelmed by the scope o f Grisez’s work and who 
therefore fails to give it all the attention is deserves.
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Reason: a Thomistic View o f Moral Autonomy (2000) and The Perspective o f the Acting 
Person: Essays in the Renewal o f Thomistic Moral Philosophy (2008).13
Finally, some surveys and discussions of moral theology since Vatican II have treated 
Grisez’s work. One example, by a critic who is very dismissive of Grisez’s approach and 
conclusions, is Charles Curran, Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History 
(2008).14 A more positive evaluation of Grisez’s work is found in Paulinus Ikechuckwu 
Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age o f Renewal: A Study o f the Catholic Tradition Since 
Vatican II (2003).
1.2 Grisez’s natural law theory
Grisez’s philosophical ethics is a natural law theory. One helpful summary is given by 
one of Grisez’s collaborators, Robert P. George:
13 W.E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology 2nd ed. (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 2003), 
119-125 discusses Rhonheimer’s work, with its similarities to and differences from Grisez’s work.
14 The main section of Curran’s book dealing with Grisez’s moral theory is at 109-111. Curran offers only a 
paragraph of critical discussion o f Grisez’s approach. Like many proportionalists, Curran’s main interest in 
Grisez is in his ecclesiology and his treatment o f dissent and Church authority. Another example of 
proportionalist discussion o f Grisez’s work regarding his ecclesiology is B. Hoose, “Grisez’s Ecclesiology, 
the Role of Moral Theologians, and the Scope for Responsible Dissent,” in The Revival o f  Natural Law: 
Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, eds. N. Biggar and R. Black 
(Aldershote/ Burlington USA/ Singapore/ Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), 184-200. Hoose also criticised Grisez’s 
work, though somewhat superficially (relying too much, for example on Beyond the New Morality, which 
is not a fully scholarly work o f Grisez’s), in his Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European 
Roots (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987), 55-56, 87-89 and 111-116. At least Curran 
and Hoose acknowledge Grisez’s work, unlike another revisionist theologian, Philip S. Keane, who totally 
ignores it in his survey o f theology since Vatican II: see his chapter “Catholic Moral Theology from 1960 
to 2040: Accomplishments and Challenges for the Future,” in Catholic Theology Facing the Future: 
Historical Perspectives, ed. D.A. Lane, (New York/Mahweh: Paulist Press, 2003), 76-94. It is also ignored 
in a popular introduction to moral theology: R. Gula, Reason Informed by Faith (New York/Mahweh: 
Paulist Press, 1989).
1 1
Theories of natural law are reflective critical accounts of the constitutive aspects of 
the well-being and fulfillment of human persons and the communities they form. 
The propositions that pick out fundamental aspects of human flourishing are 
directive (that is, prescriptive) in our thinking about what to do and refrain from 
doing (our practical reason) -  that is, they are, or provide, more than merely 
instrumental reasons for action and self-restraint. When these foundational 
principles of practical reason are taken together (that is, integrally), they entail 
norms that may exclude certain options and require others in situations of morally 
significant choosing. So natural law theories propose to identify principles of right 
action -  moral principles.. .15
This is very concise. What it means will be developed and explained in the chapters to 
come. One initial point to emphasise is that the natural law is not the same thing as 
natural law theory.16 The natural law is what natural law theory is about. Natural law 
theory can be complex, whereas the natural law itself, especially with regard to its 
primary principles, is simple.17 This is why even children can grasp the basic principles 
of the natural law, and some at least of its specific norms, with relative ease, even though 
they have little or no theoretical knowledge. The natural law is not something that only 
experts can understand or grasp. Natural law theory makes use necessarily of theoretical 
insights in its investigations, explanations and justifications of the natural law, whereas 
the natural law itself, which is presupposed by the theoretical aspects of natural law 
theory, is primarily practical, not theoretical.
15 R.P George, “Natural Law,” American Journal o f Jurisprudence 52 (2007), 55-75, at 55-56, (emphasis 
added).
16 Another way to put this is that practical reason is not the same thing as ethics. Ethics is about practical 
reason, which it presupposes and develops both practically and theoretically. This point is overlooked by 
both Hittinger and Di Blasi, whose criticisms of Grisez are analysed in chapter eight below. Another 
(friendlier) critic, Benedict Ashley, suffers the same confusion: see B. Ashley, “What is the End of the 
Human Person? The Vision of God and Integral Human Fulfilment,” Moral Truth and Moral Tradition, ed. 
L. Gormally (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), 68-96, at 72-74.
17 Trying to understand and justify simple realities or truths is often the most complex and difficult of tasks.
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It might be helpful to offer a short but simpler outline now of what is meant by “the 
natural law”.18 The natural law guides us in how we are to choose and act. It shapes our 
practical reasoning. It is objective and can be known in principle by human practical 
reason whenever it works soundly, even when it is unaided by divine revelation or faith. 
This does not mean that natural law cannot, or need not, be informed and specified by 
divine revelation and faith -  it certainly can be, and needs to be, as the following work 
makes clear. The classical biblical reference for natural law is Romans 2:14-15, in which 
St. Paul states that the gentiles have God’s law “written in their hearts”. The natural law 
is not an exclusively or originally biblical concept, but one with its roots in classical 
thought. However, it was the Church, with its belief in a Creator who is reasonable, wise 
and loving, that rediscovered and developed the notion of natural law in the Middle 
Ages.19
The natural law is, according to May’s summary of Grisez’s theory, “an ordered set of 
true propositions of practical reason.”20 These propositions can be subdivided into three 
subsets, or three levels of the natural law, each building progressively on the previous 
one.
18 What follows draws on May, Introduction, 112-113, in the context of 93-140.
19 See J.R. Fears, “Natural Law: The Legacy of Greece and Rome,” Common Truths: New Perspectives on 
Natural Law, ed. B. McLean (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI books, 2000), 19-56, whose analytical survey 
includes reference to Herodotus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Stoic philosophy 
and Marcus Aurelius, amongst others. Fears also draws attention to the text from Romans 2:14-15 and its 
importance in enabling the Church to accept and promote the idea of the natural law (45-46) and to St 
Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical and theological work, which helped the Church to become “the bearer of 
the great tradition of natural law” in the middle ages and into modem times (47-48). This latter point has 
been treated in detail in J. Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition fo r  Christian Ethics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2000).
20 May, Introduction, 112.
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At this level we have the first principle of practical reason: “Good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil avoided.”21 This principle directs all our practical thinking to be truly 
practical and not impractical or pointless. The word “good” in this principle refers to 
anything that we can understand to be fulfilling for us as human beings and that can 
therefore provide us with a reason to choose and act. The first principle is a very general
principle. So it needs to be, and can be, specified by further primary principles of
• • 22 practical reason directing us to pursue and instantiate various types of good.
Thus we have several primary principles of the natural law, which identify various kinds 
of human flourishing which are the goods to be pursued and realized by or in our actions. 
These basic forms of human flourishing, according to Grisez’s natural law theory, are as 
follows:
Life and health
Knowledge and aesthetic experience 
Excellence in work or play 
Marriage 
Inner peace
21 This principle is first mentioned by St Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Grisez 
discussed in detail this important article, and the first principle, in his “The First Principle of Practical 
Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” Natural Law Forum, 
10 (1965): 168-201. May presents a very helpful account of Aquinas’s natural law theory in Introduction, 
71-86. According to May’s account, Grisez’s and Aquinas’s theories of natural law overlap considerably.
22 To instantiate a good is to embody it or participate in it to some extent in or through one’s action. One 
instantiates the good of health, for example, when one achieves one’s purpose in taking medicine to make 
one healthy. A human good extends further than any one instantiation of it, so one can pursue a good in or 
through many diverse instantiations of that good. Goods attract the will in an open-ended way.
1.2.1 First level: The foundational level o f  the natural law
14
Social harmony of various sorts
Religion.23
Inner consistency
The basic principles of the natural law direct us to pursue and instantiate through and in 
our actions these forms of flourishing. Religion, which is one of these basic goods, and is 
the object therefore of one of the basic or primary principles of the natural law, is the 
focus of the present work. The primary principle regarding religion is: “Religion is to be 
pursued and instantiated and its opposite is to be avoided.” This is one of eight such 
primary principles directing us to pursue and instantiate the diverse basic goods. These 
eight principles are considered to be truly basic, self-evident to anyone who grasps the 
meaning of their terms, not deduced or derived from any more prior principles or 
knowledge. The first principle of practical reasoning and its eight specifications 
(directing us to pursue and instantiate the eight basic goods) form the foundational or 
roots level of the natural law.
23 These basic human goods are divided into reflexive goods (the final four listed here, which are 
instantiated in choices), and substantive (which are chosen but not instantiated precisely in our choices). 
This is explained in more detail in the following chapters. Marriage was included in Grisez’s list only in 
1993. Two other natural law theorists who provide lists o f basic goods, influenced by but not exactly the 
same as Grisez’s, are: Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Morality and the Human Goods: An 
Introduction to Natural Law Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002). Murphy lists 
life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in play and work, excellence in agency, inner peace, 
friendship and community, religion, and happiness (see 100-135); Gomez-Lobo lists life, family, 
friendship, work and play, experience of beauty, knowledge, integrity, and, with reservations, religion (see 
6-25). Sabina Alkire, “The Basic Dimensions of Flourishing: A Comparison of Accounts,” The Revival o f  
Natural Law, 73-110, provides a synthesis o f basic human goods based on a survey o f recent accounts by 
philosophers (including Finnis), psychologists and anthropologists. She lists life, understanding, skilful 
performance and production, creative expression, friendship and affiliation, meaningful choice and identity, 
inner harmony, harmony with a greater-than-human source of meaning and value (i.e. religion), and 
harmony with the natural world (see ibid., 99).
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Everyone who considers what to do follows one or more of these primary principles, 
even people who make immoral choices. However, the first primary principle of practical 
reasoning and its specifications (in the principles directing us to pursue and instantiate the 
basic goods) are not fully or satisfactorily fulfilled by immoral acts, but only by morally 
good acts. Thus the foundational level of the natural law opens out, so to speak, towards 
the next level, the moral level, and shapes it integrally.24
1.2.2 Second level: The specifically moral level o f the natural law
The second subset of practical propositions making up the natural law specify how our
actions are to be not just rational, in that they avoid pointlessness and aim for some type
of fulfillment, but fully rational, in that they respect and love integrally all the goods of
the foundational level of the natural law.25 The first principle of morality, according to
Grisez’s theory until recently, was formulated as follows:
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one 
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing 
is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment.26
24 The term “foundational” is not used by Grisez (or May), but is used here because it brings out better than 
the bare term “first set” the fact that the distinct moral dimension o f the natural law is not a separate thing 
from the generally practical level o f the natural law. Rather, the moral level or dimension rests on the 
generally practical level, whose foundational support and integral directiveness pervades the moral level 
(and the third level too, the specific moral norms level). Another metaphor that could be used is the “roots” 
level, which would communicate nicely the idea that the moral and moral norms levels are rooted always in 
the level o f the first principle o f practical reasoning and its specifications in the primary principles directing 
us to pursue and instantiate the basic human goods. Appendix One below provides a simple outline of this 
level.
25 It must not be supposed that this emphasis on rationality entails that Grisez’s theory ignores the 
importance of emotions for our motivation. According to his theory, emotional motivation, whether 
conscious or subconscious, is essential for all human choices and actions. The natural law at the moral level 
directs us to order our emotions towards true and lasting goods sought in a manner that respects the integral 
goodness of these goods. This point is ignored by G. Bexell, “Is Grisez’s Moral Theology Rationalistic? 
Free Choice, the Human Condition, and Christian Ethics,” The Revival o f  Natural Law, 131-147.
26 This is a philosophical formulation. Grisez’s moral theory acknowledges that the principle can be 
formulated in a religious way, such as: Love God and love your neighbour as yourself.
16
The central concept here is that of “integral human fulfillment”, which refers to an ideal 
of all human beings sharing fully, individually and communally, in all the basic human 
goods (such as life, knowledge, work, inner peace, community and friendship, and so on). 
Grisez’s recent modification of his theory replaces this concept with that of “integral 
communal fulfillment”.27 The fulfillment referred to by this concept includes that of all 
persons we can hope to cooperate with or benefit by our actions -  human beings, but also 
God and non-human persons (such as angels). This fulfillment can be intended in our 
choices as an ulterior motive. Although Grisez has not offered a new formulation of the 
first principle of morality as yet, we can guess that it will essentially consist of the this 
directive:
Intend integral communal fulfillment in all one’s choices, or at least intend always
in a way that is harmonious with intending integral communal fulfillment.
What has not changed in Grisez’s theory is the idea that all the basic human goods are 
intrinsically good in diverse and irreducible ways and that the morally good person 
respects the goodness of each of the goods, and never chooses in a way that fails 
voluntarily to love all the goods integrally.28 Integrality, or wholeness, is the central 
concept in Grisez’s understanding of moral good. One is morally good only when one 
chooses in a way that respects and loves the whole of goodness, as specified by the whole 
set of basic human goods for all people.
27 See s. 6.3 below, which analyses Grisez, “The True Ultimate End of Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not 
God Alone,” Theological Studies 69, no. 1 (March 2008), 38-61.
28 Morality concerns only what is in one’s control, what is voluntary in some way.
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The first principle of morality is quite general and it too needs to be specified. Grisez 
does this in what he calls “the modes of responsibility”. These are moral principles that 
“exclude ways of choosing that ignore, slight, neglect, arbitrarily limit, or damage, 
destroy, or impede basic human goods”.29 Disordered emotions can sway us away from 
our true, integral good or fulfillment; the modes direct us not to be swayed in this way. 
For example, we are not to be swayed by laziness or inertia from pursuing goods. This is 
what one of the modes of responsibility excludes. Another of these modes excludes 
acting on an unreasonable or arbitrary preference, whether for oneself or some other 
person. Another mode directs us never to act for revenge or out of hatred and 
intentionally cause harm. Another mode directs us never to do evil for the sake of good. 
And there are a few others, all directing us not to let our reason be fettered by 
unreasonable emotion: in other words, we are always to act according to right reason.30
1.2.3 Third level: The level o f specific moral norms
On the basis of the two previous levels it is possible to form correct moral norms to guide 
us with regard to specific choices and commitments.31 Grisez does not claim that people
29 May, Introduction, 112.
30 Grisez originally listed eight modes of responsibility in Christian Moral Principles, chapter eight. He 
seemed to change his mind about some of them, seeing them as possibly reducible to others, in Difficult 
Moral Questions, appendix one, and he adds one there, which has to do with acting unreasonably for mixed 
motives. Still, the basic ideas are unchanged: one is never to choose in a way that ignores, slights, neglects, 
arbitrarily limits, or damages, impedes or destroys any basic human good. Appendix Two below provides a 
summary of the modes o f responsibility drawn from chapter eight o f Christian Moral Principles.
31 It is also necessary to understand what kind o f willing is involved in any particular potential action before 
one can apply the modes o f responsibility to the action and work out a correct specific moral norm. This 
present work cannot go into any detail concerning Grisez’s action theory, but it should be acknowledged 
that it is a very important part of his moral theory. In particular, one needs to understand how accepting 
side-effects is distinct from willing means or ends. Grisez deals with this in chapter nine o f his The Way o f  
the Lord Jesus, vol. 1 of Christian Moral Principles, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1983). There is a very
do this in a way that explicitly uses the concepts or terms of his theory; nor does he claim 
that people work out specific moral norms in a fully articulated and self-conscious 
manner. The process can be almost totally instinctive for virtuous people. Still, Grisez 
holds that morality is not based on emotions or instincts or taste. It is cognitive and 
intellectual and based ultimately on reason. The most basic idea in natural law theory is 
that morally good acts are constituted as such by one’s being fully reasonable.
Some specific moral norms are absolute, admitting of no exceptions, whilst some are 
non-absolute. This level is very important, of course, but it does not concern us directly in 
the present work, which is concerned with the more foundational matters (to do with 
level one in particular, but also level two).
1.3 Grisez’s moral theology
Grisez’s approach to ethics is not purely philosophical, however, but largely theological. 
By this is meant that his approach to ethics as a Christian theologian assumes the truth of 
divine revelation, which is accepted in faith. The natural law is seen by Grisez as 
including, in its foundation or roots, practical principles that direct us to know the truth 
and seek harmony with God. Divine revelation (which invites us into a covenant 
relationship with God) specifies the natural law, giving it content and shape suited to the 
actual condition of man and of the world in which he lives (i.e. a fallen and redeemed 
man and world). Thus, Grisez’s theology flows from his natural law theory, which is
18
concise summary o f other aspects o f Grisez’s action theory in R.P. George, In Defence o f  Natural Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29, n. 6.
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somewhat general and lacking in content and motivational power without the theology. 
Grisez’s theology also helps to support and illuminate his natural law theory.
It is difficult to summarise Grisez’s moral theology as easily as his natural law theory, but 
it can be said here that the central concepts of his theology include the following.32 The 
natural law is supported by, included in, and specified by divine revelation. Christian 
faith is both a human act and a divine gift. Our good works are both God’s gift and our 
own free choices. Jesus Christ is the norm of all morality -  he perfectly embodied and 
expresses the natural law. Christian life is cooperation with Jesus our friend and Lord. 
The primary moral principle of Christian ethics is our choosing always in a way that 
contributes to the fulfillment of all creation in Christ that has already begun and will be 
perfected in the kingdom of God. This primary principle is specified by what Grisez calls 
“Christian modes of response”, which are embodied in the Beatitudes, and in Jesus 
Christ. These modes of Christian response transform the natural law modes of 
responsibility into specifically Christian ways of being moral. We each should seek 
always the kingdom of God in all our choices for the basic human goods of all the people 
we can reasonably help or benefit by our choices. One specifically Christian principle is 
that each of us ought to discern, accept and live by our personal vocations, or, in other 
words, each of us ought to live the life of love that God wills one to live, in light of one’s
32 These somewhat bald statements are explained in more detail in chapter three below, which examines 
Christian Moral Principles, where Grisez first developed and presented his moral theology.
33 The “Modes of Christian Response” are listed in Appendix Three below. Grisez’s term “Response” 
emphasises the idea that Christian morality is essentially about responding wholeheartedly to what God has 
done, is doing, and will do in Christ. The modes of Christian response are a kind o f transformation or 
transfiguration of the modes o f responsibility that are found at the natural law level of Grisez’s moral 
theory, in light of divine revelation and grace. Rufus Black has done excellent work recently on this aspect 
of Grisez’s moral theory: see R. Black, Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the 
Gospel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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unique talents and opportunities. God calls man not only to integral fulfillment as human, 
but also to a more-than-human sharing by grace in his divine life, in the divine life of the 
Trinity. We cannot act directly to achieve this supernatural fulfillment, which is a pure 
gift of God, but our moral acts unite us with Jesus and mediate our sharing supematurally 
in God’s love. In summary, it could be said that Grisez’s theology is encapsulated in the 
title of his four-volume moral theology project: Christian life is following The Way o f the 
Lord Jesus.
1.4 The aims of this dissertation
Grisez’s work was chosen for this present study because it is substantial and ambitious in 
scope and is worked out thoroughly in a sound and interesting manner. His is a highly 
systematic approach to moral theology, one that is rooted in a very rigorous philosophical 
understanding. Even his critics have acknowledged Grisez’s philosophical acumen and 
the strikingly wide and deep scope of his work.34
34 See, for example, Benedict M. Ashley, on Grisez’s 4-volume moral theology project: “[It] promises to be 
the most important work in the field (at least in English) to appear since Vatican II”, “Review Discussion of 
Christian Moral Principles”, Thomist 48 (1984), 450. Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black: “The scope and depth 
of the Grisez School’s work is such that it has the potential to attract and reward attention across a wide 
front”, The Revival o f  Natural Law, xiii. Fulvio Di Blasi: “Today the credibility o f Finnis’s natural law 
theory is undisputed, and an ever-increasing body of writings touches upon his thought, directly or 
indirectly”, God and The Natural Law, A Rereading o f  Thomas Aquinas (South Bend, Indiana: St 
Augustine’s Press, 2006), 8. Jean Porter: “considered on its own terms, this is a formidable and widely 
influential theory o f the natural law”, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory o f  the Natural Law (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, UK: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 39. Frank Hobbs: “Grisez has 
produced an outstanding work of Christian moral theology ... It is difficult to think o f any recent work on 
the subject comparable in scope and rigor of argument ... He is an expert in logic, metaphysics, 
epistemology, ethical theory, and the history of Western philosophy. He is also very much at home with the 
tradition of analytic philosophizing . ..”, Beyond Its Authority? The Magisterium and Matters o f  Natural 
Law (Alexandria NSW, Australia: E.J. Dwyer, 1997), 110.
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The specific focus on religion as a basic human good and its role in Grisez’s moral theory 
was chosen for several reasons. It seemed to the present author that some other aspects of 
Grisez’s moral theory tend to get attention, especially with regard to pressing current 
controversial issues to do with life and sexuality/marriage, but that religion has been 
neglected.35 This present work hopes to remedy this situation. It hopes to remedy another 
problem too, namely, a narrow understanding of the natural law, which, perhaps misled 
by the word “natural”, tends to think of it as an exclusively biology-based or biology- 
focused theory of morality.36 Focusing on religion, and showing how the natural law has 
a foundational place and central role for religion, helps to promote a more accurate and 
rounded understanding of the natural law, and answers criticisms that it is based too 
narrowly on human biology and is concerned mainly with sexual or biological issues. It 
helps also to show that specifically religious concerns are included in the natural law, and 
that the natural law is a religious law, which most treatments of natural law tend to 
overlook.37
35 Two critics o f Grisez’s work have given attention to religion in his theory, namely R. Hittinger and F. Di 
Blasi. Their efforts are examined in chapter eight below. As will be seen there, their work is not adequate, 
especially in its understanding of the role of religion in Grisez’s work. This present work is in part a reply 
to their criticisms. The main reason that proportionalists’ criticisms of Grisez are not treated here directly is 
that they do not give much attention to the concept and role of religion, nor do they analyse the 
foundational level o f Grisez’s theory in any distinctive and developed manner, but tend rather to focus on 
the moral and specific norms levels o f Grisez’s theory, (particularly with regard to the issue of moral 
absolutes), as well as issues o f ecclesiology (conscience and authority, and so on).
36 See, for example, the treatments o f natural law in the following: J. Baggini and P.S. Fosl, The Ethics 
Toolkit: A Compendium o f  Ethical Concepts and Methods (Malden, MA/Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2007), 36-38 and D.B. Ingram and J.A. Parks, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Understanding Ethics 
(Indianapolis, IN: Alpha, 2002), 111 - 120.
37 See, for example, the treatments of natural law in Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, 220-249; P. Vardy 
and P. Grosch, The Puzzle o f Ethics, rev. ed. (London: Fount, 1999), 36-48; and M. Timmons, Moral 
Theory: An Introduction (Lanham/Boulder/New York/Toronto/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2002). Though much better than the treatments in the two books mentioned in the previous note, these 
treatments still overlook or treat inadequately the religious nature of the natural law.
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As will be shown in this work, the good of religion is a very important part of Grisez’s 
understanding of the natural law, and it is one that Grisez has developed his thinking on 
over recent decades. So studying it enables the most important recent developments in 
Grisez’s theory to be appreciated and understood. Studying the role of religion also 
enables better understanding of how Grisez’s natural law theory opens out towards his 
moral theology, and how these two parts of his moral theory are interrelated. This helps 
to avoid narrowing Grisez’s moral theory to a purely or mainly philosophical approach. 
Further, studying religion helps to make clear the most basic concepts in Grisez’s moral 
theory: principle, practical principle, primary practical principle, basic human good. It 
also, of course, aids better understanding of religion too, particularly insofar as religion is 
not just a theoretical area to be studied, but a practical good to be pursued and 
instantiated in and/or through human acts. One major conclusion of this thesis is that the 
natural law as understood by Grisez is religious and at least implicitly (though, at best, 
explicitly) theocentric, rather than secular, atheistic, or narrowly autonomous.
1.5 The Methodology of this dissertation
This work seeks to be as comprehensive as possible within reason. It seeks to ground all 
its interpretations, applications, and evaluations of Grisez’s work directly and accurately 
in his works.38 Whenever the present author departs from the direct thought of Grisez, to 
apply his work to religion, or to offer some evaluation or comment, this is made clear.
38 To give him his due, Hittinger (1987) made one of the best efforts so far to treat a comprehensive range 
of Grisez’s works in his analysis and criticism. Many critics deal with only a few of his works. (Almost no- 
one deals with Difficult Moral Questions, for example, though Rufus Black is an exception here.) However, 
Hittinger’s reading and evaluation leave much to be desired, as will be shown in chapter eight below. Also,
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It was decided to follow a chronological structure, analyzing each of the main works of 
Grisez in order, because his work is a work-in-progress. This present work aims to show 
how Grisez's moral theory has developed organically and creatively over decades. 
Though kept to a minimum, some repetition is unavoidable in order to show the 
consistent elements of Grisez’s developing theory. This present work gradually unfolds 
Grisez’s moral theory. Because Grisez has worked collaboratively from the 1970s, a 
chapter is included that looks at the cognate work of Grisez’s collaborators, John Finnis 
and Joseph Boyle. Criticisms of Grisez’s theory from outsiders are mentioned throughout 
the text and in discussed in detail in chapter eight.
1.6 An outline of this dissertation
Chapter two analyses six major philosophical works of Grisez’s from the years before 
Christian Moral Principles (1983). It clarifies the beginnings of Grisez’s original work 
and the main concepts relating to practical thinking. It shows briefly how what Grisez 
wrote in these early works applies to religion, and how they contain the seeds of his 
mature moral theory, including aspects of his theology. This chapter also outlines the 
metaphysical foundations of Grisez’s theory with regard to religion by looking at Beyond 
the New Theism (1975) and its cosmological argument for God’s existence. Another 
important part of this work is examined too: the ontological schema of the “four orders”
Grisez’s theory has undergone significant development since 1987, and Hittinger has not up-dated his 
work, which remains therefore a very limited treatment of Grisez’s moral theory. At the time of writing, 
no-one has published any response to Grisez’s March 2008 development of his theory, which is analysed 
here (see s. 6.3 above).
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of reality, which has shaped Grisez’s understanding of the basic human goods and the 
relationship between practical thinking and theoretical knowledge.
Chapter three looks at Grisez’s most important work: Christian Moral Principles (1983). 
His natural law theory is presented. Grisez also developed an original and detailed moral 
theology beginning with this book. This theology flows from his natural law theory and 
richly and religiously specifies it in light of divine revelation. Chapter three analyses the 
main elements of Grisez’s moral theology, and explains how Grisez’s philosophical 
ethics is related to his Christian ethics via religion, or, in other words, how the natural 
law is related to Christian faith and divine revelation (and vice versa).
Chapter four looks at the most substantial presentation to date of Grisez’s natural law 
theory: “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends” (1987), co-authored with 
John Finnis and Joseph Boyle. Here, we note the beginnings of a specific and developing 
focus on the good of religion and its role in the natural law. We note particularly how 
religion is an overarching, or architectonic, good . This was also seen in a short work by 
Grisez in 1989, “A Contemporary Natural-Law Ethics”, which is looked at in an 
appendix to this chapter.
Chapter five examines the place of the good of religion in volumes two and three of the 
Way o f the Lord Jesus, ft makes clear that religion plays a significant role in Grisez’s 
Christian ethics. It also explains why it can be difficult to notice this role. This difficulty 
is partly due to a lack of integration of elements of Grisez’s natural law theory into his
moral theology; and it is due to the fact that elements of the natural law theory are 
specified theologically in the moral theology. This latter point is examined in this chapter 
mainly in terms of faith, hope, personal vocation, avoidance of sin, reverence for God and 
respect for the environment.
Chapter six looks at three articles by Grisez from the present decade. The first is a 
substantial summary of his natural law theory, which emphasises the role of religion in it. 
The second reiterates the role of religion and continues Grisez’s criticisms of Aquinas, 
whom he considers to have failed to see the central role of religion in the natural law and 
in Christian ethics. However, in his most recent article, Grisez seems to row back from 
his emphasis on religion as the overarching commitment that can unify the moral life. 
This chapter finishes by discussing this most recent development, and whether Grisez has 
really moved away from his previous position on the importance of religion in the natural 
law and in the Christian moral life.
Chapter seven looks at the work of John Finnis and Joseph Boyle and what it has to say 
about the role of religion in the moral theory developed originally by Grisez, and since 
then jointly by Grisez and collaborators. A few central concepts are clarified: religion as 
assimilation to God, natural law as participation in the eternal law, religion as friendship 
with God and willing our common good, transparency of goods, supervenient goods, 
religion as a broad but distinct good, and religion as subjective and objective. The chapter 
also looks at the similarities and differences between Grisez’s approach and that of 
Aquinas (as interpreted by Finnis).
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Chapter eight presents and provides some answers to the most substantial criticisms made 
of Grisez’s theory, especially in relation to the role of religion in it. Two Thomistic critics 
and a non-Thomistic critic are analysed in detail. One major issue looked at is whether 
Grisez’s moral theory is atheistic and autonomous or whether it has a proper role for God 
and religion. We also look at the issue of whether Grisez is subjectivist or objectivist in 
his moral theory, particularly regarding his understanding of the good of religion,.
The final chapter synthesises the main insights of this present work and outlines the role 
of religion in the moral theory of Germain Grisez. In light of this, it highlights some 
aspects of Grisez’s theory that are in need of further development.
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CHAPTER TWO 
BEFORE CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES [1964-]
The approach in the next five chapters is chronological, examining several of the 
major works of Grisez in order of publication and showing how they have dealt with 
the concept of religion as a basic good. This enables us to see how Grisez’s 
understanding of the concept has developed along with his theory’s development.
2.1 Contraception and the Natural Law  [1964]1
This book shows us the beginning of Grisez’s development of his moral theory. It has 
a number of interesting things to say about basic human goods in general, which are 
applied here to the basic human good of religion.
2.1.1 Practical thinking forms practical principles for its own starting points
Grisez’s approach, based on his interpretation of Aquinas’ work, emphasises the role
of principles of practical reason in moral thinking:
These principles are neither theoretical truths, nor facts of nature, nor are they 
imperatives whose rational force depends on an assumption laid down by
1 Contraception and the Natural Law  (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964).
2 It should be noted that Grisez’s article “Man, Natural End o f ’, which is to be analysed in the next 
section, was written before Contraception and the Natural Law, and so, in its section on Grisez’s 
thinking, it gives us the beginnings o f  Grisez’s theory. However, as Contraception and the Natural Law 
was published first, and as it deals more directly and in detail with moral theory, we begin our analysis 
of Grisez’s work with it. (The order in which the works were written is given in G. Grisez, J. Finnis and 
J. Boyle, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence, 
32 (1987): 99-151, at 148.)
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authority. Instead they are fundamental prescriptions -  basic formulations in the 
mode is-to-be -  which practical reason itself forms for its own starting point.3
Practical reason “shapes action from within” and the “least condition for human 
action is that it have some intelligible object toward which it can be directed.”4 Thus, 
the primary principle of all practical reasoning is that the good, meaning everything 
that man can practically understand as an intelligible object, is to be pursued and done 
(and it also includes the related principle, or corollary, that evil is to be avoided).5
2.1.2 God has a fundamental place in Grisez’s approach
“Good is to be done not because God wills it, but because one must do something
good if he is to act intelligently at all.”6 One need not advert to commands of God to
understand the primary principles of practical reason and their directiveness. However,
God is not ignored or excluded:
Of course, metaphysics can show that the human mind has been created, and 
that its practical reason and the primary principles it necessarily forms are a 
participation in divine intelligence. God has made man able to govern his own 
life by his own intelligence just as God by His wisdom governs the universe as a 
whole.7
Philosophical reflection can lead to understanding practical reasoning as our humanly 
rational participation in God’s divinely rational governance of creation, which echoes
3 Ibid., 61, with reference to Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
4 Contraception and the Natural Law, 61-62.
5 Grisez’s most detailed examination o f this first practical principle is to be found in one o f his earliest 
articles: “The First Principle o f Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2,” Natural Law Forum, 10(1965): 168-201. Much o f what is written in this 
present work in its analysis of practical principles in Grisez’s work, especially his early work, finds 
extra support and extension in this article.
6 Ibid., 62. Note omitted. This means that good is to be done not only because God wills it. Grisez is not 
a voluntarist.
7 Ibid., 62-63, including a reference to Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
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Aquinas’ classical definition of the natural law.8 Grisez emphasises that we do not 
have to make the principles of practical reasoning practical by reference to any 
extrinsic factor, such as God’s will (understood as extrinsic).9 Nevertheless, natural 
law is seen here as a religious reality in its objective essence; even though one does 
not have to advert to God and his will to derive in practise the “fundamental 
prescriptions” of practical reasoning, God is still the governor of all, including the 
human intelligence and will that he makes actual and guides, even if  this remains 
unnoticed by us.
2.1.3 Basic natural tendencies ground practical thinking
A practical possibility can interest a person, and so motivate action, only “to the 
extent that it falls within the scope of some inclination already present within 
oneself’.10 The inclinations that human motivation presupposes form a relatively short 
set of categories, which are outlined in Contraception and the Natural Law in a list 
that is parallel to the list of basic goods presented later by Grisez and his collaborators. 
Grisez does not describe these “inclinations” as goods, but as natural tendencies that 
the basic principles of practical reasoning presuppose. 11 This list includes the
8 It is interesting that Grisez does not here refer to “faith” but to “metaphysics” -  thus acknowledging 
that one can grasp a religious dimension to practical reason even without faith. Knowledge o f religion 
is not confined to a faith perspective, but can be gained through philosophy. Grisez was to explore a 
philosophical approach to God and religion in Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy o f  Religion 
(Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1975), later to be reissued, with a new preface, as God? 
A Philosophical Preface to Faith (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005). The latter title 
suggests clearly a positive attitude to philosophy as an approach to preparing for faith. Grisez is not a 
fideist.
9 See also “The First Principle of Practical Reason”, 192-193.
10 Contraception and the Natural Law, 63, emphasis added.
11 See also “The First Principle o f Practical Reason”, 181: “Nature is not natural law; nature is the 
given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies ... These tendencies are not natural 
law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point o f  departure 
it requires in order to propose ends. The precepts of reason which clothe the objects o f inclinations in
following tendencies: “to preserve life ... to mate and to raise his children; ... to seek 
certain experiences which are enjoyed for their own sake ... to develop skills and to
exercise them in play and the fine arts ... to explore and to question ... to seek out the
* 12 company of other men and to try to gain their approval”.
2.1.4 The basic natural tendency towards religion
This list also includes religion, which Contraception and the Natural Law refers to as:
13“the tendency to try to establish good relationships with unknown higher powers”.
Although this is only a short phrase, it is worth careful consideration. It is the earliest 
reference in Grisez’s work to what will later be known as the basic good of religion. 
More accurately, it is the first reference to the fundamental human tendency that 
fonns the basic content of experience that enables a person to have the insight that 
leads to one’s understanding of religion as a basic good.14 The powers that one is 
trying to establish good relationships15 with are described as “unknown”. This 
suggests that one’s awareness of the good of religion,16 at the most fundamental level 
of the natural law, is not based on any innate or acquired grasp of what or who God is
the intelligibility o f  ends-to-be-pursued-by-work -  these precepts are the natural law.” (Emphasis in 
original.)
12 Contraception and the Natural Law , 64.
13 Ibid.
14 Theoretical reflection (“anthropological investigation” and psychology, according to Contraception 
and the Natural Law), can assure us o f  the reality of the basic tendencies, but these tendencies “become 
the source of the primary principles o f  practical reason not by theoretical reflection but by practical 
insight”, ibid., 64.
15 The language used by Grisez seems to allow polytheism as one kind o f religious response.
16 Grisez does not consistently refer to this specific basic inclination, or to the intelligently grasped 
good it makes possible, as “religion” in Contraception and the Natural Law, but for the sake of 
simplicity, the term “religion” is used here (to refer to the intelligently grasped good that is pointed to 
by our religious inclination).
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in any detail but on only a very minimal awareness, at least initially, that there are, or 
might be, higher powers and that it is, or it might be, possible to establish good 
relationships with them (or, perhaps, it or him or her). Such awareness, albeit rather 
limited and unspecific, grounds the practical insight that it would be worthwhile 
acting to pursue this goal, that is, to pursue the good of religion.
2.1.5 Practical intelligence grasps principles and interprets experience 
Grisez insists that this religious tendency, along with other various tendencies, is a 
“psychic fact” that can lead to practical reasoning when “our understanding grasps in 
the inclinations the possibilities to which they point”.17 Thus, we intelligently, though 
“naturally and without reflection”, grasp the possibility of trying to establish good 
relationships with unknown higher powers as “a guide for our action”.18 It is worth 
mentioning that Grisez sees these guides-for-action as essentially affirmative. 
Morality begins with affirmative principles guiding us to seek what is good.19 
Experience is used by practical intelligence “as a point of departure for forming its 
own fundamental insight. The principles are practical intelligence’s interpretation of 
experience.”20 Nevertheless, these principles “go beyond experience” in that they 
“have the mode of ought-thinking even though they depend on the given content of 
experience”.21 It is worth noting this phrase concerning how basic human goods 
depend on “the given content of experience”, as it helps to answer criticisms made of
17 Ibid., 65.
18 Ibid., 65.
19 See Contraception and the Natural Law, 65. See also “The First Principle o f  Practical Reason”, 186.
20 Contraception and the Natural Law, 65. Grisez does not apply the ideas in this paragraph directly to 
religion in Contraception and the Natural Law, but makes a short application to life (65), and, of 
course, throughout the whole book applies his theory to the issue o f contraception.
21 Ibid., 66.
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• * 22  * and therefore somehow isolated from the facts of experience. Clearly, Grisez’s
moral theory does not deny that one must have experience prior to one’s grasp of the
primary practical principles.
2.1.6 The basic goods are grasped as intelligible
Grisez notes that our intelligent grasp of the goodness of our natural inclinations, 
including religion, goes beyond experience in another way too: every good thus
• • 99grasped “takes on an intelligible form and characteristics.” This means that we grasp 
by our intellect that these various goods are good: we understand them as good. Their 
goodness is not confined to what is found attractive by emotion or imagination. These 
things are grasped as good for oneself or others insofar as one is human (or they are 
human), not because of some individual, concrete circumstance. They are grasped as 
good by virtuous people and even by sinners too (to some extent). And so one can 
understand each basic human good as not only a good for oneself but also a good for 
all humans, because they are human like oneself.
2.1.7 There are substantive and reflexive basic goods
Grisez distinguishes between “substantive” goods and “reflexive” goods in 
Contraception and the Natural Law, but does not develop this in any detail, nor apply 
it to religion.24 (Briefly, “reflexive” goods are found in choices themselves, in the
22 On the importance o f experience in Grisez’s moral theory, see also “The First Principle o f Practical 
Reason”, 176-181.
23 Contraception and the Natural Law, 66.
24 See ibid., 67-68. Grisez develops his thought considerably on these matters in later works, in 
particular by specifying reflexive goods as essentially including choice in their goodness, as explained 
in more detail in ss. 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 below. Religion is a reflexive good, instantiated in choosing.
Grisez’s whole approach to natural law, namely that it is subjectivist and rationalistic,
33
very choosing itself; “substantive” goods provide motives for choices distinct from 
the choosing itself.) One point that Grisez does emphasise and develop in some detail 
is that one should not choose arbitrarily between the various basic goods. In 
particular, one should not value the subjective aspect of morality, which is indicated 
by the reflexive goods, over the objective aspect, which is indicated by the substantive 
goods. Each of the basic goods, whether reflexive or substantive, is good “in a 
peculiarly different way, since ‘good’ is predicated analogously of all the basic human 
goods.”25 Therefore, one cannot rightly choose to act against any of the basic goods, 
but must always “hold fast to all the primary principles of practical intelligence, 
which we spontaneously form as the origin for all our rational deliberation”.26 This is
• 27how the phrase “act in accord with reason expresses the meaning of virtue”. Thus, 
right reason means acting virtuously by holding fast to all the primary principles of 
practical reason and avoiding choosing arbitrarily between them.
2.1.8 Religion can be related to the other goods
In this work, it is clear that the reflexive goods are not to be seen as superior to the
substantive goods, but as serving to integrate substantive goods into morality. On the
other hand, the substantive goods are seen as giving definite meaning to the reflexive
goods. Overall, the two types of good are seen to be related in a very close manner,
which brings the subjective and objective aspects of practical reasoning together. This
relationship is described later in Contraception and the Natural Law in this way:
In one sense, indeed, morality is an interplay of subjective and objective factors. 
Not that it is a mixture of merely subjective meanings and merely natural facts
25 Ibid., 67.
26 Ibid., 70, emphasis added.
27 Ibid. Emphasis is in original, indicating the phrase under discussion.
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in the way that situationists imagine. But morality is the process of self- 
determination, and the self comes to be, not apart from the world or against it, 
but only as the world enters the mind through knowledge and as the will enters 
the world through action.28
This explains why Grisez regards his theory as quite different from subjectivist 
approaches. Grisez’s approach is not one that disregards the facts; nor is it one that 
reduces morality to having good intentions. To be moral is to love all the human 
goods and such a love will want to know the facts and have intentions that are truly 
in touch with the full reality of all the basic goods, both reflexive and substantive. 
This implies clearly that love of “religion” as a basic good will not function rightly 
in isolation from pursuit of knowledge (of religious facts and history, for example, 
and, in particular, of God’s revelation in history).
2.1.9 Basic goods are irreducibly diverse yet participate in pure goodness
Grisez deals only briefly in Contraception and the Natural Law with the issue of “the
end of man”. He stresses that none of the basic goods is absolute, insofar as none of
9Qthem can satisfy “man’s potentiality for goodness as such”. Nevertheless, “each
good uniquely represents the prefect good itself without ever encompassing its
absolute goodness”.30 In terms that will be developed critically in his later works, and
be applied to religion as a basic but also architectonic or overarching good, Grisez
makes the following suggestion:
This complex orientation and delicate balance [in man’s approach to 
understanding the basic goods as both irreducibly diverse and yet sharing in 
goodness] could provide man with a basis for establishing orderly direction in
28 Ibid., 179. Grisez dealt with the relationship between reflexive and substantive goods in his mature 
work Christian Moral Principles, chapter 5, question H, which is examined in ss. 3.1.7 and 3.1.8 below.
29 Contraception and the Natural Law, 71.
30 Ibid.
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his life. Although the unity would not be monistic and although the actual 
achievement of goods could not be definitive, the love of all proportionate 
human goods as participations in pure goodness could guide him toward an 
existence both full and open.31
2.2: “Man, N atural End o f ’ [1967]32
This article is a highly concise treatment of the issue of what the natural end or 
purpose of man is, as distinct from his supernatural end or purpose. It looks also at 
whether and how these two ends are related.
2.2.1 Aristotle: m an’s end is happiness in contemplation
Aristotle held that “man’s true happiness lies in his distinctive action, the use of
* 33reason, which best realizes specifically human capacities”. ' The “highest excellence 
of reason is philosophical wisdom ... in contemplation of the truths the philosopher 
can know about the highest realities”.34 This is done by man’s own natural powers, so 
even though it is “godlike” it is not “supernatural in the theological sense”.35 All 
human life is to be organised to facilitate the attainment of this highest good, so that 
all other goods are secondary to this supreme good of contemplation. Although 
neither Aristotle nor Grisez say so explicitly, it could be said that Aristotle’s view 
seems to be that a kind of natural, intellectual “religion”, namely contemplation of the 
highest truths, is the ultimate good or end for man, insofar as man can achieve
31 Ibid., 72. Emphasis added. The pure goodness here is God’s goodness.
32 “Man, Natural End o f ’ appeared originally in volume 9 o f New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1st ed. (1967), 
132-38. This article was reprinted unchanged in volume 9 o f New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. 
(Detroit: Washington, D.C. Thomson/Gale; Catholic University o f America, 2003), 96-103. Quotations 
here are taken from the 2003 edition. As mentioned above in note 2, Grisez wrote this article before 
Contraception and the Natural Law, although it was published after it.
33 Ibid., 96.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 96-97.
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happiness by his own ability and action, and all other goods are subordinate to this 
highest good.
2.2.2 St. Augustine: m an’s end is the satisfying o f  his natural desire to see God
• • • * 36Augustine was heavily influenced by neo-platonism, a kind of natural mysticism. He
emphasised the idea that man has a natural desire for God and is unfulfilled and 
restless until he finds God. True happiness lies in the fulfillment of man’s
fundamental desire for God in heaven, where man will know God. This heavenly 
beatitude can be achieved only by the help of grace and Christ. Augustine’s ideas 
helped to create the notion that man’s ultimate happiness is in a supernatural end that 
fulfils his mind by harmony with God through knowing Him as He is. This final state 
of supreme fulfillment encompasses all goods, leaving nothing else to be desired. 
Thus, it could be said that Augustine understands “religion” to be a certain kind of 
harmony with God, which is seeing God as he is in himself (the “beatific vision”). 
This is a different concept of the good of religion than Grisez’s, and much of Grisez’s 
later work is a kind of criticism of Augustine on this score, which is only hinted at in 
this early work.
2.2.3 St. Thomas Aquinas: man has a twofold end or beatitude
St. Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle’s lead, but developed it hugely. Aquinas
taught that man has “a twofold end or beatitude”, natural and supernatural, with the 
supernatural end as “the absolutely ultimate goal of human life”, which is “perfect
36 See ibid., 97.
37 See ibid., 97-98.
38 See ibid., 98-99, but also the modem Thomists examined in 100-101, and Grisez’s own ideas 
presented in 101-103.
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beatitude”, as distinct from the natural end of human life, which is “imperfect
beatitude”.39 Aquinas’ approach in dealing with this twofold end is very complex and
has been debated and disputed. According to Aquinas, God is the ultimate end of man,
as He is for all creatures. And yet, like Aristotle, Aquinas sees man’s will as central to
his ultimate fulfillment. The human “will is indefinitely open toward good and is
naturally oriented toward God”.40 Still, man’s perfection involves more than the
fulfillment of this natural orientation toward God: “the greatest perfection man can
receive, heavenly beatitude, would fulfil and surpass his capacities in a way he can
neither suspect nor wish for without faith and grace.”41 It is difficult to interpret
Aquinas with regard to the serious questions raised by his approach, especially its
emphasis on the “twofoldedness” of man’s end. What are we to make of the idea that
man naturally desires a happiness that can be achieved only in supernatural beatitude?
Given grace, does man have a natural last end as well as a supernatural one? 
The negative answer is indicated because man cannot have two ultimate ends. 
But Thomas’s derivation of a complete doctrine on natural virtues and natural 
law from a consideration of goods proportionate to human nature (Summa 
theologiae la2ae, 61, 94) suggests that man’s natural end is not removed by 
grace; therefore, the natural end must take a subordinate place within Christian 
life. This conclusion agrees also with Thomas’s general teaching that grace 
presupposes nature but does not abridge it.42
2.2.4 Various other answers to the question: What is the good?
It is clear that Grisez is particularly concerned in this article with the question of 
whether the supernatural good is ultimate in a way that substitutes for, or abridges,
39 Ibid., 98.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 99. Grisez makes much o f the idea that “man’s natural end is not removed by grace” in his own 
approach, and he thinks that Aquinas was not clear or consistent enough in his theory on this point, 
especially insofar as he promoted the idea that man’s natural end is so totally subordinated to his 
supernatural end that this natural end (including bodily goods, for example) is de-valued.
natural goods. He is concerned also with the issue of whether there is one natural 
ultimate good, for example, contemplation. He outlines how various recent 
philosophers and social scientists have named the ultimate natural good for man.43 
Spinoza took a somewhat neo-platonic position in saying that man’s ultimate 
happiness lay in a kind of natural mystical state of satisfaction. Locke, Hume, 
Bentham and Mill equated human natural happiness with pleasure. Kant considered 
the moral law, derived from reason, to be the ultimate motivation for human action, 
and renounced happiness as a principle of ethics. Sartre did something similar, but 
took the moral law to be derived from freedom, rather than reason. Evolutionary 
theories take man’s ultimate happiness to be defined by progress. For Hegel, man’s 
ultimate happiness is defined by “his place in the system” developing towards an 
absolute reality. Dialectical materialism and American pragmatism see man’s ultimate 
happiness in “the realization of the possibilities of human nature”, with particular 
emphasis on “rationally guided activity and work”, and “social solidarity”, rather than 
Aristotle’s focus on the “contemplative ideal”. Psychology has focussed on “the 
mature, integrated, and effective personality” as “a standard for human welfare”; and 
“many social scientists assume that values such as health, technological efficiency, 
and political freedom” are such standards.
Grisez here seems to be outlining several approaches to the basic human goods, most 
of which place strong or total emphasis on one kind of good, to the exclusion of any 
others, and many of which ignore the issue of whether man has a supernatural good or 
end alongside one or more natural goods or ends. Religion as a basic good is ignored 
by many recent approaches; it seems also to be left out of Aristotle’s approach, unless
43 All the following points and quotations are taken from ibid.
we see his contemplative ideal as a kind of natural religion, which is perhaps the best 
way to view it.44 However, although the older approaches of Augustine and Aquinas 
have a place for religion, for harmony with God, it is not clear in their approaches 
whether it is a natural good or a supernatural one, or both. Grisez outlines the 
approaches of several modem Catholic philosophers/theologians to these issues, 
before giving his own thoughts on them, in which he uses several ideas from these 
modem Catholic approaches.45
2.2.5 Grisez: m an’s natural end is not religion or God alone
Grisez emphasises that there is “a variety of goods” that different people “in fact 
accept as their ultimate end”, and that this “proves that the human will is not 
determined to any definite good, even the highest”.46 Grisez wants to make sure that 
“the positive character” of the “comparative imperfection of any natural end” is not 
lost from view, as it is likely to be whenever we take an Augustinian approach, which 
focuses attention on eternal rest gained by the gift of grace as our truest and only 
fulfillment as human beings. Grisez thus implicitly rejects any approach that puts 
religion (harmony with God) as the highest and only ultimate good for man, and 
defines man’s natural end in terms of religion alone.
39
44 It should be noted that this goes beyond what Grisez says explicitly in the article.
45 The various approaches will not be treated here due to space limitations and because Grisez 
integrates some o f their main ideas in his own thoughts, which are treated here. The philosophers/
theologians whose approaches to the natural end o f man Grisez outlines are: Santiago Ramirez, from
the 16th century, and, from the 20”’, Walter Farrell and Mortimer Adler, Jacques Maritain, Joseph 
Buckley, and Henri de Lubac: see ibid., 100-101.
46 Ibid., 102.
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2.2.6 Grisez: man’s natural end is predetermined by his nature and place in reality 
Grisez also makes this point: “from an ethical point of view, what last end every man 
should seek is predetermined by the nature of man and by his inescapable place in 
reality”.47 Therefore, Grisez’s approach to understanding and appreciating man’s 
natural purpose or purposes is based on considering “man strictly according to the 
requirements and possibilities of his nature”.48 We can see here the beginnings of 
Grisez’s attention to human nature and human possibility as the source(s) of moral 
obligation and human action, and thus, natural human fulfillment.
2.2.7 Grisez; m an’s natural and supernatural ends are distinct
In this article, we see also the beginnings of a theme that will dominate Grisez’s
approach to moral theory and especially the role of religion in natural law. This is the
distinction between basic human goods and their instantiations in or through human
acts, and the supernatural good of sharing God’s very life. Human goods
belonging to man’s natural end may rightly be sought only so far as they are 
participations in the perfect goodness of God, although no act within man’s 
natural ability can attain God as He is in Himself, since intimate sharing in 
divine life depends upon divine grace.49
Grisez rejects the approach of Aristotle that makes only one finite good, the good of 
intellectual excellence, the ultimate natural end of man, and he agrees with the 
approaches of more recent thinkers (Farrell, Adler, and Maritain) that “all goods truly 
perfective of man have a place in his natural end.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
49 Ibid. “Human goods” are not explicitly referred to in the article, but Grisez uses the synonymous 
term “finite” goods.
2.2.8 Grisez: though diverse, goods can be compared to one another 
Grisez does not list finite human goods comprehensively here, but he does mention 
two in particular: knowledge of God and of man’s place in reality, and health.50 He 
makes an interesting distinction between these two naturally perfective goods of man, 
one that anticipates a later distinction he makes between the basic good of religion 
and the other basic human goods. He says of the good of knowledge of God that it is 
“most noble” among the goods, whereas the good of health is “most fundamental” 
among the goods. This distinction is interesting because it indicates that early in the 
development of his moral theory, Grisez was willing to consider the various human 
goods to be equally necessary and irreducible to one another, whilst allowing that they 
can differ in importance in subtle ways. One presumes that by the greater fundamental 
importance of health, Grisez refers to the obvious fact that one needs to be alive and 
basically healthy in order to have any knowledge of God or man, and so health is most 
fundamental among the goods in this respect. Nevertheless, life/health is not the only 
good necessary for man to achieve his natural end: someone who is alive and healthy 
but who lacks any knowledge of God would be lacking in a perfective good, a good 
that is most noble. In later works, Grisez develops the idea of the good of religion as 
pre-eminent among the basic goods in having an architectonic role to play in 
organising one’s life as a whole, whilst not subordinating or replacing the other goods, 
which all retain their own incommensurable value and place in practical reasoning, 
human life and man’s natural end.51
41
50 See ibid., 102-103.
51 In his most recent work, Grisez seems to modify his views on this point: see below, s. 6.3.
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522.3 Abortion: The M yths, the Realities, and the Argum ents [1970]
We look here at some key points about the basic goods in general and apply this to 
religion, even though Grisez does not do so in this book, which not surprisingly is 
focussed on the good of life.
2.3.1 The good o f  religion
In a chapter that outlines his moral theory, Grisez provides a “list of fundamental 
human goods”,54 including the good of religion, which he identifies in these terms: 
“Worship and holiness -  the reconciliation of mankind with God.”55 Grisez purports 
to write this book as a philosopher and not as a believer,56 but he has been criticised 
for using language here that is theological in nature, rather than philosophical, thus 
putting in doubt whether the good of religion is a good of the natural law or a good 
only of faith.57 Indeed, in later works, Grisez moves away from such theological (and 
morally charged) language in speaking of the good of religion.
52 Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments (New York and Cleveland: Corpus Books, 
1970).
53 It should be mentioned, however, that the book includes a substantial chapter on religious views of 
abortion, 117-184. Although the substance o f this chapter could be seen as evidence that the good of 
religion (and not only the good of life) is at stake in abortion, Grisez does not deal with it in such terms 
here. Instead, he seems to see “religion” in terms o f its institutional and historical embodiment and 
expression, rather than as a basic human good. This suggests that at least at this stage in the 
development o f his theory, Grisez has not fully integrated his thought about the full range o f  basic 
human goods into his moral analysis o f specific issues, and he has not fully understood the potential o f 
the good of religion.
54 Ibid., 312. Grisez does not list our natural inclinations here, as in Contraception and the Natural Law, 
but lists instead the goods to which our inclinations point. From now on, Grisez’s works list the goods 
and not the inclinations, perhaps leading some readers to think his theory ignores inclinations.
55 Ibid., 313. Grisez does not use the term “religion” in this work for this good, but clearly he is 
referring to what he calls “religion” in later works.
56 See ibid., 267.
57 See R. Hittinger, A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1987), treated in detail in s.8.1 below.
Grisez treats the good of religion here as one of four basic human goods, which are 
concerned with “unity achieved by reflection and self-determination at each level on 
which alienation is experienced or believed to exist.” 58 This kind of basic good 
involves one’s choosing to pursue it, in contrast to goods such as life and knowledge, 
which are good in a way that does not include our choosing to pursue them. Grisez is 
becoming more clear on the character and distinctness of reflexive goods and 
substantive goods. In later works, Grisez uses the term “harmony” rather than “unity” 
to indicate the good that religion aims for.59
2.3.2 Goods and needs
Grisez explicitly links the list of basic human goods to our basic human needs, which 
are pointed to by our most basic human inclinations: “The objects of such inclinations 
are what we mean by basic human needs”.60 We can become aware theoretically of 
such needs and our corresponding inclinations by asking questions about what it is 
that we as human tend to be interested in pursuing by our actions. We can also 
become aware of them theoretically by joining such questioning of basic human 
motivation to “a survey of psychological literature and a comparison with the 
categories of human activity found by anthropologists to be useful to interpret the
43
58 Ibid., 313.
59 This could be because Grisez wishes to retain the word “unity” for our sharing in God’s divine life 
by charity, which is God’s gift and not a human act; therefore, he uses the word “harmony” to specify
the benefit o f the good o f religion and the other reflexive goods, which are less than unity with God. If 
this is so, it helps to answer a later criticism o f B. Ashley’s in which he says, following Aquinas, that 
charity not religion is our unity with God: see B. Ashley, “What Is the End o f the Human Person?: The 
Vision o f God and Integral Human Fulfillment”, L. Gormally (ed.), Moral Truth and Moral Tradition. 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), 68-96, at 89, n. 95. Grisez would agree with Ashley here.
60 Ibid., 312.
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facts of life in any culture”.61 The findings of psychology and anthropology “lend 
empirical support”62 to the list of fundamental goods given by Grisez.
Still, it is not necessary for a person to be a scholar in order to become aware of his or
her basic needs, inclinations, and of the basic goods to which these needs and
inclinations point. All that is necessary is to become aware by
experience... of our own inclinations and of what satisfies them; our own 
longings and delights are facts of our conscious life that we discover as we 
discover other facts. At the same time, by understanding we interpret these facts 
in a special way; our intelligence is not merely a spectator of the dynamics of 
our own action, but becomes involved as a moulder and director. Understanding 
grasps in our inclinations the possibilities toward which they point and 
understanding becomes practical by proposing these possibilities as goals 
toward which we might act.63
So, both experience and understanding are necessary for us to become aware of the 
basic goods, including the good of religion, and the basic human needs that these 
goods satisfy. The need that religion satisfies is our need to deal with alienation from 
God. One becomes aware of this need in a practical way, not a theoretical way, when 
one grasps the principle directing one to pursue and instantiate it.
61 Ibid. Grisez refers in two footnotes (nn. 62 and 63) to some examples o f such psychological and 
anthropological literature. The term “theoretically” is used here to refer to a kind of knowing that is 
distinct from practical knowledge in that it is knowledge o f what is the case, rather than what is-to-be 
done.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 313-314. This is a very concise passage, showing how one knows practically the basic human 
goods. Note that Grisez denies clearly that the goods are to be seen as possibilities in any theoretical 
manner, but rather as “purposes-to-be-realized”, which is a practical manner o f thinking: see ibid., 314.
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2.3.3 Basic practical principles direct open-ended reasoning
Grisez states that our grasp of the basic human goods is “prior to any choice or 
reasoning effort”, and indeed, makes rational desiring possible.64 It is our basic grasp 
of the good of religion that constitutes our rational desire for it, and enables us to 
choose to pursue it, and to reason about it. Religion as a good is practical through and 
through, as are all the basic human goods.
In relation to our reasoning about the goods, Grisez makes an important observation 
(albeit very briefly):
It will always be possible for us to discern more clearly in what such goods as 
health, knowledge, and friendship concretely consist; it will always be possible 
for us to seek new dimensions of such inexhaustible possibilities.'15
Clearly, Grisez is not claiming that we naturally grasp the fullness of the meaning and 
benefit of the basic goods in our initial grasp of their truth. He acknowledges that we 
can and should reason about, and investigate, these goods and how to pursue them 
more and more effectively. This point was lost sight of by some of his harshest 
critics.66
2.3.4 God and the natural law
Grisez’s moral theory clearly rejects the idea that the goodness of the basic goods is 
imposed by God’s will; rather, their goodness is intrinsic to them and to action in
64 Ibid. It would seem that this point applies only to the basic goods in general. Our grasp o f  a specific 
basic human good, such as religion, is not necessarily prior to all our choices or efforts at practical 
reasoning. A point developed by Grisez only in later works is that our grasp o f the reflexive goods is 
dependent on our prior efforts to pursue substantive goods, as we see in our examination o f his work 
after Christian Moral Principles.
65 Abortion, 314.
66 See the treatments o f Hittinger and Di Blasi below in chapter eight.
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pursuit of them.67 However, Grisez does not exclude God from the natural law. He
acknowledges that a religious account of morality is invaluable:
It certainly is impossible to maintain a fully open attitude toward all human 
goods, irreducibly diverse and incommensurable as they are, unless we accept 
the reference of our conception of goodness to a reality we do not yet 
understand.68
Only such reference to a unifying source of goodness can prevent us from finding the 
unity of the goods in one of the goods themselves, and thus to descend into 
immorality, which tends to deny the incommensurable goodness of the full range of 
human goods. If we love all the goods, and we are called to do just that if we are to be 
morally good, we are loving God who is the source of their goodness. This means that 
the goods ought to be seen in a religious light as participations “in a goodness which 
first belongs to God”.69 Immoral acts can be understood as instances of idolatry in 
such a religious approach to the natural law.70 Grisez does not develop his thoughts on 
these matters in this work, but they are suggestive of later developments of his 
understanding of the role of religion.
67 See ibid. Their intrinsic goodness is, o f  course, created by God precisely as intrinsic goodness.
68 Ibid., 316.
69 Ibid., 317.
70 See ibid. Grisez does not deal here with the issue o f whether a religious viewpoint is dependent on 
faith, but his remarks in this work suggest that if  one can come to see God as the source o f  goodness 
and morality by reason alone, then any adequate natural law theory will have to acknowledge a 
particularly important role for the good of religion in that natural law theory, and indeed in the natural 
law itself.
2.4 Beyond the N ew  M orality [1st edition, 1974]71
• 72This text provides the only book-length treatment of Grisez’s moral philosophy. 
Keeping in mind some reservations concerning its popular style, an examination of 
the first edition shows that many of the central themes of his later philosophical 
thought, and its development in his moral theology proper, were present in the earlier 
stages.
2.4.1 Religion as one o f the basic goods (purposes)
Religion is included in the list of basic human goods or purposes.73 The authors 
observe that
men in all cultures and at all times have been concerned about their relationship 
with a transcendent Other to whom the name ‘God’ is usually given.74
Religion as a basic human good is concerned centrally with either re-establishing a 
relationship with the transcendent Other or with strengthening and perfecting it. It is 
assumed that people have had, and will have, varying beliefs about what this Other is 
and about how to pursue this good.
It is worth pointing out here that “speculative knowledge” is included in the list of 
basic values75 and that all the basic purposes are seen to be equally important and
71 G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities o f  Freedom  (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).
72 However, it is not reliable as a fully accurate or comprehensive treatment o f his understanding of 
natural law. See the important remarks to this effect in its introduction, xv.
73 This list is much the same as the one we have already seen above. However, Grisez here tends to call 
the good of inner peace “integrity” .
74 Ibid., 69, emphasis in original. This universality is not presented to prove that religion is a good.
75 See ibid., 66-67. In later works, Grisez moved away from using the term “values” to using the term 
“goods”, which perhaps better indicates the objective benefits we seek in these fulfilments.
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equally to be valued and respected in all our choices.76 This implies that Grisez’s 
approach is not one that is confined to a purely subjectivistic perspective. One who 
intends to be moral will always be concerned with acquiring knowledge, either as a 
good in itself or as an instrumental good that enables one to pursue other goods 
effectively, or as both. “Speculative knowledge is most important because unless one
• • 77has a grasp of truth, he lives a truncated, partial life.”
2.4.2 The basic goods are interrelated
However, one does not pursue reflexive goods, including the good of religion, in 
isolation from other goods. All the basic purposes are related to each other. The 
authors give an example that relates the substantive good of play to the reflexive good 
of religion:
If there is no room for the notion of play -  doing something because one likes to 
do it -  in one’s approach to religion, and if religion is a matter of strict quid-pro- 
quo necessity, then one has effectively debased religion by reducing it to a kind 
of deal with the transcendent (I will sacrifice my oxen in order to please the 
gods and make the rain fall, etc.). If religion is to be something more than a 
contractual relationship between oneself and the Other, one has to leave room 
for play.78
The authors emphasise the idea that the reflexive goods, which include religion, are
not to be seen as isolated goods:
The four reflexive purposes (integrity, authenticity, friendship, religion) are so 
intimately related that to the degree that one is failing to realize one of them, he 
is failing to realize them all. This is because each involves, in a different way, 
the quest for harmony in life -  harmony among aspects of the self, harmony 
between one’s self and one’s action, harmony between the individual and other
16 See ibid., chapter eight.
77 Ibid., 72.
78 Ibid., 72. This helps to answer the criticism that Grisez’s approach is a kind o f legalism focused on 
obeying God’s will as a code: see Ashley, “What Is the End o f the Human Person?” , 94.
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people, and harmony between individuals and the transcendent Other whom we 
call “God”. It is simply a fact of experience that when any one of these 
relationships is disturbed, the other relationships are also affected and to a 
degree undermined.79
2.4.3 The basic human goods are not fully determinate
One further very important point is made in the chapter presenting the eight basic 
purposes: they are not realities that exist fully yet or that are conceptually “fully 
determinate”.80 It is impossible to say fully what the content o f the basic purposes is, 
because “they have never been fully realized and never can be”.81 They “constitute the 
outlines of human possibilities”.82 People “cannot help but understand them to some 
extent (because they are part of us, they sum up what it means to be what we are: 
human beings), so we can never in our lives exhaust the fullness of what it means to 
be human.” 83 Our initial basic understanding of these basic purposes (goods), 
including religion, can be developed by us by our “dedicating ourselves to them and 
seeking their realization in our lives and the lives of others.”
2.4.4 Religion provides hope and thus supports morality
Beyond the New> Morality devotes its final two chapters to religion in some detail. The 
penultimate chapter is called “The Role of Religion”. It distinguishes between religion 
and morality. There is no “inevitable connection”85 between religion and morality.
79 Ibid., 72-73.
80 Ibid., 73.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 74.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 190.
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People who have strong religious beliefs can do very immoral things. Nevertheless, 
religion can be a great support for living a moral life. It provides this support by 
giving us hope:
To say this is not to assume the truth of religion, but only to point to the fact that 
hope, founded on traditional religious beliefs and attitudes, does in fact strongly 
buttress the effort of many people to do what is ethically right.86
Religion gives us a positive way to cope with the fact of evil. Without hope we would 
be tempted to respond to evil by either “a kind of technical-humanistic presumption 
which takes it for granted that, if only the proper techniques are found and applied, 
evil can be eradicated from human life” or “despair which takes for granted that evil is 
ineradicable and can never be overcome.”87 The former response leads to a morality 
of consequences, or consequentialism,88 which holds that it can be right to do evil for 
the sake of good. The latter leads to fatalism and a rejection of the reality and 
goodness of the world. Religion, by providing hope, is not a solution for all the 
world’s problems, but it supports the efforts of people to do what is right even when 
faced with evil.
2.4.5 Religion is not a mere means to an end, but is intrinsically good
The authors are also concerned with criticising the idea that being religious is a mere
means to an end, the end of going to heaven. This way of understanding the good of
86 Ibid., 197. Clearly, Grisez is not discounting the truth o f a religion here, but indicating that religion 
can be valuable even independently o f its objective truth. O f course, religion is more objectively 
valuable when it is true, and knowledge o f the truth is one o f the basic human goods.
87 Ibid., 197-198.
88 “Utilitarianism” is the term used in Beyond the New Morality, later works o f Grisez use the terms 
“consequentialism” and “proportionalism” for the same basic approach to ethics.
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religion fails to appreciate it as motivating “action performed for its own sake in order 
to participate in a basic good.”89 So religion has its own intrinsic value.90
2.4.6a Religion can motivate acts and sets o f acts, and life as a whole91 
Religion is not concerned only with isolated acts: it can motivate sets of acts. A 
“pattern of acts” that enable one to participate in the good of religion “can be 
described as ‘living a holy life’”. 2 The pursuit of religion, or any of the basic goods 
or purposes, is not concerned with achieving specific objectives as such, but is 
concerned with a kind of open-ended pursuit of human possibility.
Again we see the point emphasised that the basic goods are interconnected. The 
reflexive goods, in particular, “are mutually dependent, so that to the degree a person 
acts contrary to one he is undermining his participation in all”.93 This means that a 
person will be committed to pursuing all the reflexive goods as an harmonious whole.
A further, highly important point is made in this chapter, initiating a theme in Grisez’s 
work that becomes very central.
89 Ibid., 191.
90 In a later edition, the authors develop this point to answer the common objection to religion: that it 
distracts us from caring for this world, this life. People who participate in the good o f religion are 
participating in this good here and now. In addition, their participation in the good o f religion does not 
exclude pursuit o f  the other basic goods here and now, but supports this pursuit. See Beyond the New 
Morality: The Responsibilities o f  Freedom  (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press, 2nd ed. 
1980), 201-203.
91 This section and some subsequent sections are further subdivided to indicate close connections 
between sections. W henever a cross-reference refers to a section without mentioning the subdivisions, 
the whole section is indicated (e.g. s.2.4.6 includes both 2.4.6a and 2.4.6b).
92 Beyond the New M orality, l sl edition (1975), 191.
93 Ibid., 193.
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[The] man whose basic commitment is to the good of religion has merely 
established the emphasis and orientation of his life according to which he will 
seek to work out his relationship to all the other goods besides religion. A man 
who is really living a holy life has not cut himself off from everything else in 
human life except religion he has only established for himself the terms 
according to which everything else will be fitted into his life and he will relate 
to everything else.94
2.4.6b Religion is the best good with which to integrate one’s life
This point is developed in the final chapter, “We must Decide Who We Shall Be”.
There Grisez and Shaw focus on basic commitments, which are constituted by sets of
choices and actions. The authors insist that
each of us, in order to pull together the strands of his life and be a unified person, 
must make some most basic commitment which is broad enough to embrace all 
of his other commitments ... Such a fundamental commitment gives coherence 
and pattern to what would otherwise be the disordered fragments of life.95
Religion is the basic good that provides the best focus for such a basic commitment. 
The substantive goods camiot form a suitable focus for all o f life, because no one of 
them “can always be realized in every act of our lives”.96 The reflexive goods are 
more suitable. However, the two goods concerned with harmony within the self 
(integrity and authenticity) are not fully suitable as the main focus of one’s whole life 
“since such an emphasis would tend to have the practical outcome of subordinating 
others to oneself’.97 The good of harmony with others (friendship, justice) is also not 
fully suitable “because this orientation would tend to have the effect of subordinating
94 Ibid. This is perhaps overstated, with the terms “merely” and “only” giving the impression that 
Grisez’s approach does not value religion except insofar as it motivates one to be morally good with 
regard to the non-religious goods. He was to be criticised for this by Hittinger later.
95 Ibid., 206.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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oneself to others”. Grisez wants to avoid making following one’s conscience or 
acting justly the main focus of one’s life as a whole, because to do so could lead to 
either moral subjectivism or neglect of the proper place of the self and its needs.
Grisez and Shaw argue that religion is the most suitable basic good for shaping the
basic inclusive commitment of a person’s life:
To the extent that we identify the transcendent Other with the principle which 
sustains human goods, even when they are not chosen, making one’s religious 
commitment most fundamental is closely related to -  if not identical with -  
taking one’s moral stand on the side of openness to all of the human goods. 
Emphasis upon this good can fulfill the need for integration of the person, 
without in any way constricting or devaluing one’s proper concern for harmony 
within one’s self and with one’s neighbor."
Religion is capable of being operative in all kinds of choices and it is capable of 
“including” all the other goods, so to speak, (but not in a way that reduces religion to 
one or more of the other basic human goods). Religion is the most suitable focal 
perspective for understanding one’s life as a unified moral endeavour. Religion is a 
good that lies at the heart of “the fundamental responsibility of human freedom [, 
namely] the responsibility faced by each person to create his own life, his own self, 
through the choices he makes.”100 Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 206-207. In making this point, Grisez develops an idea we saw above in our analysis of 
Abortion (s. 3.3.4) where Grisez sees one’s love o f all the goods as a kind o f  love o f God and a 
participation in God as the unifying source o f all goodness and goods. Clearly, even though Grisez does 
not want to reduce religion to morality, he acknowledges that it is possible for us to very closely relate 
them when we are morally good in our choices and choose religion as our overarching commitment in 
life.
100 Ibid., 207. It should be noted here that the 2nd edition o f Beyond the New Morality (1980) makes 
substantially the same point about the suitability o f religion as the focus o f  an integrated life, but tones 
it down a little. To the question o f which o f the reflexive goods is the best one for one’s most basic 
commitment, the answer is: “It seems doubtful to us that an absolutely definitive philosophical 
argument can be made in favor o f one rather than the others. At the same time it also seems clear that 
for a person who is already a religious believer religion quite reasonably will play this unifying role” 
(216). In the 3rd edition (1988), Grisez and Shaw once again recommend making a religious 
commitment the centre o f  one’s life and one’s commitments, but without specifying clearly that
basic good of religion lies at the heart of Grisez’s natural law theory and, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, at the heart of his moral theology.
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2.5 Beyond the New Theism [1975]101
Beyond the New Theism is not directly about moral theology or moral philosophy, but 
presents a detailed philosophical, cosmological argument for the existence of God and 
further arguments, arising from this cosmological argument, about how we can speak 
meaningfully about God and religious truths. It provides the “metaphysical
• 107foundations” of Grisez’s moral theory.
2.5.1 Philosophy can play a limited but important role
The argument that forms the bulk of this substantial book is extremely weighty in its 
philosophical technicality and rigour.103 However, Grisez does not expect everyone to 
know and understand (or necessarily to accept in full) such a technical argument in 
order to believe personally in God. In fact, he readily acknowledges that “most human 
convictions are based on authorities of one sort or another” and “it is not unreasonable
religion is better than the other reflexive goods as the focus for an integrated life (see 229). Still, this is 
said: “If  one finds a worldview which one has good reason to believe is true, one should accept it and 
make the commitment to shape one’s life in accord with it, for this means living in accord with one’s 
best understanding o f reality” (231).
101 As this is a chronological survey o f Grisez’s work, analysis in this section is confined to the first 
edition of this book: Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy o f  Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1975). The recent reissue, God? A Philosophical Preface to Faith (South Bend, 
Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), is exactly the same as the 1975 original except for the new 
preface. The recent reissue o f  the main text without changes, and his comments in the 2005 preface (xv) 
show that Grisez considers this work to be still relevant and sound.
102 Grisez, “A Contemporary Natural-Law Ethics,” in Moral Philosophy: Historical and Contemporary 
Essays, ed. W.C. Starr and R.C. Taylor (Milwaukee, USA: Marquette University Press, 1989), 140.
103 Grisez spends several pages, for example, explaining and justifying his use o f the word “obtains” 
rather than “exists” in the strict presentation of the argument. See Beyond the New Theism, 43-48 and 
172-180.
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for a believer to continue to believe what he cannot prove, so long as no weighty 
reasons are not given for changing”.104 Still, philosophy can play an important part in 
showing that there are weighty reasons for believing in God’s existence and that 
objections against such belief can be answered.
2.5.2 Grisez’s basic argument for God’s existence
Grisez’s basic argument can be summarised as follows:
Contingent states of affairs within experience do obtain [i.e. occur] although 
they need not. Their obtaining is not identical with what they are; thus there is a 
gap of the sort which leads to a demand for explanation -  that is, for finding an 
intelligible link which would close the gap. The obtaining of contingent states of 
affairs cannot be explained by saying that all such states of affairs together are 
self-sufficient. An explanation is possible only if there is something distinct 
from experienced, contingent states of affairs. It is reasonable to demand and to 
expect an explanation; the objections of empiricism [Hume] and of critical 
philosophy [Kant] do not show otherwise. Therefore, one must posit a factor 
which would explain the obtaining of contingent states of affairs. The 
explanatory factor must be an uncaused cause ... a necessary entity -  which 
obtains merely because it is the state of affairs it is.105
Even this short summary of the argument can give some idea of the technicality and 
abstractness of Grisez’s approach. What has all this to do with religion as a basic good?
2.5.3 The importance o f  religious questioning and wonder as a foundation 
One part of the answer to this question focuses on where Grisez’s argument starts. It 
begins with questioning. One wonders not only what things one experiences are but 
why they are. One seeks to know causes; one tries to fill in the gaps of knowledge and
104 Ibid., 10.
105 Ibid., 261. The final part o f this summary has been somewhat simplified here as it is not necessary 
for present purposes to go into the technical details o f the argument concerning the contingency o f  the 
uncaused cause and so on. A more lengthy summary o f the argument, although a “provisional” one 
(until the arguments o f Hume, Kant, Hegel and the post-Hegelians are considered and answered by 
Grisez later in the book), is given in ibid., 82-84.
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understanding. Even children do this -  it is not exclusively for technically proficient 
philosophers.106 As a young boy, for example, Grisez was given answers to his 
religious questions by his mother who spoke from her religious tradition, which he 
internalised as he developed his own religious faith and understanding, and his own 
way of relating faith and reason. Such is the experience of many; the cosmological 
argument, and an openness to religious questions, begins with the kind of wonder that 
is universal among humankind.
2.5.4 A God who is utterly mysterious but personal
The end of the cosmological argument is interesting too. It concludes with utter 
mystery. The “God” that it ends with, as the uncaused cause of everything in our 
experience, is ineffable. We cannot speak accurately about what God is in himself by 
using the kind of descriptive language that we might use for any contingent thing.
1 07God is utterly non-contingent, whereas everything in our experience is contingent.
Does this mean that religion as a natural phenomenon, that is, without any input from
divine revelation (and perhaps even with such input), has as its object nothing? Can
we know anything naturally at all about God? Grisez’s answer is yes, we can. We can
know what God is not:
Since one must deny every proposition which applies to D [i.e. God] any
predicable applicable to a contingent entity, a conjunction of all these negative
statements forms a description of D which distinguishes D from each and every 
• • 108 entity given in experience.
106 See ibid., 13.
107 See ibid., 245-247.
108 Ibid., 246. Grisez is here taking a via negativa or negative theology approach.
Further, it is possible to say rightly that God “causes” and that God “obtains”, because 
these terms, generate new meaning in the context of their use in the cosmological 
argument and can be applied to God as they have no descriptive (contingent) content 
as such.109 We can also use the terms “one”, “something”, “true”, and “good” about 
God as long as we use them by way of negation, in a different way than we use them 
to refer to things in our experience, contingent things.110
All this might seem very “philosophical”, in the sense of abstract and difficult, but 
very far from “religious” in its most common meaning, which, at least in most theistic 
contexts, refers to a God or gods and our personal relationship to him or them. 
Grisez’s argument does open out towards a more personal understanding of God when 
he analyses how we might accurately understand how the uncaused cause actually 
“causes” contingent things to obtain. Even though we cannot use the verb “to cause” 
of God in exactly the same way that we use it for causation in our experience, we do 
have experience of causation that is similar to the causation involved in God’s causing 
contingent things to obtain. It is only God’s causing that enables all and every 
contingent things to obtain. They rely totally on the uncaused cause; the uncaused 
cause does not rely on them for its obtaining. This structure of dependence is 
strikingly like that of our free choices on our choosing them, even though the analogy 
is imprecise.111 By understanding “causes” as a relational predicate of God in this 
analogous manner, and bearing in mind all the time the strict philosophical argument 
that he has developed in such detail, Grisez thinks it possible and useful to posit a
57
109 See ibid., 249-252.
110 See ibid., 252-255.
111 See ibid., 268-272.
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“model” for understanding God and his causality by analogy with man as one who
makes free choices.112 In this way, one can state tentatively that God’s creative
causality is an free creative act that presupposes knowledge. God’s act of creating the
world is “a form of play” as it does not satisfy any need of God, but God’s act of
creating “cannot be pointless”.113 Grisez outlines this argument only briefly (and the
outline here is briefer still) but it leads clearly to an important conclusion:
Since D [i.e. God] knows, acts freely, and plays, D lives, since these are forms 
of life. Moreover, the functions which are characteristic of this life are spiritual 
ones; therefore D is a person.114
This model is put forward by Grisez only tentatively. He thinks that “considering the 
model philosophically, one cannot be certain whether the inferences are sound”.115 
Still, he thinks that his argument has concluded to a “God” that Jews and Christians 
would recognise as “a partial and inadequate concept of what they would call
‘God’”.116
2.5.5a Existential objections to God and religion can be answered
Grisez attends to several “existential” objections to belief in God’s existence in part V
of Beyond the New Theism. As these are closely related to what people generally
112 See ibid., 270.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 271.
116 Ibid., 271-272. Grisez outlines an additional argument in the new preface to the book in the 2005 
edition, an argument that he would place at this point in the book, just after outlining the free choice 
“model” of G od’s causality. This new argument is very much related to the developed concept of 
religion in Grisez’s later work. It leads to a more certain philosophical conclusion that the Creator is a 
person. See 6.1.4 below, where this new preface is mentioned in the context o f  Grisez’s 2001 article on 
natural law and God and religion.
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understand as “religion”, it is worth looking at them, albeit only briefly. The titles of
the chapters give a good sense of the main arguments presented in them:
[chapter 21] Human Freedom Is Compatible With Creatureliness.
[chapter 22] Evil Is Real, But Is Not Created.
[chapter 23] Religion Need Not Conflict With Humanistic Values.
[chapter 24] Developing Creatures And A Perfect Creator.
2.5.5b Accurate theoretical understanding is important
A recurrent theme in these chapters is that an accurate understanding of God, as 
shaped by, or at least consistent with, the philosophical approach in the earlier parts of 
the book, helps to eliminate obstacles to believing in God (and, we might add, to 
pursuing the good of religion as a theist). For example, Grisez puts forward several 
arguments that would rule out as unsound any religion that is dualistic (believing in 
both a god of goodness and a god of evil) or polytheistic, or which considers a God or
117gods to be the cause of evil.
2.5.5c Religion promotes the fu ll range o f human values/goods
The chapter “Religion Need Not Conflict with Humanistic Values” deals directly with 
religion. Firstly, Grisez answers the objection to religion that sees it as subjecting man 
to the will of God, reducing him to a mere instrument of the divine will. Grisez points 
out that “traditional religious faith” understands God’s commands not as “arbitrary 
decrees imposed upon man by an exploiting deity”, but as “a form of loving 
guidance”118 for our benefit. Conforming our wills to God’s will is not a humiliating 
submission to a divine dictator, but a sharing in divine goodness and wisdom, and
117 Ibid., 299. There is not enough space here to examine these arguments. Attention is drawn to them
simply insofar as they illuminate Grisez’s philosophical idea o f  God, and also his understanding o f 
religion, which has God as its transcendent object.
118 Ibid., 303.
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love of the creator’s goodness -  if that is possible -  does not preclude but rather 
implies the love of every good, including one’s own good and that of one’s 
neighbor.119
This implies that the good of religion, as understood by Grisez, is not based on 
voluntarism, the belief that God’s will exclusively defines what is good, which leads 
to a divine command theory of morality.120 To pursue the good of religion, to conform 
one’s will to God’s will, is pursue what is rationally required, to be reasonable, to love 
all persons and their goods, and to love God in loving others.
2.5.5d Religion: not absolute or exclusive, but architectonic and inclusive 
Another, related, issue addressed by Grisez in this chapter is that of fanaticism and 
religion. He admits that religious fanaticism has been a fact in history, but argues that 
fanaticism is not necessarily connected to religion. The good of religion is not 
identical to God himself.121 Religion is “a human good, a good which is created and 
which is realized in human persons.” 122 Religion is “the relation of harmony or
» • ■ 123friendship between created persons and God... [It] is m an’s relation to God.” Jews
and Christians have never understood religion as the only human good.
According to traditional Jewish and Christian doctrine the right religious 
relation of man to God was inseparable from the right relation of human persons 
to one another, and from a harmonious inner relationship of the person in 
himself. Inner integrity was believed to be necessary for sincerity of life, and
119 Ibid., 304. In later works, Grisez becomes more confident that man can love the Creator’s goodness.
120 See ibid. Grisez refers here to Aquinas’ works Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, chapters 121-122 and 
Summa Theologiae I-II, 19, 9-10, to show that Aquinas did not hold a voluntarist view, but rather he 
held that God is the source o f all good and wills only what is for our good, so it is truly reasonable for 
us to accept and follow God’s will.
121 See ibid., 308. This is a constant and central theme o f Grisez’s work and his understanding o f the 
good of religion.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., emphasis in original.
61
both were regarded as inseparable from love of neighbor, which was considered 
essential to love of God. Moreover, respect for such human goods as life itself, 
justice, and faithful marital love was considered essential to the carrying out of 
love of one’s neighbor.124
This quote contains several ideas that are central to Grisez’s understanding of religion 
and the basic human goods, most importantly, the ideas that religion as a basic human 
good is intrinsically connected to the other goods, and the idea that living a good life 
involves all the human goods simultaneously.
The idea that religion might perform an architectonic role is clearly expressed when 
Grisez says:
Of course, once a person made a religious commitment, he did not see religion 
as one particular good among others. The religious orientation shaped life as a 
whole, animating and harmonizing all particular goods... It endorsed other
n r
values and sanctified them.
Grisez also makes the point that as religious commitment is a free choice, it must be 
the case that there are other distinct human goods that are not reducible to religion. If 
religion was the only good, or if it was absolute in every respect, then one would not 
be able to choose it:
Freedom in choosing a good implies its nonabsoluteness, for if one believed that 
one good included everything of value in another, then it would be impossible 
to choose the second in preference to the first.126
Grisez’s understanding of religion as a basic human good is that it is a part of a 
greater whole: it is a finite created good. As such, it ought not to be treated as an
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. There is perhaps a risk here o f reducing religion to morality, as Hittinger accused Grisez of 
doing: see s. 8.1 below. Perhaps Grisez should have inserted the qualifier “only” before “one particular
good”.
126 Ibid.
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ultimate. “Religious fanaticism is a form of idolatry in which the created good of
197religion is wrongly exalted to the position of divinity.”
2.6 The four orders ontology in Beyond the New Theism
Grisez sets out a kind of ontology, an “inventory of everything given in experience ... 
which is a part of descriptive metaphysics”.128 Following the analytical schema of 
Aquinas, Grisez outlines four orders of the reality given in experience. These orders 
are picked out by noting how human reason relates in distinct ways to reality, when it 
discovers, or organises, the inherent order of the various entities it can relate to. Much 
of what Grisez writes is shaped by his understanding of this ontological schema of 
four orders of reality, an ontological schema which stretches back to Aristotle through 
Aquinas.129
2.6.1 Against reductionism
As can be seen from the title of the chapter in which he first outlines the four orders, 
(‘Limits of Reductionism’), one of the things that Grisez wishes to emphasise in
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., 232, emphasis in original. Grisez does not insist strictly that the four orders include everything 
given in experience, but says that they include “perhaps all” such entities: see ibid., 233. It should be 
noted that Grisez does not mean by “entities” necessarily physical beings. One major point in insisting 
on the reality of fo u r  orders is that “entities” or realities are not always physical: if  they were, there 
would be only one order, the physical. Grisez thus emphasises the objective reality o f  the moral order 
and its irreducibility to any o f the other orders, including the physical. Grisez extends his treatment of 
the four orders in other chapters o f Beyond the New Theism , especially in chapters fifteen and twenty- 
three.
129 See ibid., 232, footnote one. Aquinas briefly outlined this schema originally in the first lecture o f his 
commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics. The four orders ontology is also an important part o f  the work of 
John Finnis, who is a collaborator with Grisez: see J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, 
U.K.; Oxford University Press, 1980), 135-138 and 380-383, and also J. Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, 
Political, and Legal Theory, (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20-23 and 294-298. 
Finnis’s work is examined in chapter seven below.
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delineating them is that reality is not to be understood in terms of only one or two or 
even three of them, and each of the orders is not to be reduced to any other or set of 
others. It is a mistake to see reality as only physical, for example; but it is also a 
mistake to see reality as only a cultural creation. Most importantly, for our present 
focus on Grisez’s moral theory and the place of the good of religion in it, we cannot 
account for reality fully only in terms o f existential matters: all four orders must be 
taken into account for an adequate understanding of any one of these orders and 
reality as a whole. Coming to understand the distinctness of each of the orders, their 
irreducibility, and their relationship to each other, is extremely important in avoiding 
misunderstanding Grisez’s work, and, indeed, in avoiding misunderstanding morality 
itself. Grisez is most emphatic that it is primarily in terms of the third order, the 
existential order, that one must understand morality, and that one must not reduce it to 
the merely physical, logical, or technical/creative. At the same time, Grisez does not 
argue that morality is to be understood in existential terms in total isolation from the 
other three orders. The four orders are united though distinct.
2.6.2 An outline o f the four orders [physical, logical, existential, technical]
The first order is the physical order: “an order which reason does not bring about but 
only considers.”130 The second order is the intentional order: an order “which reason 
by its own consideration introduces into its own acts”. 131 The third order is the 
existential order: an order “which reason by reflection and deliberation constitutes for
130 Beyond the New Theism, 232.
131 Ibid. It might be somewhat confusing that Grisez uses the term “intentional” to name the second 
order, when the term “intentions” is often used to refer to practical aims or decisions, which belong to 
the third order, the existential order. So, sometimes the term “logical order” or its cognates is used here, 
as Grisez uses them too, to refer to the second order, the intentional order.


possible choices”.132 The fourth order is the cultural order: an order “which reason by 
inventing or planning or habits of using induces in or imposes upon what is in human 
power”.133
The physical order
The first order is the physical order.134 Reason considers the physical order as given. 
It is the order of reality “studied by the natural sciences”. 35 Grisez mentions the 
examples of sounds (of a lecturer speaking) and written marks on a page as typical 
instances of entities of this order.136 The normativity found in this order is that of 
“conformity to natural laws”,137 using the term “natural laws” in a very different sense 
from the term “the natural law” as used in ethics (which names the normativity of the 
third order). The natural laws referred to in the physical order are the laws picking out 
the regularity of natural processes, and the normal expectations that people can and do 
have that such and such an event or process will happen as usual. The normativity of 
this order is quite distinct from the types of normativity appropriate to each of the 
other three orders.
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132 Ibid., 233.
133 Ibid.
134 By putting it first, neither Aquinas or Grisez seem to be saying that it is primary or most important. 
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to deal with it first, as the physical order grounds the other three, and 
so is most fundamental in that respect. Some o f Grisez’s critics seem to think he overlooks this and 
they could be right to an extent.
135 Ibid., 232.
136 See ibid., 233 and 349.
137 Ibid., 237.
* ■ • 138The second order is the intentional order “of thought-entities studied by logic”. 
Reason introduces this order into its own acts. An example of a reality in this order is 
an explanation of something, which, although it can be embodied in a series of 
physical sounds or written marks on a page, is not to be identified with these physical 
realities pertaining to the first order.139 The normativity of the intentional order is the 
normativity of the laws of logic. Something is correct in this order if it conforms to 
logical principles, rather than if it conforms to, for example, (physically-based) 
psychological association.140
The existential order
The third order is the existential order, the order “of human acts which make up 
personal and interpersonal life”.141 It is studied by ethics, but also by other disciplines 
such as history and parts of psychology.142 Reason constitutes this order by reflection 
and deliberation about possible choices. Grisez mentions as examples here the 
deliberate act o f communicating a meaning through giving a lecture and the act of 
asserting a proposition through written marks.143 This order includes individual
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The logical order
138 Ibid., 232.
139 See ibid., 233-234 and 349.
140 See ibid., 237.
141 Ibid., 233.
142 See ibid. Psychology can pursue its studies with a focus on first order realities, when it is primarily 
concerned with the physical dimension o f psychology, or with a focus on third order realities, when it 
is primarily concerned with human deliberation and choices in their own right. This is one example of 
the interrelatedness and irreducibility o f  the four orders.
143 See ibid., 233-234 and 349.
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deliberation and choice, but also social deliberation and cooperation. 144 The
organising unity of this order is found not in physical laws or logical principles, but in
the conditions of a free choice which follow from the values presupposed by all 
human acts -  for example, the requirement that an act be directed to something 
understood as a good or the requirement that one accept a person’s plausible 
explanation of something if one sees no reason to reject it.145
The normativity of the existential order, therefore, is not that o f statistical normality or 
conformity to scientific laws; nor is it the correctness of logical coherence. It is the 
“rightness and reasonableness of ... conformity to love of human values”.146 This is 
why the immorality of an act cannot be adequately accounted for as merely a 
psychological weakness or illness (which would locate immorality in the physical 
order) or as ignorance or confusion (which would locate immorality in the logical 
order): rather, the immorality of acts must be understood as a failure in the existential 
order, as failure in practical reasonableness and, thus, in love.147
The cultural order
The fourth order is the cultural order of “works of art, products of manufacture, the 
results of engineering and technology, and also all sorts of symbols, including 
linguistic ones”.148 It is studied “by many arts and applied sciences”.149 In this order,
144 See ibid., 354-355.
145 Ibid., 235. The first example here is what Grisez in other contexts calls the first principle o f practical 
reasoning: see Christian Moral Principles, 178-180. (The second is what he calls a rationality norm.)
146 Ibid., 237. Grisez tends to use the term “goods” and “practical principles” rather than “values” in his 
later works.
147 This is a central and distinctive theme o f Grisez’s moral theory, which seeks to avoid any reduction 
o f morality to any o f  the three other orders. This is one reason why Grisez criticises so strongly some 
serious misunderstandings o f  the word “natural” in the term natural law. they reduce morality to the 
given natural order, the first o f these four orders.
148 Ibid., 233. Grisez says he disagrees in one respect here with Aquinas, who thought that language 
belonged exclusively to the second order, the order o f logic.
reason creatively “induces in or imposes upon what is in human power”.150 In other 
words, here human reason uses and transforms extrinsic nature for practical purposes 
to achieve specific ends. Grisez points out here as typical the examples of the specific 
language used by a lecturer or in any written assertion.151 Whereas in the existential 
order the human person is seen in terms of self-direction through free choice, the 
human person is seen in the cultural order as “man symboling, man the maker and 
communicator”, engaging in “a creative interplay with his environment”. 152 What 
unifies this order is “the fitness of a technique to the goal it is intended to achieve, 
or ... the aptness of linguistic expression to communicate the explanation of a subject 
matter”.153 The normativity of the cultural-symbolic order is, therefore, the “aptness 
or adequacy” found in “conformity to the implications of a particular purpose”.154
2.6.3 The four orders are distinct and irreducible, yet interrelated 
The four orders are quite distinct from each other, as each shows us reason relating to 
reality in different ways. Grisez is emphatic that it will not do for us to reduce reality 
to any one of the orders. We cannot rightly account for reality in terms of materialism, 
logic, freedom, or culture; nor can we evaluate reality in terms of only natural laws, or 
logical principles, or practical/moral reasonableness, or technical/artistic effectiveness. 
All four orders must be taken into account in understanding the realities of human
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 See ibid., 233-234 and 349.
152 Ibid., 248.
153 Ibid., 235.
154 Ibid., 238. Grisez does not consider effectiveness or efficiency to be the normativity o f the 
existential order; rather, it is the normativity o f the cultural-symbolic, or technical, order.
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experience.155 The four orders are united as well as being irreducible to each other,
and this unity is important to understand. Grisez begins his analytical treatment of the
orders by giving an example of a unitary experience: hearing a lecture.156 This is
experienced by a person as one experience of hearing, even though “one hears in four
diverse ways”.157 The diverse ways one hears a lecture are specified in terms of the
four orders, each one an aspect of the one reality seen from a different angle, so to
speak. And so Grisez says:
Each of the four orders includes in its own way what is included in the others.
At the same time no one of the orders comprehends the whole of reality -  the
I C O
very ordering principle -  of any of the others.
2.6.4 How does the existential order include the others?
We focus here only on how the third order, the existential order, includes the others. 
First: the physical order, the order of given nature. One can choose to do something 
(third order) related to the physical order (first order) -  to eat, or sleep, and so on.159 It 
seems clear that the substantive basic human good of life and health, which Grisez 
includes in his moral theory developed in later works, especially Christian Moral 
Principles, is a substantive good that takes its character mainly from the first order, 
the physical order.160 However, it is a substantive good that can be the object of the
155 It should be noted that Grisez does not consider our philosophical knowledge o f God and his 
existence to be matters o f experience, but to be found in reasoning that transcends what is given in 
experience. Nor does he consider God to be a reality in any or all o f the four orders: see ibid., 230-232 
and 262.
156 See ibid., 233-234.
157 Ibid., 233, emphasis in original.
158 Ibid., 235, emphasis added.
159 See ibid., 236.
160 See Christian Moral Principles, 118, 124, and the treatment o f one inadequate theory o f the human 
good, which thinks that the human good is to get what one has natural desires for (prior to choice), 125- 
126. Grisez has not explicitly linked the basic human goods to the four orders in the way done here.
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deliberation and choice characteristic of the third order, the existential order. Most 
importantly, in making any choice related to the first order, one will have to take into 
account the normativity of that order, if one is concerned with effective pursuit of the 
good, which one will be if one is thinking practically. So, one who chooses to pursue 
and instantiate life and health will have to take into account the laws of diet and the 
regularities of normal human psychological development, which pertain to the first 
order, the physical order.161 We cannot choose what the laws of nature are. The 
system of nature and its natural regularities and laws needs to be taken into account in 
the effective pursuit of any human good, including religion. Surely this also includes 
taking into account the given aspects and laws of human nature as a given reality.
How can the existential order include the intentional order? It seems that the 
substantive basic human good of knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, which Grisez 
includes in later developments of his moral theory, takes its character from the second 
order, the logical order.162 Whenever one deliberately chooses to think, thus acting in 
the existential order, one must take account, if one wishes to be truly practical and, so, 
effective in one’s instantiation of the good of knowledge (whether basic or 
instrumental),163 the particular norms of the second order. If reasoning, for example, is 
to be good thinking, then it must be clear, consistent, certain, and explanatory; in 
contrast, bad reasoning will be characterised by “confusion, inconsistency or
161 See ibid., 182.
162 See ibid., 118, 124, and Grisez’s treatment of an inadequate theory o f the human good, especially 
associated with Aristotle, which sees it as exclusively in the exercise o f  reason, and ignores goods of 
other types, 126.
163 A basic good is one pursued for its own sake; an instrumental good is one pursued for its usefulness 
in pursuit o f another good. One might pursue knowledge, for example, in order to be the better able to 
pursue the good o f health or religion. See ibid., 122.
looseness, inconclusiveness, and lack of illuminating insight”.164 These are norms of 
the second order, but they are of direct concern to a person deliberating about how to 
think well (and act well) -  in this way, the existential order includes the intentional 
order. We cannot choose the laws of logic, but we ought to be logical in our 
deliberation and choosing.
How can the existential order include the cultural order? Just as one cannot choose 
one’s own body or the laws of nature, and just as one cannot choose the principles of 
logic or the truth of propositions, so, too, “one cannot choose that a technological 
process succeed or that linguistic expressions mean what one wishes them to 
mean”.165 The fourth order, the cultural-symbolic order, has its own principles and 
norms, and one who wishes to choose wisely and to instantiate successfully the 
particular good or goods one is pursuing in and/or through one’s choice, must take 
account of those particular principles and norms. The fourth order seems to be the 
source of the substantial human good that Grisez calls “playful activities and skilfxill 
performances [which] in general fulfil persons as makers and sharers in culture”.166 
To pursue this good wisely and instantiate it effectively, one has to strive for 
“creativity, efficiency, success” and avoid “dull conformism, wastefulness, and
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164 Ibid., 118.
165 Beyond the New Theism, 236.
166 Christian Moral Principles, 124.
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failure”, which are norms of the fourth order.167 Thus, the third order, the existential
1 ¿TO
order, includes the fourth order, the cultural-symbolic.
2.6.5 The four orders and religion
The four orders are distinct but unified in experience. We will look at this unity by 
examining an example from religion.169 Our example is a person deliberately and 
freely using a rosary beads to aid his or her prayer. At one level, this example can be 
considered as a physical phenomenon. As such, it could be studied by the natural 
sciences. The physical make-up of the beads could be examined; so too could the 
psycho-physical make-up of the person praying the beads. Even if not a scientist, one 
can still appreciate that physical reality is important. It is important to the person 
praying: their physicality is one reason that people choose to use beads as an aid to 
prayer. However, the physical reality is not the whole of the reality.
We need to take account also of the meaning of the action and its physical elements. 
Reference to meaning takes us to the second order of reality, the logical order of 
thought-entities. The person praying the rosary understands the action in a certain way; 
otherwise, there cannot be such an action. Religion can be studied and experienced as 
part of the logical order.
167 Ibid., 118-119. See also ibid., 126-127, where Grisez criticises the approach o f  Nietzsche and others 
like him, which sees the human good as “ living a life which executes a difficult task well”, thus 
reducing morality and Christian life to the fourth order, the cultural order o f creativity and technical
effectiveness.
168 Still, it needs to be emphasised that Grisez is clearly concerned not to reduce the existential order to 
the cultural, or, in other words, to reduce the moral order to the technical or artistic or scientifically 
pragmatic.
169 Grisez applies his ontological schema to listening to a lecture, to written communication, and, in the 
greatest detail, the human person and human community: see ibid., 233-234, 349, and all chapter 23. 
He does not apply it to religion, as such, in any detail in any work o f his. Indeed, Grisez has not 
developed his thinking on this analytic schema to any great degree since Beyond the New Theism.
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Rosary beads are used for a specific purpose. Their usefulness for this specific, 
limited purpose could be evaluated: Do they help one to pray? How do they aid prayer? 
And so on. This is to study the symbolic and pragmatic aspect of religion, the cultural 
order.
However, in Grisez’s moral theory, religion is mainly understood as belonging, 
though not exclusively (as Grisez’s work on the four orders clearly indicates), to the 
existential order. Thus, Grisez understands religion as a good to be an aspect of our 
human fulfillment that we can be rationally interested in pursuing through and in our 
deliberately chosen actions. In this understanding of religion, one’s free choice to use 
a rosary beads is of the essence of the act of prayer, and of the essence of one’s 
participation in the good of religion, which gives meaning to the physical, meaningful, 
symbolic free act.
2.7 Life and Death with Liberty and Justice [1976]
This book was co-authored with Joseph Boyle. It refers briefly to the good of religion 
as one of a few “harmony” goods, which is constituted by “harmony with God”.170 
The authors note that “for those who believe in the divine, friendship with God is 
considered good for its own sake.” 171 They also make the point, in terms that are 
almost word for word the same as in Grisez’s earlier book, Abortion: The Myths, the
170 See G. Grisez and J. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the 
Euthanasia Debate (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1979), 360. Boyle has
contributed much to Grisez’s work over the years.
171 Ibid.
Realities, and the Arguments (1970), that, if  one is not to make of one of the basic 
human goods the (false) unifying principle of all morality, it is essential to understand 
God to be this transcendent source, and to understand the goods themselves as 
“diverse participations in a unity beyond all of them.”172
2.8 Conclusion to the chapter
We have seen Grisez develop an understanding of “religion” as a basic form of human 
fulfillment, a form that is one of several, diverse, irreducible (though interrelated) 
forms of human fulfillment that he calls the basic human goods. Religion is 
constituted by harmony with God, which human beings have a natural inclination 
towards and a need to pursue, a natural inclination and need that ground, but are not 
identical to, the self-evident practical principle directing us to pursue harmony with 
God. The fact and virtual universality of our natural religious inclination can be 
verified by theoretical studies, but the practical principle directing us towards the 
good of religion is not a grasp of what is already naturally given as such, but our 
rational grasp of opportunity to pursue one kind of intrinsic fulfillment of human 
nature through our deliberate actions. Thus, religion is openended and not determinate 
as a good. One’s understanding of religion can and should develop beyond, but 
founded on and guided by, one’s initial practical insight into the human need for it 
and its value.
Grisez is keen to emphasise that religion is not God in himself, but an aspect of our 
natural end as human beings. He rejects elements of Aristotle’s, Augustine’s and
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172 Ibid., 367.
Aquinas’ thought, particularly as they seem to reduce ultimately all of human life and 
good to the good of religion and/or the good of knowledge (especially knowledge of 
God’s essence in the beatific vision). Grisez rejects all approaches to moral theory 
that make a single human good, even contemplation of the divine good, the ultimate 
or only good. Still, Grisez does acknowledge that religion, along with other basic 
goods, can form the focus not only for choices but for commitments by individuals 
and groups. Most importantly, Grisez holds that religion is the best basic human good 
in this regard, as it can be at stake in every choice and commitment (if one so chooses 
and commits oneself to it), and it can ground the moral life better than any of the other 
basic human goods. It is necessary for us to see God as the unifying transcendent 
source of all goods, and of the objective moral (natural) law that directs us to love all 
that is good, and thus love God. Without such an understanding of God as the ultimate 
source of goodness, and of human goods as participations in God’s goodness, we 
would be inclined to make a basic human good supreme over all the others, and thus 
lose sight of what true moral goodness is: openness to and love of all the goods of all 
human persons.
Grisez sees the good of religion as a reality of the existential order, a quality of our 
free choices. Still, he does not regard it as an existential reality in isolation from other 
realities in the physical, logical and cultural orders, all of which he sees as interrelated 
and united with each other in complex and diverse ways. Grisez develops an argument 
for the existence of God and an understanding of God as utterly mysterious, but still 
personal, but he does not insist that the good of religion is grasped only by theists. 
Still, Grisez clearly holds that a theistic view is the most reasonable view to take and 
that theism is the most adequate perspective for one to pursue and instantiate the good
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of religion. In his early works Grisez takes a mainly philosophical approach to moral 
theory, but it is one that is open to a theological specification of his natural law theory 
grounded in the basic human goods, which he develops in the first volume of his 
magisterial moral theology project, The Way o f the Lord Jesus'. Vol. 1, Christian 
Moral Principles, to which we now turn our attention.
76
CHAPTER THREE 
CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES [1983]
The first, lengthy volume of Grisez’s moral theology project lays out the 
philosophical and theological foundations of his moral theory.1 This chapter presents 
what Christian Moral Principles has to say about the basic good of religion as part of 
Grisez’s moral theory and especially at its role in the movement in Grisez’s theory 
from natural law theory into moral theology.
3.1 Religion as the object of a primary principle of the natural law
3.1.1 The basic human goods
A list of the basic human goods is given in chapter five of Christian Moral Principles. 
These goods are “aspects o f persons”2 by which individuals and communities 
participate more and more fully in being human. These goods appeal to our practical 
intellect and thus, going beyond emotional desires arising out of our sentient nature
1 G. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, vol. 1 of The Way o f  the Lord Jesus (Chicago: Franciscan 
Herald, 1983). Grisez wrote the book with the help o f several others (Joseph M. Boyle, Basil Cole, 
John M. Finnis, John A. Geinzer, Jeannette Grisez, Robert G. Kennedy, Patrick Lee, William E. May 
and Russell Shaw), but the work is substantially his own.
2 Ibid., 121, emphasis added. The treatment o f the natural law in the first two sections of the present 
chapter flesh out the brief outline given in s. 1.2 above. It should be noted from the start that the basic 
human goods are not presented by Grisez as realities apart from persons, but always as aspects of 
persons, providing us with reasons to contribute to persons’ well-being precisely as persons. This point 
is completely overlooked by some critics. See, for example, J. Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic 
Theory o f  the Natural Law  (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, UK: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2005), 130, where she says that Grisez and Finnis are wrong about how we reason about practical 
matters. According to Porter, “we do not desire [states of affairs] simply as instantiations o f basic 
goods; we desire them because they promote the overall well-being o f people and other entities about 
which we have some concern, or avert harm from them.” However, this is a false dichotomy. 
According to Grisez’s theory, instantiations o f the goods are rationally desired precisely because they 
are thought to promote human well-being (including, but not exclusively, one’s own well-being).
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(though not necessarily opposed to such emotions), they “provide us with reasons for
• 3 ■intelligently wanting something and choosing to act for it as a goal”. The basic
human goods are diverse, are grounded in complex human nature, and pertain to the
four dimensions of being human.4 Three of these dimensions have to do with the
following: (1) life and health, (2) knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, and (3) work
and play. These identify three of the basic human goods. A fourth dimension of being
human is our ability to reason practically and choose freely -  the existential
dimension. A set of related basic human goods pertains to this existential dimension
of human well-being.
3.1.2 Religion as a reflexive and existential good
One of this set of existential harmony goods is “religion”:
We experience sin and alienation from God; the goods are the peace and 
friendship with God which are the concern of all true religion.5
3 Ibid., 122.
4 See ibid., 124. Grisez does not emphasise the point o f  “the four orders” in Christian Moral Principles, 
but it seems clear that his thinking about them lies behind what he says about the seven basic human 
goods and how he organises the list o f basic human goods into four categories (with the four existential 
goods seen as four aspects o f the good o f existential harmony). A fuller account o f the four dimensions 
or orders of reality is found in Beyond the New Theism : see s. 2.6 above. In chapter five o f Christian 
Moral Principles, where Grisez presents his list o f basic human goods, he first provides a short outline 
of a theory o f the good, following Thomistic lines: see Christian Moral Principles, 115-122. This is 
overlooked by his critics, who seem to think he presents the goods without any reference to theoretical 
understanding. See, for example, Bebhinn Donnelly, “The Epistemic Connection Between Nature and 
Value in New and Traditional Natural Law Theory”, Law and Philosophy 25 (2006): 1-29. Certainly, 
Grisez holds that a person does not need to know explicitly any theory (o f the good, or o f human 
nature) from which to deduce or derive the primary principles of the natural law, or to know at least 
some o f its norms, at a minimal level; but he does not ignore theoretical issues, nor does he ignore the 
issue of the nature o f  the good, in his own presentation o f his theory of natural law.
5 Ibid., 123. (In the original, this quote is found in bold print to highlight it; however, for stylistic 
purposes, it, and any similarly formatted quotations are given here in regular font.) In light of how he 
talks about the good o f religion later in this work, it is clear that Grisez’s use here o f the plural 
(“goods”) does not imply that he sees religion as a plurality o f goods, although it does seem to suggest, 
correctly, that religion can be instantiated in diverse ways and to greater and lesser degrees. In more 
philosophically strict works subsequent to Christian Moral Principles, Grisez avoids using morally 
charged terms for the basic goods, such as “friendship with God” for the good o f religion.
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Religion is included in the four existential or “reflexive” goods, which are concerned 
with harmony and which include choice in their very definition. They are called 
existential goods “because they fulfill persons insofar as persons make free choices 
and are capable of moral good and evil.”6 The other three reflexive goods are: (4) self- 
integration, (5) practical reasonableness, and (6) justice/friendship. With (7), religion, 
the list of basic human goods is complete.7
3.1.3 The good o f  religion is not the good o f  God himself
As in previous works, Grisez is careful here to distinguish the good of religion from
the good of God himself:
Religion is a great blessing, for nothing in life is more important than liberation 
from sin and friendship with God. However, harmony with God should not be 
confused with God himself or with the divine life in which Christians share by 
adoption. The human good of religion -  that harmony with God which perfects 
human persons as human -  is only one human good alongside others.8
6 Ibid., 123-124. In this context, “reflexive” refers to one’s choosing with awareness o f one’s choosing.
7 See ibid., 124. Religion is often presented by Grisez as the seventh of the goods, and the fourth of the 
reflexive/existential goods. Again, it is worth noting that the terminology used by Grisez and his school 
to describe the goods, especially the reflexive goods, varies from work to work. In Christian Moral 
Principles, they are described usually in language that carries a moral connotation, and assumes that 
these goods are pursued virtuously and effectively. Also, the natural law theory in Christian Moral 
Principles is presented in a theological light. Finally, Grisez was to add marriage as a basic human 
good in volume two o f The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, but this aspect o f his work is not our concern here.
8 Ibid., with a reference to Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes 11. Grisez also makes reference to Aquinas’s 
work in this respect too (Summa Theologiae II-II, 81, 5). According to Grisez, Aquinas distinguished 
between the virtue o f religion and the theological virtues in that the former does not “bear upon God 
himself as the latter do”. Religion is seen, therefore, as a natural virtue, rather than a theological one, 
and as a natural virtue that bears upon God in a more indirect way than the infused, theological virtues. 
Grisez does not refer much to Aquinas’s treatment o f religion as a virtue; this is an area o f his theory in 
need of development. In fact, his whole treatment of virtue, and his integration o f  a theory o f virtue, 
following along the lines o f  Aquinas’s schema, is seen as in need of development by one o f Grisez’s 
collaborators: W.E. May, “Contemporary Perspectives on Thomistic Natural Law”, in J. Goyette, M.S. 
Latkovic and R.S. Myers (eds.), St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary 
Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: University of America Press, 2004), 113-156, at 154. That Grisez’s 
understanding o f the good o f religion can be integrated with Aquinas’s thought on the virtue o f  religion 
is made clear by William H. Marshner, “Implausible Diagnosis: A Response to Germain Grisez”, 
American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 91-112, at 93.
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The good of religion is part of what human persons can know will be fulfilling of 
themselves as human. There is more to our human fulfillment than religion, however, 
and this “more” is specified by the other basic human goods.
Still, Grisez clearly sees religion as a very important good; the way he speaks about it 
in the quotation above lets us know that he does not want to downgrade religion when 
he distinguishes it from God in himself and our divine life through grace. Religion 
specifies an essential aspect of our human good, one that ought to be of concern to all 
people. Even apart from faith in God’s revelation, the good of religion calls on us to 
fulfil our human nature by deliberately making choices that instantiate harmony with 
God. However, this harmony with God is not complete unity with God. It can be 
described as “friendship” with God, but Grisez clearly considers this friendship to be 
distinct from the divine life that God offers to share with us through grace.
3.1.4 Religion can and should he understood theologically
However, Grisez does not speak of religion as a good that can be known only by 
reason. Information on the good of religion, and other elements of the natural law, can 
be, and is, communicated by divine revelation, as will be seen as we continue our 
analysis.9 For one thing, even in the natural law chapters of Christian Moral 
Principles (chapters five and seven especially) Grisez tends to write about the good of 
religion in purely theistic terms, indeed in monotheistic terms that consider God to be 
personal. Christian Moral Principles takes a primarily theological perspective on the 
natural law and on human goods, as part of a larger project that involves detailing
9 This is not to say that revelation is primarily concerned with communicating information. Grisez 
clearly presents it as involving a personal invitation to enter into intimate relationship with God: see 
Christian Moral Principles, 477-481 and s. 3.4.2 below. On the claim that revelation “includes truths of 
natural law” : see ibid., 175-178, at 176.
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what it is to live a Christian life.10 This theological approach and aim probably
account for the language used in his description of the basic good of religion as
religion or holiness, which is harmony with God, found in the agreement of 
human individual or communal free choices with God’s will.11
3.1.5 Religion is natural peace with God
Nevertheless, the good of religion is a basic human good alongside the other basic 
human goods:
We tend to think of friendship with God as something too elevated to list 
alongside other human goods ... But although communing with God in Christ 
does go beyond a merely human good, human fulfillment also is sought and 
found in the human relationship of peace with God.12
We see here that Grisez distinguishes the basic good of religion from the fullness of 
the new life of grace made possible by faith. It seems that there are two dimensions or
10 See chapter one o f  Christian Moral Principles for details of how Grisez understands his overall aim 
in this book and the four volume project of which it forms the first part. It is notable that he uses 
scripture, for example, as a way towards understanding the human goods o f harmony, referring to the 
story of the Fall in Genesis 3 and how original sin affected our peace within ourselves, with each other, 
and with God -  see Christian M oral Principles, 122-123. It is worth noting too that seeing God in 
personal theistic terms is not confined to a theological perspective; an understanding o f God as 
personal and singular can be defended from a purely philosophical perspective too, as Grisez himself 
does in the Beyond the New Theism: see s. 2.5.4 above. The reissued edition, God? A Philosophical 
Preface to Faith (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), makes this even clearer in its new 
preface: see xv-xxvi, at xx-xxii.
"  Ibid., 124.
12 Ibid., 136, with a reference to a published work on comparative religion by M. Dhavamony “for 
evidence on this point” (see n. 13, page 139). Grisez has not referred in the years since Christian Moral 
Principles to theoretical works supporting his list o f basic goods, and in particular religion. Some 
recent theoretical backing for his list of goods, and for the inclusion o f religion in this list, is found in 
Sabina Alkire, “The Basic Dimensions o f Flourishing: A Comparison o f Accounts”, in The Revival o f  
Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School ed. N. 
Biggar, and R. Black, (Aldershote/Burlington USA/Singapore/Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), 73-110. See 
chapter one, n. 23 below for details of her list o f goods, abstracted from the various lists o f other 
scholars that she examined. Religion is included in her list. Even though it was not explicitly mentioned 
in several o f the empirical and conceptual studies she surveyed, elements o f  the good o f religion were 
to be found on most lists, so “there is considerably more implicit affirmation o f  religion or spirituality 
than first appears” (97). Alkire mentions also that although some people might reduce the good of 
religion to some other good (e.g. inner peace or meaningful identity), other people consider some of 
their actions to be for a religious good that cannot be reduced to other non-religious benefits (see 98). 
Boyle makes the same point: see s. 7.4.3 below.
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levels, so to speak, of human relationship with God: one is the natural dimension of 
friendship, which is pursued and instantiated in the good of religion, which perfects 
and fulfils us as human; the other is the supernatural dimension, which is a divinely 
given gift that goes beyond the merely human good (and, to echo Grisez’s terms, 
beyond mere natural friendship with God).
3.1.6 Reflexive goods, choice and moral good
The reflexive goods, which are concerned with the pursuit of harmony, are
not primarily realized in definite states of affairs, which result from the carrying 
out of choices. Rather, the existential goods (self-integration, practical 
reasonableness and authenticity, justice and friendship, and friendship with 
God) are personal and interpersonal spiritual realities which primarily exist in 
upright individual and communal choices themselves.13
Therefore, religion can constitute part of the moral good, moral uprightness, when it is 
pursued properly. (Grisez clearly acknowledges that religion can be pursued morally 
or immorally.) The moral good is not the whole of human fulfilment, however, but 
only a part, albeit “an intrinsic part”, of it.14 It is a part of our human fulfilment that 
pertains directly to the will. So, Grisez understands the concept of religion as a basic 
good as something pertaining directly to our will, to our choices shaped by our will, 
and to the quality of harmony between our wills and the will of God.15
13 Ibid., 129. Reflexive goods are reflexive insofar as one is aware o f one’s choosing thus: one chooses 
to choose, so to speak.
14 Ibid., 130-131.
15 It should be remembered here that Grisez, following on in the tradition o f  St. Thomas, does not view 
the will as separate entirely from the practical intellect. Both practical intellect and will work together, 
with “will” as our intelligent grasp o f possibility and opportunity, which enables us to choose freely.
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3.1.7 Substantive goods provide the content for religion as a reflexive good 
The “substantive” basic human goods, listed in Christian Moral Principles as life and 
health, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, and skilled performance, are non­
reflexive, and “are realized in definite states of affairs distinct from one’s choices”.16
1 7These substantive goods are “the vehicles for the existential goods”. This means that
the substantive goods provide the content for the harmony pursued in the reflexive
goods. Grisez relates this point to religion briefly:
One cannot pursue religious fulfillment apart from activities in which one seeks 
to promote bodily well-being or skilful performance or thoughtful reflection; 
religion which does not make a difference in daily life is meaningless (see Jas 
1:23-25; 2:14-17).18
It is clear from this that Grisez does not see “religion” as an entirely separate good to 
be pursued in isolation from the other basic goods; even though it is distinct from the 
other goods, and not reducible to one or more of them, it is never effectively 
instantiated apart from at least one substantive good and the other reflexive goods too 
(at least implicitly). It would seem too, although Grisez does not make this point 
explicitly, that the necessary relationship between reflexive and substantive goods 
entails that effective pursuit of religion cannot be a purely subjective thing: the pursuit 
of religion is given objective content by the substantive goods.
16 Ibid., 129.
17 Ibid., 130. This point is completely overlooked by Grisez’s critics. Hittinger and Di B lasi’s errors in 
this regard are looked at in chapter eight below. Another example is B. Ashley, “What Is the End o f the 
Human Person?: The Vision o f God and Integral Human Fulfillment,” in Moral Truth and Moral 
Tradition, ed. L. Gormally (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), 68-96, at 85-86. One problem with 
Ashley’s interpretation o f  Grisez is that he fails to acknowledge that the basic human goods can be 
means to an end (or, instrumental goods) as well as ends (or intrinsic goods): see ibid., 81. Although 
Grisez has made his thinking clear on these points, perhaps it could be said that he has not made it clear 
enough, and that he has not developed some aspects of his natural law theory, especially with regard to 
the interrelationships between the basic human goods. He has, however, clarified theologically some 
important aspects o f how religion is related to the good o f knowledge, as we will see (ss. 3.4.3ff 
below).
18 Christian Moral Principles, 129.
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3.1.8 In Grisez's moral theory, religion is not a substantive good 
Although religion is seen to require substantive content (from objective knowledge of 
reality, for example), it does not play the role of a substantive good in Grisez’s moral 
theory. Precisely as a good, religion is existential and reflexive, a quality of our 
choices and commitments. Religion, as a practical good-to-be-pursued, is not seen as 
consisting of a group of persons, or a set of places, buildings and physical objects, to 
be considered or studied theoretically; nor is it a set of beliefs to be held in thought or 
analysed logically, nor something to be admired as beautiful; nor is it a set of 
practices or symbols to be used to achieve a specific goal or set of goals.
The core of religion as an existential good, as understood by Grisez, is found in the 
choices and commitments of a person or community to instantiate and pursue 
harmony with what that person or community understands as God’s will. These 
choices might be for the following actions:19 holding and professing religious beliefs 
or knowing religious persons or symbols; carrying out religious actions well (rituals, 
for example, or acts of charity); appreciating religious beauty and worth (in religious 
art, for example, or the beauty of the idea and reality of God); doing acts for the sake 
of one’s own or others’ bodily health and life (avoiding unnecessary risks, for 
example, or making efforts to feed the hungry). Such actions may be done for the sake 
of basic substantive goods, goods such as knowledge, excellence in performance, 
appreciation of beauty, life and health, but they may also, at the same time, be done 
for the sake of the harmony goods too, including the good of religion.
19 The applications and examples in this paragraph are my own and not Grisez’s, though, in my 
judgment, they are suggested directly by his thought in Christian Moral Principles. The Thomistic 
ontological schema treated by Grisez in Beyond the New Theism (see s. 2.6 above) is drawn on here, as 
are the basic human goods mentioned by Grisez in Christian Moral Principles.
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The other reflexive goods can be involved along with religion too. So a person going 
to Mass for the sake of religion, for example, might be seeking also the good of 
community by participating in the common good of the Church, or he might be 
seeking the good of “self-integration”, (which can also be called “inner harmony” or 
“order within the self’), or he could be seeking the good of “practical reasonableness 
or authenticity”, which brings “harmony between one’s moral reflection, free choices, 
and their execution”.20 It is clear that the basic goods are not entirely separate objects, 
as such, but realities that can interpenetrate each other and be combined with each 
other in various ways in our choices.
3.1.9 Primary practical principles and basic goods
Precisely as a distinct, basic human good, religion forms the object of a primary 
principle of practical reasoning.21 This principle is a specification of the first principle 
of practical reasoning, namely, “Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.”
There are several other specifications of the first principle of practical reasoning,
*  * *  * 22 • which direct action to the pursuit of the other basic human goods. The primary
practical principle that corresponds to the good of religion directs us to pursue religion
and to instantiate it (to “do” it) in chosen actions. This principle can be formulated as
follows: “Religion is to be pursued and done, and its opposite avoided.” As religion is
20 Ibid., 124.
21 See ibid., chapter seven, questions C and D, 178-183. It is true therefore that Grisez does seem to 
acknowledge a distinction between the good  o f religion and the principle directing us to pursue and 
instantiate the good. Grisez does not make much o f this distinction. See, however, G.V. Bradley and 
R.P. George, “The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply To Jean Porter”, American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence 39 (1994): 303-315, at 305, where the authors draw attention to the distinction between 
goods and principles directing towards the goods. They insist that Grisez has never spoken o f self- 
evident basic goods, but o f  self-evident basic principles. (They argue that this is but one o f many 
misreadings by Porter o f  Grisez’s and Finnis’s work.) Arguably it is an important distinction.
22 See Appendix 1 below for an outline o f the primary principles of the natural law.
harmony with God, the evil to be avoided is conflict with God. So, one of the 
foundational truths of practical thinking and action is that harmony with God is to be 
pursued and instantiated and conflict with God is to be avoided (insofar as it is in our 
power to do so). The primary principle of practical reasoning corresponding to the 
basic human good of religion is one of the foundational ordinances of the natural 
law.23
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3.2 Religion and moral goodness
3.2.1 Two phases o f the natural law: generally practical and morally practical 
The primary principle directing us to pursue and instantiate the good of religion is a 
naturally known truth24 that marks out religion as one of the “fields of practical 
possibility” that “make possible all human acts”.25 As a primary practical principle, it 
belongs to “the first phase” of the natural law, or practical reasoning, the phase 
concerned with “what might be done”.26 This phase includes all practical thinking and 
action shaped by it. It includes even wrongdoing, which is not irrational, but practical 
and rational, albeit to a limited extent. The second phase of practical thinking is
9 7concerned “with what ought to be done”, which is the strictly moral phase. In
23 See ibid., chapter Seven, question A, 173-175.
24 See ibid., 173.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 178. The use in the subheading o f the phrase “generally practical” for this phase of the natural 
law is my own.
27 Ibid. The use in the subheading o f the phrase “morally practical” for this phase o f the natural law is 
my own. It helps to keep clear that the moral phase involves being practical too, following the first 
principle of practical reasoning perfectly. Thus the first principle o f  practical reasoning is the 
foundation of all practical reasoning, including the moral phase. It is not left behind in the moral phase, 
but pervades it, and is specified by its normativity (integral directiveness).
Grisez’s moral theory, the two phases are analysed separately. Nevertheless, even 
though the two phases of practical reasoning are treated analytically, and, so, 
separately, in his moral theory, Grisez states: “these phases are not usually separated 
in practice”.29
Grisez wishes to present practical reasoning as having two phases at least partly 
because he wishes to show both how free choice is possible and how a person can be 
morally responsible for wrongdoing. In relation to religion as a basic human good and 
to its corresponding primary practical principle, for example, Grisez’s theory holds 
that it is possible for persons to make free choices in relation to religion only because 
it is a field of practical possibility that one can grasp as a possibility for pursuing an 
aspect of human fulfilment before one faces the further moral issue of whether and 
how one ought to choose to instantiate it in a particular choice. Therefore, the 
goodness of “religion” is not from the very beginning moral goodness, strictly 
speaking, but more general practical goodness. One can be faced with the moral 
question of whether to pursue the good of religion in a particular way or not because 
this basic good can be pursued in ways that respect all the other goods fully or in ways 
that fail to respect all the goods folly. The former are morally good ways of pursuing 
(and instantiating) religion; the latter are morally bad ways of doing so.
8 6
28 The first phase (practical rationality in its most general form) is looked at in Christian Moral 
Principles chapter seven, questions C and D; the second phase (practical rationality in its fullest form, 
morality) is looked at in Christian Moral Principles chapter seven, questions E -  G, and the following 
chapters, eight to twelve.
29 Ibid., 178.
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3.2.2 Basic goods and moral goodness are distinct but related
So, it is part of Grisez’s moral theory that at the most foundational level the basic 
good of religion is not yet a fully moral good. It is a “practical good”, so to speak, 
though to a limited extent, in that it enables human persons to participate at least 
partially in the good of harmony with God (insofar as we understand God and 
harmony with God). Nevertheless, it is clearly part of Grisez’s moral theory that it is 
morally wrong to pursue the good of religion in an unnecessarily limited or partial 
way. One ought to pursue harmony with God in a moral way. Pursuit of religion is 
moral only when it is done as directed by the first principle of morality and its
« » • • • If)specifications in the modes of responsibility.
3.2.3 Harmony with God can be blocked by non-moral factors too
It is possible to pursue the good of religion and to act to instantiate it without 
participating fully in that good even though the failure is not a moral failure, (i.e. in 
one’s own control). Religion as a basic good is an essential aspect of “integral human 
fulfillment”, which is the fullness of being a human person in all aspects, including 
both existential and substantive goods, and including both individual and social 
aspects of human well-being.31 It is possible, and ultimately inevitable, that one will 
fail to achieve the substantive goods (life and health, knowledge and appreciation of 
beauty, excellence in work and play) even whilst making upright moral choices in 
pursuit of them. A morally good person can be unhealthy or ignorant or inept through
30 On the first principle o f morality, see ibid., 184-189 and on the modes see 189-195 and 205-226. The 
first principle o f morality is “In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to 
them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is 
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment” (184).
31 Ibid., 132. Although Grisez moves away from this concept in his 2008 article (see s. 6.3 above), his 
moral theory continues to place the integral fulfillment of us as human persons, as individuals in 
community, at its centre.
no fault of his own, and yet be morally good.32 One’s instantiation of reflexive goods 
is also limited by social factors outside one’s control.
Moral goodness is only a part of integral human fulfilment, of human happiness. This 
implies that virtuous pursuit of the specific good of religion can be engaged in without 
the actual achievement of substantive goods such as knowledge or excellence in one’s 
performance (or without achieving life/health). Nevertheless, ideally, one ought to 
pursue the good integrally, with due regard for all the various aspects of human 
fulfilment: “The upright person is concerned not only to choose rightly but also to 
serve all the human goods.”33
If one’s pursuit and instantiation of harmony with God is limited unnecessarily, in a 
way that one could avoid, then one is pursuing or instantiating religion immorally and 
imperfectly; and if one’s pursuit and instantiation of harmony with God is limited 
only in a way that is outside one’s control, then one is pursuing and instantiating the 
good of religion in a moral, upright way (even though the effectiveness of one’s 
participation in harmony with God might still be imperfect due to non-moral factors 
such as inculpable ignorance).
3.2.4a One ought to understood basic goods integrally
This idea of the necessity (for personal uprightness) of one’s being interested in 
serving all the human goods is central to Grisez’s understanding of how generally
8 8
32 See ibid., 128-130.
33 Ibid., 132.
practical reasoning becomes properly moral reasoning.34 Grisez is at pains to avoid 
the idea that one can or ought to understand or pursue any basic human good, 
including religion, as an isolated or absolute good. Ideally one ought to understand 
and pursue any good, including religion, in a way that is open to all the other goods. 
So, although one can grasp the point of pursuing harmony with God prior to any 
understanding of religion as one of an integral set of interrelated, irreducible, diverse 
and incommensurable basic goods, one grasps the point of religion, and instantiates it 
more effectively, as well as morally, only when one understands it integrally.
3.2.4b Religion can be understood on different levels
It can be said, in light of the points above, that Grisez’s moral theory presents a 
complex idea of religion as a basic human good. Religion can be understood on at 
least two levels:
a. At its most basic, religion is a generally practical good. It appeals to our 
basic rational interest in pursuing, in and through action, harmony with God 
and avoiding conflict with God.
b. At a more developed level, religion is a precisely moral good. It appeals to 
our rational interest in harmony with God, in a way that is simultaneously 
open and dedicated to all the other forms of human goodness specified in the 
diverse basic human goods.
3.2.4c Understanding religion at the moral level o f Grisez’s theory 
Looking at point (b) in more detail, we can say that the goodness of religion can be 
understood fully  only at the moral level of understanding, even though the practical 
principle that directs us to pursue the good of religion is grasped even at the merely 
practical level. So, a full understanding of the goodness of religion can be had only at
89
34 This is one major theme o f chapter seven of Christian Moral Principles.
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the moral level, which, as it were, subsumes the lower, practical level, and enables the
35person to see religion in the fullest light of reason: integral reason, right reason.
To understand what has just been said we need to look a little further at the moral 
phase of practical reasoning. This phase is controlled by the first principle of morality, 
which is specified by the “modes of responsibility”.36 Therefore, one’s pursuit of 
religion, which ought to be directed not only by the first principle of practical 
reasoning and the specific primary practical principle directing one to pursue the good 
of religion, but also by the first principle of morality, ought to be shaped by all the 
modes (when relevant, of course). One ought to avoid pursuing or instantiating 
harmony with God in a way that violates any of the modes. This rules out any 
pursuit of harmony with God that lacks proper concern with the full range of the basic 
human goods, or that is fettered by inertia, as directed by the first mode. It also rules 
out any approach to religion that is overly individualistic or that overlooks the value 
of cooperation, as the second mode directs. Pursuit of religion that is motivated by 
unreasonable emotional desires is also ruled out as immoral, according to the third 
mode, and the fourth mode rules out pursuit of religion shaped by unreasonable fear 
or disgust. The fifth mode concerns being impartial or fair in all one’s choices, so any 
pursuit of religion that is unfair or unjust is ruled out by this mode. The sixth mode
35 See Christian Moral Principles, 187. This point concerns only a logical relationship, not a 
chronological one. It is possible that a person might initially grasp the good o f religion in a way that 
simultaneously unites the two phases o f practical reasoning, thus grasping its practical point in a way 
that is immediately truly moral. It needs to be said that the point here about the necessity o f seeing the 
good of religion at both the practical and moral levels or phases o f practical rationality is not explicitly 
mentioned in Christian Moral Principles, but is implied by what is said there in a more general way.
36 See Christian Moral Principles chapter eight for details o f all eight modes o f responsibility. See 
Appendix Two below for details on the modes of responsibility and the first principle of morality as 
presented in Christian Moral Principles.
37 The application o f the eight modes o f responsibility that follows in this paragraph is my own; Grisez 
does not apply them all to religion in chapter eight of Christian Moral Principles or elsewhere in that 
work, or in any o f his works. None o f Grisez’s critics seem to have noticed the relevance o f the modes 
to one’s understanding o f the basic human goods.
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rules out choices that are superficial, concerned with empirical aspects of goods in a 
way that interferes with a more perfect sharing in a good or avoidance of a bad -  so 
any pursuit of religion that is unreasonably focussed on its empirical aspects is judged 
immoral by this mode. Religion that embodies vengeful or unreasonable hostile 
feelings is ruled out by the seventh mode. Finally, any approach to religion that would 
either absolutise it above the other goods, or treat it as inferior to one or more of them, 
is definitively ruled out by the eighth mode.
3.3 How one comes to be aware of the good of religion
3.3.1 Religion is not necessarily a virtue, but more basic
Even though it is clear from Grisez’s theory that it is only from the fully moral point 
of view that a person can fully understand the good of religion and effectively pursue 
it, it is also clear that Grisez’s moral theory holds that one’s grasp of the principle 
directing one to pursue religion is not dependent on one’s being virtuous. At the most 
basic level or phase, practical reasoning is available to all, even sinners. How does 
one come to know, at this most basic level or phase, the natural primary principle 
directing one to pursue and instantiate the intrinsic good of religion?38
38 We analyse here how Grisez’s moral theory accounts for how one can come to know by reason the 
principle directing us to pursue the good o f religion for its own sake. Obviously, one can come to know 
the good of religion by being brought up within a religious tradition and community and learning about 
religion and how to be religious from a very young age. It could be said that for many people, perhaps 
most, this is the way they first learn about the good of religion. It could also be argued that Grisez’s 
natural law theory, whilst it does not discount this way o f coming to know the good o f religion, tends 
not to mention it much, and that this is a weakness in his theory. Still, even a person who is brought up 
in a religious context still needs to grasp naturally the basic practical principle that harmony with God 
is worth pursuing fo r  its own sake. Our treatment of how religion is naturally grasped as a good 
indicates how such a person, and all persons, can come to be aware o f  the intrinsic practical worth of 
religion (and not just the worth o f  being true to one’s social identity or united with one’s social group, 
for example, which would be grounded in basic human goods other than religion).
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The principle directing one to pursue the good of harmony with God, and the other 
primary principles corresponding with the other basic human goods, “cannot be 
learned as conclusions from more basic truths.”39 One does not deduce a primary 
practical principle from any prior principle. Nor does one learn it from experience in 
the way that one learns what is the case from experience. Knowing the principle 
directing one to pursue the good of religion “is to understand something of human 
possibility”.40 With the frame of mind that asks “What might I bring about or not 
bring about?”, shaped by the practical principle Good is to be done and pursued, 
“people experience their tendencies and understand in them possibilities which could 
be satisfied by action.”41 These tendencies are natural, arising from one’s human 
nature, and interpreting them in a practical frame of mind enables one to project 
“possibilities implicit in one’s naturally given tendencies”.42 One is not necessarily 
virtuous in being able to do this: one is virtuous only when one does this in a way that 
respects the integral directiveness of all the basic goods, and chooses in a way that is 
not just practical, but fully and integrally (i.e. morally) practical.
39 Ibid., 181. This is why Grisez, following the clear lead o f Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I-II, 94, 2, 
refers to the primary principles of the natural law as self-evident, per se nota. James Hanink notices 
one implication o f  this in “A Theory o f Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy,” The Thomist 52 (1988): 
235, “There is no demonstration that a given basic good is such nor even that there are basic goods. 
That is, there is no argument for such conclusions whose premises we must accept on the pain of self- 
contradiction. For if  self-contradiction threatens, a skeptic could always impoverish his life so as to see 
as unattractive what which is attractive or to treat as instrumental that which is not. So here we can only 
recommend that the skeptic Took again’.” Hanink is only partially correct in his final point, in that one 
could argue with a sceptic using dialectical arguments for a good or goods: see s. 6.1.1 below.
40 Christian Moral Principles, 195.
41 Ibid., 196.
42 Ibid., 196 and also 182-183.
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3.3.2 How knowledge o f  the good o f religion is naturally acquired 
Knowing the basic principle directing one to pursue the good of religion is not 
something that happens suddenly out of nowhere, so to speak, with no antecedent 
conditions or experience. Knowledge of the good of religion is not innate and it is not 
a data-less intuition. It is acquired as follows. Firstly, people become aware of 
substantive goods, such as life and productive activities. How? People experience 
their “natural inclinations and the things which fulfill these inclinations” and bring 
satisfaction. Then they gain practical insight into “the total experience of natural 
inclinations and their fulfillment” and so they can “project goods as possibilities 
which can be realized by [their] own action”. Thus, people first act spontaneously to 
realize some basic human goods and then they learn to act by free choice for them. 
Finally, having come to learn to pursue and instantiate substantive basic goods by 
their free choices and commitments, the “experience of free choice itself becomes part 
of the data for understanding existential goods”, which include religion.43
Grisez does not directly apply these points to the good of religion in the chapters of 
Christian Moral Principles where he elaborates his natural law theory, but he does 
discuss in an earlier chapter of Christian Moral Principles (in a lengthy appendix to 
chapter 2) some points about how one is to understand one’s naturally possible 
knowledge of God, and part of this discussion offers some clues as to what are the
43 Ibid., 181. Grisez gives the brief example o f curiosity and the development o f  understanding of the 
good of knowledge, and also mentions the goods of friendship and justice here, but does not mention 
religion.
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natural tendencies concerning religion and the experiences that makes possible 
practical insight into the basic good of religion.44
3.3.3 Realities grounding our grasp o f the good o f religion
Grisez outlines “the general form of the reasoning by which one comes to know God 
from experience”, a form that he says is “simple enough”.45 Reason “follows the 
pointing of [the world of experience and the knowing self] beyond themselves”. The 
experience that we have as humans of the world is “in many ways ... incomplete”. It 
is natural to engage in reasoning to try to fill the gaps thus experienced and known by 
seeking after causes.46 The incompleteness of the world is felt in the various ways that 
the world fails to satisfy “the human mind and heart”. Grisez refers to four universal 
human realities to specify what is meant here:47
a. Our awareness that we will die; this fact seems absurd to persons, who have 
an inherent sense of their own dignity.
b. Our awareness of solidarity and community with ancestors and 
descendants; this suggests another dimension of reality, outside time and 
space, in which we remain with others.
c. Our poignant sense of evil, especially our own guilt, which cries out for 
salvation and forgiveness.
d. The realization that the world of things which come to be and pass away 
needs as a principle of its reality something independent in being.
44 Ibid., 63-67, a substantial appendix to the chapter on free choice, in which Grisez discusses how one 
can understand the compatibility o f free choice with God’s causality. Our main concern here is with 
one page in particular: 65.
45 All quotes in this paragraph are from Christian Moral Principles, 65, unless otherwise noted. Grisez 
makes reference to Rom 1:20 and the teaching o f Vatican I in support o f his approach to showing how 
God’s existence can be known by reason. Even children and simple people can come to know o f God’s 
existence by this kind o f reasoning, and philosophers can engage in it in a sophisticated manner.
46 See ibid., 64.
47 The wording is taken directly from ibid., 65, but the formatting is added.
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This final point, the realization that contingent reality needs a cause that “must have 
its reality of itself’, is described by Grisez as “shaping all this experience”. In other 
words, the first three experiences (of mortality, of community and its limitations, and 
of evil and guilt) are shaped by our overall sense that our experienced world and 
selves are radically incomplete and in need of explanation and meaning from some 
source that is different from us, and all contingent being, in that it has its being from
• 4 8nothing else more basic or primordial than itself.
After referring briefly to the four limitations of the world, listed above as (a) to (d), 
Grisez summarises his cosmological argument.49 He then sums up his overall 
position:
Nothing within the world of experience nor even the human self grasped in 
knowing this world is able to remove the absurdity of death, unite the 
community of humankind, overcome evil, and account for the reality of things 
not real of themselves. And so an Other, apart from the world of experience but 
required by it, is posited as an invisible and higher reality. This Other almost 
inevitably is thought of as a person or as something like a person. Virtually 
every human group seeks ways to live without tension and in harmony with this 
quasi-personal Other. The ways diverse peoples find and use constitute their 
religions. Thus, religion of some sort is almost a universal phenomenon.50
Along with the experiences thus specified, in which we are aware of the frustration of 
our practical pursuit of life, community, inner peace and authenticity, and 
knowledge,51 we have an awareness of our inherent dignity and human solidarity and
48 Point (d) above was treated by Grisez in great detail in Beyond the New Theism, which was treated in 
the previous chapter: see s. 2.5 above, especially 2.5.2.
49 Christian Moral Principles, 65-66.
50 Given the direct reference to religion in this quote from page 65 o f Christian Moral Principles, it is 
somewhat surprising that the page, and the appendix it forms part of, are not mentioned in the index 
under the heading o f “religion”; see ibid., 944.
51 The direct reference here to the frustration o f our pursuit o f the basic human goods is my own, not 
Grisez’s in Christian Moral Principles. The last point about knowledge, in particular, goes beyond 
Grisez. His last point, point (d) above, is interpreted as expressing, among other things, the frustration
our need for salvation and hope, as well as our awareness of the universal necessity 
for contingent being to have an uncaused cause. It is experiences such as these, and 
the reasoning by which we seek to make sense out of such experiences, that ground 
our knowledge of the practical principle directing us to seek the good of religion in 
and through our action.
A person can come to have the practical insight that it would be good to pursue 
harmony with God because the four experiences mentioned by Grisez are problems on 
a very large scale, in fact, on the largest scales we can think of: the historical, global,
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and cosmic scales. We can pursue the good of life, for example, in concrete 
instantiations, as we try to deal with individual or even social instances of illness and 
threats to health, but we find ourselves with a more-than-human problem when we 
face the fact that all our efforts to pursue life are doomed to fail ultimately. In such 
circumstances, which are universal and keenly felt by humanity in virtually all 
cultures, it is easy to grasp the point of trying to achieve some measure of harmony 
with the ultimate Source of life, in the hope of coping with mortality. It is the same 
with the other three experiences -  failure to maintain community, to deal with guilt, to 
account for contingency -  they all point human persons beyond the merely human 
toward a more-than-human Source that it would be good to know about and be at 
peace with, even to a limited extent. Hence the primary practical principle directing us 
to pursue religion (however we can) is grasped naturally.53
of our pursuit of the good o f knowledge. See also s. 4.1 below for how Grisez develops his thinking in 
the 1987 article co-authored with Finnis and Boyle.
52 This paragraph goes beyond what Grisez says in Christian Moral Principles.
53 Later in Christian M oral Principles, Grisez explains how this rational desire for harmony with God, 
which presupposes such experiences as we have seen here, along with our rational desire to know the 
truth about life and history, are the natural grounds for our ability to freely choose to make the act of
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This natural grasp of the good of religion is not initially a full understanding of the
goodness of religion; nor is it a complete understanding of God; nor is it a complete
knowledge of how one is to pursue harmony with God. Initially one grasps the good
of religion as something very basic and very simple. Even a child (beyond the age of
reason) can grasp rationally the good of religion in this basic way. However, the very
basic understanding of religion that one begins with can be developed, and indeed
must be developed, as is the case with the other basic human goods too:
Experience of fulfillment together with theoretical inquiry leads to more or less 
detailed practical sketches of the basic goods... The secondary parts of the 
understanding of the basic forms of human goodness can develop and vary, and 
they can include mistakes and thus be open to correction ... The various levels 
of existential harmony are understood as good on the basis of human tendencies 
no less fundamental than the urges to survive, to play, and to understand. For 
everyone wants peace of mind, friends, and a favorable relationship with unseen 
Power. But differences in experience and in theoretical beliefs make a great 
difference in how people conceive these goods in specific detail.54
The term “religion” in Grisez’s moral theory does not denote necessarily a fully 
worked out set of beliefs and/or practices about God and his will; still less does it 
denote necessarily true religious beliefs or effective religious practices. The basic 
human good of religion is seen by Grisez as a field of human possibility to be 
explored and, ideally, to be more and more accurately understood and effectively 
instantiated through action at the individual and social levels.
3.3.4 One’s initial grasp o f  religion can and must develop
faith, thus accepting God’s revelation and entering into the new covenant. See ss. 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 
below.
54 Ibid., 196.
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The practical principle directing one to pursue and instantiate the good of religion 
calls for more than just the initial basic grasp of the point of such a pursuit and 
(attempted) instantiation to be effective.55 The primary part of the principle directing 
one to pursue the good of religion seems to be seen by Grisez as rather “thin” in 
content, so to speak, but once one grasps the basic insight that it would be good to 
pursue harmony with God, in some way and however minimally one understands 
what is meant by “God”, one has grasped the point and knows the principle.56 
However, there seems to be a complexity to the good of religion and to the principle 
directing us to pursue it, in that the “secondary parts”57 of one’s understanding of the 
good of religion can and must be developed and, insofar as one is in error, corrected.
Although Grisez insists that the primary practical principles, including the one 
directing toward the good of religion, are basic and underived, not in any way 
deduced from theoretical knowledge, it is evident that he does not want to completely 
separate the practical from the theoretical. His moral theory fully acknowledges that 
theoretical knowledge can and should be a major factor in how our initial grasp of the
55 Another way o f putting this is to say that the good o f religion is just one o f the basic human goods, 
not the whole o f the good. So too is inner consistency (or authenticity, as Grisez sometimes calls it). It 
is not enough for a person to be sincere and conscientious in his or her pursuit o f the goods, including 
religion: a conscientious person will also want to be objectively correct in his or her knowledge. We 
should remember that knowledge is one of the basic human goods and that the goods form an integral 
set.
56 It needs to be said, however, that Grisez does not develop clearly in Christian Moral Principles
philosophical answers to the questions: How do we know that the more-than-human source o f reality 
wants to help us deal with our more-than-humanly-solvable problems? How do we know that harmony 
with the more-than-human source o f  all reality will bring us peace and fulfillment? Grisez’s attention 
as a moral theologian is on how divine revelation accepted in faith answers these questions, rather than 
with specifically philosophical answers to them. Still, Grisez had addressed some philosophical issues 
in great detail in Beyond the New Theism (see s. 2.5 above) and addresses some aspects in works 
subsequent to Christian Moral Principles (see s. 5.1.4 below, which looks at his approach to faith in 
Living a Christian Life).
57 Ibid.
goodness of religion, and the other basic goods, is developed and made more and 
more correct and practically effective.
3.4 The place of the good of religion in Grisez’s moral theology: faith
3.4.1 Theological development o f one’s knowledge o f the good o f  religion 
It could be argued that the major part of Christian Moral Principles, chapters nineteen 
through thirty six, is devoted to a theological development of our understanding of, 
and participation in, the goods of knowledge and religion, and that this development 
includes a great deal of theoretical knowledge about God, revelation, faith, 
Christology, Christian modes of responsibility, prayer and sacraments, and Church 
authority. This knowledge is theoretical in that it concerns what was, what is, and 
what will be.58 This theological information and elaboration is presented with a 
practical aim in mind, of course, and not just theoretical interest, and so it is possible 
that someone who reads it with a practical frame of mind shaped by primary practical 
principles, which are outlined in chapters five, seven and eight of Christian Moral 
Principles, will be greatly helped to do something', to pursue and instantiate the goods 
of knowledge and religion (and, indeed, other basic goods too) in the most effective 
and fulfilling way -  “The Way of the Lord Jesus”.59
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58 The term “theoretical” is not used here to mean hypothetical, or abstract, or irrelevant, as it often is in 
everyday usage. It is used here, and constantly in Grisez’s theory, in its Aristotelian sense, always in 
contrast to “practical” . Theoretical knowledge is knowledge o f what is given already, o f  what is (or 
was, or will be); practical knowledge is knowledge o f what is to be, or what ought to be. Theoretical 
knowledge is descriptive; practical knowledge is prescriptive.
59 It is also possible that a reader o f Christian Moral Principles could approach it in a purely theoretical 
frame o f mind and so miss its practical religious importance and value.
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3.4.2 The bridge between natural law and moral theology: the act o f  faith 
It would seem that here we are at the intersection or bridge between strictly natural 
law theory and moral theology proper. The key to understanding how Grisez sees this 
intersection or bridge is found by studying how he analyses the act of Christian 
faith.60 Christian faith is “the acceptance of [God’s] personal communication”.61 It is 
not merely the acceptance of information about God or his existence, which might be 
motivated by only the specific pursuit of the good of knowledge. Faith is a choice, not 
an inevitable acknowledgment of self-evident or obvious facts or logical conclusions.
• • • ff)Faith is essentially concerned with “a personal relationship”.
One has good reasons to put one’s faith in God’s revelation; it is not an arbitrary 
choice, even though it is a free choice. “It is a choice made for the sake of the human
S'! t f
goods of truth and religion.” This highlights the reasonableness of the human act of 
faith. There exist “factors that make it possible to give responsible assent”64 to God’s 
revelation. There are “provisional grounds of faith which finally matures into absolute 
acceptance of God’s self-revelation”.65
60 Grisez deals with this in chapter twenty o f Christian Moral Principles, questions B to F, and in 
chapter twenty four, question D.
61 Ibid., 482.
62 Ibid., 480.
63 Ibid., 485. In the moral order, the good of truth and the good o f knowledge are synonymous: 
someone seeking knowledge is seeking truth. So Grisez often uses the two terms interchangeably. 
Whether one actually finds objective truth depends on moral factors and non-moral factors. In this 
respect, the basic good o f knowledge is similar to the good of religion, the effective instantiation of 
which is also limited by moral factors and non-moral factors, as examined above. Someone seeking a 
basic human good is acting subjectively, but is seeking the objective reality o f  the good sought. 
Subjective and objective are closely linked in Grisez’s moral theory and in morality.
64 Ibid., 486. Grisez makes reference in his main text to the teaching o f Trent and Vatican I, and to the 
theological analysis o f Aquinas, in his treatment o f faith. Grisez mentions as two initial provisional 
grounds for faith the fact that people often and reasonably rely on testimony that seems honest, and that 
the preaching of the Gospel is accompanied by signs that back up its truth.
65 Ibid., referring to Mark 8:22-26, John 4:6-42 as examples.
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Two motivating factors for faith, which are closely related to the good of religion, are 
mentioned later in the same chapter of Christian Moral Principles. First, we have a 
moral responsibility to acknowledge the reality of sin and strive to avoid it and its 
consequences, and this motivates the act of faith because faith “is necessary for 
justification and the overcoming of all the humanly devastating consequences of 
sin”.66 Second, because we live in a situation of sin and temptation, “the act of faith 
and fidelity to it are not only morally required but are in one’s own best interests. The 
alternative is failure to be fulfilled, now and eternally, both as a human individual and 
as one called to membership in the divine family.” Thus, the human act of faith is 
seen by Grisez as motivated, especially in its initial stage, by our intelligent desires 
both to avoid sin (and its effects) and seek harmony with God, and avoid ignorance 
and seek knowledge of God and his will.
As said already, faith is not the acceptance of bare facts or information, but an 
acceptance of personal communication by which God invites the human person into 
communion with him. This communication from God is mediated through the 
Church: “Thus, converts come to the Church and seek faith from her in baptism 
because they think her teaching true and her way of life a sound path to peace with 
God.” Pursuing the good of religion is not an exclusively individualistic thing, but 
has a necessary community and tradition dimension.
66 Ibid., 492.
67 Ibid. The two motivating factors mentioned by Grisez here echo the experiences and kinds of 
awareness presupposed by our grasp of the good of religion: human mortality, social disintegration, 
evil and guilt, and the mystery o f contingency: see s. 3.3.3 above.
68 Ibid., 485. Note the reference to the goods of knowledge and religion as motivating factors for the 
human act of faith. (The phrase “peace with God” is another way o f referring to the good o f religion.) It
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3.4.3 The basic goods o f knowledge and religion are interrelated 
As faith is chosen for the sake of religion and knowledge, the interplay or 
combination of these two basic goods should be acknowledged.69 As we have already 
seen, we can and do pursue the basic goods in combination with each other. In 
particular, Grisez mentions the substantive goods being “vehicles” for the reflexive 
goods.70 This combination of the substantive good of knowledge and the reflexive 
good of religion would seem to be a case in point. One’s knowledge and 
understanding of how the good of religion is to be instantiated and pursued is 
something that grows and develops as one’s knowledge of religion grows and 
develops so that one is more surely in touch with reality (which is the object of the 
good of knowledge).71 Before one can make the act of Christian faith, one needs to 
know more than the basic principle that religion “is to be done and pursued” 
(following the first principle of practical reasoning and its specification regarding that 
particular aspect of human fulfillment). One needs one’s initial, general grasp of the 
principle to be further specified by accurate knowledge of what is involved in the 
good of religion. In particular, given the fact that God has revealed truths about 
himself and his will, and that man is a fallen creature who finds it difficult to know 
the truth about God, one needs to know, at least to some extent, central elements of 
God’s revelation before one can fully understand the nature of true religion and know
could be argued that Grisez does not give enough attention to people who are brought up in the faith 
and who never explicitly “convert” to it. Still, it would not be difficult to adapt what he does say to the 
situation of people who are brought up as Christians, who stand in need o f continual conversion.
69 This is a point only implied by Grisez’s treatment o f the issues in Christian Moral Principles.
70 Grisez clearly acknowledges that a person can choose a single act for more than one motive, or, in 
other words, in pursuit o f more than one basic human good: see ibid., 181-182. See also s. 3.1.8 above.
71 Pursuit of the good o f knowledge has as its object the achievement of contact with objective reality, 
knowledge of what is real. Those who criticise Grisez for being too subjectivist seem to overlook his 
emphasis on the good o f knowledge as an integral part o f human fulfillment and o f  morality.
how to pursue it soundly and effectively. Then, interpreted in light of one’s practical 
insights that it would be good to be in (greater) harmony with God and to know God 
better, one’s knowledge of what God has revealed in Christ and through the Church 
puts one in a position to make the act of faith as a freely chosen human act.
This shows that the practical good of religion, or at least its effective instantiation, can 
be specified in the light of one’s theoretical knowledge, one’s knowledge of what is, 
or was, or will be -  as revealed by God in Christ and mediated by the Church. In fact, 
the good of religion ought to be thus specified if one is to be in touch objectively with 
reality and to act in a way that is totally reasonable.
3.4.4 Faith is a human act and more
It is clear that the Catholic Church considers the act of faith to be the most adequate 
response to reality, a response that is completely reasonable. Grisez agrees fully. 
According to him, the act of faith is “a reasonable, free human act” from start to 
finish.72 However, the act of faith is more than just a human act made for the sake of 
human goods. Following the constant teaching of the Church, Grisez insists that “faith 
is both a human act and a divine gift”.73
From the human side, the one who makes the commitment of faith causes himself or 
herself “to share in the human goods of the Christian community”; not only that, but
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72 Ibid., referring to the teaching o f Vatican I.
73 Ibid., 487.
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relationship with God”.74 But then:
in the act of living faith, one’s acceptance of God’s proposal is transformed by 
being made out of love for him. The transformation occurs by God’s gift, the 
love poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, and not by a self- 
creative act of our own. Thus, we participate in divinity by our own free choice 
-  not, however, by constituting ourselves divine, but by God’s so constituting
the act of faith “contributes to constituting, from the believer’s side, the intimate
3.4.5 The motivations o f Christian acts
There is, therefore, in the single act of living faith a self-constituting dimension 
corresponding to human action for the goods of religion and knowledge, which 
disposes us to live for integral human fulfilment, and a God-constituted dimension 
corresponding to the gift of God’s love poured into our hearts, which disposes us to 
live for God’s goodness.
The self-constituting dimension causes the one who makes the act of faith (for the
sake of knowledge and religion)
to share in the human goods of Christian community, such as religion and truth 
-  for example, one becomes a catechumen, associates with members of the 
Church, participates in some of their religious acts, such as prayers, and receives 
instruction in the faith.
74 Ibid., 485. Note that Grisez says that the human act of faith “contributes to constituting” our 
relationship with God, not that it “constitutes” it. Grisez does not hold that we can constitute our 
relationship with God totally by ourselves and our choices. God’s action is necessary too.
75 Ibid. It should be noted in what follows that often in Christian M oral Principles Grisez uses the 
following phrases virtually interchangeably (though not without nuance): the love o f  God, God’s love, 
the divine goodness, our sharing in divine life, our sharing in the divine nature, charity, the gift o f the 
Spirit, God’s love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, our status as G od’s children, sanctifying 
grace. I will follow this usage here. Some aspects o f this are controversial, but this present work does 
not enter into all the complicated difficulties: for more details, see Christian Moral Principles, 592- 
595, 614-616 and 681-682.
76 Ibid., 485.
Grisez does not see the good of “religion” as pertaining only to the pre-baptism stage 
of Christian life. He says also that the act of living faith, in its being at the same time 
both human and divine, and its being the primary act of the Christian life, the 
fundamental option of the Christian, “is the paradigm for every other act of Christian 
life”.77 Religion (and knowledge) continue to motivate and shape the acts of one’s 
Christian life after faith and baptism, because such acts also are human acts rationally 
motivated for the sake of religion (along with other goods, including knowledge).
However, as the human agents who choose the acts of Christian life are now children 
of God who share in divine life, their acts will be motivated and shaped in a way that 
is also divine, and so they are also “divine acts”, in a mysterious way. In other words, 
all human acts of the Christian life will be motivated both by the basic human goods, 
especially religion and knowledge, and also by the divine goodness, present in the 
divine life given to us by the Holy Spirit when we make the act of faith and receive 
baptism.
3.4.6 Natural and supernatural are both gifts o f  God, but distinctly so 
Thus, in his analysis of the act of faith, Grisez sees faith as having two dimensions: it 
is a human act motivated by the goods of knowledge and religion, a free choice 
undertaken for humanly grasped reasons (but not determined by them); at the same 
time, it is a divine gift received by the one who makes the human free choice. The 
former, it could be said, refers to the level of nature and natural law, the dimension of 
reality constituted by our basic awareness of practical principles, followed by 
reasoning, deliberation, choosing and acting for human goods; the latter could be said
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77 Ibid.
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to refer to a higher dimension than nature and natural law, a supernatural dimension, 
in which man can share in the divine life and divine nature not by his deliberation and 
choice or action, but by God’s choice, action and gift.78 In making this distinction 
between the free choice of the believer to believe and the free choice of God to pour 
his love into our hearts (see Rom 5:5),79 Grisez is following what was said in the
OA
Decree on Justification of the Council of Trent.
One major aim of Grisez’s here is to clarify “how God’s love invites, respects, and 
ultimately divinizes a human being”.81 The phrase “God’s love invites” indicates the 
fact that the act of faith is right from the very start (and not only ultimately) God’s 
gift. The points made by Grisez in his analysis of faith are not meant to suggest that 
the “natural” aspect of the act of faith, its being a human free act for the sake of 
religion and knowledge, is unrelated to God, or independent of God, and that only the 
ultimate supernatural aspect of faith is dependent on God. No, both the natural and the 
supernatural aspects of faith are fully dependent on God. As Grisez often says in his
78 Again, it needs to be noted that Grisez does not use the language o f “natural law” and “supernatural 
dimension” in this respect; but the language used here corresponds to what Grisez is saying in 
Christian Moral Principles. See ibid., 478, paragraph 3.
79 Romans 5:5 is a biblical text that Grisez refers to often in Christian Moral Principles, as can be seen 
by looking at the scripture index in Christian Moral Principles, 957.
80 See ibid., 583-586. An English translation o f the Council o f Trent’s Decree on Justification can be 
found online at http://www.americancatholictruthsociety.com/docs/TRENT/trent6.htm [accessed 17th 
July 2008]. Perhaps it could be argued that much o f the difficulty o f this part o f  Grisez’s theology is 
simply the effect o f the complexity o f the issues involved, which are virtually impossible to reconcile 
in one, totally clear understanding. It is notoriously difficult to see how to put together into one 
coherent understanding o f  reality: God’s free gift o f grace, God’s universal causality, our free choices, 
our good works, and the contributions to our salvation o f God’s grace and our own good works. One 
might consult the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church on justification, grace and merit, and notice the 
way that Grisez is trying to be faithful to all the different aspects o f the Church’s teaching on these 
topics: see pars. 1987-2029.
81 Christian Moral Principles, 585.
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work, our free choices are God’s creation.82 God’s justifying and sanctifying love 
respects our humanity by allowing us an active part in our own justification. Our 
active part in our own justification is not one that is independent of God’s grace, of 
course, but one by which we initially cooperate with God’s grace, which precedes any 
choice or act of our own, in making our free choice to believe and accept God’s offer 
of a share in communion with him, and we continue to cooperate with God’s grace 
and live out our communion in divine life by living a Christian life that is motivated 
by human goods and divine life.83 Thus, our human act of faith, made for the sake of 
knowledge and religion, is changed into the “living faith which works through love
84(cf. Gal 5:6) and keeps the commandments”.
Grisez sums up his point about the distinctive roles of religion and divine goodness in
the act of living faith in this way:
One is prepared to accept the gospel because it is credible; seeing that one ought 
to believe it, one chooses to do so. Before receiving God’s love, one makes this 
choice for the sake of some human good, such as avoiding God’s punishment or 
enjoying his favor. Having accepted God’s proposal and thereupon received his 
gift of love, however, one is disposed by this love toward the divine goodness 
which God is and which he shares with his children. Thus, one has an 
additional reason, his goodness, for choosing to listen to God and adhere to him 
faithfully. One’s choice is thereby transformed, not as if one chose to assent to a 
different gospel, but by being a differently motivated choice to assent to the 
same gospel. 5
82 On this point, it is worth noting, for example, how often Grisez makes reference to Ephesians 2:10, 
in which our good works are clearly spoken o f as God’s creation. In the scripture index to Christian 
Moral Principles, this passage is shown to be referred to in seven places in the book. The substantial 
third appendix to chapter three o f Christian Moral Principles deals in some detail with our choices as 
both free and caused by God. One might also refer to chapter eighteen o f  Beyond the New Theism for 
more on the topic of G od’s causing all our free choices, as he does every contingent reality.
83 See Christian Moral Principles, 614-616, for Grisez’s understanding o f the various uses of “grace”.
84 Ibid., 584, final note (referring to official Church teaching supporting the point) omitted.
85 Ibid., 585, emphases added. The phrases “avoiding God’s punishment or enjoying his favor” are 
another way to refer to the basic good o f religion. Note how Grisez sees love o f God going beyond the 
good o f religion as such: love o f God is love o f God both for him self and as he shares his own divine 
life with us.
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3.4.7 Divine goodness and human goodness are distinct but related
Grisez makes a clear distinction between two types of good: the human good and the
divine good. They are distinct and irreducible to one another, but they are related too.
Although our human act of faith is not for the sake of the divine goodness in any
direct way, our human act of faith, made for the sake of the basic human goods of
religion and knowledge, is necessary for our receiving the gift of God’s love poured
into hearts, justifying and transforming us. Earlier in Christian Moral Principles,
Grisez said that constant openness to all the human goods (i.e. moral goodness)
is important for one’s future choices, for one’s attitude toward other people’s 
choices, and for one’s readiness to accept a share in divine life, which includes 
in a higher mode all the created goods o f human persons.86
It is a mistake to see Grisez as putting the good of religion (and all the basic human
%
goods in both their individual and integral directiveness) in a category totally 
unrelated to, and separated from, the divinely given gift of the love of God that forms 
the principle of Christian life.
How one’s willingness to be morally good is related to one’s sharing in divine life is
further illuminated when Grisez says that
choices which conform to the primary principle of morality -  a will to integral 
human fulfilment -  leave open the possibility that the meaning of human life is 
not limited to what persons actually choose and attain, but derives at least in
• ♦ 87part from humankind’s greater possibility of fulfillment in Jesus.
86 Ibid., 186, emphasis added. Again, it should be noted that it is clear in Grisez’s natural law theory, 
and its theological development, that our natural openness to moral goodness is already God’s gift to 
us, and not some achievement o f our own, independent of God. See, for example, ibid., chapter seven, 
questions A and B, on the natural law as participation in the eternal law.
87 Ibid., 188. This point is a theological development o f what Grisez had said in earlier works about the 
extremely important role o f belief in God (as the transcendent source o f  all goods) in helping us to 
avoid making any basic human good the supreme good, and thus being immoral: see ss. 2.1.9, 2.3.4, 
and 2.7 above.
109
A genuinely religious attitude is seen as open to God’s goodness:
A genuinely religious attitude acknowledges that human purposes and 
possibilities have meaning which transcends their particular significance for the 
individual -  meaning related in some way to God’s goodness.88
The meaning of human life, including the natural law, is not confined to our natural 
fulfillment but also somehow includes openness to God’s love and goodness and our 
possible fulfillment by grace.
3.4.8 Sin and religion
Grisez treats sin in Christian Moral Principles in a series of six chapters in between
his treatment of natural law (chapters two through twelve) and his treatment of moral
theology proper (chapters nineteen through thirty six). Are these chapters on “sin”
natural law theory or moral theology? They are filled with theological references and
arguments, but it would be a mistake to think that Grisez, therefore, thinks of sin as an
exclusively theological concept. He defines sin as
moral evil considered precisely insofar as it is contrary to the good of religion -  
contrary, that is, to the fulfillment of humankind’s potential for harmony with 
God.90
Sin is not something that only Christians (or Jews) can be aware of or commit; it is 
possible for anyone to be aware of and/or commit sin because anyone can know the 
natural law and choose to go against it:
88 Ibid., emphasis added.
89 Although the last two chapters o f  Christian Moral Principles can be seen as a kind o f appendix to its 
moral theology proper, it is reasonable to include them under the heading o f moral theology. Both 
chapters develop points made in earlier chapters concerning the relationship between conscience and 
the Church’s teaching authority.
90 Ibid., 314. This important reference to “religion” is not mentioned in the index entry for “religion”, 
see ibid., 944.
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For even without faith, people can realize that immorality offends not only 
against reason and, often, the rights of one’s neighbor but also against the more- 
than-human source of meaning and value called ‘God’. One who violates moral 
requirements refuses to accept his or her limitation as a creature and implicitly 
rejects God’s wisdom and love, the source of meaning and value in creation at 
large and in human life in particular.91
This (at least) implicit rejection of God’s wisdom and love, which is a constitutive 
part of every immoral act that makes it a sin, is a violation of the natural law “and so 
violates the eternal law in which natural law participates.”92 Such a sin by an 
unbeliever, (sometimes spoken of as a kind of “philosophical sin”, as distinct from 
“theological sin” committed by those with faith), can be mortal.93 It is clear, therefore, 
that failures to follow the natural law, and in particular failures to respect and serve 
the good of religion, can be mortal sins. Failure to love the good of religion is 
therefore a serious obstacle to sharing in the divine life that is the gift given by God in 
and through living faith (and baptism).
From what he says about religion and faith and sin, it can be argued that Grisez sees 
the good of religion as both a very important human good in its own right and a good 
that forms a kind of link between natural law and revealed law (or, in other words, 
between the natural morality of reason and the Christian moral life shaped by love of 
God). The good of religion is violated, at least implicitly, in every immoral will and 
act. And any immoral choice, or any kind of unwillingness to accept the primary
91 Ibid., 317, emphases added. This reference to religion is not indicated in the index to Christian Moral 
Principles. Grisez makes reference to Rom 1:18-22 just before this quote; to this could be added the 
famous reference o f  Paul to the natural law, in Rom 2:14-15, which supports the point made here, that 
even those without faith can know the reality of sin. Arguably, the words “at least” should be placed 
before the words “implicitly rejects God’s wisdom and love” , as it is obvious that Grisez accepts that 
one can explicitly reject G od’s wisdom and love by violating moral requirements.
92 Ibid. Grisez here echoes Aquinas’s classic definition o f natural law as the rational participation o f the 
eternal law in the rational creature: see Christian Moral Principles, 174.
93 See ibid., 317-318.
principle of morality, is a kind of idolatry.94 So any refusal (deliberate failure) to 
pursue and instantiate integrally the basic human goods is simultaneously both sin and 
a failure to live in harmony with God. Thus, the good of religion is violated in every 
immoral kind of willing, at least implicitly. The good of religion and avoidance of sin 
are intrinsically linked. Thus, the good of religion and our openness to receiving the 
love of God are intrinsically linked too.
3.4.9 Supernaturally transformed motivation: what does this mean?
The good of religion (along with knowledge) motivates the human act of faith, which 
is then transformed by charity/grace into a sharing in the divine life, the love of God. 
Even though the initial act of human faith, motivated by human goods, is transformed 
by God’s love into justifying, living faith, this initial “act of reasonable submission” 
made for the sake of religion and knowledge “is not suspended when the gift of faith 
is received”.95 The good of religion is continually important for living faith. The 
transformation by God’s love of a person’s act of faith does not negate the basic 
human good of religion. Somehow the human good (of religion) and the divine good 
(of sharing in God’s divine life of love) are linked, though distinct and irreducible to 
one another, and can operate in our motivation simultaneously.
But what is the relationship between the human goods, including the good of religion, 
and the divine goodness that we can share by God’s gift? What is the nature of the 
transformation of motivation effected by the gift of God’s love poured into our hearts
94 See ibid., 188. Note that Grisez does not confine his understanding o f human voluntariness to only 
choices. One can be responsible for other kinds of willingness: see chapter nine o f Christian Moral
Principles.
I l l
95 Ibid., 485.
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by the Holy Spirit, and how is this divine love related to motivation toward human 
goods? How is the act of living faith, shaped by the infused disposition to love God 
with divine love itself, “differently motivated” than the act of faith carried out for the 
sake of religion and knowledge?96
One possible answer to these questions is that the supernatural motivation provided by 
divine revelation accepted by living faith replaces the merely human motivation, with 
the result that divine goodness is seen as a new, better motivation for human acts, one 
that supersedes the motivation provided by basic human goods. This is a position that 
Grisez rejects totally.97 He rejects the idea that the supernatural replaces the natural, 
that the love of God replaces our human love of integral human fulfillment in the 
basic goods. Religion is not, to coin a phrase, a “supergood”.
3.4.10 Biblical insights into the good o f religion and its non-absoluteness
98Grisez criticises certain aspects of the Old Covenant in the Old Testament. Because 
they were affected by “the fallen human condition and living in the early stages of 
divine pedagogy which culminates with Jesus”,99 the Israelites were inevitably lacking 
in a fully correct understanding of the basic human goods, and they misunderstood the 
good of religion, seeing it as a good that was more important than other goods. As “a 
side-effect of certain other aspects of divine revelation”,100 the people of God in the
96 See s. 3.4.6 below.
97 One o f the central themes o f all Grisez’s work is that grace does not supersede or replace nature.
98 See ibid., chapter eight, question H, where Grisez treats the eighth mode o f responsibility, which is: 
“One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance o f an intelligible good to act for it by 
choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance o f an intelligible good” (216-222, at 216).
99 Ibid., 219.
100 Ibid., 218.
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Old Testament thought of their specific aspirations to be God’s covenantal people as a 
higher good that relativised other goods, even the good of human life, and so they 
condoned, and even saw as God’s command, war against their enemies and the 
widespread use of the death penalty.101
However, with Jesus an improved, more accurate understanding of religion is 
revealed: “Jesus undermines the traditional understanding of the subordination of 
other human goods to the good of religion.”102 It is clear that Jesus is presented by 
Grisez, not only in the part of Christian Moral Principles being looked at here but
i a-> m
throughout the book, as the key to understanding how human goods and divine 
goodness are related. The new covenant that Jesus makes available to all humankind 
is a good, but it
is not a limited set of human goods, such as Israel hoped for. Hence, the 
relationship with God no longer demands the constrictions upon human 
fulfillment which were taken for granted as acceptable both by the Pharisees and 
the zealots.104
This good, the new covenant, is a sharing in divine life by sharing in unity with Jesus, 
who is both fully human and fully divine.
101 See ibid., 218-219 for details and biblical references.
102 Ibid., 221. The phrase “traditional understanding” here refers to what Grisez takes to be the Old 
Testament’s inadequate and provisional view o f religion: that it takes precedence over all other goods.
103 See especially Christian Moral Principles, chapters nineteen, twenty-two, and thirty-four.
104 Ibid., 221. The Pharisees made the prescriptions o f the law absolute and sought to separate 
themselves from evil; the Zealots tended to reduce the kingdom o f God to a purely earthly political 
fulfillment and sought to destroy evil. Grisez sees Jesus as taking a very different approach, one of 
merciful and reconciling love.
114
3.5.1 Christological considerations are central
Grisez’s moral theology is centred on the Incarnation, on Jesus as both fully human 
and fully divine, and on Jesus as the model for Christians.105 An adequate Christology 
is essential for understanding how human and divine goodness are related. 
Specifically, understanding the role of religion in moral life is essential in coming to 
understand Jesus Christ; and understanding Christ sheds light on religion too.
3.5 The place o f religion in Grisez’s moral theology: Christology
3.5.2 Jesus pursued the basic human good o f religion
As man, Jesus pursued the basic human good of religion. This pursuit was at the heart
of his life and mission:
Jesus had to choose -  and did choose -  to live his human life in fulfillment o f 
the unbreakable communion between him and the Father. This choice is his 
basic commitment. Scripture testifies that his basic commitment was a religious 
one: “My food is to do the will of him who sent me, and to accomplish his 
work” (Jn 4:34, cf. Jn 5:30) ... A commitment to doing God’s will is a 
commitment to the good of religion, that is, to that human fulfillment which 
consists in harmony between humankind and God. It is also a commitment to 
the persons involved: to humankind and to God.106
Jesus did the will of the Father, pursuing his basic commitment to the good of 
religion, by finding and carrying out his own personal vocation, which was “to 
overcome sin and communicate divine life to fallen humankind by establishing a new
105 See ibid., chapters twenty-one and twenty-two.
106 Ibid., 530, emphasis in original. Paragraph numbers are omitted (the quote moves from paragraph 
one into paragraph two o f chapter twenty-two, question B). Note that Jesus’ pursuit o f  the good of 
religion is not exclusively individualistic, but includes at its heart a deep concern for the good o f man. 
By his pursuit and instantiation o f harmony with the Father, Jesus makes possible harmony with the 
Father for the whole human race insofar as people can be united with Jesus.
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vocation from the religious and political leaders of his day, Jesus remained faithful
even when faced with the threat of execution. His free acceptance of death carries out
his personal vocation and is redemptive. Jesus’ free acceptance of the cross
is a gift to the Father. The Father receives and approves this gift and in return 
raises Jesus from the dead. The gift and response together perfect the 
relationship of friendship between Jesus as man and the Father; this relationship 
displaces the alienation from God of fallen humankind. This new relationship is 
more than the friendship of the old covenant, for by it Jesus, as Word Incarnate,
1 ORcommunicates divine life to his human brothers and sisters.
and lasting covenant.”107 Facing extreme opposition to this commitment and personal
3.5.3 Jesus, sacrifice and the good o f religion
Thus, sacrifice is at the heart of Jesus’ mission and our redemption by him. Sacrifice 
is also at the heart of the good of religion: “Sacrifice is central to all religion. The very 
notion of sacrifice involves a gift offered to God”109 Sacrifice involves offering to 
God what he has already given us (everything being God’s gift in the first place) as an 
effective sign of a harmonious relationship with him. Sacrifice also involves accepting 
difficulty or loss and is therefore a sign of one’s sincere devotion to God. The most 
important thing in offering sacrifice is the attitude of the one who offers the sacrifice, 
the sincerity and purity of heart with which the gift is offered. Also, it is important 
that God accept the sacrifice.110
107 Ibid., 532. By “personal vocation”, Grisez means the specific, unique calling from God to Jesus and 
to each one o f us, to do the good deeds that God the Father has prepared for each o f us to do as his will, 
loving actions that are appropriate to our own individual talents and circumstances, and that serve the 
needs of others. Personal vocation is presented in Christian Moral Principles as a central theological 
concept in Grisez’s moral theory: see ibid., 532-538 (regarding Jesus) and 559-565 (regarding 
Christians).
108 Ibid., 539.
109 Ibid., 468, with a reference to Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2, and III, q. 48, a. 3.
110 See Christian Moral Principles, 468. What is said here about “God” is spoken from a Christian 
point o f view. There are also non-Christian concepts o f  sacrifice as being to “the gods”, but they 
include many o f the same essential elements outlined in this paragraph. Even though such non- 
Christian sacrifice is an instantiation o f religion to some extent, Grisez’s moral theology would see it as 
clearly inferior to Christian understanding and practice o f  religious sacrifice.
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The fact that Jesus’ life and freely accepted death were a sacrifice to the Father is seen
particularly in his institution of the Eucharist.111 “To the extent that Jesus outwardly
does anything to carry out his redemptive commitment, he does it at the Last
Supper.”112 By instituting the Eucharist as a memorial of his redemptive death, Jesus
puts sacrifice at the heart of the Christian life:
As the celebration of the Passover kept the old covenant alive, so the celebration 
of the Eucharist would keep the new covenant alive -  until Jesus comes. Thus 
he makes his sacrificial act not just an example to be followed but, more 
basically, a communal act embracing in itself all the subsequent acts done by his 
followers in fulfilling this command of his. Those who share the Lord’s Supper 
share his covenant-forming commitment: they are to do the Eucharist in
• 113memory of him.
It is clear then that understanding the good of religion and the central place of 
sacrifice in this good is essential in helping us to understand a number of things: Jesus 
himself as man; his human commitment to do the Father’s will and his carrying out of 
his personal vocation in obedience to the Father; Jesus’ free acceptance of his death as 
the sign of his total harmony with the Father and his faithfulness to the Father’s will; 
our redemption by Jesus. Further, understanding the good of religion also helps us to 
understand Christian life as our essentially religious following of Jesus centred on the 
Eucharist. Christian life is to be a religious commitment to carry out one’s personal 
vocation come what may, in obedience to the Father, offering it all up to the Father in 
union with Jesus’ redemptive act.
111 See ibid., 538-541.
112 Ibid., 538.
113 Ibid., 539, with a reference to Summa Theologiae III, q. 73, a. 3 and q. 79, aa. 5-6. See also 
Christian Moral Principles, 553-555.
117
Indeed, Christian life itself is a living, spiritual sacrifice (see Rom 12:1; 1 Pt 
2:5). Thus, human goods, immanent in a Christian life, can be given to God. 
From one point of view, giving human goods to God can be understood as 
putting them at the service of all that God intends in creating. Obedient service 
fulfils the Father’s providential plan, builds up Jesus’ body toward ultimate 
fulfillment, and cooperates with the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying work.114
3.5.4 Jesus reveals the natural law
To understand the basic human good of religion correctly we need to know Jesus.
Indeed, according to Grisez’s moral theory, the natural law as a whole, including the
directive to pursue the good of religion, is fully understood in practice only by
including the Christian faith perspective, which accepts and appreciates the reality of
Jesus as God-made-Man. Though a divine person, Jesus was fully a man, and he
reveals what it is to be perfect human being. Grisez clearly acknowledges that Jesus
reveals the natural law:
In him, human persons see what a man can be. His good life is not rendered 
ambiguous by mixed motives; his human commitments are not limited by 
compromises with sin. The possibilities of human nature, which are known 
naturally (up to a point and with more or less mixture of error), are revealed in 
Jesus and become accessible to every man and woman by faith which accepts 
him in his total, Incarnate reality.115
Note that the human nature that Jesus reveals is not a static, closed, and fully given
reality, but an openness to possibility suitable to human beings, an openness that is
specified in the human goods, an openness that is shared naturally by all men and
women, a specific kind of openness that characterises us as human. Note also that
revelation (through Jesus) makes clearer what can be known by reason. Revelation is
114 Ibid., 469, emphasis omitted.
115 Ibid., 620-621, at 621 (chapter twenty-five, appendix two: “The humanity o f Jesus and the natural 
law”). There is a note attached to this extract from Christian Moral Principles that refers to Vatican II, 
Gaudium et Spes, 22, which teaches that Jesus “fully reveals man to man h im self’. This is a Conciliar 
reference that Grisez refers to often, as can be seen from the index in Christian Moral Principles, 965, 
(listing 19 sections o f Christian M oral Principles that refer to this paragraph o f Gaudium et Spes). 
Grisez makes reference elsewhere in Christian Moral Principles (183) to Gaudium et Spes, 29, 41 and 
45, and to Lumen Gentium, 13 and 40, to make the same point about Jesus revealing “what human 
nature can and should be” .
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necessary because, as Grisez recognises, knowledge by natural reason of our human 
possibilities, which is to say, knowledge of our human nature and world, is not 
without error and limitation.
3.5.5 Jesus: fully human but also fully divine
Jesus was not just a man pursuing and instantiating the basic human goods, especially
the good of religion, in carrying out his basic commitment to do the Father’s will.
Jesus was a divine Person, the Word made flesh (see Jn 1:14). As God Incarnate,
Jesus had two wills, a human will and a divine will.116 All Jesus’ actions were both
humanly and divinely willed, both wills unified in the one person of the Word:
As a man, [Jesus] makes a commitment to the human good of friendship with 
God, discerns his unique human vocation with respect to this good, and lives out 
this vocation. His whole life is a well-integrated system of human acts. But the 
divine will of the Incarnate Word can hardly have remained inoperative with 
respect to anything he did humanly, whether the performing of miracles or the 
accepting of sufferings. Thus, the whole life of the Lord Jesus was both divine 
and human at the same time.... Insofar as he is God, Jesus reveals the Father in 
the medium o f  his human nature and life as a man. Insofar as he is man, the 
Word responds to the Father in a manner appropriate to a man in perfect 
communion with God.117
Grisez acknowledges that it is pointless to speculate about the exact relationship 
between divine and human in Jesus -  apart from emphasising that Jesus is in the two 
natures
‘without any commingling or change or division or separation; that the 
distinction between the natures is in no way removed by their union but rather 
the specific character of each nature is preserved and they are united in one 
person and one hypostasis’.118
116 See ibid., 517-520, with references to authoritative Church documents on these matters.
117 Ibid., 519, emphasis in original, two notes omitted.
118 Ibid., 516, quoting from the Council o f Chalcedon. Once again, it is worth making the point that the 
difficulty of parts o f Grisez’s theology (in this instance, understanding how the divine and the human 
are related in the Christian and the moral life) reflects the complexity o f  the issues involved, which 
have historically been the source o f much debate and study that have never fully resolved the apparent
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We simply do not understand what the divine nature is, or what divine causality is, in 
themselves, to be able to fully grasp what the relationship is, in any detail, between 
the human and the divine in Jesus -  or in Christian life, which follows Jesus.119 
However, a number of false ideas of what the relationship is can be marked out as 
inadequate. One of these false ideas is that the divine takes over from the human,
replacing it, annulling it, superseding it. This is not true of Jesus; nor is it true of the
♦ 120 Christian who follows in the way of the Lord Jesus.
3.6 The Christian life has both human and divine dimensions
3.6.1 The divine does not annul the human, nor the human the divine 
Although it is important to see that the divine does not annul the human in Jesus and 
the Christian, it is also important to see that the human does not annul, or substitute 
for, the divine in Jesus or the Christian. Jesus’ divine nature is united to his human 
nature -  they are both natures of the one divine person, the Word, who performs the 
one set of actions in and through the life of Jesus Christ, with his divine and human 
wills working in complete unity (without being mixed together into a sort of new 
hybrid nature and will).
This is an important point for our study here of the place of religion in the moral 
theory of Grisez. The basic human good of religion pertains to human nature and 
human willing, both in Jesus and in human persons. Religion is an aspect of human
incoherencies, and probably never will. A useful concise presentation o f Church teaching on the 
Incarnation is found in the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church, 456-483.
119 See Christian Moral Principles, 516-517, 523, and 63-67.
120 See ibid., 514-517.
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fulfillment that both Jesus, as man, and human persons grasp naturally as a good to be 
pursued and instantiated in and through our chosen actions. The good of religion is the 
good of being in harmony with God in our choices and actions. The human act of faith 
is made as a human choice for human goods (perfections of human nature’s potential), 
particularly the goods of religion and religious knowledge. Yet, this human act of 
faith for the sake of human goods is transformed by the gift of God’s love poured into 
our hearts by the Holy Spirit, transformed into a sharing in the divine good, in divine 
love, by which we are part of God’s family, united in the Son with the Father through 
the Spirit. We are not divine in exactly the same way as Jesus is, by nature, but by 
adoption:
Divine life in us is a disposition to fulfillment in divinity; it is the love of God
which is poured forth in our hearts and inheres in us. Receiving this gift by
faith, we act in faith both according to our divine love and according to our
natural human love. Divine and human are thus united in the Christian
dynamically, not hypostatically. Nevertheless, this union is real and is without
commingling; likewise, the distinction of the divine and human in us is real and • • 10 1 is without any opposition.
Just as the two wills of Jesus operated in his living his life, so too one’s human will, in 
willing basic human goods -  the good of religion is one pertinent example here -  is 
united in a mysterious way with God’s divine will, which now operates in union with 
one’s own human will and enables the Christian to will according to one’s new, divine
“disposition to fulfillment to divinity”, which “inheres in us” by God’s grace, by his
• 100  gratuitous gift.
121 Ibid., 590, emphasis added.
122 This idea o f G od’s will and ours becoming one in our sharing o f the divine nature is well expressed 
in the remarkable quotation from St. John o f the Cross given by Grisez in ibid., 583. This quotation is 
more clearly emphasised in Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary o f  Christian Moral Principles (Notre 
Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1991), 283. This work, co-authored by Grisez and Russell 
Shaw, is a shortened version o f Christian Moral Principles.
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3.6.2 God’s love is dynamically related to our human love o f human goods
The new divine disposition, one’s sharing in the life of the Trinity, is conceptually
distinct from one’s human love of human goods and one’s human acts, but it is not
separated in actual Christian life from one’s human love and human acts. The new
disposition, the love of God that makes us God’s children through our unity with his
Son, disposes us to love God as God, but this is not opposed to, or sealed off from,
our human love of the basic human goods and the persons we are directed to love by
the basic principles of practical reasonableness.
God is perfect goodness. Every other good reflects and participates in his 
perfect goodness. Loving God is thus inseparable from loving created things to 
the full measure of their goodness. But one who does not love human 
fulfillment to the extent that is in his or her own power is failing to love a 
created thing as it should be loved and so failing in love of God. The 
requirements of morality, however, are simply the implications of love of 
human fulfillment to the extent that it is within human power. Therefore, one is 
obliged to meet the requirements of morality if one is to love God with 
charity.123
This quote is an important one in Grisez’s work as a whole as it sums up a central 
point in his moral theology, and it accounts for the unity between his natural law 
theory and his moral theology. Grisez is saying that even though the love of God in its 
fullest sense, as the divine gift of sharing God’s goodness itself, is not in our human 
power to pursue and instantiate, this love of God is “inseparable” from loving acts that 
are within our power, moral acts that pursue and instantiate the basic human goods. 
What does Grisez mean by this inseparability? We need to look first at Grisez’s 
understanding of acts within our power, the acts making up the moral life.
123 Christian Moral Principles, 602.
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3.6.3 Three levels o f understanding: creation, old covenant, new covenant 
Christians are called to choose and act the way that Jesus did: to follow the way of the 
Lord Jesus. However, according to Grisez’s moral theology, this means more than just 
following the natural law in its pure philosophical form, or even as encapsulated in the 
old covenant: loving God and neighbour as oneself.124 It is helpful here to look at
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what could be termed three ‘levels’ of moral understanding.
The most basic level is that of creation, in which we are aware of the natural law at its 
most basic -  here we can speak of the first principle of practical reasoning and its 
specifications in the basic human goods, along with the first principle of morality and 
its specifications in the modes of responsibility, followed by the specific moral norms 
based on these practical and moral principles.126
Then there is a second level, at which the old covenant is revealed:
God loves first; he offers the [Old Testament] covenant. This fact creates a new 
situation for human moral life. The new situation is what transforms the basic 
requirement that one’s will be toward integral human fulfillment into the 
commandments of love of God and neighbor. For all human hope of fulfillment 
depends upon God’s mercy and faithfulness, and the human contribution to this 
fulfillment is to do good -  or, at least, to avoid harm -  to one’s human fellows,
19 7particularly to members of the covenant community.
124 See ibid., 603-604.
125 Ibid., 603-605. Grisez does not deal with these ‘levels’ as discrete levels in the way done here, but 
the approach here is clearly suggested by what Grisez writes in Christian Moral Principles at this 
point. It should be noted that the levels are distinct, but they are interrelated too: the second 
incorporates and specifies the first, and the third incorporates and specifies the first and second. Thus, 
lower levels are open to being specified by higher levels.
126 This is all treated in chapters two to twelve in Christian Moral Principles, and is Grisez’s natural 
law theory, unspecified by revelation. It needs to be said that this philosophical level o f the natural law 
can be informed by good philosophical knowledge o f God and o f God’s will, and by the elements of 
truth and grace found in other religions. This point is not always emphasised by Grisez, as he is 
focussed on Christian theology as giving content to the natural law, but it is clearly acknowledged in 
those parts of Christian Moral Principles that deal with the salvation o f non-Christians: see Christian 
Moral Principles, 655-657 and 743-745.
127 Ibid., 603. Note that Grisez here clearly acknowledges that facts matter to morality.
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At this second level, the philosophical wording of the first principle of morality is 
better phrased in specifically religious terms, as one’s understanding of practical 
reasoning and morality has been specified by divine revelation (pre-Christ).
The third level of moral awareness is the specifically Christian level, in which Jesus
becomes the norm of all moral life. The goods we hope for when we act morally for
integral human fulfillment, and which the old covenant specified in the
commandments shaping the life of God’s people, are finally and definitively made
actual in Jesus and his life. So the fulfillment that gives moral integrity its point is
more than an ideal; it is being accomplished in the fulfillment of all things in 
Jesus. Thus, Christian love transforms the first principle of morality into a more 
definite norm: One ought to will those and only those possibilities which 
contribute to the integral human fulfillment being realized in the fulfillment of 
all things in Jesus.128
This third level incorporates the other two levels, but perfects them in light of the 
fullness of divine revelation in Christ and also in light of our unity in faith with Jesus, 
a unity that empowers us to live like Jesus. Thus, natural law morality is incorporated 
into Christian morality, which perfects it.
In terms of our present focus, we can say that religion can be understood at the three 
levels just mentioned: at the most basic level, religion is a pursuit of harmony with the 
transcendent by the power and in the light of reason alone; at the next level, it is living 
in harmony with God in the light and by the power of the old covenant; at the third
128 Ibid., 605, note omitted. Note that we are here talking about human fulfillment, fulfillment in all the 
basic human goods, in the context o f  the fulfillment o f all things in Christ. It is human fulfillment that 
gives moral life its point, as it is only this fulfillment that we have the power to directly pursue and 
instantiate. What this might mean for our action to protect the environment, for example, is not treated 
by Grisez in Christian M oral Principles, but it is treated in later volumes: see ss. 5.1.6c and 5.3.8 
below.
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level, it is living in harmony and peace with God through our human union with 
Jesus, by which we are enlightened and empowered to live as Christians in the way of 
the Lord Jesus in the new covenant.
3.6.4 Union with Jesus has three distinct but related dimensions
• * 1 2 9Union with Jesus is seen by Grisez as having three aspects, which are related. The 
second and third specify what is meant by human union with Jesus (i.e. by religion at 
the third level mentioned above). The first kind of union, which has to do with sharing 
his divine life, is mediated by the second and third.
The three distinct but related dimensions of unity with Jesus are:
a. sharing his divine nature and sonship through the love of God received as gift;
b. bodily unity with Jesus in sacrament and church;
c. unity between Jesus’ human acts and our human acts in Christian moral life.
The first way is union with the divine nature of Jesus, by which we humans become 
“partakers of the divine nature” (see 1 Pt 1:4) and “enjoy familial intimacy with the 
Father”.130 This is the love of God, or charity, that we have already seen Grisez 
describe as a divine gift that transcends any merely human understanding or act. The
n i  ,
second way we are joined with Jesus is “bodily union”. In some mysterious way,
129 The three kinds o f unity treated here are not a parallel to, or specification of, the three levels of 
morality treated in the previous section.
130 Ibid., 463, emphasis in original. This unity with Jesus is treated in ibid., 463-465 and chapter twenty 
four (573-598).
131 See ibid., 463 and 465-467. We are concerned here with the relationship between the first and third 
kinds of union with Jesus; this second kind o f union is important but not directly relevant to our present 
concerns. The three kinds o f union begin now and are perfected in heaven. The second kind o f unity is 
perfected in the resurrection o f the dead, for example.
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we are united with Jesus not only spiritually but bodily -  our membership of the 
Church, the Body of Christ, is emphasised by this mode of union. The third way we 
are joined with Jesus is by “community in human acts”.132 Our human acts in pursuit 
of the basic human good of religion, for example,133 can link us with Jesus, who, as 
we have seen above, also pursued the good of religion in his own acts as a man doing 
the will of the Father. Of course, it is not only our acts in pursuit of religion that can 
unite us with Jesus: all our morally good acts unite us with Jesus and all his morally
1 134good acts.
Grisez is very insistent that the first kind of union with Jesus, our sharing in the divine
life by the gift of the Spirit, is not a human act, and so it is distinct from the third
mode of union with Jesus, which does directly involve our human acts. And yet:
Although the gift of the Spirit is distinct from and far transcends the human acts 
by which we respond to Jesus in faith, our response [in and through these 
human actions] is nevertheless the condition for receiving the higher unity with
• • 13 SJesus in divine life.
According to Grisez here, our human cooperation with God in making our human act 
of faith, is a “condition” for our receiving the gift of divine life, God’s love. It is not 
that God is “conditioned” by us, however, but that he chooses to give us the gift of 
grace through our own free choice to make the act of faith, a free choice which is
132 Ibid., 463, emphasis added.
133 This is not an application that Grisez makes directly, but obviously acts instantiating human 
harmony with God unite us with Jesus in a powerful way, for religion was at the very centre o f  Jesus’ 
life, as Grisez clearly emphasises (see ss. 3.5.2 - 3.5.3 above).
134 As Jesus is divine, this means that all our morally good acts, not just those explicitly for the sake of 
religion, can instantiate the good of religion insofar as they unite us with Jesus, who not only as man 
perfectly instantiated the good o f religion, but who is a divine Person sharing fully in the divine life and 
love. Being in harmony with Jesus thus brings us into harmony with God, and, further, it disposes us to 
perfect unity with God in fully sharing the divine gift o f God’s very life in heaven.
135 Ibid., 463, with reference to Jn 20:31, and Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 108, aa. 1-2.
already a kind of cooperation with God speaking to us through the natural law and 
directing us towards the good.136 Also, God wishes us to enjoy the gift of his love 
throughout all our Christian lives, in which all our actions can be motivated by living 
faith. Grisez’s theology holds that the first kind of unity with Jesus (sharing in the 
divine life that Jesus has as divine) is conditioned on our unity with Jesus of the third 
kind (in morally good acts shared with Jesus’ morally good acts as both human and 
divine).137
3.6.5 Religion and receiving the gift o f divine life
Our human openness to the good of religion, and our pursuit and instantiation of the 
good of religion in the act of faith, is, in a sense, used by God to give us his great gift 
of sanctifying grace, which is a share in God’s life, God’s love. It is not that our 
human act instantiating the good of religion achieves divine fulfillment in God’s love; 
this divine fulfillment is a totally free gift from God, and hence it is grace. However, 
God’s grace is mediated to us through our act of faith. And as religion is an important 
motivating factor for the act of faith, religion mediates God’s grace to us.
Our union with Jesus begins even before we are explicitly and consciously united with 
him in the three ways mentioned above (in divine life, in bodily unity, and in human 
acts). Our moral goodness, including our openness to the good of religion and our 
choices to pursue it morally, is already a kind of implicit union with Jesus, and is 
already a gift of God to us through the natural law and natural virtue. Ordinarily, this 
implicit union with Jesus through the natural law needs the explicit completion and
136 This point is more clearly developed in a later work of Grisez’s, along with Boyle and Finnis, which 
will be examined in the next chapter: “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends” (1987), as 
we will see in the next chapter.
137 It is not entirely clear where the second kind o f unity, bodily unity, fits in this scheme.
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perfection of living faith and baptism in which we receive full union with Jesus, 
including union with the divine life of Jesus.138 The natural law, therefore, can be seen 
as opening out -  in both its potentiality and its need -  towards its perfection and 
completion in faith and grace.
3.7 How do God’s love and divine revelation affect the natural law?
3.7.1 Divine love has a humanly understandable effect
If it is true that the natural law opens out toward the fullness of divine revelation and 
grace, it is also true that divine revelation and divine love affect the natural law. If the 
love of God, charity, is a divine gift that disposes us to divine fulfillment that 
transcends our merely human potential and abilities, what, according to Grisez’s 
moral theory as theologically informed and shaped, is the transformative effect that 
God’s truth and love have on morality, which pertains to human potential and human 
abilities? We have already seen Grisez refer to the transformation of our motivation 
for faith that occurs when the gift of charity is poured into our hearts by the Holy 
Spirit, a transformation that affects the human motivations constituted by the 
principles directing us to pursue and instantiate the goods of knowledge and 
religion.139 So what is the nature of this transformation of faith (and of all the 
Christian acts flowing from the act of faith)? The difficulty in answering these related 
questions comes from the mysterious nature of charity, God, and God’s causality. In
138 On this point, see Christian Moral Principles, appendix to chapter twenty-six “The upright who 
have not heard the gospel”, 655-657, where Grisez follows Vatican IPs lead in seeing the goodness of 
non-Christians as a gift o f  God’s grace that can save them, even whilst calling them to full communion 
with Jesus in the Church. “Those who are upright seek God insofar as they know how. They receive the 
gift of divine love which enlivens their love o f human goods and makes them conscious o f the 
unsatisfactoriness o f the human condition and the inadequacies of conventional morality”, 656. See 
also appendix two to chapter thirty, at 743-75.
139 See ss. 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4 above.
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spite of this mysterious nature of the divine life in itself, however, it would seem that 
Grisez wishes to point out clearly that divine love has a distinct effect, a humanly 
understandable effect, on our human motivation.140 In other words, it would seem that 
the love of God that inheres in the Christian purely by God’s gift, a gift which 
transcends our human nature and human potential, has an intelligible effect on how 
we understand our human nature and its potential.
God’s love has an effect on how we are to act in pursuit of human goods, which fulfil 
our human potential in all the various aspects picked out by the basic human goods. 
We need divine revelation to know of this effect with certainty and clarity, and we 
need grace and faith to share in it. Still, it is not an effect that totally transcends our 
natural humanity in the sense of being ineffable, totally separate, and having no effect. 
Although the love of God poured into our hearts by God does transcend our humanity 
(and in so doing allows us to be fulfilled by the divine nature), it also motivates us as 
humans in a new way to pursue the human goods. This is an instance of grace 
perfecting nature. Grisez spells out what all this means in the chapters of Christian 
Moral Principles where he explains the specificity of Christian ethics.141
3.7.2 How God’s love transforms natural law ethics: specifying it
The way that Grisez speaks of grace perfecting nature with regard to the moral
domain is usually in terms of Christian faith specifying the morality known by human
reason.
128
140 It seems that Grisez wishes to try to understand to some extent, and to some practical purpose, the 
relationship between grace and nature, even if its full reality is ultimately mysterious.
141 Chapters twenty-five to twenty-seven.
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Christian norms add to common human moral requirements from within, by 
specifying them, not from without by imposing some extrahuman demand upon 
human acts. Rather than ignoring or violating the general requirements of 
human morality, one who lives by Christian faith fulfils them.142
Grisez makes the point that Christian morality, morality transformed by charity and 
faith and hope,143 does not totally transcend our human morality; nor does it add to the 
natural law new basic principles from outside our humanity, extrinsic requirements of 
our new Christian identity as sons or daughters of God; nor does it oppose or neglect 
the natural law. “The teachings of faith neither conflict with any of the general 
principles of morality nor add any new principles to them.”144
It must be said that Grisez deals with the transformative effect of charity on ethics 
mainly by looking at how the moral level or phase of the natural law is specified by 
divine revelation and grace.145 He does not directly deal in any explicit detail with 
how the primary principles of practical reason, which constitute the generally 
practical phase of natural law (the foundational or roots phase), are affected by 
charity. In fact, it would seem that the primary principles directing us to pursue and 
instantiate the basic human goods are not affected by charity as such, insofar as they 
remain the principles they always were: we continue to be directed as Christians (who 
are still human) to pursue and instantiate the substantive and reflexive human goods, 
including religion. But our motivation to pursue them is affected, just as the modes of 
responsibility are affected, by the theological truths we come to know through faith,
142 Ibid., 608.
143 We will speak of the transforming effect of charity from here on, assuming that charity works 
through faith and hope.
144 Ibid., 607.
145 On the two phases o f the natural law, see s. 3.2.1 above.
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by the new relationship of hope that we enter into with God in Christ, by our new 
status as sons and daughters of the Father, by the charity poured into our hearts by the 
Holy Spirit. As was noted above, the way we ought to understand and pursue the basic 
goods benefits greatly from seeing them and pursuing them integrally, when we think 
and choose according to the modes of responsibility.146 Surely it is also true then that 
the way we are to understand and pursue the basic goods will be affected by the way 
that charity shapes Christian disposition, choice and action.
3.7.3 How charity affects the primary phase o f practical reasoning
Grisez indicates the effect of charity on the first phase of the natural in an important
passage, which we look at here in two parts. The first part is the following:
Charity is a disposition toward fulfillment in superhuman, divine goodness. The 
most basic choice in Christian life, the choice to accept Jesus with living faith, is 
made out of this love. It follows that the love of God which inheres in the 
Christian is analogous to simple volition. It is a principle of action toward 
heavenly fulfillment similar to one’s natural and necessary disposition toward 
human fulfillment.147
In chapter nine of Christian Moral Principles, Grisez outlined what natural “simple 
volition/willing” is, namely, a “constant, underlying disposition toward the [human] 
goods”, which is presupposed by all “volitional desire, choice, voluntary action, and 
volitional enjoyment”.148 Now, in chapter twenty-five, “Christian Love as the 
Principle of Christian Life”, he says that charity is a kind of supernatural simple 
volition, which disposes the Christian toward divine fulfillment in the goodness of
146 See s. 3.2.4 above.
147 Ibid., 600. It is true that the passage being analysed here is in small print in the original, and so is 
not included in the main substance o f the chapter. Arguably, Grisez should have highlighted it by using 
a bigger font or even bold print.
148 Ibid., 231. In “Practical Principles” , Grisez, Boyle and Finnis use the term “aliveness” for this kind 
of volition. So: charity is a supernatural aliveness to divine good and to human good(s) through divine 
good, so to speak.
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God. So the Christian has basic natural dispositions towards pursuing and enjoying 
human goods and a basic supernatural disposition towards receiving and enjoying the 
divine good. However, Grisez also says that our new divine disposition affects our 
natural dispositions:
However, the love of God poured forth in our hearts must not be regarded as 
merely another simple volition of an additional human good, inserted in us 
alongside the love of human life, knowledge of truth, [religion] and so on. 
Divine goodness and human fulfillment are not direct alternatives. The love of 
God includes and transforms all the natural forms of simple volition. Hence, out 
of love of God, Christians act both for the human fulfillment to which they are 
naturally disposed by simple volition and also for fulfillment in divine 
goodness.
The morally significant acts of Christian life are always inspired both by love of 
God and by love of some human good. According to the latter principle, they 
always are acts suited to human nature, although many of them, beginning with 
the act of living faith, can be done only by grace.149
First, note the sentence: “The love of God includes and transforms all the natural 
forms of simple volition.” This tells us that charity strongly affects the first phase of 
natural law, at its most basic level where we are alive to the basic forms of 
opportunity for fulfilling our natural potential. Grisez is saying here that the divine 
gift of God’s love changes (“transforms”), without distorting or destroying or 
rejecting (“includes”), our most fundamental practical understanding of the basic 
human goods. This includes religion, which is one of these human goods.
Second, note the point that, even though the gift of divine love is not achieved by any 
action of our own, we still are required to act fo r  divine fulfillment “out of love of 
God”. Our acting for divine fulfillment is simultaneous with our acting for human
149 Christian Moral Principles, 600-601, emphasis added. The word “religion” is inserted here as all the 
basic human goods, including religion, are being referred to. Also, this whole passage follows on in the 
original context from some remarks o f Grisez about how religious acts such as devotions and prayer, 
especially the Eucharist, can be acts o f  charity only insofar as they are good acts serving the good of 
religion.
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fulfillment in the basic human goods. Each kind of action seems to be related to the 
other in some way. As we saw in the section above devoted to the Christological 
dimension of Grisez’s moral theory, the divine and the human exist in us in a way 
analogous to how they exist in Jesus.150 The divine and the human are distinct in us, 
and not merged together; but neither are they totally separate. There is a mysterious 
dynamic relationship between them. One aspect of this is that the divine can 
powerfully (dynamically) affect the human.
3.7.4 Specific Christian norms
Although Grisez holds that the natural law remains operative for Christians, just as it
does for all persons, he also holds that there is a distinctively Christian morality.
Divine revelation accepted by living faith, the life of grace we enter into by faith, and
the new status we are given by God in living faith, (all of which can be summed up in
the single word “faith”), have an effect on our human motivation, the motivation
shaped by the primary practical principles. This is how Grisez summarises his
thinking on how Christian ethics is distinctive:
Yet faith does generate specific norms proper to Christian life. It does this by 
proposing options both possible for and appealing to fallen men and women -  
options which either cannot be conceived without faith or would lack sufficient 
appeal to be considered in deliberation in the absence of Christian hope. 
Specific moral norms are generated only when proposals are articulated as 
appealing possibilities for choice. Thus, by advancing fresh proposals, faith 
generates specific norms which could not be known without it.15
In other words, faith and hope, by which we live in charity, enable us to see or
understand differently and so to choose differently. We can see or understand
opportunities in the light of faith that we would not otherwise be able to see or
150 Seess. 3.5.5, 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.
151 Ibid., 607.
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including harmony with God, in a way that is new (“fresh proposals”). We are alive to
new opportunities in a new way. Grisez describes this new way of acting for integral
human fulfillment, this new aliveness, by specifying “Christian modes of response”
that transform from within the natural law modes of responsibility.152 We will look in
a little detail at one of these to see how natural law is transformed by divine love, and
1where the good of religion fits in this transformation.
3.7.5 The fifth mode o f  Christian response: be merciful
The Christian is called not only to be impartial and fair in responding to human goods 
and to human persons (as the fifth mode of responsibility specifies),154 he is called 
also “to be merciful according to the universal and perfect measure of mercy which 
God has revealed in Jesus”155 (the fifth mode of Christian response). Each time Grisez 
introduces an answer devoted to explaining a particular mode of Christian response,156 
he relates the mode to the effect of charity (or, in other words, the love of God poured 
into our hearts by the Spirit uniting us with Jesus) on human motivation. Regarding 
mercy, this is what he says:
understand, and so we can be motivated to act for the sake of the basic human goods,
152 See chapter twenty-six o f  Christian Moral Principles for a complete treatment o f  the Christian 
modes of response. Grisez presents these eight modes o f Christian response as corresponding closely 
with the Beatitudes, the gifts o f the Spirit, and with various virtues. We have space here to look only 
briefly at these modes, but an adequate presentation of Grisez’s moral theory in its theological fullness 
would need to look at all o f them in detail. We present an outline o f them in Appendix Three below.
153 In this, we are following the lead o f Grisez who used the example of mercy in relation to the Golden 
Rule when explaining the specificity of Christian norms in a publication just after Christian Moral 
Principles: “Presidential Address: Practical Reason and Faith,” Proceedings o f  the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association  58 (1984): 2-14.
154 See Christian Moral Principles, 211-213.
155 Ibid., 644.
156 In chapter twenty-six o f Christian Moral Principles.
134
People whose primary love is charity are disposed to divine goodness before all 
else. But God practices no partiality and is utterly and absolutely faithful; he is 
unconcerned with justice to himself, for his own goodness is absolute. One 
identified by charity with the universal good can and will take the same totally 
disinterested and selfless attitude. Thus the fifth Christian mode of response is 
to “be merciful according to the universal and perfect measure of mercy which
i en "
God has revealed in Jesus” ....
Charity affects how we are to live by the natural law’s modes of responsibility, in this
case the mode requiring us to be impartial and just. This effect comes through our
being united with God’s way o f  being and seeing. We see the world through God’s
eyes, so to speak.158 God is impartial, totally faithful, utterly selfless, and absolutely
good: we are called to share through charity his impartiality, faithfulness, selflessness
and goodness. If we see the world through only human eyes, which in historical
reality is a human understanding weakened by the Fall, we find it very difficult, if not
impossible, to live according to the fifth mode of responsibility. We will find it
difficult to see the attraction of the impartiality, to see it as offering any real
opportunity for fulfillment. When we see things from God’s point of view, in
harmony with him because we are united with him in Christ (in faith, hope and
charity), we are able to transcend all difficulties.
Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, transforms the understanding of 
human goods and human community. Human goods can and will be realized in 
the fulfillment of everything in Jesus; there, too, everyone willing to accept a 
place has one. All the boundaries of existing societies dissolve.159
This transformation of our vision is not our own achievement; it is God’s gift. It is
grounded in what God has already done for the Christian in Christ:
157 Ibid., 644, emphasis in original. The internal quotation is Grisez’s expression o f the mode itself.
158 The terminology here is not Grisez’s, but it is closely based on his approach to this issue: see
especially his highlighted point explaining why Christian love requires moral goodness, at ibid., 602 
(top of page). Seeing  is used here as a synonym for understanding.
159 Ibid, 644.
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Having been redeemed, sharing in God’s own justice, the Christian must be 
altogether impartial in sharing redemption with others. Only so is the 
requirement of impartiality fulfilled by one who knows himself or herself to be 
a child of God.160
Grisez relates all this to charity and its effect, but it seems closely related to the good 
of religion too. Charity enables one to pursue human fulfillment more perfectly, by 
motivating one to see and choose in total harmony with God’s will, which is now 
dynamically united with one’s human will. Thus chanty perfects the natural harmony 
with God that is religion.
3.7.6 Fulfillment in Christ and the primary principle o f Christian morality
Foundational in all this is the truth that our integral human fulfillment has begun
already and continues to be achieved in and through Jesus Christ. This is a truth seen
only with the eyes of faith. It is a truth that motivates us to fulfil the requirements of
the natural law in a new way, with much greater hope and love than we could have
naturally. Fulfillment in Christ is at the foundation of Christian morality, according to
Grisez’s moral theology.161 The new, singular, primary principle of Christian
morality, according to Grisez, is:
One ought to will those and only those possibilities which contribute to the 
integral human fulfillment being realized in the fulfillment of all things in 
Jesus.162
160 Ibid, 645.
161 It is interesting in this regard that the shortened version of Christian Moral Principles, co-authored 
by Grisez and Russell Shaw and published eight years later, was called Fulfillment in Christ.
162 Christian Moral Principles, 605. In later writings, Grisez tends to express the primary principle of 
Christian life in terms o f intending or seeking the kingdom (of God) in all one’s choices and acts. 
Reference to seeking the kingdom, contributing to, and witnessing to it, are found in Christian Moral 
Principles (see 470, 514, 819) but it does not stand out as clearly as it does in later writings (see chapter 
six below).
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This principle arises out of seeing one’s life, with all its choices and commitments and 
actions, as cooperation with Jesus in his work of redemption.
1Another way of putting this new primary theological principle of morality is the 
new commandment of Jesus: “Love one another as I have loved you” (John 13.34).164 
Christians are called by God to abide in the love that has been given to us, poured into 
our hearts by the Spirit, and to live our lives inspired and guided by this love, which is 
a pure gift to us from God. Such a life is modelled on the life of Jesus, who embodied 
all the Beatitudes and all the modes of Christian response, and is lived in union with 
Jesus. Most especially, the sacrificial act of Jesus, sacramentally made present at the 
Last Supper and consummated on the cross, is the foundational act of his life and of 
Christian life:
In this completely virtuous act Jesus overcomes all the disharmonies of sin -  
within the individual, among the principles of human actions themselves, 
among human individuals and groups, and between humankind and God. 
Hence, Jesus’ act includes both the norms for the choices essential to these 
existential harmonies and their virtuous fulfillment. These norms and their 
realization are the modes of Christian response.165
Jesus not only reveals the principles of Christian life in his teaching, he exemplifies
and embodies them in his deeds. In the Cross, especially, Jesus overcomes all
disharmonies.
163 This theological principle o f morality specifies the natural law principle o f morality that Grisez 
presented in an earlier chapter o f  Christian Moral Principles', see ibid., chapter 7, question E, and s.
3.2.2 above.
164 Cited and commented upon in ibid., 604.
165 Ibid., 662-663. Note the fourfo ld  reconciliation in Jesus, which embodies the harmonies that are the 
objects o f the four primary existential principles o f the natural law. The Eucharist perfects the 
existential dimension o f the natural law, bring us true peace and goodness.
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As we have seen, Grisez considers the basic good of religion to be the overcoming, or 
at least the lessening, of disharmony with God. Jesus has instantiated this perfectly in 
his life and death. Jesus, therefore, exemplifies and fulfils the good of religion 
perfectly, along with the other existential goods. Union with Jesus is an essential 
requirement for us fallen and redeemed people to share perfectly in the existential 
goods, including the good of religion. And for sharing in the moral good too, which is 
the integral pursuit and instantiation of the basic human goods, especially the 
existential goods. All of Christian life can be understood under the heading of “union 
with Christ”.166 It is entirely appropriate, therefore, that Grisez finishes off his 
substantial first volume of The Way o f the Lord Jesus with a series of chapters 
devoted to prayer and the sacraments as principles shaping Christian life.167
Grisez sees our union with Jesus Christ as the central reality o f our lives as Christians, 
and prayer and the sacraments are essential for our unity with Jesus. Prayer and the 
sacraments are essential for organising Christian lives because they enable living 
faith, which we have seen is the foundational act of Christian life according to 
Grisez’s moral theology, to be integrated into all of our lives.168 We cannot look in 
detail here at Grisez’s treatment of this theme, but it is important to point out one
166 In this respect, it is interesting the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church's section on morality is called 
“Life in Christ” . Grisez tends to speak of union “with Jesus” because he wishes to emphasise the 
humanity of Jesus, which mediates his divinity.
167 See Christian Moral Principles, chapters twenty-nine to thirty-three (705-806). Actually, Christian 
Moral Principles finishes with a chapter devoted to eschatology (chapter thirty-four) and two devoted 
to Church authority and dissent (chapters thirty-five and thirty-six), but the main body o f his moral 
theology finishes with a hundred pages devoted completely to prayer and the sacraments as integral to 
the Christian moral life. Along with the central place of Christology, this spirituality aspect o f Grisez’s 
theological moral theory is rather unique in manuals o f moral philosophy/theology and manifests 
Grisez’s desire to engage in a renewed moral theology in line with Vatican II’s prescriptions: see 
Christian Moral Principles, 13-14. This is an aspect o f his work that is often overlooked.
168 See ibid., 705.
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relevant aspect of his focussing on the sacraments so substantially in these chapters of 
Christian Moral Principles. This point concerns the place of religion in the Christian 
life, and in morality, and in Grisez’s moral theory.
The good of religion has to do with seeking harmony with God and avoiding or
lessening conflict with God, through our own human choices and actions. The
sacraments are God’s gifts to us, but they also involve our own action, our
cooperation with God (which is itself God’s gift). Beginning with the Last Supper and
the Cross, God has given us a way of being involved with our redemption and
sanctification, and of being united more and more with him in his goodness and life:
Included within Jesus’ single act of self-oblation are the subsequent actions 
performed to fufill his command by the apostles, their successors, and their 
successors’ priestly assistants. Thus, in the Eucharist -  and by association with 
the Eucharist, in all the other sacraments -  Jesus’ redemptive act is made 
present to us, available for our cooperation and effective for our sanctification.
As extensions into the present of Jesus’ unique redemptive act, the sacraments 
have all its complexity. They reveal and communicate the divine life which they 
signify, while at the same time responding to it with appropriate human 
worship. Furthermore, these two aspects mutually include each other.169
The sacraments are both human and divine, and one aspect of their human side is that 
they enable us as humans to seek and instantiate harmony with God, to seek and 
instantiate the basic human good of religion. Thus, the basic human good of religion, 
whilst it is not the whole reality of any sacrament, or of the Christian life, is one 
important motivating factor for the acts by which we experience the sacraments and 
live out our lives as Christians. Whilst the sacraments are the channels of divine 
grace, they also are the occasions for human worship, which makes sense only in light 
of the basic good of religion, specified by divine revelation in Christian faith, but
169 Ibid., 726, emphasis in original, two notes omitted. The omitted notes refer to sections o f the Third 
part of the Summa Theologiae to support Grisez’s theology. This quotation spans two paragraphs in the 
original, but this has been ignored here for stylistic reasons.
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carried out by human acts shaped by principles of practical reasoning. The sacraments 
are examples, therefore, of the dynamic interrelationship of the natural law (the law 
written in our hearts at our creation) and the new law of Christ (the love of God 
poured into our hearts at our recreation).
3.8 Conclusion to the chapter: different levels of harmony with God
The good of religion has a central place in Grisez’s moral theory. It is central in the 
natural law theory and also in the theological development and extension of it, insofar 
as the good of religion is the good of harmony with God, and all that has been dealt 
with in the preceding theological sections has to do with the effect that our union with 
God (in faith, hope and charity) has on morality. However, is “harmony with God” the 
same thing as “union with God”? Grisez’s moral theory, with its dynamic 
interrelationship between natural law theory and moral theology, seems to imply that 
there are different levels of harmony with God.
At the most basic level, the natural level, harmony with God is an open-ended field of 
human opportunity that we can pursue and instantiate, and can participate in more or 
less, by our choices and actions. This is what “the basic good of religion”, at its most 
fundamental, refers to in Grisez’s moral theory. It is the object of a primary principle 
of the natural law, of practical reasoning at the natural level. It is God’s gift through
170creation.
170 This level o f  Grisez’s moral theory is treated in chapters two to twelve o f Christian Moral 
Principles, and it is found also to some extent in chapters thirteen to eighteen, which deal with sin.
The primary natural level of Grisez’s moral theory, which deals with practical 
reasoning, or the natural law, can bring a person to the brink of faith, so to speak, 
insofar as the act of faith can be made only by someone who is motivated by the 
goods of religion and knowledge. The act of faith is a human act, and so it is shaped 
by the primary principles of practical reasoning that shape all human acts. These 
primary principles of the natural law are natural, but they are not independent of God. 
The natural law is God’s law, and our capacities to know and act according to the 
natural law are given to us by God the Creator. The specifically human aspect of the 
act of faith is God’s gift to us.171
The act of faith is also God’s special and gratuitous gift, which mediates supernatural, 
sanctifying grace, and so our human act of faith made for the sake of religion and 
knowledge is not the whole reality of living faith. There is a higher level o f harmony 
with God that is possible for us to participate in. This is the level of unity with God 
through our unity with Jesus, made possible by the Father’s constituting us as his sons 
and daughters through our sharing in his divine life (love, charity). This unity with 
God in Jesus also involves a sharing in God’s revealed truth too, insofar as our 
sharing in charity opens our eyes to see the full truth about our world, our lives, and 
ourselves. We learn to see through the eyes of God and to live according to the divine 
life within us. Thus, the higher harmony with God, which is God’s special gift to us 
and not something we participate in purely through our human actions, is able to 
transform our knowledge of the natural law and our ability to live by it.172 We come to
171 Grisez’s emphasis on the distinction between the human and the divine in Jesus, the Christian, and 
the act of faith, might lead one to forget that the specifically human is also God’s creation and gift, and 
depends totally on God.
172 On this point about how the divine life enables us to live moral lives, see ibid., 613, and the whole 
of chapter twenty-seven o f  Christian Moral Principles.
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know the truth and this truth sets us free to live by God’s law, thus participating in 
both human fulfillment and divine fulfillment.
The good of religion is involved in the first level, the natural law level, obviously. The 
basic human good of religion is the object of a natural principle of practical reasoning, 
one that motivates a wide variety of religious acts, commitments, communities, 
traditions, beliefs and practices. The practical principle directing us to pursue and 
instantiate the good of religion is involved also in the higher level of harmony with 
God too, however, as it is specified and perfected by divine revelation and grace, and 
Christians are enabled to pursue and instantiate a harmony with God that is perfectly, 
humanly fulfilling, but also somehow more than humanly fulfilling.
One verb that Grisez uses several times, for what is called here a pursuit and 
instantiation of our union with God in Jesus through faith and charity, is “abiding in”.
• • • 173We are called to abide in God’s love, following on the words of Jesus in John 15: 9. 
This gets across the idea that this higher level of “religion” is different from the 
natural law level of religion as a basic human good, in that at the higher level (i.e. of 
living faith) we already have the status of being God’s sons and daughters by our 
being given a share in divine life/love/charity by God and not through our own pursuit 
or instantiation of a merely human good, and our choices and acts flow from this 
already-given-gift, rather than from our own natural practical knowledge and moral 
acts. This is why Grisez wants to distinguish the good of religion from the life of 
grace, as we saw early in our analysis of Christian Moral Principles.I74
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173 See ibid., 581,600, and 604.
174 See ss. 3.1.3 and 3.1.5 above.
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The life of grace is a special divine gift that transcends human capacity and 
achievement, of which “religion” as a basic human good is one aspect. Still, it seems 
that the life of grace, especially in its transformative effect on morality, is closely 
related to the good of religion insofar as the life of grace involves our sharing in 
God’s life and truth and so it is the highest form o f harmony with God, one that is a 
perfection and fulfillment of the human good of religion (and all the other goods too) 
whilst transcending the merely natural possibilities of “religion” by bringing us into 
the divine life itself by a pure gift of grace.175
Still, using the term “religion” for two levels of fulfillment might be confusing, and it 
might lead to us thinking that the supernatural level of fulfillment is a substitute for 
the natural level, that grace replaces nature, or that the supernatural is the same as the 
natural level, that grace is nature. Grisez’s use of the term “religion” exclusively for a 
primary principle of the natural law is useful in that it avoids any abolition of the 
natural by the supernatural or confusion of the two.
At its most basic level, the basic good of religion is a natural good. Beyond this, it can 
be specified by divine revelation and can motivate the act of faith as a human act 
seeking harmony with God in the Christian religion. Beyond this, our pursuit and 
instantiation of all the goods specified by the natural law are dynamically affected by
175 The fact that Grisez is willing to use both the term “sanctifying grace” and the term “actual grace” 
for charity is interesting in this regard. It would seem that Grisez recognizes that there is a twofold 
aspect to charity. In one sense charity is a transcendent, divine gift, above any human, natural potential 
or fulfillment, such as religion: thus the term “sanctifying grace” is appropriate for charity. However, in 
another sense, charity has a very human effect, in that it can aid us dynamically in our living humanly 
good lives, and in our abiding in God’s love: thus the term “actual grace” is appropriate for charity. See 
Christian Moral Principles, 614.
the new filial status we are given by God in charity and living faith. We understand all 
the human goods more clearly and hopefully, and their lack of attraction in a fallen 
world is dealt with by us seeing them and the world through the perspective of divine 
truth. Prayer and sacraments, especially the Eucharist in which we are united with 
Jesus, are understood and cooperated with as principles of life, life seen as 
cooperation with Jesus in his work of redemption. This redemption was accomplished 
by Jesus’ complete harmony with the Father, and we come to share in redemption in 
our coming to be united with Jesus. All of our Christian lives can be understood as 
cooperation with Jesus in bringing redemption to all people. Thus, religion is 
transformed by living faith. Instead of being only a human fulfillment to be pursued 
and instantiated by our human actions, it becomes also a divine gift for us to abide in 
and live out of, as we pursue our human fulfillment with new vision and realism and 
hope, and as we open ourselves to the divine fulfillment that transcends human 
fulfillment.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES ...” [1987]
The main work to be looked at in this chapter is a substantial article on moral philosophy, 
which Grisez co-authored.1 It devotes considerable attention specifically to religion as a 
basic good and so develops and clarifies its role in Grisez’s moral theory.
4.1 Preliminary remarks about the good of religion
4.1.1 The basic human goods and the basic good o f religion
The first part of the article deals with “Practical Principles”, among which is the principle 
directing us to pursue the good of religion, one of the basic goods.2 The authors list 
religion as one of seven basic goods. These seven basic goods are the same ones we have 
seen in Christian Moral Principles, but they are identified here using language that is 
generally practical and not specifically moral, unlike that used in Christian Moral 
Principles, which was more morally charged. As in previous works by Grisez, these 
goods are divided into substantive goods, which do not include choices, and reflexive 
goods, which do. The substantive goods are (1) “life itself -  its maintenance and
1 G. Grisez, J. Boyle, and J. Finnis, “ Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” American 
Journal o f Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151. Henceforth, this article will be shortened to “Practical 
Principles”. At the end of the chapter, we look briefly also at one other publication o f Grisez’s shortly after 
“Practical Principles,” which develop some of its ideas on religion.
2 We do not look here at everything the authors say here about practical principles, but focus on religion 
and its place in their theory.
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transmission -  health, and safety”, (2) “knowledge and esthetic experience”, and (3) 
“some degree of excellence in work and play”.3 The reflexive goods, which are defined 
as goods essentially concerned with seeking to avoid or overcome various forms of 
conflict and/or to attain or maintain various forms of harmony, are (4) “various forms of 
harmony between and among individuals and groups of people”, (5) “inner peace”, (6) 
“peace of conscience and consistency between one’s self its expression”, and (7) 
“religion”, which is the focus of our treatment here.4
The basic good of religion is introduced in the following terms:
... most people experience tension with the wider reaches of reality. Attempts to 
gain or improve harmony with some more-than-human source of meaning and 
value take many forms, depending on people’s world views. Thus, another category 
of reflexive good is peace with God, or the gods, or some nontheistic but more- 
than-human source of meaning and value.5
4.1.2 Grounded in human experience o f tension
When the authors refer to the source in human experience that grounds the insight into 
the good of religion, they use the phrase: “tension with the wider reaches of reality”. 
There are a number of clues in the article that help to explain what they mean by this 
phrase.6 When they explain the “genesis” of the first practical principles, the authors state 
that people do not grasp the point of pursuing the various forms of human goods by some
3 Ibid., 107.
4 Ibid., 108. Social harmony is listed here before the two kinds of harmony to do with the self, as social 
harmony is a very obvious good. The order is not significant. However, it can be helpful to consider the 
four existential goods as being concerned with self, then other human persons, and then God.
5 Ibid.
6 Once again, every attempt will be made to demarcate the direct assertions and arguments o f Grisez (and 
his co-authors) from interpretations and applications o f my own.
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kind of “data-less” intuition or by innate knowledge. Data is necessary, and it is provided
• * 7by “natural dispositions” or, put another way, “natural inclinations” that we experience.
The reflexive goods include choices in their goodness, and so the data grounding
practical insights into the reflexive goods “include volitions”. The authors go on to
explain the nature of such volitions in this way:
Various forms of disharmony involving choices bearing upon substantive goods 
thwart one’s interests. The will’s frustrated intentions are natural inclinations which 
are data. And so, volitions specified by the substantive goods are part of the data for 
the insights whose content is the reflective practical principles.8
If we apply this to the genesis of the practical principle directing to the pursuit of the 
good of religion, we can say that one begins to grasp the good of religion when one 
becomes aware of the thwarting of one’s interests in substantive goods and one’s choices 
to pursue and instantiate the substantive goods. In one’s pursuit of life and health, 
knowledge and esthetic experience, and work and play one encounters difficulties that 
thwart one’s interests in these goods. Thus, one becomes aware of a kind of conflict or 
tension. But how is the conflict grounding one’s grasp of the good of religion distinct 
from the inner conflict within the self and from inter-human conflict?
4.1.3 Specifically religious tensions: sin and a difficult world
In the final part of the article, the authors speak specifically about the tension involved in 
one’s coming to grasp the good of religion, and give us some indications of what might
7 Ibid., 108.
8 Ibid., 109, emphasis added. Grisez and his co-authors use “data” as a plural.
147
be the “will’s frustrated intentions” that provide the data for our grasping the good of 
religion:
Aware of this more-than-human source of meaning and value, most human persons 
also are acutely aware that they are not in complete harmony with it. For everyone 
sometimes makes immoral choices. And everyone finds the natural environment, 
which so clearly points to its transcendent source, in some respects a hard and cruel 
world. The fish are not to be found; crops fail; fire destroys carefully built 
dwellings; everyone gets sick, is hurt, and eventually dies. Harmony with the more- 
than-human source of meaning and value plainly must be pursued.9
The quotation specifies two causes of our becoming aware of tension between us and the 
more-than-human source of meaning and value: our making sinful choices and our 
experience of the difficulty and cruelty of the world.10
Before we examine these two causes, we must briefly analyse something else. The 
authors refer to our being already aware of the transcendent source, independently, it 
would seem, of our experience of sin and the harshness of life in this world. How does 
one thus become aware of “this more-than-human source”?
4.2 The cosmological argument developed
4.2.1 The cosmological argument
As the first part of the answer to this question, the authors outline briefly the 
cosmological argument that was developed by Grisez in depth in Beyond the New
9 Ibid., 142.
10 These two sources o f  tension are similar to the experiential grounds for our grasp o f the good o f religion 
treated above in Christian Moral Principles: see s. 3.3.3.
Theism.11 This argument shows how we naturally become aware that each and every 
reality we experience is contingent and so calls inevitably for an ultimate non-contingent 
source to account for its reality. Contingent reality is constituted not only by physical 
things such as the stars and planets and bodies and so on, but also “human experience, 
feeling, thought, volition, action, and fulfillment”.12 And, as contingent reality is but need 
not be, its being caused is very similar to a free choice. This leads us to understand the 
more-than-human source as being like a person causing “according to a plan” (as every 
free choice is shaped, however simply, by some plan of action, and brings into being the 
contingent reality that is the chosen action) and so the transcendent source of reality is 
seen as the transcendent source of meaning.
4.2.2 A new development o f the cosmological argument
Thus far, the argument is the same one made in Beyond the New Theism. However, the 
authors now make a new point that develops the previous cosmological argument. The 
transcendent source of meaning is also a transcendent source of value, because it is not 
only the source of the existence (or obtaining) of practical principles themselves, but also 
the source of the very directiveness of practical knowledge.13 The directiveness of the 
basic goods (and the practical principles that call us to pursue and instantiate these goods) 
is not a necessary reality, but a contingent one, and so this directiveness, too, calls for an
11 See ss. 2.5.2 and 3.3.3 above. John Finnis briefly outlines the argument in the final chapters o f Natural 
Law and Natural Rights and Aquinas, which are treated in chapter seven below.
12 “Practical Principles,” 141.
13 See ibid., 142. In Beyond the New Theism Grisez prefers to use the terms “obtains” rather than “exists” in 
his cosmological argument for technical reasons that will be ignored here. The distinction between God 
being a source o f “meaning” and being a source o f “value” is implied in the “Practical Principles,” but not 
stated as explicitly as in the present work.
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explanation, one that only a transcendent (i.e. non-contingent, necessary) reality can 
provide. Following on from this point, the authors develop a very important extension of 
it:
But since, in this case, the transcendent source is of directiveness, that source can 
only be thought of as if it were a person anticipating human fulfillment and leading 
human persons toward it.14
In this last point, although they do not use the traditional language of natural law theory, 
the authors are reiterating the classical philosophical idea that God is the author of the 
natural law, the objective moral law that human reason can discover and know (and, 
indeed, to some extent, constitute by its own proper use). The sheer contingency of all 
practical principles leads us to understood them as ultimately created by God, and the fact 
that they direct us to human fulfillment prompts us to understand that this Creator leads 
us to fulfillment as human beings as part of his plan. Just as the contingency of the 
objectively existing natural physical world and its intelligibility can lead us to know of 
God as the intelligent and powerful Creator, so too can the contingency and intelligibility 
of the objectively existing moral domain.15 When one is aware that the moral domain is 
created by God, who is the more-than-human source of all that is, one can become aware 
that one’s failure to live in accordance with the moral order is a failure to live in harmony 
with God, who gives the moral order both its existence and directive nature.
14 “Practical Principles,” 142. The directiveness referred to here is directiveness towards human fulfillment.
15 See on this the important section o f Beyond the New Theism that deals with the four orders of reality, 
130-140, treated above in s. 2.6. Although the cosmological argument is often applied only to the physical 
order, Grisez and his co-authors are now applying it to the moral order too. Grisez and his school do not 
deal in any detail with the relationship between God’s being the creator o f  the physical order and God 
being the creator of the moral order. It might also be argued that in this article the authors go beyond a 
purely cosmological argument, such as that in Beyond the New Theism, to include elements o f an argument 
from design (thus making reference to not only the existence or obtaining of realities, but to their 
intelligibility too).
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4.3.1 A very basic awareness
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis are not claiming that one must first have an accurate, 
theoretical, philosophical knowledge and understanding of God and religion before one 
can have any practical understanding of God and religion. Their position is quite 
different: one begins with no theory as such, but with some experience of religious 
tension and some understanding of it, coupled with some, perhaps dim, awareness of a 
more-than-human dimension of reality; then one grasps the practical point of pursuing the 
good of religion and attempting to instantiate it by action(s); and then one can develop a 
more adequate and fuller theoretical and practical understanding of God and how one 
might pursue harmony with him. One can be aware of being sinful and in need of 
harmony even if one is not fully aware in any philosophically sophisticated manner of a 
cosmological argument.
In fact, it is an important aspect of the moral theory of these authors that one’s initial 
grasp of the practical principle directing one to pursue and instantiate the good of religion 
is necessarily simple and unsophisticated. As in previous works, Grisez presents the basic 
goods as open-ended fields of possibility to pursue and in which to participate, not 
objectives to be comprehensively and finally achieved.16 Therefore, it is fully in keeping 
with Grisez’s understanding of basic goods and their role in practical rationality, that 
one’s initial grasp of the good of religion is usually quite minimal and one’s
4.3 Religion and knowledge
16 See especially “Practical Principles,” 103 and 117-119. See also ss. 2.4.3 and 3.3.4 above.
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understanding of how to pursue and instantiate religion (harmony with the transcendent 
source of meaning and value) is usually quite incomplete, distorted, and even erroneous. 
A child can grasp the good of religion to an extent, even though this “grasp” is only a 
beginning. Adults, too, can be more or less wrong in their understanding of God and how 
to pursue and instantiate harmony with God, whilst still grasping clearly that it is 
important to pursue and attempt to instantiate some kind of harmony with God, however 
this “God” is understood. This is why their initial quotation on religion (see note 5 above) 
talks about religion in a very general way: the good of religion, as it is grasped as the 
object o f a first principle ofpractical reasoning, involves one’s pursuit of harmony with 
“God, or the gods, or some nontheistic but more-than-human source of meaning and 
value”. And the minimal experience needed to grasp the point of such pursuit is “tension 
with the wider reaches of reality”.
4.3.2 Basic religious awareness can and should be developed by knowledge 
The truth of the first practical principle directing us to pursue the good of religion is a 
practical truth, and as such cannot be deduced or derived from purely theoretical 
knowledge (or, as it is a primary principle, any other practical knowledge either). It is 
underived and basic in itself.17 Still, theoretical knowledge is important in the 
development of this basic awareness of this first practical principle. The very basic 
insight directing us to pursue the good of religion can be “enhanced” by “theoretical 
knowledge, true opinion, and experience”, just as the other basic goods can.18 Grisez and
17 See ibid., 102 and 106. The existence of basic goods and their identification and defence can be argued
for indirectly, by theoretical “dialectical” arguments or self-referential arguments: see ibid., 111-113.
18 Ibid., 109.
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his co-authors specifically mention religion as a good that can be understood more or less
well, depending on one’s theoretical knowledge, true opinion and experience:
For example, both sound metaphysics and experience in practicing authentic 
religious faith contribute to one’s understanding of the good of religion. In doing 
so, they enhance the power of the practical principle underlying the religious 
quest.19
A little further on, the authors make the point that one cannot “effectively pursue 
friendship with God without knowing (by reason and/or faith) at least some truth about 
God”.20 What this means is that in Grisez’s moral theory, although it is necessary to 
begin deliberating about one’s actions with first practical principles, such as that 
associated with the good of religion, it is not sufficient to have only first practical 
principles; one also needs other kinds of knowledge, including theoretical knowledge.
And this ‘knowledge’ is not just opinion, but knowledge of the truth, or else it will not
♦ ■ 21 enable one to effectively pursue and instantiate any basic good.
With regard to religion, then, it is not enough to have a simple awareness that one is in 
conflict with the more-than-human source of meaning and value and that one ought to 
pursue and instantiate some measure of harmony with this source; one needs to pursue 
accurate and helpful knowledge about this source and the means available for us to
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 111. The word “effectively” here seems to mean, quite precisely, “with effect” rather than “with a 
satisfying effect”. Understood in this way, what Grisez and co-authors are saying is that some knowledge is 
necessary for us to be able to pursue religion (as “friendship with God”) at all. R. Black, Christian Moral 
Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), at 96- 
97, seems to misunderstand this point.
2' One needs also to have emotional motivations if  one is to act for any good, and emotional motivations 
are linked to perception, memory and imagination of sensory realities: see “Practical Principles,” 100, and 
104-105.
effectively achieve some degree of harmony with it.22 One’s pursuit of such religious 
knowledge is shaped by one’s grasp of the basic goods of knowledge and religion, whose 
directiveness, working together, ensures that one is not content simply to make a sincere 
effort to pursue the good of religion, but to conscientiously make an effective effort to do 
so. Although the first principle that directs us towards the good of religion is very simple 
and basic, it has a dynamism “built into” it that requires us, and enables us, to develop 
our knowledge of religion and to pursue and instantiate the good of religion in more and 
more effective ways.
4.4 How one becomes aware of the good of religion
4.4.1 Our experience o f sin and sinfulness
Having acknowledged that Grisez, Boyle and Finnis allow for an understanding of the 
good of religion as an open-ended field of possibility that can, and should, be more and 
more deeply and accurately understood and effectively pursued, we can return to our 
examination of the origin of our basic grasp of the good of religion, which grounds the 
possibility of such development of understanding and effectiveness. As we have seen, 
one element in this basic, simple initial grasp of the good of religion is our experience of 
sin. We experience ourselves as directed to pursue human fulfillment by trying to 
instantiate various goods, such as health and life, knowledge, and work, but we also find 
ourselves failing to act according to what we grasp as moral standards. Thus, we
22 What Grisez and his co-authors say here echoes what Grisez said about the motivating role of religion 
and knowledge with regard to the act o f faith: see ss. 3.4.1 -  3.4.4 above. However, Grisez does not hold 
that it is only theological knowledge that can help us to pursue religion; philosophical knowledge of God, 
such as that demonstrated in Beyond the New Theism, for example, can help also.
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experience ourselves as letting ourselves down as individuals, and letting down our 
families, neighbours and communities. But, insofar as the objective existence and 
directiveness of moral standards are not accounted for adequately by ourselves 
individually or our communities, we can see ourselves letting down not only ourselves 
individually and our communities, but also the “wider reaches of reality”, the cosmic 
dimension of morality, so to speak. We find ourselves breaking the natural law and being 
in tension with the natural law’s lawgiver, even though we might (inaccurately) consider 
that lawgiver to be nature itself, or humanity itself, or some other nontheistic 
transcendent source of value.23 No-one wants to live in a situation of tension, particularly 
one in which we are in conflict with the wider context of our whole existence. It is not 
just that we do not like to feel guilt; we also do not like to understand ourselves to be 
failures, to be “out of synch” with reality and its principles. (In other words, we do not 
like to feel guilt that we understand to be deserved.) And so we easily grasp that there is a 
point in our attempting to overcome this tension, this conflict, this deserved and 
inescapable guilt -  in other words, we grasp naturally the practical good of religion.
23 It is worth noting that this line of argument does not seem to take account easily of persons who refuse to 
acknowledge any more-than-human source of value or meaning, for example, those who see humans 
exclusively as creating our own meaning and values. Maybe Grisez would consider such people to have 
made themselves, individually or socially, their own “god” or “gods”, with harmony with self or 
group/humanity as their “religion” . Such people would seem to reduce the good o f religion to one or more 
o f the other three reflexive goods listed by Grisez and his school: inner peace, peace of conscience and 
consistency between one’s judgements and actions, peace with one's communities. Grisez does not deal 
directly with this issue in his work on moral theory, but Beyond the New Theism can be read as a 
philosophical answer to such reduction ism, and parts o f Living a Christian Life can be read as philosophical 
and theological answers to it too, especially chapter one, in which a kind o f Christian apologetics is briefly 
outlined.
4.4.2 Our experience o f a harsh world
As well as our experience of sin, the authors mention a further dimension of our 
experience of religious tension. This is our experience of the harshness of life and the 
difficulties of living in the world as it has been experienced by virtually every human 
person through all history. They mention a few examples: “The fish are not to be found; 
crops fail; fire destroys carefully built dwellings; everyone gets sick, is hurt, and 
eventually dies.”24 Here we come up against the same ideas we saw in Grisez’s brief but 
thought-provoking treatment in Christian Moral Principles of the sources of our natural 
knowledge of God.25 Humans find ourselves and our actions in pursuit of life and health, 
and other basic forms of human fulfillment, coming up against what we might describe 
here as more-than-human difficulties. Such difficulties point toward the need for a more- 
than-human solution to our difficulties, and so the point of the religious quest for 
meaning and value can be grasped by anyone who experiences the fragility of life and the 
limitations of human action.
4.4.3 A natural theology
In summary, then, we can say that Grisez and his co-authors present us with a kind of 
natural theology,26 which begins with a focus on how our basic awareness of the 
existence of a transcendent creator emerges naturally from our awareness and 
understanding of the contingency of all experienced realities. Then, in addition to this 
theoretical awareness of the transcendent source of reality, we have a practical awareness
24 See “Practical Principles,” 108.
25 See s. 3.3.3 above.
26 Grisez, Boyle and Finnis do not use this phrase here (or in their other works, to my knowledge).
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of our lack of harmony with this Source, pointed to by the facts that we sin and we face 
inevitable and deeply frustrating limitations in our hopes and actions. In both the 
theoretical and practical phases of the argument, it is the inevitable limitations, the human 
limitations, that point clearly to the need for a more-than-human Source of reality, 
meaning and value. It is as if Grisez is saying that the dynamism of the human intellect 
and will, if one is willing to accept the logical implications of this dynamism, points 
ultimately towards God, who alone can account for the existence and intelligibility of 
reality, including objective morality, and who, therefore, alone can save the human 
intellect and will from being ultimately absurd in their dynamic thrust to know and love. 
Human intellectual and volitional dynamism, which might be called “the human spirit”, is 
at the heart of the religious quest, the quest for harmony with the transcendent Source.
4.4.4 The community dimension
This religious quest is not something that is a purely individual matter. Our individual 
responsibility and need to seek accurate religious knowledge is great. So we need the 
help of others, particularly in light of the fact that knowing how to realise any harmony 
with the more-than-human source of reality is difficult.27 The various religions have 
developed as people in various communities and settings have tried to find ways to 
pursue harmony with whatever they have come to understand as the transcendent source 
of meaning and value. Thus, both in the case of individuals as they grow and the case of 
groups and cultures as they evolve and change, religious belief systems and practices 
develop as, virtually universally in human history, people respond both individually and
156
27 See “Practical Principles,” 142.
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socially to their natural responsibility “to seek religious truth, embrace what appears to be 
that truth, and live according to it”.28
4.5 True and false religion can be distinguished
4.5.1 Human actions are a kind o f cooperation with God
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis provide an analysis of human action and its place in a kind of 
natural theology. Crucial to grasping the point of the religious quest is our becoming 
aware of the discrepancy between our hopes and our abilities/achievements. In line with
* 2 9their philosophical attention to the process and implications of human free choice, the 
authors develop their understanding of religion and its role in morality (and, thus, in their
TOmoral theory) by focussing on this discrepancy.
One always hopes to achieve some benefit whenever one acts. But success in achieving 
any benefit is not fully within anyone’s power. Therefore, one necessarily “hopes in 
whomever or whatever will make one’s effort fruitful.”31 (We can add here that it is true 
also that even the whole community of humankind cannot guarantee the success of our 
efforts to pursue and instantiate human fulfillment. It is natural, therefore, for people 
virtually universally to put their hopes in a source that transcends the self and the
28 Ibid. Grisez and his fellow authors are specifically echoing Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae, 2 and 3.
29 The authors point out in the introduction to the article that free choice is the most important element of 
the framework of their whole article and theory: see “Practical Principles,” 100-102.
30 See ibid., 143-144.
31 I b i d . ,  1 4 3 .
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community.) Further, as we have seen, the more-than-human Source of meaning and 
value is the source of the directiveness that motivates all our actions, as this directiveness 
itself is part of contingent reality standing in need of a non-contingent source, and so, as 
the source of our rational motivation, the transcendent Source shapes all our hopes. 
Further still, this transcendent Source is the source too of the fulfilments that we seek 
through action. In addition, we naturally think of this Source as if it were a person (which 
is the reason I have written it with a capital initial). So, we end up thinking of a 
transcendent personal Source who is the ultimate cause of everything, including us, our 
thoughts, choices, actions and fulfilments.
We can add here that this Source is necessarily this ultimate cause if our hopes and 
activity are not to be seen as ultimately absurd. To see our hopes and activities as 
ultimately absurd would rob them of their practical value; and to see objective morality as 
ultimately merely a human creation or “fact of mindless nature”, would rob it of its 
motivating power. There is, in a very real and practical sense, no point in seeing our
32hopes, actions, and moral standards as ultimately absurd.
The authors conclude thus:
Therefore, for those who recognize the reality of a more-than-human personal 
source of meaning and value, every human action is carried out in cooperation 
with that unseen, more-than-human source, understood to be both directing human 
persons toward their fulfillment and helping them to bring it about.
32 There certainly would be no point in affirming or arguing for the absurdity of morality and human action. 
To advert to this is to make a self-referential argument.
33 Ibid., 144, emphasis in original. It should be noted here that the authors do not mean the word 
“cooperation” to refer necessarily to fully morally good cooperation. I f  “all” human actions are to be 
understood as involving cooperation with God, then even sin involves some level of cooperation with God,
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This is a very important point. Earlier in the article, the authors wrote that “human 
actions can and naturally do lead to the instantiation of certain participations in divine 
goodness.”34 What this meant is that God’s being the source of the goodness of the basic 
goods makes our pursuit of these goods, at least implicitly, a kind of participation in 
God’s own goodness as Creator. The authors go beyond this point, however, when they 
argue that not only is God the source of the basic goods as directive, but he is also the 
source of the goods as actually fulfilling. God does not only direct us towards goals and 
benefits; he helps us to achieve our goals and benefits by causing these goals and benefits 
to exist.35
4.5.2 Human action involves willing the fulfillment o f God
The authors extend their argument by focussing on the implications of seeing all human 
actions as cooperation with God. “In any cooperation, the other party, as a personal agent, 
also has intentions.”36 Understanding the transcendent Source as a Person, rather than,
but it cannot be a morally good kind of cooperation. Sin involves a kind o f manipulative and partial 
cooperation with God. This point will be developed below.
34 Ibid., 135, emphasis in original.
35 It seems therefore that the authors are developing what Grisez said in Christian Moral Principles when
he wrote that life could be understood in the light o f  faith  as a kind of cooperation with Jesus. Here, Grisez 
and his co-authors are writing philosophically, not theologically, and yet they argue that life can be seen 
even by the light o f  reason unaided by faith as cooperation with God. Clearly, faith enriches considerably 
the concept and possibilities o f life as cooperation with God, as these authors recognise in the final part of 
this article. Life as cooperation with Jesus can be seen as a specification in the light o f revelation of the 
more general cooperation with the Source o f meaning and value that the authors speak o f here. We could 
say that Grisez’s faith has illuminated his natural law theory, allowing him to see more clearly a 
philosophical truth. Thus the theology o f Christian Moral Principles has led to clarification and extension 
of Grisez’s natural law theory in “Practical Principles” .
36 Ibid., 144.
say, an impersonal energy or force, we must assume that the transcendent Source 
cooperates in our actions for his own reasons, for his own fulfillment. “Hence, in every 
action every human person naturally and necessarily wills (what cannot be thought of 
otherwise than as) a fulfillment o f the unseen source of meaning and value.”
The authors make the point that speaking of such “fulfillment” of God should not be 
taken as implying that God lacks anything; the language they use in their argument here 
is a kind of “relational predication”, which speaks of God only insofar as we are related 
to him and he to us, but does not claim to speak about God in himself.38 Still, even 
though the language must be read as a kind of analogy, and is limited as such, it 
emphasises a point about the more-than-human Source of meaning and value that is 
important: this Source is not in our power, this source is not a mere means to our ends. 
The reason for this is that “God emerges in the very exercise of human agency as one 
who directs human persons to act and brings about what is not within their power.”39 In 
other words, the way that we have come to understand God as a personal Source of all 
reality, emphasises our ultimate contingency and powerlessness, and thus our need for a 
truly independent, objective and non-contingent Reality to be this Source.
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37 Ibid., emphasis in original.
38 See ibid.
39 Ibid. What Grisez is referring to here is our understanding of God, and not God himself.
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis end up with the following conclusions in their concisely 
outlined natural theology.40 All human willing, because it puts its hope necessarily in the 
transcendent Source, is a kind of cooperation with this Source. Because this Source is a 
Person with intentions of its own, it is understood to cooperate with all human action for 
its own reasons. These reasons are for fulfillment of the Source’s own purposes. 
Therefore, all our actions are to be understood as a kind of willing of the purposes of 
God, insofar as these actions, in their ultimate and inescapable contingency and 
limitation, are a kind of cooperation with God, who makes everything actual. The authors 
call this cooperative willing “the fundamental human love of God”, which is “natural” for 
those who recognise “the reality of a more-than-human, personal source of meaning and 
value”.41
4.5.3 What about sin?
The idea that all human actions are to be understood as a kind of cooperation with God 
seems puzzling. What about sin? How can we understand sinning, which is obviously a 
kind of human action, as cooperation with God?
Firstly, Grisez and his co-authors are not saying that all human action is an explicit 
cooperation with God. Although they do not point this out using the terminology of 
“explicit/implicit”, it is clear from their discussion that they do not assume or argue that
40 It could be argued that their presentation of this natural theology is too concise, and that it needs to be 
extended, especially to respond to objections, such as Grisez did in the extensive arguments of Beyond the
New Theism. However, none o f the authors has done this and so it remains an area o f  their work in need of 
development. The present work aims to contribute to this development.
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41 Ibid.
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all human action is carried out with any explicit awareness of its being a kind of 
cooperation with God.42 Their argument is a more modest one: all human action is at 
least implicitly a kind of cooperation with God. Obviously, one might not be explicitly 
aware always of its being so. Their argument seems to say that even if one is not aware of 
cooperating with any ultimate Source when one chooses and acts, one’s choosing and 
acting must involve hoping for whatever conditions are necessary for success, and such 
conditions must include the transcendent Source of reality, meaning and value, whether 
one knows this or not. So everyone’s actions are a de facto cooperation with God, 
whether they understand them to be so or not.43
Secondly, the authors are not claiming that all human action is morally good cooperation 
with God. Here, they are quite explicit. They distinguish between two types of 
cooperation. The first kind of cooperation obtains when human persons act in cooperation 
with God exclusively for their own (human) fulfilment, and only insofar as it is necessary
42 In an earlier part o f  the article, the authors make the point that some human actions are carried out for the 
sake of substantive goods rather than reflexive goods: see ibid., 139. This means that the good of 
cooperation with God, or in other words, the good of religion, is not explicitly at stake in all actions. They 
do not rule out the possibility, however, that one can do an action explicitly for one basic human good, such 
as life, whilst at the same time other basic goods are instantiated implicitly in the same action.
43 However, Grisez and his co-authors seem to assume that people who understand their actions in general 
to be cooperation with God are already aware of God as the transcendent Source of reality: see nn. 33 and 
41 above. Belief in God is a condition for explicitly understanding one’s actions as cooperation with God. 
Perhaps Grisez would accept the following point, however: that for those who do not believe in God, their 
actions are implicitly a kind o f cooperation with God, but they understand their actions only imperfectly, 
and see them as cooperation with all the necessary conditions for the success of these actions, whilst failing 
to see that God is the ultimate such condition. Presumably, such people have some kind o f substitute for 
God as their ultimate condition for successful action: maybe “scientific progress”, “scientific truth”, or 
“social justice”, or “luck”, or “destiny”, or “nature’s law”, and so on. Thus, even atheists can be understood 
to conform to Grisez’s theory here: even they always act with reference to an ultimate condition or set of 
conditions with which they are motivated to act in cooperation with, or at least to be resigned to and accept 
with some grace, insofar as they can. Even atheists have a religion o f sorts.
for this selfish fulfilment, but not for God’s own (divine) fulfilment.44 This cooperation is 
an unreasonably limited cooperation, a cooperation in which the will “subordinates the 
fulfillment of others to the benefit it seeks for itself’ and “establishes an exploitative 
relationship” with the other.45
4.5.4 False religion and true religion can be distinguished practically
This kind of exploitative willing instantiates the basic good of religion, but only in an
immoral way. It is immoral because it fails to respect the integrity of the basic human
goods in their integral directiveness, and so it pursues and instantiates the good of
religion only in a mutilated and fragmented and miserable manner.46 It is clear that Grisez
and his fellow authors acknowledge that the basic good of religion can be understood and
pursued in a very imperfect and unacceptable way:
Those who relate to others in this [immoral] way try to coerce them, trick them, 
manipulate them, bargain with them, evade their claims for mutuality, and, 
ultimately, get along without them. Many entire religions and some forms of every 
religion are marked with these signs of morally bad will.47
In this quotation, Grisez and his fellow authors point out a specifically practical way of 
distinguishing between true and false religion. True and false religion are distinguished 
by the kind of willing involved in each. False religion is marked by “morally bad will”, 
which manipulates, tricks, bargains with, evades and even ignores the purposes of God.
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44 See ibid., 144-145.
45 Ibid., 145.
46 See ibid., 126-127, for an explanation o f what characterises the will as immoral, using these adjectives.
47 Ibid., 145.
Another way of distinguishing false religion from true religion would be to point out that 
false religion lacks accurate knowledge of God and his purposes. Grisez and his fellow 
authors do not mention this more theoretical way of judging religion to be inadequate, 
and one can be confident that they would not reject it48 as a method of evaluating the 
truth of any religion, or any religious attitude or lifestyle, but their approach in this article 
is thoroughly practical in its focus on the will. Practically considered, false religion is 
constituted by willing that lacks the integrity of “a will toward integral human 
fulfillment”, willing that violates the first principle of morality.49 This kind of willing, 
morally bad willing, constitutes cooperation with God insofar as one hopes in God for the 
fulfillment of one’s intentions, but it is a morally bad cooperation with God insofar as it 
is a selfish hope and it lacks the integrity that accepts God as the personal Source of all 
that is good in its integral wholeness and directiveness. It could be said, in line with the 
analysis of Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, that false religion, insofar as it is a morally bad 
cooperation with God, involves a kind of idolatry in which the human person or 
community creates ‘god’ in our own image, so that our immoral desires and choices will 
be supported or rationalised by this created ‘god’.
48 It is important to bear in mind that knowledge is a basic human good, and it forms part o f the integral 
directiveness of practical truth, and so one is immoral whenever one chooses in a manner that slights, 
overlooks, ignores or damages the good o f knowledge. Therefore, Grisez’s practical approach does not 
ignore the need for one to have accurate knowledge o f God and his purposes; he is not saying that 
subjectively good intentions are sufficient or that ignorance is acceptable. One should also bear in mind 
Grisez’s acknowledgement of the value of, and need for, dialectical arguments in defence of the basic 
goods: see ibid., 111-113.
49 See ibid., 128. This point is not affected substantially by Grisez’s recent development of his moral 
theory: see s. 6.3 above.
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True religion is the opposite of false religion. Practically considered, true religion 
involves morally good willing. This is willing that respects the first principle of morality, 
willing “toward integral human fulfillment”, willing that is open to the integral 
directiveness of all the first principles of practical knowledge. True religion involves 
right reason, unfettered practical reason that seeks the good with a heart open to all that is 
good and true and beautiful.50 True religion involves morally good cooperation with God. 
This kind of cooperation is fully open to the fact that God is a person independent of us, 
who has purposes of his own, which our cooperation with him ought to respect. In our 
religious quest for knowledge of God’s will, we ought to seek, accept and live by God’s 
purposes. True religion involves the rejection of idolatry and the acceptance of God’s 
independent existence and objectively real purposes. True religion involves the avoidance 
of using “God” or “religion” to support or rationalise our immoral desires and choices.
4.5.5 Religion as a virtue
The authors do not explicitly list “religion” as a virtue. In fact, they deal with religion as 
a basic human good, and they distinguish between virtues and basic human goods. They 
see the basic human goods as the objects of the truly primary practical principles that 
form the first principles of moral truth.51 As a basic human good, religion can be pursued 
and instantiated in an immoral way: whenever it is pursued or instantiated in deliberately 
chosen or unfairly accepted isolation from the other basic human goods, or, in other
50 This language (the good, the true, and the beautiful) is not that used by Grisez, Boyle and Finnis in this 
article. Notice however that morally good religion is necessarily open to, and not closed to, accurate 
theoretical knowledge of God and his will. Morally good religion, true religion, is not purely subjectivistic.
51 See ibid., 130.
166
words, in a way that lacks the integrity of moral truth. However, whenever religion is 
pursued or instantiated in a morally good way, respecting the integral directiveness of all 
practical truth, then, although the authors do not say this explicitly, their argument 
supports the idea that religion is a kind of virtue. “Virtues are aspects of the fully 
integrated personality of a good person. Such a personality concretely realizes the 
reflexive goods in accord with moral truth.”52 So, a person who pursues religion, which is 
one of the reflexive goods, in accord with moral truth, does so in a way that integrates his 
or her personality, thus forming virtue. Although “religion” as a basic human good can be 
(mis)understood as merely “pre-moral”, as a fragment of the integral whole set of basic 
human goods, and so pursued in an immoral way, it can also be understood as a virtue 
whenever it is seen and pursued as an integral part of a whole set of basic human goods.
4.5.6 The objective content o f our religious beliefs and practices matters 
Grisez and his fellow authors deal with religion from a practical point of view, 
emphasising the practical intellect and the will, looking at things mainly from within the 
moral agent’s perspective. However, the natural theology argument that the authors 
develop, which was outlined above, implies several truths about the content of religious 
beliefs and the specificity of religious practices. The natural theology they present seems 
to imply that the only adequate way of understanding the transcendent Source is as a 
personal reality that directs us towards moral truth and human fulfillment. Therefore, as 
well as a theoretical argument from contingency (a kind of cosmological argument), they 
present an argument from practical rationality, which provides some religious content and
52 Ibid.
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specificity. This content and specificity are knowable by reason, insofar as it is open to 
the truth of the argument from contingency and the argument from practical rationality.53 
Knowledge is one of the basic human goods, and one who loves the good of knowledge 
will be open to learn the truth about God and religion, and will never settle for ignorance 
or mere guesswork or human projection, insofar as one is able individually or socially to 
avoid religious ignorance, guesswork and projection. Also, one who is morally good can 
learn from this moral goodness itself, insofar as it is a reflexive goodness that points to its 
Source, some naturally knowable religious content.
One can know philosophically at least the following natural truths about God and 
religion: there is a transcendent Source of meaning and value; this Source is non­
contingent and thus mysterious; this Source is what all contingent realities depend on 
ultimately; this Source is adequately understood only as personal; this Source is singular; 
this Source is the intelligent source of all meaning; this Source is the good source of 
value; this Source is the condition of all our hopes; religion, or harmony with this Source, 
is to be pursued and instantiated; we must individually and socially seek the truth about 
this Source and how to realise harmony with it; we must avoid any kind of immoral 
pursuit and instantiation of religion.
53 It is not necessary for one to be explicitly aware o f these arguments in any detail for one to be aware of 
their implications for religious belief and practice. Even those who are not philosophers can grasp the idea 
and at least the probability o f G od's existence, his mystery, his singularity, his personality, his power, his 
intelligence, and his goodness. — all o f  which are implied by the argument from contingency that Grisez put 
forward in Beyond the New Theism and the argument from practical rationality and that Grisez, Boyle and 
Finnis present in this article.
The authors make it clear several times in this article that accurate knowledge is 
important in our pursuit of, and instantiation of, the basic human goods.54 To be 
practically rational one needs both practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. One 
needs “sound metaphysics and experience in practicing authentic religious faith” if one is 
to understand the good of religion.55 We can achieve some accurate natural knowledge of 
religious truth. We can even be naturally aware of sin and the need to avoid it.56 At the 
same time, Grisez and his fellow authors clearly understand that what is naturally 
knowable about religion is limited. There are “commitments of faith with far richer 
purposes than the negative one of remaining blameless before God”.57 At the end of the
58article, the authors make it clear that Christian faith offers much in this respect.
4.6 Religion as the integrating overall commitment of one’s life
4.6.1 Reflexive basic human goods have a natural moral priority
There is another important aspect of religion as a basic good that is developed in this 
article. The authors emphasise, as in previous works, that the basic human goods do not 
form a hierarchy amongst themselves.59 Taking each one singly, no one of them is prior
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54 See “Practical Principles,” 109, 111 and 118.
55 Ibid., 109.
56 See ibid., 146. See s. 3.4.8 above for Grisez’s treatment of sin in Christian Moral Principles.
57 “Practical Principles,” 146.
58 Ibid., 146-147. The details o f this focus on Christianity will be examined below. Clearly, Grisez does not 
confine our need for religious content to what can be known philosophically.
59 See ibid., 139-140.
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in every circumstance, in every choice. Religion in itself is not the most important basic 
good.
Still, the authors make it clear that there are natural priorities among the basic goods.60 
These natural priorities are specified by moral truth, rather than by (more general) 
practical truth. When we understand the reflexive goods in a moral way, grasping their 
particular directiveness in the context of the integral directiveness of all the basic goods, 
we can see how each of the reflexive goods can have priority in particular choices. 
Whenever one has a choice between harmonising feelings with choices by either 
choosing in accord with (unreasonable) feelings or harmonising feelings with choice by 
“bringing one’s feelings into line with one’s reasonable choice”, one must choose the 
latter. Thus, the reflexive basic human good of inner peace, when understood morally, 
takes priority whenever it is at stake.61 So too with the good of harmony among 
judgment, choice and performance -  it takes priority whenever it is at stake and it is 
understood virtuously. In other words: “Whenever one must choose between doing what 
is morally right and what is morally wrong, one must act according to one’s 
conscience.”62 Harmony with one’s fellow human beings can take priority too, whenever 
it is at stake in some particular way and it is understood morally.
60 See ibid., 137-139.
61 Ibid., 137-138.
62 Ibid., 137.
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Following on from these points about these three reflexive goods, Grisez and his fellow 
authors focus on religion and show how it too can have a kind of natural priority, when 
understood morally.
4.6.2 Religion as a virtue has priority over the other basic goods
We have seen above what is meant by understanding religion morally. It means 
understanding religion as a true cooperation with God, respectful of God as a person, 
open to God as the Source of practical and moral truth, open to God’s objective reality 
and will. Religion as a virtue has a particular importance,63 which gives it a priority over 
the other basic goods, whilst not denying the basic goodness of the other goods or 
reducing them to religion.
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis want to make the point that the basic human goods are not an 
unordered crowd of goods, and the moral life is not an incoherent set of choices for 
incommensurable goods, with no shape or overall structure to it. They do not see the 
moral life as made up of isolated choices. Commitments are an important part of the 
moral life. Grisez, Boyle and Finnis argue that each human person should pursue an 
overall commitment that integrates his or her whole life.64 This unity of life is part of the 
happiness that one is prepared to settle for as the ultimate natural end of one’s life.65
63 Again, it is worth noting that the authors do not explicitly write about religion as “a virtue”, but their 
arguments imply that it is right to speak o f religion as a virtue whenever it is specified morally.
64 See ibid., 136.
65 See ibid. The authors point out that the happiness for which one is prepared to settle is not the exact same 
thing as ‘integral human fulfilment’, because the latter is beyond human realisation, even in principle, and 
so can function only as an ideal to rectify the will, whereas the former is realisable in principle through 
one’s morally good choices. Grisez’s recent development o f his moral theory replaces integral human
Without such an integrating commitment unifying one’s choices and lesser commitments, 
it is possible that one’s choices and commitments will overlap wastefully or interfere 
with each other, and so one’s practical purpose will be frustrated. Therefore, one is 
naturally bound to try to integrate one’s choices into a coherent and practically effective 
whole. To fail to do so is to violate the very first principle of practical reasoning.66
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis argue in this article, for the first time in any detailed way, that 
only a (virtuous) religious commitment can integrate one’s life into a unified, satisfying 
whole.67 As God is the Source of meaning and value, and thus of the directiveness of the 
practical principles of the natural law, every choice is a kind of participation in God’s 
goodness. Every choice is a kind of cooperation with God, who is the ultimate condition 
of all our hopes. Only morally good choices embody a true cooperation with God; only 
such choices participate as fully as possible in God’s goodness. The good of religion is 
instantiated (at least implicitly) in every morally good choice, and is violated (at least 
implicitly) in every immoral choice. Even choices between two good options can be 
understood to be religious insofar as one is necessarily choosing between options 
conditioned by the ultimate Source of all reality, meaning and value. Thus, it is religion 
that is the most appropriate basic human good for unifying a human life, coordinating 
one’s choices into a coherent whole that is adequate to both the first principle of practical 
knowledge and the first principle of morality. Even when religion is not explicitly at
fulfillment and the happiness fo r  which people settle with integral communal fulfillment as the ultimate 
natural end of one’s life: see s. 6.3 below.
66 See ibid., 119-120.
67 See ibid., 141. We saw hints of this argument in earlier works of Grisez: see ss. 2.1.8, 2.1.9, 2.2.8, 2.4.6a- 
b,2.5.5d, 3.4.5, and 3.4.8.
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stake in a choice, and often it is not,68 it is always at stake implicitly simply because we 
face a choice.
4.6.3 Religion is the best good for providing one’s overall orientation 
The most suitable basic orientation of a human life, therefore, is that of seeking to avoid 
conflict with the transcendent Source of meaning and value, and seeking harmony with 
this Source, in all our choices. Put negatively, this means that it is right for us to see all of 
our choices as conditioned and shaped by the intention of avoiding sin.69 Seeing all of our 
choices as conditioned and shaped by any one of the other basic human goods, even one 
of the other three reflexive goods, is not as adequate. Religion is held by Grisez and his 
fellow authors to have an architectonic role that is “greater” than any other good. It is not 
confined to one area of life, as the substantive goods are. Nor is it only at stake in choices 
between right and wrong, as the other reflexive goods are. It has to be admitted, however, 
that the reason why religion is better than the other three reflexive goods in its 
architectonic role is not fully explained or justified in this article.70 It would seem that 
perhaps the main justification for their claim is that when religion is morally specified, 
and only then, it is able to serve as a unifying good for all the other goods insofar as
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68 Clearly, the authors are not claiming that all choices must be explicitly religious, or even explicitly for 
the sake of a reflexive good. They give an example: a girl chooses to help an old man purely for the sake of 
his safety, unaware of any other basic good at stake in the choice: see ibid., 139.
69 See ibid., 146.
70 It is worth noting, for example, how Finnis in his writings before this article gave the overall 
architectonic role to the basic good o f ‘practical reasonableness’, which is synonymous with what the 
authors here call the good o f harmony between one’s judgements, choices and performances, when morally 
understood. It is not explained fully in this article why he has now moved away from such a position. See 
ss. 7.2.3-5 above.
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religion seeks harmony with the ultimate Source of each of the other goods, and of all of 
them as an integral whole.
4.7 Christian faith and religion
4.7.1 Christian faith specifies a rich integrating religious commitment 
The final part of the article is devoted to the Christian faith and forms a kind of 
theological epilogue to the mainly philosophical article.71 The Christian faith is seen as a 
religious view that specifies an integrating religious commitment. During the course of 
the article, the authors have presented religion as a basic human good, the good of 
harmony with the transcendent source of meaning and value, towards which we are 
naturally directed by a first principle of practical knowledge. This initial simple directive 
leads us to make efforts to develop and deepen our knowledge of this transcendent source 
and how to pursue and instantiate harmony with it (and avoid conflict with it). We do this 
individually and socially, in each individual’s life and culturally in the life of society, and 
so religions develop and help us on our religious quest for the goods of knowledge and 
religion. Thus, we are helped towards making a virtuous religious commitment that 
unifies our life.
Christian faith is seen by the authors (and they seem to say that others will see this easily 
too) as offering a richer understanding of “religion” and the ultimate purpose of life than
71 Ibid., 146-147.
a merely general religious commitment.72 Examined philosophically, Christian faith 
exemplifies and epitomises clearly how a virtuous religious commitment can integrate a 
human life in a way that contributes to the closest approximation to integral human 
fulfillment. Understood theologically, Christian faith presents a true vision of life 
understood as cooperation with God in the completion of “his work of creating, 
redeeming, and sanctifying humankind.”73 Life is seen as a commitment to seek first the 
Kingdom of God. This Kingdom “will include every sort of benefit intended by morally 
good wills”.74 Christian faith involves entering into human cooperation with Jesus.75 This 
cooperation involves “willing one’s own fulfillment in communion with Jesus”, but also, 
in willing one’s own fulfillment, simultaneously willing “the fulfillment of the divine 
person of the Word, according to his human nature.”76
Grisez and his fellow authors are here applying to Christian faith what they earlier said 
about religion in general: understood and instantiated virtuously, that is in the light of the 
full integrity of moral truth, religion involves a morally good cooperation with the Source 
of meaning and value, and this cooperation is the best kind of commitment to unify one’s 
life practically and morally. What the authors are doing in this short final section of the 
article is a kind of summary of some major points already developed by Grisez in
72 See ibid., 146. This final part o f the article does not set out to examine or defend the truth o f the Christian 
faith, but to present briefly its meaning, and to show how it exemplifies what has been said in the article 
about religion’s role in shaping an overall commitment unifying one’s life.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 147
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Christian Moral Principles, and examined in the previous chapter of this present work, 
but developing what was said by Grisez there by focussing on how religion as a basic 
human good, especially when specified by Christian faith, is eminently suited to play an 
architectonic role in unifying the moral life.
4.7.2 Religion mediates our fulfillment in divine goodness
Grisez, Boyle and Finnis end by referring to something we saw in our examination of the 
theology in Christian Moral Principles. Religion, even when specified by divine 
revelation and embodied in Christian faith, is only a basic human good. It denotes a form 
of human fulfillment, a kind of human love of God leading to human happiness. Even 
though this human happiness, according to Christian faith, will be fulfilled by God in the 
Kingdom after our death, it is still specifically human fulfillment.
However, there is a further kind of fulfillment that God offers to humankind through 
Jesus: “fulfillment in divine goodness”.77 This fulfillment is a gift, received by us, not 
instantiated by (or in) any of our choices, as the human good of religion is. It is a 
fulfillment that we can have even as we continue to be human, because, whilst remaining 
human, we can share in the divine nature (in a manner similar to Jesus sharing in our 
human nature) by our receiving “a second birth by water and the Spirit or a second nature 
by divine adoption”.78 This gift of divine fulfillment is not a substitute for human
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
fulfillment in the Kingdom (i.e. heaven): it is a compliment to it. We are to be fulfilled in 
both a human way and a divine way.
Still, the authors present Christian life as having one overall purpose: to live for the sake
of the kingdom of God.79
The happiness for which those who live such a life are prepared to settle embraces 
every human fulfillment for which they hope. Moreover, mediated by their human 
solidarity with Jesus but beyond the limits of merely human peace with God [i.e. 
the basic human good of religion], they hope for intimate communion in divine
joy-80
We note here the importance of living in friendship with Jesus, which is a specified 
form of religion: this friendship is a bridge, to speak metaphorically, that links our 
human acts and fulfillment to the gift of our divine fulfillment. Our joy in the divine 
fulfillment is mediated by our human solidarity with Jesus, and therefore we are able 
to hope for it.81
4.8 Conclusion: Various levels of meaning of the term “religion”
It is clear from this article that, as in Christian Moral Principles, the basic good of 
religion is seen to have various ‘levels’ of meaning.82 At its most basic, religion functions 
as the object of a simple insight (or practical directive) into the value of pursuing
79 This article marks the beginning o f Grisez’s emphasis on the kingdom o f God (or simply “the kingdom” 
as he often refer to it) as the unifying theme of Christian life, as our ultimate end.
so Ibid., emphasis added. Both the emphasis and the added insert seek to emphasise the role o f religion.
81 Grisez develops this idea later: see s. 6.1.9c below.
82 Again, as in our analysis o f Christian Moral Principles, we acknowledge that Grisez and his co-authors 
do not treat religion or the basic goods in terms of levels.
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harmony and avoiding conflict with whatever is the transcendent source of reality, 
meaning and value. The basic level of “religion” can be developed as one develops one’s 
understanding of what the transcendent source is and how one is to pursue and instantiate 
harmony with it (and avoid conflict with it). At the level of natural theology, much can be 
learned about what the transcendent source is and about how to pursue the good of 
religion. Much of what is found in various religions can be understood as the unfolding of 
what can be learned, and what can be guessed at, often erroneously, as part of our quest 
for the basic goods of knowledge and religion (which are seen as an interrelated pair, 
each specifying the other). Various things can help or hinder us in our religious quest.
Immorality especially can hinder us from correctly understanding the good of religion 
and participating in its goodness, and morally bad will can twist the good of religion into 
an evil version of the true good of religion, into a manipulative form of relationship with 
God, an idolatrous form of cooperation with God. Understood morally, the good of 
religion can open out into a true form of friendship with God, one where we are willing to 
accept God as he truly is, especially in his being the Source of the natural law, the 
integral directiveness of practical principles. At this level, religion is a virtue.
Christian faith is seen as giving such good will or such virtue specific and integrating 
shape, true and rich knowledge, and inspiring and transcendent vision. The basic good of 
religion finds its fulfillment in Christian faith. And it finds its most perfect fulfillment in 
the heavenly kingdom.
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Finally, “mediated” by the “solidarity” with Jesus that Christian faith makes possible, 
“but beyond the limits of merely human peace with God”, which is the basic good of 
religion, we find the special gift of sharing the divine life.83 So, although religion is a 
wonderful human good in itself, in its specification in Christian belief and practice, and in 
its architectonic role as the overall commitment of a good life, it is not the highest good, 
not the most transcendent sharing in communion with God. That is a gift beyond the 
basic good of religion, although our way to being given this great gift is through the good 
of religion.
4.9 Appendix: “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics” [1989]84
4.9.1 Religion and the environment
In a chapter-length outline by Grisez of his natural law theory, covering much the same 
ground as the article just examined above, and written shortly after it, Grisez mentions a 
new point concerning the meaning of “religion” as a basic human good. The range of 
reference of the basic human good that we are calling “religion” is expressed in terms 
that seem wider in scope in this article than in other works:
83 Ibid. Note that the gift of sharing the divine life is not an instantiation o f religion realised by or through 
or in our action; it is a pure gift. Nevertheless, it is “mediated” by our human solidarity with Jesus, which is 
an instantiation o f the good o f religion specified in Christian faith. This point is suggested clearly by the 
final sentences of this article.
84 Grisez’s “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics” was published in Moral Philosophy: Historical and 
Contemporary Essays, ed. William C. Starr and Richard C. Taylor (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1989), 125-43. It would seem that commentators and critics have overlooked this article. William E. 
May, Introduction to Moral Theology, for example, which presents a detailed summary of Grisez’s thought, 
with copious references, does not mention it. Grisez’s 1989 presentation o f his natural law theory is very 
similar to the chapter length presentation o f it in the better known Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and 
Realism, co-authored with John Finnis and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). Grisez acknowledges Finnis and Boyle as major contributors and co-owners o f  their natural 
law theory in “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics,” 125.
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And beyond human relationships, there can be harmony between humans and the 
wider reaches of reality and its principles. Concern for this last good underlies such 
diverse activities as believers’ worship and environmentalists’ work to save
f Of
endangered species.
This way of referring to the basic good of religion is very broad. It can be understood to 
refer to a theistic view, but it also allows very clearly for a non-theistic view. This much 
was expressed in the ‘Practical Principles’ article too, and previous work, but one of the 
examples that Grisez gives here is new and interesting: environmentalists’ work to save 
endangered species.86 This example of an activity instantiating the good of religion 
suggests that it can be understood very broadly in Grisez’s moral theory. We might put it 
like this: For some people, the earth and/or its life forms can be a kind of “god”. Or, 
perhaps, we could say that work for the sake of the good of the environment, including 
the good of the survival of non-human species, can be accounted for by reference to the 
human good of harmony between humans and “the wider reaches of reality and its 
principles”.
Grisez’s broad description of what the basic human good of religion can involve can 
allow for an environmentalist religion of sorts, in which nature itself will fulfil the role of 
“god” in the practical thinking of such people, and will render their choices intelligible to 
them and to others. But it could be also that human concern for the good of the earth and 
its species is accounted for within a theistic religious world-view. This article by Grisez 
does not elaborate on the matter, but the broadness of its brief treatment of the good of
85 Ibid., 128.
86 Actually, the example is not totally new as it appeared word for word in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality 
and Realism, 280. This is the first time that Grisez makes reference to this example in a work written by 
him alone.
religion is notable, and it seems to allow for human concern for the good of non-human 
species. In addition, of course, Grisez mentions a more obvious example of religion in 
action: the worship of believers.
4.9.2a Christian faith is necessary to participate richly in the human goods 
Like “Practical Principles”, this article ends with a theological section. It is worth looking 
in a little detail at how Grisez makes the transition to this final theological section. In the 
penultimate section, Grisez made the point that living a good life entails having “an 
integrated set of upright commitments” that enables one to effectively and consistently 
participate in goods.87 However, one requires more than just making commitments, even 
an integrated set of them, to live a fulfilled and good life. One requires virtues, which are 
aspects of character shaped by good choices: “a good person is one whose whole self is
DO
formed by a comprehensive set of upright commitments”. Virtues enable us to make 
good free choices and commitments. However, this is not an easy task.
The final, theological section begins by outlining the difficulties of living a good and 
fulfilling human life. “The good we achieve and enjoy is mutilated and threatened by 
ineptitude, failure, breakdown, ignorance, error, misunderstanding, pain, sickness, and 
death.”89 We seem to be faced with inevitable failure, both individually and socially. Our 
society suffers from immorality and compromise, and such morally imperfect society
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87 “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics,” 137. See ibid., 129-130, on the first moral principle.
88 Ibid., 137.
89 Ibid.
makes it harder for each of us to live a good life. We are all lacking in freedom in various 
ways. “All humankind lives in slavery, though some are always only slaves, while others 
sometimes play the role of master.”90 Added to immorality are other “repugnant aspects 
of the human condition”, which are “epitomized by death, which seems natural and 
inevitable”.91 Philosophical reflection is inadequate to explain our human predicament.
According to Grisez, the “Christian gospel ... offers a more adequate account of the 
situation.”92 He outlines the gospel, emphasising the fact that God calls each of us to 
make the commitment of faith in Jesus. Grisez wants to make very clear that making the 
Christian commitment of faith is not to commit to something non-human, something 
narrowly spiritual or religious: “The gospel teaches Christians that if they live their lives 
to implement their faith in Jesus, they will live the best human lives possible in this 
broken world.”93 Here once again we see a central theme of Grisez’s moral theory: 
commitment to religion, when specified by Christian faith, is not a commitment that takes 
one away from the other human goods, and from natural human fulfillment. Rather, 
commitment to Jesus and to his cause, the Kingdom, is a commitment in which humans 
can seek and find true, integral fulfillment. True, such fulfillment is not possible simply 
by making and keeping one’s commitment of faith; such commitment is only the first 
stage of human liberation from all the negative aspects of the fallen human condition. A 
second, final stage is necessary too, in which God recreates by his own act earth and
90 Ibid., 138.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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heaven, including the resurrection of the body, a divine act of recreation begun in Jesus’
94resurrection.
4.9.2b Christian faith and natural law ethics
None of this means that the natural law ethics developed by Grisez is superseded or no 
longer applicable:
If the Christian gospel is true, the normative ethical theory outlined in the previous 
sections remains adequate. The basic human goods remain, though they unfold in 
unexpected ways.95
This quote does not mention religion specifically, but it implies that the basic good of 
religion, along with the other six basic human goods, remains relevant to the commitment 
of Christian faith and its fulfillment in the Kingdom, the “unending divine-human 
fellowship”96 of heaven.
It is clear that Grisez sees Christian faith as supporting and developing the natural law 
ethics he outlines in this article. An important element of this view is his rejection of 
what he calls “an Augustinian or Thomistic version of neo-Platonism”,97 in which the 
good of religion plays too strong a role, drowning out the full range of human goods and 
their fulfillment in the Kingdom. Grisez insists at the end of this article, as he has done in
94 See ibid., 138-139.
95 Ibid., 139. Grisez also mentions that “the modes of responsibility remain, though they generate many 
specifically Christian norms”.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. What he means by this phrase is not explained in any detail in “A Contemporary Natural Law 
Ethics”, but see ss. 6.1,9d and 6.2.2a below.
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Christian Moral Principles and continues to do in later works, that “faith does not 
substitute a supreme instantiation of a supernatural good for integral human 
fulfillment”.98 Grisez wants to be clear that Christian faith does not aim at the Beatific 
Vision as our natural and comprehensive fulfillment. The goods of religion and 
knowledge, which might (falsely) be thought of as being supremely fulfilled by the 
Beatific Vision, are not the only basic human goods; they are not the only important 
aspects of our human nature. Grisez’s view is that all the human goods will be found in 
heaven, which is to be seen as “an unending marriage feast”, a “communion of divine and 
human persons [in which] all the basic human goods will be instantiated without the 
defects imposed by death.”99 So, religion is only one of a range of human goods to be 
perfected in heaven, although it is obviously an important one insofar as it refers to our 
harmony with God, which is an integral part of heaven’s happiness. However, Grisez 
ends his article with a sentence referring to what we have already seen him deal with in 
detail in Christian Moral Principles, the fact that God offers us a more-than-human 
fulfillment, a special gift of sharing in his divine life, a gift that goes beyond any merely 
human good that we can instantiate in or through our choices and actions: “And the 
more-than-human fulfillment which is naturally proper to God alone also will be enjoyed 
by his adopted sons and daughters”.100
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98 “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics,” 139.
" Ib id .
100 Ibid.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VOLUMES TWO AND THREE [1993/1997]
5.1 Living a Christian Life, volume 2 of The Way o f the Lord Jesus [1993]
We turn now to analyse the second and third volumes of Grisez’s moral theology project, 
The Way o f the Lord Jesus, beginning with the second.1 We look mainly at the parts of 
this book that indicate or suggest how the good of religion finds its place in a Christian 
life shaped by natural law specified by Christian faith.
5,1. la  The basic goods in Grisez’s moral theory in this volume
It is not easy to find clearly in this volume where the basic human good of religion is 
treated. It does not appear in the contents page; nor does it appear in the index.2 In fact, 
several of the other basic human goods are difficult, or even impossible, to find in the 
contents page or index. True, life and marriage are very easy to find as each has a full 
chapter devoted to it (chapters 8 and 9 respectively). Also, work is treated in part of 
chapter 10.3 There is very little on the good of play, however, and although the good of 
knowledge is treated in the chapter about “Seeking Moral Truth” (chapter 5), it is treated
1 G. Grisez, Living a Christian Life, volume 2 o f The Way o f the Lord Jesus (Quincy, III.: Franciscan Press, 
1993). Though written with the help o f  Joseph Boyle, Jeannette Grisez, Russell Shaw, and others, this work 
is substantially Grisez’s. This volume deals with “the specific moral responsibilities” common to all 
Christians, both lay and clerical (see xi).
2 There are entries in the index for “religious assent”, “religious liberty” and “religious life” (meaning, the 
“religious state of life, or the religious vocation): see ibid., 946.
3 Only two pages of the 950 deal with the good of play, looking at the immorality of prize-fighting and at 
how the norm governing this matter can be generalised to cover other sports: see ibid., 550-551.
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only with reference to moral knowledge. It is certainly easy to find references to the good 
of interpersonal harmony, specified morally: there is plenty about this good in chapter 6 
(“Love, Justice, Mercy, and Social Responsibility”) and in other chapters dealing with the 
interpersonal aspects of Christian life. It is difficult, however, to find any reference to the 
reflexive goods to do with harmony within the self: inner peace and good conscience.4 In 
summary, it would seem that this book lacks a clear presentation concerning the place of 
the substantive goods of knowledge/aesthetic appreciation, the good of play, and three of 
the reflexive goods (i.e. all except interpersonal harmony) in the Christian life.5
In previous works, Grisez clearly says that Christian morality does not abrogate the 
natural law, or substitute for it, or supersede it: rather, Christian morality specifies and 
perfects the natural law.6 So, we can expect any treatment of living a Christian life to 
include all the principles of the natural law, specified and perfected by divine revelation 
accepted by living faith. The problem is that Living a Christian Life does not seem to 
indicate clearly where some of the primary principles find their place in the Christian life. 
This includes the good of religion. However, this chapter will show that the good of 
religion pervades the whole of Living a Christian Life, even though it is not often referred 
to as “the good of religion”.
4 These two goods are dealt with in chapter five, however: see especially, 249, 273-284, and 291-296.
5 It is also worth noting that the index does have a brief set of references under the heading “basic goods”, 
but these refer only to the goods o f  life, marriage and work, as mentioned above. There are several 
important (albeit brief) sections o f the book that, although they deal with the basic goods and their place in 
the Christian life, are not mentioned under the heading o f  “basic goods” in the index (nor are they obvious 
from the contents page either): see ibid., 30, 85-86, 100, 102, 333-334, 340, 468, and 513. This suggests 
strongly that the index is inadequate for finding out how volume two follows on from volume one of The 
Way o f  the Lord Jesus.
5 See ss. 3.7.1 -3 .7 .4  and 4.9.2b above.
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5.1.1b The good o f religion can and should be specified theologically 
Arguably, one ought not to expect to see harmony with God described exclusively or 
even mainly as “religion” once one is treating it as an element of a Christian life. For the 
Christian, the good of religion is now seen in a specific way rather than a general way, a 
specific way shaped by divine revelation and grace. The Christian identifies “religion” 
with the Christian faith, (at least for himself and other Christians). Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, religion is treated theologically in Living a Christian Life. This is one reason 
why it is difficult to find mention therein of “the good of religion”.
5.1. lc Two aspects o f the good o f religion: its specific role and its
Another reason is that religion operates in two ways, as a specific good and as an 
architectonic good, and the latter is often implicitly rather than explicitly religious. 
Therefore it can be more difficult to notice the good of religion as an architectonic good.
The good of religion can be a specific motive for specifically religious acts, which are 
acts focussed explicitly on pursuing and instantiating harmony with God. This is religion 
in its distinctiveness, different from the other basic human goods. According to this 
specific role of religion in the Christian life, sometimes the good of religion, specified by 
faith, is at stake explicitly in a choice or action, even though other goods are operative 
too, either instrumentally or as basic. We can call this “the explicit-specific role of 
religion”.
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Religion also can play an “architectonic role” in life. Religion can and ought to have a
role in organising all of our choices, commitments, relationships and actions.7 It can do
this because, although it is a specific human good in its own right, and although there are
some other diverse and irreducible goods in their own right, the good offered by religion
♦ 8can be at stake in all choices, commitments, relationships and actions.
Both the “explicit-specific” and the “architectonic” roles of the basic good of religion can 
be seen in Living a Christian Life. In both cases the good of religion is not called “the 
good of religion” but it is presented in specifically Christian terms. What we are looking 
for is not the term “religion”, but those places in Living a Christian Life where the good 
of harmony with God is a primary motivating factor in assessing choices and 
commitments. When we put it this way, we can find plenty of reference to the good of 
religion and its role in Christian life. With regard to the “explicit-specific” role of 
religion, we are looking in Living a Christian Life for areas of Christian life in which the 
Christian seeks to do actions specifically for the sake of being in harmony with God. 
With regard to the “architectonic” role of religion, we are looking for any references to 
how the good of harmony with God has a primary role in shaping Christian life as a 
whole, including those choices and actions in which the good of religion is not explicitly 
at stake as a motivating factor.
7 See s. 4.6 above.
8 The term “architectonic” is not used here by Grisez, who tends to use “overarching” and other terms. 
However, one of his collaborators, Patrick Lee, in his “Germain Grisez’s Christian Humanism,” American 
Journal o f Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 137-151, at 140-141, uses “architectonic” and it seems slightly more 
suitable than “overarching” to express how religion can shape and organise one’s life as a whole, providing 
the underlying architecture for it, so to speak.
1 8 8
The “explicit-specific” role of religion is treated in the first quarter or so of Living a 
Christian Life, in the chapters dealing with faith, hope, charity, and penance, and related 
matters.9 These chapters deal with specifically and explicitly religious choices and 
actions. The rest of Living a Christian Life deals with choices and actions in which 
religion is not necessarily an explicit factor, but in which it is always at least implicitly at 
stake, and in which an explicit awareness of its being at stake can help to motivate a 
Christian to act morally, and so instantiate the good of religion and other goods 
integrally.
5.1.2a Religion provides reasons for faith
The first chapter of Living a Christian Life is called “Faith, Religious Assent, and
Reverence for God”. Even though faith is God’s gift, it is also our own act. These two
aspects are not mutually exclusive. Grisez states that
a Christian’s acts are not replaced by grace; rather grace takes shape in acts: ‘For 
we are what he has made us, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God 
prepared beforehand to be our way of life’ (Eph 2.10). The first of these good 
works is the act of faith itself.10
In Living a Christian Life, Grisez presents us with details regarding what it means to say 
that the act of faith is made for the sake of the basic goods of religion and knowledge.
9 The first four chapters deal with these matters: faith (ch. 1), hope (ch. 2), love/charity (ch. 3), and penance 
(ch. 4). In each case, however, related matters are dealt with too, matters such as religious assent (related to 
faith) and personal vocation (related to hope). The sections in this present chapter are numbered here in a 
way that highlights the themes of faith, hope, love, and penance. All the sections under 5.1.2 concern faith, 
for example (5.1,2a, 5.1.2b, and so o n ) .
10 Ibid., 2. This is the one reference to this text from Ephesians in Living a Christian Life, but it is referred 
to frequently in Christian Moral Principles. It is a text that supports and encapsulates Grisez’s thought on 
how both God’s grace and human free choice are simultaneously operative in all human good acts. The 
supernatural does not replace or negate or supersede the natural; rather, it includes, supports and perfects 
the natural.
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Several questions in this chapter deal with the reasons why someone could reasonably 
choose to make the act of faith and be baptised.
Question C looks at the reasons pointing to the credibility of Catholic faith. Firstly, an 
outline is given of the cosmological argument for God’s existence.11 It could be said that 
this argument shows that the act of faith is made only for the sake of the good of 
knowledge. Next, however, Grisez mentions some reasons for believing in God that 
appeal more to the good of religion than to the good of knowledge: “Human beings are 
aware that they are at odds with God”.12 Grisez notes how we are naturally aware of our 
moral failings, which are failures to follow the direction that God has given us in “the 
starting points of practical reasoning”.13 Thus, people become aware “that they are sinful 
and need [God’s] forgiveness, guidance, and strength to overcome their sins.”14 Grisez 
makes the further point that we humans also are aware of our need for help in coping 
with the evil of others and the evil of natural disasters, which leads us to desire aid from a 
transcendent source that can cope with these large-scale, inevitable difficulties, which 
surpass our abilities to surmount them.15 Finally, Grisez points to the virtually universal 
wonder that human beings feel about life after death. We wonder how morality can make
11 See ss. 2.5.2, 3.3.3, and 4.2 above. The frequent appearance of the cosmological argument in Grisez’s 
work suggests its importance in his moral theory.
12 Ibid., 12. As with the treatment o f Christian Moral Principles above, emphasis in the original is 
generally left out for stylistic reasons. Many of the quotations from Living a Christian Life here are taken 
from headings, all o f which are in bold font in the original.
13 Ibid. Grisez does not go into any detail in Living a Christian Life about how we become aware o f  God as 
the source of the directiveness o f practical reason. This matter was dealt with in “Practical Principles”, 141- 
146, examined above in ss. 4.2 - 4.4.
14 Ibid.
15 See ibid.
sense when being good is not always rewarded in this life. We also find that our sense of 
others’ value, and everyone’s human abilities to understand and choose freely, are in 
conflict with the fact that our loved ones and indeed all people will die.16 Grisez is 
highlighting areas of conflict in human inclinations, awareness and understanding. People 
feel strongly aware of how we lack harmony with reality and its principles and so we are 
open to hope for God to reveal the truth and offer his help.
Grisez outlines several reasons why we should believe that God has spoken, among
1 T
which is the fact that “Biblical religion responds to human hopes and expectations”. 
The hopes and expectations mentioned here are those related to our awareness of our own 
sinfulness, others’ evil, natural disasters, including death. These natural hopes are 
addressed in the Old Testament and the New, and they continue to be addressed in the 
tradition of the Church.18
5.1.2b Religion as a practical foundation for faith
It is our grasp of the good of religion that enable us to experience and understand the 
gospel as a practical opportunity, and not just a theoretical possibility. The good of 
religion, grasped as the object of one of the primary principles of practical reasoning, is 
required if we are not to view God’s revelation as a mere fact, but as an opportunity 
calling for our personal free response of faith, thus offering us human fulfillment and,
16 See ibid., 13. Such observations echo points made in Christian Moral Principles: see s. 3.3.3 above.
17 Ibid., 14.
18 See ibid., 15-21. It is clear that faith is seen by Grisez as an ecclesial matter and not just a personal, 
individual decision. Right from the start, Grisez emphasises that the “faith” that he speaks o f is a 
“baptismal faith”: see ibid., 3-4.
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more, a share in the divine life itself.19 One of the advantages of seeing the good of 
religion as a foundation (though not the only one) of faith is that the essentially practical 
nature of faith is highlighted.
5.1.2c Faith serves the good o f religion and all the other human goods too 
In question E, Grisez answers briefly the practical challenges to faith, which claim that 
the gospel has failed and is a lost cause, that faith is close-minded and infringes on 
freedom, and that human suffering undermines faith. He also makes an important point 
about faith and human goods: Christian faith “serves not only the goods of religion and 
truth but the other goods as well.”20 Faith can motivate us to pursue and instantiate the 
other goods too, especially in light of the eternal significance of our human choices and 
actions.21 In fact, faith ought to motivate us to serve the other goods. Grisez is firm in 
rejecting any theology that “disparages this-worldly goods”.22 Grisez does not see faith as 
concerned exclusively or narrowly with harmony with God.
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19 These points about practical reasonableness and faith are not made explicitly by Grisez in Living a 
Christian Life but are implied by what he says there and in other works. What is explicitly made clear in 
Living a Christian Life is that, in making his self-revelation and in calling us into a relationship of love with 
him, God responds practically in love to real human needs and expectations, and thus, faith is to be 
understood practically.
20 Ibid., 30.
21 In Living a Christian Life, 30, Grisez refers to the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes, 38 and 39, in 
support of his constant theme that Christian faith is a true humanism that serves human fulfillment in the 
basic goods (as well as our supernatural fulfillment in sharing divine love). Part o f  Gaudium et Spes, 38 and 
39, are given as the very first text in this book, thus showing their importance for the theological 
specification of Grisez’s moral theory.
22 Living a Christian Life, 30.
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Grisez sees secular humanism as being the main alternative to Christian faith in the 
modern world.23 Not surprisingly, Grisez considers secular humanism to be rationally 
unappealing,24 and the reasons to believe in the gospel to be much stronger than the 
reasons against believing. He sums up the reasons to believe in the gospel by saying that 
“Faith in Jesus is in human persons’ ultimate self-interest” and “Faith in Jesus also serves 
every other human good”.25 With regard to the first point, Grisez acknowledges that
making the act of faith and living by it might not always be in one’s “temporal and
• 26earthly interest” but that it is always “in one’s true and everlasting interest”. This self- 
interest is not a selfish interest because it is open to true human fulfillment in the goods 
of friendship with others and friendship with God. “Faith in Jesus reconciles human 
persons to God, enables them to be his children, and holds out the hope of everlasting joy 
in heaven (see 1 Jn 3.1-2).”27 Faith “responds affirmatively to God’s will” that we should 
be thus fulfilled and blessed, “and this pleases [God]”. The good of religion, which faith 
pursues and instantiates, opens out towards the fullness of fulfillment that God wills for 
all his children and creation.
This theme of what is here called “opening out towards” other people and goods is 
central to Grisez’s thought. He emphasises it in his second point: “Faith in Jesus also
23 It seems fair to point out that Grisez’s claim that secular humanism is the main alternative to Christian 
faith is more applicable to the Western world, and fails to take account of the huge popularity of Islam for 
many in Muslim countries and also increasingly in Western countries. Living a Christian Life was 
published in 1993, when the rise of Islam was not as prominent as it is now.
24 See ibid., 35-37.
25 Ibid., 37.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
serves every other human good”.28 He is constantly making the point that faith is not anti­
human, or anti-humanism, but human and humanistic in the truest and most adequate 
senses of these words. Faith is positive and joyful and appealing: “faith promises the 
renewal and completion in heaven of every good which the blessed wished to protect and 
promote in this world”.29 In seeking to be in harmony with God (i.e. to instantiate the 
good of religion), we seek also to serve the other goods with realism and hope. Thus, 
Christian faith is a far more appealing worldview than secular humanism.
5.1.2d Religion motivates preparing for faith
Our awareness of our need to cope with moral and natural evils, which is a religious 
awareness, opens our minds and hearts to hear and accept the gospel. Grisez 
acknowledges that human persons find it difficult to make the act of faith, due to our
•  31 *pride, sinfulness, fear of change and self-renunciation, sadness and lethargy. This 
suggests that it is not adequate to see the human person as simply ready for faith because 
we naturally have a grasp of the goods of religion and knowledge. Our grasp of the goods 
of religion and knowledge can be masked and distorted and weakened by other factors, 
such as sin, misunderstanding, and rival conflicting accounts of life. It would seem 
therefore that before we make the act of faith we have moral responsibilities to prepare 
for the gift of faith (and after we make the act of faith we have responsibilities to
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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 38, with reference to Christian Moral Principles, chapter 34, question E.
30 See Living a Christian Life, 30.
31 See ibid., 33-34. Thus faith is not just an intellectual matter, but a moral one too.
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maintain and cultivate it).32 Noteworthy here is our responsibility to develop and 
strengthen our awareness of the basic goods of consistency, knowledge, and social 
harmony, as well as the good of religion.33 However, it would seem from Grisez’s 
approach to the act of faith that it is the good of religion that is the most important in this 
respect.
5.1.4e Religion motivates assent to Church teachings
Seeking to be in harmony with God includes believing what he reveals. Thus, Grisez 
includes several questions in this chapter about our responsibilities with regard to assent 
to Church teachings. Grisez is very firm and clear here. He makes the point, for example, 
that “absolute submission to God in faith is reasonable”, and not excessive, because, to 
mention just one benefit, “faith in God’s truth frees [Christians] from sin and death”.3 
Grisez does not put forward as the main reason to believe that we should act consistently 
with our membership of the Church, which could be understood reductively as only a 
kind of social conformity to the group that one happens to belong to. Rather, he makes 
the point that assenting to all the Church’s teachings is motivated by specifically 
religious reasons.35 Even in matters that are not taught infallibly, which are not directly
32 See ibid., 3 and 55-61. Grisez gives much more attention in this book to our responsibilities after we have 
made the act of faith than to our responsibilities before we make it. This is hardly surprising since this is a 
moral theology book addressed mainly to those who have already made the act o f faith. Even though Grisez 
outlines various reasons for believing in chapter one, it is not really apologetics he is engaged in, but an 
attempt to understand the nature o f the act of faith and its goodness and reasonableness.
33 Grisez does not mention the importance o f the good o f consistency in respect to faith, but he does 
mention the good o f Christian fellowship: see ibid., 6-7, and 30.
34 Ibid., 40.
35 It should be noted here that this contrast between treating assent as a matter of inner consistency or 
religion is not Grisez’s. Still, it seems that Grisez’s emphasis on the religious reasons for assenting to 
Church teachings can be seen as quite different from approaches to the issues that stress following one’s
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“of faith”, Grisez makes the point that Catholics should assent to them for religious 
reasons. In Vatican II, this kind of assent was called “religious submission of mind and 
will”.36 Grisez explains that this kind of submission of mind and will is reasonable 
because “God gives popes and bishops their teaching role, and the Holy Spirit helps them 
fulfil it”.37 In other words, one is right to trust the teaching of the magisterium because of 
one’s trust in God and one’s intelligent desire to be in harmony with God.38 Thus, both 
with regard to teachings strictly of the faith and those calling for religious assent it is a
♦ * 39grave matter to dissent, or even in some circumstances to deliberately withhold assent. 
This means that dissent or failure to assent, especially when expressed by heresy or 
schism, is something that interferes with one’s harmony with God, which is one’s 
participation in the good of religion, as well as interfering with one’s sharing in divine 
life through grace.40
conscience or being consistent to one’s membership of the Church, such as one sometimes finds in 
treatments of assent. Grisez’s emphasis on the good o f religion helps him to see that assent is not firstly a 
matter of inner consistency or social conformity, but a matter o f seeking to be in harmony with God and his 
will. O f course, it is entirely consistent with Grisez’s moral theory to see assent as motivated by several 
goods simultaneously, each supportive o f the others. Thus, religion, good conscience, and social harmony 
(and knowledge too) can all rightly motivate assent to Church teachings. But religion is rightly the main 
and prior motive.
36 Lumen Gentium, 25, cited in Living a Christian Life, 46. Grisez dealt in detail with these issues in the 
final two chapters of Christian Moral Principles, but develops his thought in Living a Christian Life.
37 Living a Christian Life, 48.
38 Grisez deals with the reasonable limits to the trust one ought to have in such teachings of the popes and 
bishops in Christian Moral Principles, 853-854, and (adding an extra point) in Living a Christian Life 50- 
55.
39 See Living a Christian Life, 43-46 and 53-55.
40 These points are not made explicitly in Living a Christian Life but are based on what Grisez says in 
Christian Moral Principles regarding sin as essentially contrary to the good o f religion (314), mortal sin as 
involving the loss o f justifying grace (364), and the relationship between the natural and the supernatural in 
Christian life as dynamic (590). See ss. 3.4.8 and 3.7. See also Living a Christian Life, 137.
5.1.4/Religion motivates a Christian’s living by faith and developing it 
Once one has made the act of faith, it is not just something given in one’s life and being, 
but something that one has to “cultivate and perfect”.41 According to Grisez, this involves 
instruction and study, attention to prayer and scripture, and attention to one’s situation 
and events in it. Failure to attend to these things is sinful, sometimes even mortally so. 
Therefore, failure in these areas is contrary to the good of religion, but faithfulness in 
religious study, scripture reading, prayer, and discernment enables one to participate in 
the good of religion. Thus, it is not only in preparation for the act of faith, and in making 
this act, that one acts for the sake of the good of religion; the good of harmony with God 
is at stake in one’s life after one has made the commitment of faith, in one’s failure or 
faithfulness in cultivating and perfecting one’s faith, with God’s help.
5.1.3a Hope is the interest that motivates every Christian act
Chapter two of Living a Christian Life is devoted in large part to hope. One of the most 
interesting things said there concerns hope as an “interest”.42 This develops an idea put 
forward previously, in which an “interest” was defined as “a volition bearing on the 
intelligible aspect ... of some set of potential (or both potential and actual) purposes”.43
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41 See ibid., 55-61.
42 See ibid., 86-87. It could be said that in Living a Christian Life Grisez develops his theology by focusing 
more on hope than he did in Christian Moral Principles, where he tended to focus mainly on faith and 
charity.
43 G. Grisez, J. Finnis, and J. Boyle, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” American 
Journal o f  Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151, at 106. The phrase “or some set” has been changed here to “of 
some set”, as the original is obviously a typo.
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Interest is what comes in between general aliveness44 to the basic goods and specific
intention and choice for the sake of instantiating particular goods. Interest is not a choice
but underlies choices.45 Grisez says in Living a Christian Life that
hope is the volition of the ultimate end of Christian life, the kingdom and 
Christians’ sharing in it, which underlies and motivates the choices shaping 
Christian life, lived for the sake of the kingdom.46
Hope motivates the act of faith, and all Christian acts, insofar as they depend on God’s 
action for their fruitfulness. Hope operates alongside other motives, not as a separate 
motive as such, but as an interest in the kingdom shaping all other motives towards the 
kingdom. Hope consists in our being open to, and expecting, God to do his part in 
bringing the kingdom to its fulfillment, with our own actions in union with Jesus as both 
contributions to this kingdom and participations in it.
5.1.3b Hope specifies the good o f religion in the light o f divine revelation 
Grisez does not link hope and the good of religion explicitly in Living a Christian Life. 
Yet, he does say that hope is part of the single act of living faith (along with charity), that 
it motivates faith and all the acts implementing faith, and that it is the overall interest 
motivating Christian acts. When we bear in mind that Grisez also says that the good of
44 This aliveness is a general openness and love of the basic human goods; it is a simple volition of these 
goods that all healthy people share. We should note that Grisez referred in Christian Moral Principles 
(144) to charity as a kind o f simple volition (or aliveness) to divine goodness, given to Christians in living 
faith: see s. 3.7.3 above. What Grisez says o f hope as interest could be integrated with what he said about 
charity as simple volition -  it is as if  charity is a general disposition to divine life and all that goes with it, 
and hope is a more specified interest in the kingdom. However, Grisez does not note or develop this 
relationship between, or integration of, charity and hope.
45 Still, one has some voluntary responsibility for one’s interests insofar as they are influenced by one’s
choices. One can cultivate or fail to cultivate one’s interests. Grisez clearly recommends several ways in 
which the Christian is called to nurture and specify hope in Living a Christian Life, 87-97.
46 Ibid., 86.
religion motivates faith47 and that the good of religion is the most suitable of the basic 
human goods for organising a whole life,48 especially when it is a Christian life,49 then it 
would seem that hope and religion must be linked closely. Both hope and religion seem 
to operate in the same areas and do the same job, so to speak. However, what the 
relationship is between hope and the good of religion is not made clear in Living a 
Christian Life. We can only suggest a few ideas here.
Grisez says of hope: “Relying on God to be faithful in keeping his promises, his people 
hope in him for the salvation and better life they otherwise could not anticipate.”50 It 
would seem from this, and other things he says about hope, that Grisez’s understanding 
of this virtue tells us something about the kind of “harmony” that is involved in the good 
of religion in the Christian life. The harmony with God that constitutes the benefit of 
religion as a basic good, especially when specified by Christian faith, is a harmony that 
essentially involves trusting God to keep his promises. This trust is a principle of action51 
because it motivates us to make good choices we would otherwise not be motivated to 
make. We hope for “everything that contributes to eternal life”52 and for “heaven as a 
reward for doing God’s will”.53 Hope in God’s providence enables us always to make
47 See s 3.4 above.
48 See ss. 4.6 and 4.9.2 above.
49 See ss. 4.7 and 4.9.2 above.
50 Ibid., 78.
51 See ibid., 90.
52 Ibid., 80.
53 Ibid., 81.
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good efforts to do the will of God when things are very tough, and even gives us courage 
to face martyrdom.54 Thus, hope, which is itself a kind of harmony with God, motivates 
us to be more and more in harmony with God through doing good acts. Perhaps it might 
be said that hope is the good of religion specified by divine revelation in a particular way. 
This specification concerns our looking forward to the kingdom and our trusting in God’s 
providence and faithfulness. Hope is a kind of harmony with God, just as faith is a kind 
of harmony with God. Both are gifts of God, but both are affected by our own free 
choices and actions, and our dispositions shaped by choices and actions. In fact, faith is a 
free choice, whilst hope is a kind of disposition to act (i.e. what Grisez calls an “interest”) 
in accordance with faith.
5.1.3c Hope, inclusive religion and the mission o f the Church
Chapter two of Living a Christian Life deals also with the mission of the Church. Grisez 
says that this mission is the same mission that Jesus had: “to establish a new human 
communion with God”.55 This mission “is limited to what pertains to the kingdom”.56 
However, even though the Church’s mission, like that of Jesus, in which the Church
* 57 * •participates, is “exclusively” concerned with serving “the heavenly kingdom”, it is not 
concerned with a narrowly understood basic good of “religion”. Once again, Grisez is 
careful to distinguish between what could be called two meanings of “religion”. One is 
narrowly focussed on heaven, the soul, and God to the exclusion of all other human
54 See ibid., 93.
55 See ibid., 98.
56 Ibid., 101.
57 Ibid., 99.
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goods and earthly realities; the other is what Grisez understands by religion, and, more
generally, by Christian morality, and it is concerned with the kingdom of God as
inclusive of all human goods, including the specifically and explicitly religious good of
harmony with God, and all that goes with this, but also the goods of life, knowledge,
work/play, and so on. Thus, following the lead of Vatican II, Grisez writes:
Gaudium et Spes 42 and its n.l I ... says that Jesus assigns the Church a ‘strictly 
religious end’. Blit Gaudium et Spes 76, at the end, includes in the Church’s 
mission the uncovering, cherishing, and ennobling of everything true, good, and 
beautiful in the human community. The apparent contradiction dissolves if one 
takes into account that God’s kingdom and righteousness -  the strictly religious 
object of hope -  includes the renewal of the entire fallen world, which embraces not 
only religion itself but every human good.^
Thus, the hope that motivates and shapes the Church’s mission is both strictly religious 
and inclusive of all human goods. This suggests strongly that the basic good of religion is 
a good that is both distinct in itself, and so irreducible to any other good, but also 
inclusive of all the other goods too, insofar as God’s will is that all human beings would 
flourish in all the basic human goods and so manifest his glory.59 The Church’s mission is 
therefore both religious and humanistic, actively working in hope (in Jesus Christ) for 
human fulfillment in this life and the next. This means that the Church’s support of 
healthcare and education, justice and peace, is part of her strictly religious mission, not a 
distraction from it. Not only that, but these things, action for health, education, justice 
and peace, are not even to be seen as mere means to the end that is the kingdom; rather,
58 Ibid., 100-101, footnote 34, with reference at the end to Christian Moral Principles, chapter twenty-five, 
question E and chapter 34, questions D-G. Grisez also refers to Gaudium et Spes, 39, and Apostolicam 
Actuositatem, 7, in support o f  his Christian humanism.
59 Thus we have the two roles of religion noted above in s. 5.1.1c: the specific and the architectonic.
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they are to be seen as constitutive elements of that kingdom.60 In Grisez’s moral theory, 
our morally good acts and commitments are already God’s gift to us, part of “the way of 
the Lord Jesus”, our cooperation with God’s establishment of the kingdom in Jesus and 
through the Church.
Grisez links the sacrament of confirmation with hope.61 This sacrament gives us the 
assurance of the Holy Spirit, and his strength, light and gifts, especially courage, which 
enable us to fulfil our part in the mission of the Church by witnessing to the gospel.
5.1.3d Personal vocation and religion
After a section on apostolate, chapter two of Living a Christian Life treats another central 
theme of Grisez’s moral theory: personal vocation.62 Again, Grisez does not explain 
explicitly how this concept is related to the good of religion, but what he does say 
suggests that there is a close connection. The concept of personal vocation is simple 
enough. God calls each one of us to organise and lead our lives in a way that fulfils his
♦ • • 63will and in a way that suits, and flows from, our particular circumstances and gifts. 
Personal vocation pertains to the whole of one’s life, understood as a whole united
60 See ibid., 101.
61 Ibid., 94-95. He says that baptism may be considered the sacrament of faith, and Eucharist the sacrament 
of charity, and confirmation the sacrament of hope: ibid., 94.
62 A quick glance at the index of Christian Moral Principles (942) shows how central this concept is to 
Grisez’s moral theory. Grisez, along with Russell Shaw, has written a short popular style book devoted to 
this concept: Personal Vocation: God Calls Everyone by Name (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 
2003), again showing how important he thinks the topic is. At this stage o f his theory’s development, 
Grisez considered personal vocation to be a theological concept, but later he seems to allow it a place in the 
natural law as a philosophical concept: see s. 6.1,6a below.
63 See Living a Christian Life, 113-129.
around the faithful doing of God’s will, cooperating in the apostolate insofar as one can 
in one’s own circumstances. We have already seen Grisez (along with Finnis and Boyle) 
speak of the good of religion as the most suitable basic good around which to organise 
one’s life as a whole,64 so it would seem that personal vocation and religion are similar.
Personal vocation is my obedient response to God’s call to me to be an apostle in my 
unique and individual life. Grisez calls it a “dynamic submission to God’s plan and 
will”.65 It calls for faithfulness, courage, not counting the cost, abstinence from sin, 
making the best of bad situations, morally good creativity and careful discernment. Not to 
respond to God’s call can be sinful.66 It seems clear then that personal vocation embodies 
and promotes harmony with God. “Fulfilling one’s personal vocation” is another way of 
saying “being holy”, which is a morally specified way of understanding the good of 
religion. (This could be one reason why Grisez called the good of religion “holiness” in 
some of his earlier works.)
Personal vocation is all about serving the needs of others (and thus serving God).67 This 
reminds us that religion as a basic good, when it is morally specified, is concerned with 
serving the needs of others. It is only when we are willing to respond to God’s call, when 
we are willing to obey his will to love our neighbour, that we are truly in harmony with 
him.
64 See s. 4.6 above.
65 Ibid, 128.
66 See ibid, 125.
67 See ibid, 119-120.
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One of the first things Grisez says in chapter three of Living a Christian Life about its
central theme, charity, is this:
God’s love is a gift which makes its recipients his intimate friends. One’s proper 
responsibility with respect to charity is to strive to deepen this unique friendship 
and to abide in the communion of love.68
This encapsulates his thought about charity and the Christian life, which this chapter and 
indeed the whole book develops and illustrates. All of Christian life is seen as abiding in 
God’s love, living out of our friendship with God and thus deepening this friendship. 
When we think of charity, we think especially of how this friendship is first and foremost 
God’s special gift to us, not something we have accomplished by our own acts or 
efforts.69 However, this pure gift of God has, or should have, an effect on our own actions 
as
one begins to fulfil the command to love God with one’s whole heart, mind, soul, 
and strength by doing out of charity those human acts -  first of all, the act of faith -  
which integrate one’s entire self and all one’s interpersonal relationships with the 
love of God in one’s heart (see 1 Jn 2.3-6). And one abides in the love with which 
the Father, Son, and Spirit love one another by remaining in Jesus’ body, the 
Church, as a living member.70
We have already seen Grisez speak of the act of faith being motivated by the goods of
♦ 71religion and knowledge, and this motivation being transformed by chanty. It seems to
68 Ibid., 132-133.
69 See ibid., 133.
70 Ibid. with a reference after the first sentence to St Thomas, De perfectione vitae spiritualis, 5. Grisez also 
makes clear in this footnote (4) the parallel between charity and following one’s personal vocation.
5.1.4a Charity and religion
7i See Christian Moral Principles, 485, treated above in ss. 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
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be the case that God transforms our understanding and experience of “harmony with 
God” (religion) and “knowledge of God” by his making us his sons or daughters through 
union with Jesus in the Spirit. Our new status as children of God, which is God’s pure 
gift, can dynamically motivate us to live lives of love, living as the new creations that 
God has made us.
Charity, and acts of charity, are therefore closely related to the good of religion, just as 
faith, hope, and personal vocation are. Charity enriches and perfects the good of religion. 
We are talking here of the good of religion as morally specified, understood and pursued 
integrally and inclusively, but also as specified by divine revelation and grace, and 
understood theologically and supernaturally.72
5.1.4b Charity and religious acts
This is why Grisez can speak of “religious acts” as essential elements of living a life of 
charity.73 The central religious act of a Christian life is participating in the Eucharist. 
Grisez devotes a question to this,74 after noting how one’s whole life “should complete 
one’s offering of the Eucharist”.75 We have already seen how Grisez associates worship 
and sacrifice with the good of religion;76 worship and sacrifice were central to Jesus’ life
72 Grisez does not explicitly link the good o f religion and charity in Living a Christian Life.
73 See ibid., 136.
74 See ibid., 139-159.
75 Ibid., 135.
76 See Christian Moral Principles, 468, and above ss. 3.5.3 and 3.7.7.
and death, and to the Last Supper, and they are central to the Christian life, which is 
Eucharistie, too. This suggests that the good of religion is central to the Christian life, 
when religion is specified by Christian faith. So perhaps we might say this: One’s whole 
life as a Christian can be understood under different headings, one of which is abiding in 
God’s love, another of which is living the Eucharist, and another of which is living 
religiously, and all of which are synonymous, although each one picks out a particular 
emphasis or insight that the others lack.
If this is a true interpretation of Grisez’s thought, then everything he writes about in 
chapter three of Living a Christian Life, and indeed everything he writes about in the 
whole book, can be understood under the heading of the basic good of religion, though 
only when this basic good is specified morally and theologically. Thus, participating 
consciously and actively in the Eucharist, receiving communion worthily, keeping the 
Sunday and holyday obligation, receiving the other sacraments when necessary or 
appropriate, engaging in Eucharistie adoration, devotion to the Sacred Heart and/or 
veneration of Mary and the saints, meditating on the rosary -  all these are religious acts,77 
acts which embody the good of harmony with God, acts which deepen the friendship with 
God which he has given us as his gift. Abiding in God’s love involves us living up to our 
responsibilities of faith, hope and penance,78 as well as our specific responsibilities as 
members of the Church, among which are building up the unity of the Church, avoiding
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77 All these acts are dealt with as acts of charity in chapter three of Living a Christian Life.
78 See ibid., 136-137.
dissent and schism, and fostering ecumenism correctly.79 All such actions can be 
understood as fostering our harmony with God, who wills that we should do all these 
things, and who presents all these opportunities and their fulfillment as his gifts to us.
5.1.5a Penance
Chapter four is mainly about penance, both the sacrament (including its essential place in
a Christian’s following the way of the Lord Jesus) and its practical implications for the
Christian life. In Christian Moral Principles Grisez defined sin in terms of any action
contrary to the good of religion, particularly insofar as immoral actions offend God
• * 80because they are contrary to his wise and loving plan for humankind and creation.
Grisez reiterates these points here, but without mentioning explicitly the good of religion.
Basically ... sins explicitly or implicitly violate God’s wisdom and love, and so 
alienate sinners from him. For those who have entered into a covenant with God, 
sin is unfaithfulness, as adultery is unfaithfulness to a spouse. Thus, although sins 
cannot harm God, they truly offend him insofar as they are against the good he 
wills.81
Sin as alienation and unfaithfulness easily call to mind sin as a violation of the good of 
religion, which is harmony with God. This is not to say that Grisez sees sin as exclusively 
concerned with the good of religion; he also mentions that sin harms the good of truth, 
and that “every sin is contrary to some human good”.82 In the rest of the book, Grisez
79 See ibid., chapter three, question D.
80 See Christian Moral Principles, chapter 13, questions A-C, and above s. 3.4.8.
81 Living a Christian Life, 186, with a reference to Christian Moral Principles, chapter 13, questions B and 
C.
82 Living a Christian Life, 220. Grisez argues in chapter four of this book not just that we should avoid all 
sin, but that we should repent o f any sins we commit and seek forgiveness in the sacrament of penance. 
This sacrament is therefore a sacrament of religion, as it restores us to harmony with God.
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gives copious examples of how the various human goods are violated by various types of 
sins. So it seems clear that Grisez is not trying to reduce sin, and the Christian struggle 
against sin, to the good of religion in itself. Rather, his approach is based on an 
understanding of the good of religion that opens out towards and includes, without 
reducing them, the diverse goods at stake in human choices and actions.
5.1.5b Sin and religion: grave matter explicitly or implicitly against religion 
Grisez’s interest in the good of religion is not confined, therefore, to the first four 
chapters of Living a Christian Life, in which he treats matters that would conventionally 
be termed “religious” under the headings of the three theological virtues of faith, hope 
and love, as well as under the heading of penance. Throughout the rest of the book, 
Grisez is concerned with a wide variety of choices and actions that might not always be 
done explicitly for the sake of religion or against the good of religion, but which can be 
viewed as at least implicitly for the sake of religion or against it. One sign of this is the 
fact that frequently Grisez makes explicit reference to whether this or that choice or 
behaviour is “grave matter”. In doing this, Grisez draws attention to the fact that it is of 
the utmost importance that we understand how particular kinds of behaviour can be 
damaging or even destructive of our relationship with God, or, in other words, how 
particular acts can harm or destroy our harmony with God.83
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83 Sin harms or destroys our natural harmony with God, but sin also harms or destroys our supernatural 
unity with God too. Strictly speaking, “religion” in Grisez’s theory refers directly to the former, not the 
latter. However, although the two relationships are distinct, they are related too, as was analysed in ss. 3.6 
and 3.7 above. Insofar as religion mediates our supernatural union with God (see s. 4.7.2 above), sin harms 
that union by harming the good o f religion.
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A list of the references to grave matter in specifically religious acts84 in the first four 
chapters contains the following (with page references after each):
- apostasy (43)
- heresy (45)
- deliberate non-assent and sinful dissent (53)
- idolatry (63)
- divination (65)
- denial of faith and failure to profess it (66)
- blasphemy (67)
- attempting to put God to the test (68)
- sacrilege, including simony (69)
- perjury (75)
- presumption and despair (97)
- receiving Holy Communion sacrilegiously (144)
- falsifying Catholic worship (145)
- missing Mass without a reasonable excuse (148)
- failure to receive Communion when required (150)
- superstition (156)
- sharing in worship at odds with faith (156)
- disobedience to Church authority and contestation (167)
- failure to support the Church (173)
- thwarting authentic ecumenism (177)
- neglecting to examine one’s conscience (203)
- the responsibility to admonish sinners regarding grave matters (231)
- giving scandal (235)
A list of references to grave matter regarding behaviour that is not usually considered 
explicitly religious includes the following (from chapters five to eleven):
- violating others’ personal dignity (385)
- hypocrisy (399)
- flattery and ingratiation (400)
- contention and quarrelling (400)
- detraction (401)
- insult (404)
- Lying and other deceptions in communication (410)
- breaking a promise (414)
- responsibilities concerning secrecy (417)
- disobedience (439)
- abuse and abdication of authority (439)
84 In some cases in the lists presented here, the treatment in Living a Christian Life explains that the 
particular behaviour can be either grave or light matter, depending on circumstances.
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- intentionally killing the innocent (479)
- wrongly accepting risks to life or choosing to risk death (487)
- choosing to use contraception (517)
- drug abuse (539)
- sexual assault (545)
- intentionally harmful bodily contact (550)
- unreasonable refusal of marital intercourse (640)
- adultery in deed or desire (643)
- incestuous adultery (644)
- all intentional sexual acts violating the marital good (657)
- children’s disobedience (715)
- injustices to property (799)
- irresponsibility in voting (872)
- disobedience towards the law (882)
- non-cooperation with the criminal justice system (887-890).
These two lists give some idea of the range of behaviours treated as gravely wrong in 
Living a Christian Life. More importantly, they give a good idea of how many “non­
religious” types of action Grisez considers to be grave matter, matters of mortal sin. And 
when we bear in mind that mortal sin is primarily a violation of our relationship with 
God, immoral acts against the good of religion, as Grisez describes all sin,85 then it is 
clear that Grisez does not consider only the first four chapters of Living a Christian Life 
and the various acts treated therein to be concerned with the good of religion. Grisez 
considers all morality to be concerned with the good of religion, at least implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly.
85 See Christian Moral Principles, 314.
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5.1.6a The religious significance o f acts for the sake o f the other goods: truth 
Occasionally in Living a Christian Life, Grisez goes into some detail about how a 
particular “non-religious” act, or a “non-explicitly-religious” act, can be understood more 
adequately to have religious significance.86 We will look at three examples.
The first concerns our responsibility to seek moral truth, which is the central theme of 
chapter five. Grisez indicates how our search for moral truth should be part of our 
spirituality. We should ask God for the gift of prudence, which no-one can have without 
God’s help.87 Also, the quest for moral truth and wisdom is equated with seeking to know 
and do God’s will.88 So we should ask for the Spirit’s guidance, imitate the example of 
Jesus and the saints, repent and ask for healing, and avoid false “ideologies that sustain 
sin”.89 Obviously, a commitment to grow in moral knowledge and wisdom can be 
motivated by the good of religion insofar as seeking moral truth is, especially for the 
Christian, seeking to be in harmony with the God who wishes us to know his wise and 
loving will.90
5.1.6b The religious significance o f acts for the sake o f marriage
Another example of what could be called an element of the natural law that can be seen 
in the light of faith to have specifically Christian religious significance is sexual ethics,
86 Grisez does not treat these matters precisely as “non-religious” .
87 See Living a Christian Life, 247.
88 See ibid., 251.
89 Ibid., 252. See also ibid., 260-261.
90 This goes beyond what is stated explicitly by Grisez.
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which is dealt with in the very substantial ninth chapter.91 When looking at the gravity of
sexual sins, Grisez deals with the “human values” that are at stake, values such as the
promotion of psychological health, social stability, the good rearing of children for
happy, stable relationships, and so on.92 However, Grisez goes on to highlight also the
“Christian values” at stake in sexual ethics too.93 These values make explicit how our
sexual behaviour either promotes or damages (or destroys) our harmonious relationship
with God, in other words, the good of religion (specified morally and theologically):
The sacramentality of marriage foreshadows the ultimate fulfillment of the human 
body as a capacity for self-giving: communion in the one-flesh reality of Jesus’ 
risen life. Since this is the human body’s ultimate end, every abuse of human 
sexuality violates not only the natural marital good but an infinitely greater good: 
the body of Christ.94
When people act immorally sexually, they harm themselves and the rest of the Church 
very seriously, and harm their relationship with Jesus Christ. When people treat their 
bodies, and others’ bodies, as objects and instruments of satisfaction, this has effects on 
how they view their own bodies and how they view others; it even has an effect on how 
they view the incarnate Jesus and the resurrection of the body. It is clear that sexual sins 
are not just acts of disobedience to the Church, but acts that violate several of the basic 
goods, always including the good of harmony with God.
91 Ibid., 553-752.
92 See ibid., 661-662.
93 See ibid., 662-664.
94 Ibid., 663, one note omitted. Grisez follows this with a quotation from St Paul, (1 Cor 6.13-20) and a 
reference to Pope John Paul II’s thought on these matters.
5.1.6c The religious significance o f acts for the sake o f nature
A section of Living a Christian Life concerns how we are to act towards nature.95 In this 
present work, we treat only the importance of religion in Grisez’s analysis (although 
Grisez does not explicitly draw attention to the “good of religion”). One of his headings 
is: “In dealing with nature, people must cooperate with its creator”,96 thus highlighting 
implicitly the theme of religion as a good at stake in our dealings with nature. He also 
calls on us to treat sub-personal things “as God’s good creatures”.97 Grisez explicitly 
recognises that people can rightly contemplate the beauty of nature, and are fulfilled by 
this, but he goes even further when he says that our appreciation of nature’s beauty as 
God’s creation can be a way of fulfilling nature’s destiny to praise and worship God.
• ■ * 98Thus, our appreciation of nature can be a form of religion for us and for nature itself. 
Grisez notes that people should use nature and enjoy it only in such a way that they 
“revere its creator”.99 This includes how we treat animals. He makes the point that even 
keeping a pet without a good reason is wrong because of its “irreverence toward God”.100 
Clearly, along with other goods such as harmony in social relations with our fellow men, 
the good of religion is at stake in our dealings with nature.
2 1 2
95 Ibid., 771-788.
96 Ibid., 774.
97 Ibid., 775.
98 See ibid., 776-777.
99 Ibid., 780.
100 Ibid., 788.
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We can see then that for Grisez the good of religion is central to Christian morality, even 
to those areas of life that might not be considered specifically religious. God’s will is that 
we cherish and promote and pursue the whole range of human goods, including the good 
of life and health (dealt with in chapter eight of Living a Christian Life), the good of 
knowledge (dealt with in part in chapter seven), the good of work/play (dealt with in part 
of chapter ten), the good of marriage (chapter nine), the good of justice and good social 
relationships (dealt with in chapter six, but also in several other chapters). In pursuing the 
good of religion, one is concerned with choosing in a way that is shaped by God’s will. 
Thus, one’s concern for the good of religion is simultaneously a concern for the other 
goods too.
Certainly in the perspective of Living a Christian Life we are not thinking of the good of 
religion as a general, minimally initial grasp of the benefit of being in harmony with the 
transcendent source of meaning and value, grasped with little or no knowledge of that 
transcendent source or how to pursue harmony with it. We are talking about the good of 
religion specified by natural knowledge of God and revealed knowledge of him, religion 
understood and pursued in the light of reason and faith. We are also talking about religion 
specified morally, religion understood integrally and inclusively, with no negation or 
neglect of the other human goods, but with an openness to all that is good, true and 
beautiful. Finally, we are talking about religion specified by charity, by which all our acts 
are seen as religious acts of charity, acts in harmony with God’s will that deepen and 
perfect our supernatural friendship with God and strengthen our abiding in his love.
5.2 Preliminary conclusion to the chapter
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We turn now to examine the place of religion in the third volume of Grisez’s moral 
theology project. This book is addressed to Christians and written from a theological 
perspective. So we should not expect to find a philosophical or exclusively natural law 
approach. In a substantial appendix, however, “Human acts and moral judgments”, 
Grisez presents an outline of his philosophical theory, and he makes the point that he 
hopes that
readers with a theoretical interest in these matters will find that the proposed 
responses to questions in this volume illuminate, by exemplifying, the elements of 
the treatment offered [in this appendix], and that it, in turn, will clarify the
> • 109reasoning in the proposed responses.
It is clear from these remarks, and others already mentioned,103 that Grisez considers his 
natural law theory to be part of Christian ethics. So we can expect his understanding of 
the good of religion and its place in morality to inform his theological approach to 
answering the various difficult questions treated in this book.
However, as with Living a Christian Life, but even more so, it is very difficult to analyse 
this book and to find exactly where it includes the good of religion.104
5.3 Difficult Moral Questions, volume 3 of The Way of the Lord Jesus [1997] 101
101 G. Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, volume 3 o f  The Way o f  the Lord Jesus (Quincy, 111.: Franciscan 
Press, 1997), written with the help of Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, Jeannette Grisez, Russell Shaw, and 
others
102 See ibid., 849-850.
103 See ss. 3.7 and 4.9.2b above.
104 The book consists of two hundred questions and answers, all of which are substantial in length, but with 
no obvious overall structure. It is not as systematic as volumes one or two. Its index is o f no use in
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The first appendix outlines Grisez’s philosophical moral theory. It refers to the basic
good of religion in its list of the basic human goods in this way:
[Pjeople experience tension with the very source and end of their reality -  tension 
explained by faith as alienation from God due to sin. Attempts to overcome sin and 
gain peace with God are the concern of religion. Thus, another category of reflexive 
good is the reconciliation and friendship with God that religion seeks.107
Grisez does not insist here in using morally neutral language to talk about religion (or the 
other basic goods either),106 but is happy to use morally specified language such as 
“reconciliation and friendship with God”. It could be that he is happy to use morally 
specified language in Difficult Moral Questions because his primary audience is people 
of faith who are interested in virtuous living, and so his style is more theological and 
moral than strictly philosophical and basic. We can see both philosophical and 
theological language in the short passage just quoted. Philosophically understood, 
religion is concerned with “tension with the very source and end of [people’s] reality”; 
theologically, this tension is “explained by faith as alienation from God due to sin”.107
5.3.1 Religion in G risez’s moral theory
analyzing the book as a whole with regard to the good o f religion, as it mentions only one definite 
reference. The one reference to religion is to the appendix we are now going to analyse.
105 Ibid., 854. Grisez notes that John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993), supports the idea that one is to act 
morally for the sake of people’s goods: see ibid., 13, 48, 50, 67, and 79 (cited in Difficult Moral Questions, 
851, n. 440).
1 Perhaps the main example of this is that Grisez uses the term “practical reasonableness” in Difficult 
Moral Questions, 854, whereas in previous philosophical works he had avoided this term as too morally 
specified to be used of a primary practical principle at the first level o f practical reasonableness, the level 
prior to moral reflection and specification.
107 Consistent with his previous works, Grisez does not say that it is only in light o f Christian faith that one 
can know that the tension we experience between ourselves and the source and end of our reality is due to 
sin. The possibility is left open that we can know what sin is, at least to some extent, by other means than
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There is perhaps a new element in the addition of the term “end” to the term “source” in 
Grisez’s description of the transcendent reality that we seek harmony with in the good of 
religion. Its inclusion here suggests clearly that human awareness of and concern with 
death and destiny play a large role in our grasp of the point of seeking harmony with the 
transcendent.
5.3.2 Religion and the expansion o f our feelings
The appendix outlining Grisez’s moral theory also gives us some more pointers regarding 
what we should be looking for in our analysis of Difficult Moral Questions and the place 
of the good of religion in it. Grisez treats the issue of how we are to educate our feelings 
to make them more supportive of good choices. In the course of doing this, he mentions 
the importance of faith and its specification of our understanding and emotions.
In the first practice for morally educating/expanding our feelings,108 Grisez highlights 
Jesus’ teaching of the Golden Rule, a moral principle that features hugely in the answers 
to the difficult moral questions in the main text.109 Not only does Grisez explain the 
meaning and use of the Rule, which directs us to go beyond our often partial but 
unreasonable feelings, but he makes it clear that Jesus taught it. Implicit in this point is
Christian faith, for example, by natural knowledge (such as Paul indicates in Romans chapters 1 and 2), or 
by means of some other religious tradition.
108 It is worth noting how positive Grisez is towards feelings/emotions. He does not speak of suppressing or 
ignoring them, in order to be morally good, but o f “expanding” them. The good Christian is not an 
emotionless being, in Grisez’s account, but an emotional one, a person with emotions that have been 
expanded beyond the selfish and narrow confines o f immorality.
109 See ibid., 865-867.
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the idea that people who value and follow this Rule are following Jesus and acting in a 
way that is harmonious with him and his teaching. The Golden Rule is not a principle that 
is exclusive to faith, of course; it is available to all people of intelligence and good will. 
But it is particularly appropriate for Christians: “Christians who want to grow in the 
virtue of justice can do so by regularly using the Golden Rule in making moral 
judgements”.110
This much he had already mentioned in previous works, (though perhaps without 
stressing the value of the Golden Rule as a practice for developing moral virtue), but he 
adds some new ideas about how we can and ought to “expand” our feelings to make us 
more virtuous.111
The second practice he recommends is “an imaginative exercise” to “educate feelings to 
respond to goods whose enjoyment presupposes developed abilities one lacks.”112 We are 
invited here to identify with moral exemplars who “embody the prior modes of 
responsibility”, such as the Golden Rule. The first and most important exemplar is 
Jesus.113 We are directed not only to imaginatively identify with Jesus as we would with 
any moral exemplar, even a fictitious one, but to go further: to “enter into a personal
110 Ibid., 866. It should be noted that Grisez does not explicitly emphasise the fact that Jesus taught this
principle, nor does he argue exclusively or even mainly from Jesus’ authority for the truth and value of this 
principle. Rather, he relies on its intrinsic reasonableness.
See ibid., 867-870.
1,2 Ibid., 867.
113 Ibid., 868.
relationship with Jesus and cooperate with him in carrying on his work”.114 Here we see a 
natural law principle combined with Christian faith and grace, with the two realities 
dynamically supporting each other. The natural law principle indicates the reasonableness 
of identifying with moral exemplars to expand our feelings to instantiate the goods more 
and more effectively and virtuously; the faith dimension shows us how to do this most 
effectively and realistically, by our friendship with Jesus. Our “friendship” with Jesus is a 
gift from God to us, which we receive in faith and baptism, but it also is a reality that we 
can choose to cooperate with and live by in and through our choices and actions. The 
good of religion, morally and theologically specified, involves our identifying with Jesus 
as our morally perfect brother and friend, and thus participating more and more in the 
good of harmony with God. Grisez includes also the saints and those holy people who we 
meet in our lives as other moral exemplars that can help us in a similar way (though not 
as strongly or directly as Jesus), particularly if there is some aspect of their lives that we 
can identify with as the individuals we are.
A third way of expanding our feelings is to educate them “to engage fully with concrete 
things that implement our commitments, to disengage readily from those same things 
when they no longer do so, and to respond powerfully to the hazy images that beckon us 
to be creative”.115 We can do this by placing ourselves and our choices and commitments 
into the proper long-range perspective. A secular way of doing this is to think about how 
history will judge one’s life, but Grisez emphasizes a better way, the Christian way.
2 18
114 Ibid., with a cross-reference to Christian Moral Principles, 663-664.
115 Difficult Moral Questions, 868. Note the positive character o f how Grisez understands the moral life.
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The Christian solution is to consider life as the set of good deeds that God has 
prepared in advance to one to walk in, as one’s unique part in his all-inclusive plan. 
One seeks the kingdom first, trusts providence, organizes life by the commitments 
of personal vocation, and constantly tries to carry them out.116
This quote sums up several of the central themes of Grisez’s theological moral theory, 
already seen in our analysis of Christian Moral Principles and Living a Christian Life. 
Grisez’s moral theory sees every choice and action religiously, at least implicitly, insofar 
as every choice and action can be made for the sake of harmony with God’s will, a will 
that includes every aspect of human fulfillment and thus every aspect of human 
motivation and life. This implies that explicit attention to the good of religion at stake in 
all our choices, commitments and actions is of the first importance in developing virtue. 
In particular, we need to develop our awareness of the kingdom of God as the end of our 
lives, an end that includes rich fulfillment in all the human goods.117
The fourth way to expand our feelings to make them more virtuous is closely related to 
the previous one. It has to do with a narrow tendency to focus only “on the things that can
be realized in this life”. Again, we need to expand our horizons by focusing on the
♦ * 1 1 8  kingdom, which is “an invisible, permanent world already coming to be”. Our
engagement in specifically religious practices, such as liturgy, is helpful in expanding our
feelings so that we do not “treat all goods as transient and ... regard difficult moral
1,6 Ibid., 869.
117 See ibid. Once again, Grisez refers to Gaudium et Spes, 38-39, as support for his approach. As with 
Living a Christian Life, these paragraphs from the Council document are the very first text given in the 
book, emphasising their importance in Grisez’s moral theory.
118 Difficult Moral Questions, 869.
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requirements as [mere] ideals”.’19 It is clear from this that Grisez sees a specifically, 
explicitly religious perspective on life as supportive of the natural law and as necessary 
for fallen and limited human beings.
5.3.3 Religion in the main text o/Difficult Moral Questions
Does the good of religion feature in the main text of Volume 3? It does not feature in an 
explicit way, using the term “the good of religion” in the question titles or answers. But 
then, neither do many other aspects of Grisez’s moral theory. Even though it is rather 
easy to spot the questions focusing on the good of life and health (for example, questions 
43-50, 78-79, 83-86) , marriage and sexuality (19-20, 28-38, 51-56,) and work (102- 
152),120 it is not always easy to see which questions are focused on other basic human 
goods. Within an answer, often several basic human goods are referred to, or are 
presupposed, as are various moral principles, especially the Golden Rule. It is clear that 
Grisez’s whole moral theory underlies and shapes the explicit advice and comments he 
gives, but he does not give the advice and analysis in an artificial and schematic manner, 
so it is difficult to find out where he makes use of various elements of his theory until one 
reads the questions and answers in detail.121 What we can say with confidence with
119 Ibid. And see also ibid., 870.
120 As indicated, often the questions are grouped around a theme, and can be linked to a basic good. 
However, Grisez does not organise all 200 Questions around the basic goods, or around virtues (as several 
chapters of Living a Christian Life were structured). Rather, there is a loose kind o f organisational scheme 
in operation, which groups Questions around the types o f people involved in the question or issue: for 
example, families (questions 1-50 roughly), health care persons (questions 52-91), business people (102- 
152), college persons (questions 155-167), legal people (176-200). See ibid., xxiii for a slightly different 
view. This book addresses moral questions of lay people only; moral issues specifically for clergy and 
religious are left for volume four.
121 One reviewer gently criticises Grisez’s approach in this book for not building explicitly on the natural 
law arguments detailed in volumes one and two: H. Arkes, “The Lessons o f the Master: In the Chambers of 
Germain Grisez,” American Journal o f Jurisprudence 43 (1998): 185-204, at 193. Although Arkes notes
regard to the good of religion in this book is that a concern with making choices that are 
in harmony with God’s wise and loving plan for his people and creation is to be found 
explicitly in many of the answers that Grisez gives to the difficult moral questions treated 
here. For example, many of the answers he gives make explicit reference to the 
importance of “reconciliation and friendship with God” which is a central concern of the 
good of religion. We do not have the space here to look at all the questions, or even at 
some of them in great detail; all that can be done is to indicate some representative 
examples and make some brief comments.
5.3.4 Explicit references to religions concerns
A large number of the answers make reference to the kingdom of God as a strong 
motivating factor for our attitudes and behaviour. Some of these deal with issues where 
one might expect explicit reference to religion, matters such as liturgy, sacraments and 
faith; others are topics where perhaps one might not expect explicit reference to religion.
Often Grisez makes reference to the explicitly religious dimension at the very end of the
answer. For example, in advising a woman asking for guidance regarding what she
should do about rectifying a friend’s fraud, Grisez ends by praising her forgiving and
loving attitude so far, and says:
If you persist in that attitude and pray for her, perhaps your friendship will not be 
over. At least, if you both die in God’s friendship, you will be friends again in 
heaven.122
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the place that Christian faith plays in Grisez’s approach in this book, he does not mention the good of 
religion.
122 Difficult Moral Questions, 120, Question 26. Grisez has just advised the questioner to act to rectify her 
friend’s fraud by reporting it to the police.
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Here, Grisez makes reference to a faith dimension, in which our friendship with God is 
central and gives us hope that transcends a merely worldly perspective. Such an approach 
is frequently found in other answers, with a reference to the importance of hoping for the 
kingdom of God as one element that shapes our attitudes and choices.123 The placing of 
these references to religious themes at the end of so many answers suggests that a 
religious perspective, focused on the value of our relationship with God, forms a kind of 
ultimate context for understanding the morality of many diverse issues.
Grisez does not place references to religious concerns only at the end of answers. In 
Question 43, for example, (“Is it wrong to wish for death?”), Grisez advises a volunteer 
on what perspective to take regarding the elderly people he visits, and he begins by 
saying:
Since nothing is more important than that they go to heaven, you can do nothing 
better for them than help them live well and prepare properly for death -  for 
example, by receiving the sacraments, learning to join their suffering to Jesus’ 
passion, and making peace with enemies.124
Grisez goes on in this answer to make reference to the words and attitudes of St 
Maximilian Kolbe, St Paul and Jesus regarding death. He makes the point too that 
wishing for death is ambiguous, and it can have a good sense: “When rooted in hope for
123 See, for example, Questions 41 (page 192), 58 (271-272), 76 (345), 88 (405), 107 (485), 113 (510), 135 
(583), 142 (610), 177 (762), 185 (795), and 191 (812).
124 Ibid., 198. It should be noted that the whole answer is quite long and detailed (five and a half pages) and 
that only parts o f it are being mentioned here. In fact, it is worth making the point that in this whole 
analysis of Difficult Moral Questions, limitations of space and requirements of direct relevance make it 
impossible to do full justice to Grisez’s answers, which are detailed, sophisticated, related to specific 
details in the questions, often flexible, and sometimes tentative in places.
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heaven and accompanied by docility to God’s providential plan, the wish [for death] is 
good and in no way at odds with reverence for life”.125 Here, Grisez refers to another 
basic human good (life), noting how a correct attitude to God’s will, and living in 
harmony with it (“docility”), which is the concern of the good of religion, enables us to 
avoid a negative will towards what is good.
5.3.5 Personal vocation
Once again, as in the previous two volumes of The Way o f the Lord Jesus, Grisez puts a 
lot of emphasis on the concept of “personal vocation”, many times using the term itself, 
but sometimes referring to it in other terms.126 There are twenty nine questions in which 
Grisez makes reference to the moral requirement for people to discern, commit 
themselves to follow, and follow their unique personal vocations.127 Here is what he says 
in one of these:
God calls every person to fulfill his or her personal vocation, which embraces not 
only a certain state of life and other appropriate upright commitments but [also] 
conditions beyond one’s control, such as sickness, unemployment, and other forms 
of suffering. For God sometimes allows bad things to happen to us and calls on us 
to make the most of them for the sake of witness and service to the kingdom (see 
Catechism o f the Catholic Church, 309-314). Each of us should discover, accept, 
and faithfully fulfill all the elements of his or her vocation, weaving them together 
to form a seamless whole (see Living a Christian Life, 113-129).128
125 Ibid., 200.
126 It should be noted that “personal vocation” as a theological, practical principle is even more dominant in 
the answers than the index would indicate: see ibid., 926-927 (twenty two references in the index).
127 See ibid., Questions 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 21, 30, 31, 33, 37, 40, 43, 44, 49, 57, 60, 74, 77, 82, 87, 94, 99, 101,
113, 131, 155, 159, 190, 200. It is interesting that the majority o f  these references are in the first hundred 
answers. Perhaps at that stage Grisez felt he had mentioned it enough.
128 Ibid., 96.
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It is easy to see how these ideas could apply to many diverse situations and moral issues,
so it is not surprising to see the concept of personal vocation featuring so prominently in
Difficult Moral Questions. This concept links to the good of religion because the idea of
personal vocation views God’s call to each of us (to do his particular will for our unique
lives) as a practical organizing and inspirational principle for one’s life as a whole, and as
the path to peace. As Grisez says in another answer:
Ask yourself...: How can I use my gifts to serve others? What is God’s will for me 
now? For in his will you will find your peace, not only in what remains to you of 
this life but in the endless life to come.129
5.3.6 What we owe God
The notion that we have been given gifts by God and that it is good for us to develop 
them and use them well is central in several answers.130 One element of why it is good to 
develop and use our God-given talents well is that we owe it to God: “Having received 
your talents from God so as to realize that good, you owe it to him to develop them (see 
Matthew 25. 14-30).”131
We also owe God obedience. If, for example, someone involved in healthcare were to be 
ordered to perform an abortion or some other act against the good of life, “that person 
would be obliged to refuse: ‘We must obey God rather than any human authority’ (Acts 
5. 29)”.132
129 Ibid., 507 (Question 113). Grisez is advising an elderly person in this answer.
130 See for example, Questions 155, 156, and 158, all relating to students.
131 Ibid., 657 (Question 155).
132 Ibid., 331, n. 250 (Question 72). See also ibid., 81 (Question 18) and 669 (Question 158).
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We owe God assent too. Many times in his answers, Grisez makes reference to moral 
teachings in the scriptures and the teaching of the Church.133 It would be possible to 
understand our obligation to follow these teachings in terms of personal consistency or 
social harmony. It is also possible to understand it in terms of our relationship with God 
and the benefit of thinking, choosing and acting in harmony with God’s will, which is a 
religious understanding of our obligation to assent to and follow Church’s teachings.134 
This religious way of understanding the place of the Church’s teachings is found 
explicitly in several places in Difficult Moral Questions. For instance, in Question 2, 
Grisez advises the questioner to guide her son to seek religious truth and to accept her 
help in doing so, which “presupposes that God makes religious truth available to us and 
that his grace ensures that a sincere quest for it will not be in vain”.135 He advises 
especially that doubters or seekers should read the Catechism o f the Catholic Church and 
the Bible too, “with readiness to hear what God wishes to tell [them]”.136 The emphasis 
here is not on being consistent with oneself (as a Catholic) or conforming to one’s social 
group (which for Catholics is the Church), but on listening to God with an openness to 
accepting his truth and living by it as God’s wise guidance for our fulfillment and
133 See the substantial indexes, 900-904, which include references to the Catechism o f the Catholic Church 
(which had been published since volume 2 of Grisez’s moral theology project) as well as The Code o f 
Canon Law. One should look also at the many references under the heading of “John Paul II” in the final 
index, 916. It should be noted that specific scriptural or magisterial moral norms are not always mentioned 
in every answer in Difficult Moral Questions because these are difficult moral questions that often involve 
issues not specifically covered or resolved by explicitly biblical or Church norms. See ibid., xv.
134 This was treated in Christian Moral Principles, chapter 23, Question G and chapter 35, and in Living a 
Christian Life, chapter 1, Questions H and I. See above s. 5.1.4e.
135 Difficult Moral Questions, 6. The son is in doubt about the Church’s teachings; the questioner is his
mother.
136 Ibid.
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happiness. Thus, the good of religion is at stake here.137 In beginning one answer, Grisez 
says: “Moral norms guide us in carrying out God’s wise and loving plan ...”138 This tells 
us clearly that it is always appropriate to understand the moral guidance of the Church in 
a religious way, with our assent to that teaching and our effort to follow it instantiating 
harmony with God speaking through the Church.
Speaking of “owing” God, there are a couple of references in Difficult Moral Questions
to the famous gospel passage about what we should render to Caesar and what we should
render to God: Matt 22. 15-22.139 Grisez’s comment:
[Jesus] told them to give back to the emperor the things that are his (coins stamped 
with his image and an idolatrous claim) and to give to God the things that are his 
(the obedience of faith, worship, and complete love: one’s whole life and very 
self).140
The final words in brackets, referring to what we owe God, tell us succinctly how Grisez
sees morality and life through a religious lens, so to speak. He says also (to a person who
wishes to pay only the tax he owes):
Though,[s/c] I do not blame you for wishing to give Caesar no more that is his, you 
also must give God what is his, and while what is Caesar’s is limited, what is God’s 
is not, for it includes what is Caesar’s and all else too.141
137 See also, ibid., 59 (Question 12), and 198-200 (Question 43, on euthanasia).
138 Ibid., 536 (Question 121).
139 See ibid., 727 (Question 169) and 745 (Question 173). These Questions have to with tax matters, 
unsurprisingly, but their insights can be applied more widely.
140 Ibid., 727. Following this is a footnote referring to the gospel passages parallel to Matt 22.15-22 and to a 
commentary by Joseph Fitzmyer supporting Grisez’s reading.
141 Ibid., 745.
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Here, we see the all-inclusive nature of the religious perspective, which is not a narrow 
and exclusive focus on conventionally religious things, such as prayer and sacraments, 
but a view that sees God as the Creator, Redeemer and Lord of all things.142
5.3.7 The importance o f  the explicitly religious
It should not be thought, however, that Grisez is in any way negative or negligent 
towards what might be termed “conventionally religious things”, as if he wanted to 
reduce religion to (secular) life, so to speak. He is not slow to point out the importance of 
what is explicitly Catholic. In discussing matters to do with education, for example, he 
clearly points out what it is that makes Catholic education distinctively Catholic.143 The 
common good of a Catholic academic community has three elements. The first includes 
commitment to the truth and cultivating intellectual virtues, but, as Grisez points out, this 
is not a purely secular commitment but includes “the virtue of Catholic faith and faith’s 
truth”.144 The second element is justice and charity. The third is one that Grisez explicitly 
calls “religious”: “the religious significance of the common enterprise considered as 
cooperation in a particular part of God’s creative, redemptive, and sanctifying work.”145 
This third element picks out central ideas in Grisez’s theological moral theory: 
cooperation with God’s plan and action, personal vocation. The very fact that a school or 
college commits itself to work with God, cooperating with him in his role as Creator,
142 Interestingly, Grisez does not refer to the opening chapters of Genesis in Difficult Moral Questions, even 
though it might seem appropriate to do so, and they are often relied on in Catholic ethical and social 
teaching.
143 See ibid., 691 (Question 163) and 703 (Question 165). See also Question 164.
144 Ibid., 691.
145 Ibid.
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Redeemer, and Sanctifier, is itself of great value (what Grisez calls here “the common 
religious value” of the school). Also this religious value provides a criterion for working 
out, with other principles, the public policy and behaviour of a Catholic college (as 
detailed in Grisez’s lengthy answers to the pertinent questions in Difficult Moral 
Questions).
Grisez does not confine his comments on the importance of being Catholic to the 
educational sphere. He also discusses the religious value of Catholic healthcare.146 The 
importance of prayer and the sacraments generally, and of explicitly Church matters, is 
evident in several parts of this book.147 The example of Jesus is cited frequently, 
especially his attitude towards his passion and death.148 Questioners are often exhorted to 
take up their cross and follow Jesus.149 Mary and the saints are mentioned as exemplars 
for us to identify with.150
5.3.8 Reverence and the environment
There is a strong emphasis on reverence towards God throughout the book, which 
features explicitly in some answers. A few are about matters to do with the natural
146 See ibid., 392-393 (Question 87).
147 For example: on prayer, see Question 8; on sacraments, Questions 1, 4, 10-13; on supporting one’s 
parish, Questions 14 and 15.
148 See Questions 18, 2 5 ,4 3 ,7 7 ,8 1 ,9 6 , 108 and 170.
149 See Questions 7, 9, 21, 23, 29, 38, 47, 58, and 136.
150 See Questions 40 and 43. It should be said, however, that such references are relatively rare.
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environment.151 Grisez mentioned environmental action as an example of instantiating
the good of religion in two previous works,152 so it is interesting to see the good of
religion featuring in his answers here regarding the environment. In his answer about how
we should treat pets, Grisez makes the following point:
Reverence toward God requires us to respect [pets’] value. Just as it would be 
wrong wantonly to pollute a stream or crush a wild flower, so it is wrong wantonly 
to injure any animal (see Catechism o f the Catholic Church, 2415-16). Indeed, 
since animals are creatures of a higher metaphysical order than streams and
• 1 S3flowers, the wrong is greater, other things being equal.
In a footnote appended to this text, Grisez explicitly mentions the good of religion as one
of the goods at stake in actions harming animals or the natural environment. (The other
good he mentions is the good of fairness towards others, violated by wastefulness and
depriving others of benefits.) Reverence towards God is mentioned also in Question 93,
regarding treatment of whales. Grisez sums up his main point in Question 103:
Moral issues about environmental impact are reducible to questions about 
reverence toward God, the author of nature, and fairness toward fellow human
beings.154
Clearly, Grisez associates reverence towards God with the good of religion. It is only 
when we see God precisely as God, as the author of nature and Lord of all, that we can 
live realistically and therefore morally, in harmony with God’s reality. It is also clear that
151 See Questions 92, 93, 102, and 103.
152 See Grisez, “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethic,” in Moral Philosophy: Historical and Contemporary 
Essays, ed. W.C. Starr and R.C. Taylor (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989): 125-43 at 128, and 
also J. Finnis, J. Boyle, and G. Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism  (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987) 280, analysed above in s. 4.9.1. See also s. 5.1,6c above for the treatment of 
the environment theme in Living a Christian Life.
153 Difficult Moral Questions, 420 (Question 92), footnote omitted.
154 Ibid., 468, with reference to the Catechism o f the Catholic, 2414, and to Living a Christian Life, 771-82.
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Grisez’s moral theory allows for the mutually supportive combination of two or more 
basic human goods as motivations for actions, with the good of religion being combined 
here with the good of harmony with others.
5.3.9 Why is religion not always mentioned or clearly implied?
Although what has been said so far suggests that the good of religion is a major element 
in Grisez’s approach in Difficult Moral Questions, it should be noted that many of his 
answers do not make any reference to the good of religion, either explicitly or implicitly. 
There are about sixty six answers (out of two hundred), a rather sizeable number, that 
seem to omit any reference to the good of religion.155 The range of issues that Grisez 
treats without referring to the good of religion is wide, spanning the whole book. It would 
seem that the areas most lacking in religious reference are those to do with business 
ethics and legal ethics (the Questions in the second half of the book). Nevertheless, just 
about all areas have answers in which no reference to the good of harmony with God is 
mentioned or implied clearly. Does this mean that the good of religion is only sometimes 
at stake in our choices? Does it mean that this good is not at the centre of Grisez’s moral 
theory, as argued in our analysis of his previous works?
In this book’s “Preface and User’s Guide”, Grisez explains clearly that the book’s 
selection of questions and its approach to answering them is limited. The book “treats
155 It is not always easy to judge if  an answer omits even an implied reference to religion, but bearing this in 
mind, here are the Questions in Difficult Moral Questions that, in my judgement, leave out any reference to 
religion: 17, 20, 24, 27, 29, 34, 50, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 70, 73, 84, 86, 90, 91, 98, 104, 106, 
107, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 148, 
149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 161, 162, 168, 176, 179, 182, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 196, 198, 199.
only some difficult questions that are widespread, especially important, or usefully 
illustrative.”156 However, “unlike the earlier volumes, which mainly present common 
Catholic teaching and reflect on it theologically, it deals with questions not yet the 
subject of explicit or clearly applicable Church teachings.”157 So, we might expect such 
an approach to not always make reference to the good of religion, especially as 
theologically specified in Christian faith, but to make use sometimes of philosophical or 
legal arguments that are more secular in nature. Some answers are more secular in their 
style, therefore, because their subject matter is not the object of any Biblical or 
magisterial teaching or illustration. Some of the business matters treated in this book 
would seem to lack reference to the good of religion for this reason.
There is another element of Grisez’s approach that needs to be taken into consideration
too. His approach is not presented as a systematic and comprehensive treatment of the
issues and topics.158 He makes the point that
in many replies, it would be appropriate to offer additional spiritual advice ... 
However, to avoid constant repetition, in this book I usually omit most such 
spiritual advice, though I would give it in replying to questioners separately.159
Although “spiritual advice” does not refer exclusively to the good of religion, surely it 
includes it. We can find an illustration of this in the fact that Grisez sometimes makes 
reference to the good of religion specified by faith in answering a question in a particular
156 Ibid, xv.
157 Ibid.
158 See ibid., xviii.
159 Ibid., xx.
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area, such as sexual ethics, but then answers another question in this same area without 
mentioning religion, when he could have made the same basic points about religion in the 
second answer.160 Also, Grisez’s statement lets us know explicitly that he is aware that 
many of the answers he gives in the book are incomplete, and that he does not attempt to 
cover every aspect of an issue in every answer. So it is not surprising that he cautions 
readers to avoid drawing conclusions from what is not said in his answers.161 At the start 
of each question, Grisez says “The reply could be along the following lines”. This 
indicates the somewhat tentative nature of Grisez’s approach in this volume, his 
allowance for the fact that the questions he answers could be answered in various ways 
because they are genuinely difficult moral questions and moral life is rich and 
complex.162
5.4 Final conclusion to the chapter
We cannot draw any conclusions from the fact that a large number of Grisez’s answers in 
Difficult Moral Questions omit any reference to religion. We can conclude, however, 
from the book as a whole, that Grisez holds that the good of religion can and should play 
a very important role in the moral life of Catholics. It should be noted, however, that 
Grisez does not ever depend solely on the good of religion as the reason for the guidance
160 Compare the answers to Question 22, which mentions specifically religious concerns, with Questions 20 
and 69, which omit any reference to religion, but in which the religious points of Question 22 would have 
been appropriate to mention. It is interesting to note that many, though not all, of the answers omitting 
mention of religion are relatively short, suggesting that Grisez knowingly left out aspects o f his moral 
theory in these answers.
161 See ibid., xviii.
162 See also ibid., xvii and xx.
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truth, and, most often, human community of various sorts (hence the frequent reference to
the Golden Rule), as well as the good of religion. Still he does say at the start:
The motive of hope -  intending heaven and fearing hell -  regularly overarches and 
undergirds every other motive proposed for living the truth of a well-informed 
conscience.163
It is clear that what Grisez said about the suitability of religion as an architectonic good, 
shaping one’s whole life as a good person, especially when specified by Christian faith, is 
well illustrated in this volume insofar as the good of harmony with God and his will 
features in a large number of answers arising out of a wide range of activity and human 
interest. It is also clear that the concept of personal vocation, as we have seen, features 
prominently in Grisez’s moral theory and moral guidance, and it depends on the good of 
religion insofar as one is motivated to listen for God’s call and guidance for one’s life, 
and to accept and follow it, because one wishes to choose always in harmony with his 
wise and loving plan for one’s life and for the good of others. Clearly, part of this 
willingness to be in harmony with God and his will includes giving him what we owe 
him: reverence, obedience, assent, trust, gratitude, and patient endurance of suffering -  
all of which feature prominently in Difficult Moral Questions. In this, the book follows 
on from, and develops, themes already found in Living a Christian Life.
he gives. His answers make reference to other basic goods, such as life and health, and
163 Ibid., xxii.
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CHAPTER SIX 
GRISEZ’S RECENT WORKS [2001-2008]
6.1 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment” [2001]1
In the first section of this article Grisez presents the basic human goods as the objects of 
the first principles of practical reasoning, and thus intelligible motives for options for 
choice that provide us with reasons for our choices.2
6.1.1 Religion is a basic human good grounded in human nature
Firstly, we note the by now familiar way in which Grisez refers to the good of religion:
Most people also experience tension with, or even alienation from, what they 
recognize as a more-than-human source of meaning and value: so, another reflexive 
good is the harmony with a more-than-human reality that people seek by religious 
activities.3
Secondly, we note a point about basic goods as basic. One view of basic goods is that 
they must be derived from prior theoretical knowledge of human nature. Grisez states 
clearly that this view is mistaken because it “confuses priority in reality with priority in 
knowledge”.4 Grisez’s moral theory does not in any way deny that “[hjuman nature is
1 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 3- 
36. It should be noted that right at the beginning Grisez describes this article as only “a sketch”, dealing 
with matters that deserve book-length treatment.
2 See ibid., 5-6. Note that Grisez explicitly states that “basic human goods are not the only necessary 
motives for specifically human action. Emotional motives also are necessary . . .”, ibid., 6.
3 Ibid., 8, note omitted.
4 Ibid., followed by a footnote saying that the mistaken view also “overlooks the metaphysical irreducibility 
of (1) the existential order o f  human acts, which make up personal and interpersonal life, to (2) the natural
prior in reality to the basic human goods that fulfill it.”5 We come to know human nature 
by knowing the practical principles of the natural law. These principles pick out the 
objects of human acts, and these acts indicate to us the human capacities of our nature. At 
the same time, we would not engage in deliberate religious activities unless an inclination 
towards religion was already part of our nature. Grisez’s emphasis on the underivability 
from nature of our knowledge of the primary principles of the natural law is not a denial 
of the fact that the goodness of religion is ontologically grounded in the given order of 
nature.6
It follows that we can understand the goodness of religion not only practically but also 
theoretically: it functions not only as a practical principle directing practical knowledge 
and action, but also as part of moral theory and as part of theoretical knowledge of our 
nature (and as part of philosophical anthropology and other studies). Precisely as the 
object of a practical principle, religion functions as part of the moral order, directing us to 
choose and act, and, as such, it is a primary principle, underived from prior principles or 
knowledge, and irreducible to any other order of reality. On the other hand, as a part of a
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order, including human beings” (emphasis in original). In this regard, Grisez makes reference to the 
sections of Beyond the New Theism dealing with the four orders of reality. See s. 2.6 above.
5 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 8-9, followed by a footnote referring to work by 
John Finnis in which this point is made explicitly. Previously, Grisez had not made this point as explicitly.
6 On this see also a chapter written by Grisez and Boyle just prior to the article being analysed here: 
“Response to Our Critics and Our Collaborators,” in Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, 
and Politics in the Work o f  Germain Grisez, ed. Robert P. George (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1998), 213-37, at 214.
236
moral theory, religion is a reality whose nature can be contemplated and understood, 
whose logic can be judged, and whose technical/creative effectiveness can be evaluated.7
One implication of what Grisez says here is that the theoretical study and knowledge of 
religion as part of his (or any) moral theory is not prior to religion as the object o f a 
practical principle. Rather, the principle exists first in the existential order, making 
possible choices to act in pursuit of the benefit of being in harmony with God, and only 
then can it be part of a moral theory that can be studied theoretically. This seems to be 
what Grisez has in mind when he says that the basic goods can be reflected on 
theoretically and “defended dialectically” by theoretical arguments, even though this 
theoretical reflection or argument is not sufficient to experience the goods as the objects 
of essentially practical principles.8 We first come to know the human goods as human 
goods in practical thinking, not theoretical reflection or argument, but the latter can 
illuminate the former (and vice versa).
6.1.2 God and the natural law
Once again, Grisez presents his cosmological argument for the objective existence and 
mysterious nature of God.9 Once again, too, Grisez extends his cosmological argument to 
include the natural law:
7 These points go somewhat beyond what Grisez says explicitly in this article, or elsewhere, especially in 
saying that religion, and/or any primary practical principle or basic good, can be understood from the 
perspective o f the other three orders.
8 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 9-10.
9 See s. 2.5.2 above.
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Natural law manifests providence and benevolence because nothing else can 
account for its guidance toward the intelligible goods of every individual and 
community.10
Grisez claims that the universality, objectivity and intelligibility of the natural law point 
clearly towards its divine source.11 The objective reality and essential reasonableness and 
directiveness of morality cannot be accounted for sufficiently by evolution, by already 
existing benefits as natural givens, or by previous choices and commitments of oneself 
and/or others.
Also, the fact that the natural law guides all men towards what is good for them is a sign 
that the source of this guidance is intelligent, provident, and benevolent. Our good 
choices are seen to be a kind of cooperation with that source; our immoral actions are 
seen to be a failure to cooperate with it. Grisez does not claim that our awareness of any
10 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 13. See s. 4.2 above. Grisez highlights this new 
development of his cosmological argument for God’s existence in the new preface to his republication of 
Beyond the New Theism in 2005 as God? A Philosophical Preface to Faith (South Bend, Indiana: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 2005), xx-xxiv. One respondent to Grisez’s 2001 paper in the American Journal o f 
Jurisprudence, William H. Marshner, writing in the same issue, overlooks the fact that Grisez’s 
cosmological argument is the context for the new ‘natural law’ extension o f it. Thus, the argument from the 
natural law and its directiveness is convincing only insofar as one already has reason (from the 
cosmological argument, and/or from faith) to hold that a Creator exists whose creating we can partially but 
confidently understand by analogy with human persons’ thinking and willing. See W.H. Marshner, 
“Implausible Diagnosis: A Response to Germain Grisez,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 
91-112, at 96-103. Still, it is true that Grisez’s presentation of the “natural law” extension o f his argument 
for God’s existence (both in his 1987 and 2001 articles and in his 2005 preface) is somewhat brief and in 
need of development.
11 Grisez makes reference in this regard to the famous definition of Aquinas o f the natural law: “that 
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature” in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2. It is worth 
noting that Grisez relies here on three aspects of the natural law, and not only on its universality. Its 
intelligibility is perhaps the most important aspect, as it points most clearly towards an intelligent and 
provident Source.
of this will be explicit and detailed, but acknowledges that it is at least dim or implicit, 
and that it can and should be developed.12
6.1.3 Divine Command Theory rejected
Grisez goes on to make a point regarding one kind of moral theory: Divine Command 
Theory.13 One comes to know the prescriptivity (intelligible obligatory force) of the 
natural law prior to one’s being aware of being bound to obey its source.14 What this 
means is that our natural grasp of the goods of religion, knowledge, and inner consistency 
(to mention the three that, arguably, are the most relevant here), as well as our moral 
awareness of all the basic human goods as integrally directive, ground our willingness to 
accept our obligation to believe in and obey God. We do not believe in God and only then 
become moral. Moral obligation does not depend entirely on God’s commands being 
known and accepted as divine commands.15
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12 One way that this awareness can be developed is by identifying the Creator with the Source of the natural 
law: “Because one reasonably posits only as many causes as necessary to account for the facts and because 
the natural law comes with being human, it is reasonable to identify the more-than-human source of natural 
law with the creator. For people who draw that conclusion, identifying the two illuminates both”, “Natural 
Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 13. Marshner overlooks these points too: see n. 10 above.
13 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 13, note 22. Grisez does not explicitly talk of 
“Divine Command Theory” as such, but it is a commonly found term for the position he distinguishes here 
from his own theory. For a treatment o f several moral theories, including Divine Command Theory and 
Natural Law, see M. Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction (Lanham/Boulder /New York/ Toronto/ 
Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002). Timmons mentions and briefly discusses Finnis and 
some of his books in his chapter on natural law theory, but he does not mention Grisez.
14 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 13, n. 22.
15 Grisez does not deny that God’s positive commands can clarify our awareness o f moral norms and 
strengthen our willingness to live according to them. See ss 3.7 above and chapter 11, question C of 
Christian Moral Principles.
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At the same time, Grisez acknowledges clearly that the natural law comes from God and 
that its prescriptivity is a sign of God’s providence and benevolence. Grisez is not trying 
to put forward a purely secular version of the natural law; he is, however, making sure 
that the natural and essentially practical quality of the natural law is safeguarded from 
any reductionism, even one that emphasises God’s authority. Morality is not a matter of 
brute facts, not even the facts of God’s commands, combined with the force of authority, 
not even God’s authority; it is a practical grasp of the opportunities offered for human 
fulfillment (of oneself and others) in various options for choice, and a moral grasp of the 
true fulfillment to be found in choices that fully respect the integral directiveness of all 
the primary principles of practical reason. These opportunities and this true fulfillment 
are God’s gift, as is the natural law itself, but this gift is one that allows human persons to 
share in God’s providence by their own rationality, thus coming to know the natural law 
as law in the sense of “intelligent and benevolent plan for our human good”, rather than 
as arbitrary rules imposed by higher authority on lower beings.
6.1.4 The source o f our awareness o f the good o f religion
Our grasp of the practical principle regarding religion “presupposes data that become 
available only by reflection both upon actions directed by other principles of the natural 
law and upon those principles’ prescriptivity.”16 We become aware of the good of 
religion only when we have data that comes from reflection on actions and reflection on
16 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 14, n. 23, emphasis added. This suggests that 
knowledge of religion, though still basic in that it is irreducible to any other practical principles, is less 
basic than the other practical principles, which are presupposed by one’s grasp o f religion as a good. One 
does not begin with a grasp of the principle directing us to pursue religion and then become aware of the 
other practical principles; one begins with grasping other practical principles, and then becomes aware of 
the principle concerning religion.
240
moral obligation. The principle directing us towards the good of religion is dependent on 
our prior awareness of the other basic goods, or at least some of them, as prescriptive and 
as instantiated, or, perhaps more pertinently, failing to be instantiated, in actions.
Grisez is developing what he said previously about how our awareness of the good of 
religion arises. In these works, he located the emergence of our awareness of reflexive 
goods, including religion, in our experience of conflict and frustration in pursuit of 
substantive goods (and perhaps other reflexive goods too), and our intelligent grasp of the 
possibility and opportunity offered in the pursuit of harmony with the transcendent source 
of meaning and value.17 Here, he emphasises the data provided by our awareness of the 
natural law precisely as natural law as a grounding for our awareness of religion as a
basic human good. Even if we do not connect the source of the natural law with the
18Creator, we still can grasp the point of trying to choose in harmony with this source. 
Grisez allows for an understanding of religion in which one is not aware explicitly of a 
“creator” as such, but one is aware at least of some kind of more-than-human source of 
morality. Grisez says that once we have this data, which comes from our reflection on 
actions and prescriptivity (practical reasonableness/obligation), “the principle about 
harmony with God, like other principles of practical reason, is self-evident.”19
17 See ss. 3.3.3 and 4.4 above.
18 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 14, n. 23, first sentence.
19 Ibid. Grisez seems to be saying that we are aware of our need to choose in harmony with God (i.e. to 
instantiate the good o f religion) because o f our awareness o f God as the source of the natural law. Grisez 
assumes that we are aware o f our failures to follow the natural law, and o f our need for forgiveness and 
healing. The source o f our awareness of religion is not just our awareness o f  natural law but also o f tension 
and alienation: see n. 3 above. On what Grisez has to say in this article about our initial grasp of the basic 
human goods in general, see s. 8.3.2 below.
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Our natural grasp of the good of religion, then, does not come out of nowhere; it is not an 
intuition, or an innate idea, or necessarily or exclusively a special divine revelation. It is a 
natural awareness that presupposes certain data, particularly our awareness of natural law 
as a more-than-human law. Grisez does not make identifying the source of the natural 
law with the Creator a necessary condition for us becoming aware of the good of religion, 
but he does say that such identification develops insight into the good of religion.20
6.1.5 a Religion can integrate and motivate the whole o f one’s life
The third section of the article clarifies “the overarching religious commitment that can 
organize one’s entire life”.21 Grisez makes the point that one cannot organise one’s entire 
life in pursuit of any substantive good, as the basic human goods are incommensurable, 
irreducible, and diverse, and so no substantive good can be in itself the ultimate end for 
human life.22 The reflexive goods, however, which are more closely related to morality 
than the substantive goods, can always be rightly furthered in any action in which they 
are at stake. Still, only religion is fully suitable as a basic good for organising one’s 
whole life:
20 See ibid. This reminds us that one’s initial insight into the good o f religion is not necessarily an adequate 
insight into its goodness; it would be a flawed insight, for example, if it assumed that the source o f the 
natural law was not the same as the Creator. But it would still be an insight, however flawed, into the good 
o f  religion, and it could be corrected if one came to have better understanding of the object o f religion and 
how to instantiate it more adequately. Finding a more correct understanding o f God could be motivated by 
one’s initial insight into the good o f religion (along with one’s insight into the good of knowledge, or some 
other good).
21 Thus Grisez amends the earlier treatment o f this issue in “Practical Principles” : see “Natural Law, God, 
Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 3, n. 1 and s. 4.6 above. In particular, he explains more clearly why 
religion is the best of the reflexive goods for integrating one’s whole life.
22 See ibid., 14-15. This is one reason why Grisez rejects Aquinas’ understanding o f the beatific vision as 
our ultimate end.
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But harmony with other people is not at stake in every choice one makes, and 
harmony within oneself is at stake only when one or more appealing options is 
morally unacceptable; so, only the good of religion could be at stake in every 
choice. Therefore, only some prospective realization of that good could provide an 
overarching purpose to unify one’s entire life.23
Grisez clearly points out that the good of religion can be at stake even in choices between
morally good options. Every time we make a choice to pursue any good we are following
God’s guidance for us in the natural law, at least to some extent. Following God’s
guidance in its fullest moral specification is of course to be preferred to following it only
imperfectly by seeking a basic good in an exclusive and non-integral manner.
Consistently following [God’s] guidance is likely to safeguard and promote not 
only harmony with him [which is a self-evident good in itself] but every other 
aspect of one’s well-being and flourishing.24
The good of religion is a good in its own right, and as such it can appeal to us, but it also
is a good that opens out towards all the other goods, without diminishing their own
character as specific goods, but supporting, promoting and defending them. Therefore, in
organising one’s life around the good of religion, one is not necessarily making it the one
23 Ibid. Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2001) 
adds a basic good that he calls “happiness” to his list of goods (133-135), which involves one’s being able 
to integrate one’s life as a whole around a basic commitment or structure. He does not think that religion 
can play this role (see 190-198). However, his arguments to this effect are somewhat theoretical and do not 
advert in sufficient detail to the arguments presented by Grisez (and Finnis). Murphy overlooks the fact that 
Grisez’s position on the suitability o f religion as an overarching good allows for the fact that other reflexive 
goods can also play this role too to an extent, and that religion can be understood and instantiated more or 
less richly and effectively, and that it is only when religion is virtuous that it is considered by Grisez to be 
fully suitable as an overarching commitment for life. Boyle makes a more detailed and convincing 
argument for religion’s superiority than Grisez does here: see s. 7.4.6 and 7.4.7 above.
24 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 14-15. Grisez’s phrasing here is somewhat 
unfortunate: it suggests that one is interested mainly, or even only, in “one’s well-being and flourishing” in 
all the various basic human goods, but it is an important element o f Grisez’s understanding o f the basic 
human goods that they are not goods for the self only, but goods for persons as human. Therefore, it would 
be more accurate to say that consistently following God’s guidance is likely to safeguard and promote not 
only the good of religion for oneself and others, but also the other goods for oneself and others.
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and only good; nor is one reducing any other good to be merely a means for pursuing the 
good of religion.
A further reason why we ought to make religion the organising principle of our whole life 
is that “one depends on [God] for everything and always must hope for his cooperation” 
to ensure success in one’s efforts to pursue and instantiate any good. “Mutuality requires 
that one consistently cooperate with him.”25 The moral life is understood here as a 
cooperative friendship with God, a friendship that is open to a full range of goods that are 
distinct from, yet included in, that friendship.
6.1.6a Personal vocation is part o f the natural law
At this point, Grisez develops a further idea that we have seen is central in his theological
moral theory: personal vocation. Previously, Grisez put forward the idea of personal
vocation from within the context of Christian faith.26 Here, in a mainly philosophical
article, Grisez allows it a place in natural law theory itself, even when unspecified by
faith. He recognises God’s guidance not only in the generally applicable practical and
moral principles of the natural law, but also in (discernment of God’s will in) one’s
unique, individual situation:
But God not only guides all human beings by the principles of practical reason [i.e. 
the natural law]. He also guides each person by his or her unique gifts and situation. 
One’s gifts and situation indicate which morally acceptable options to choose.27
25 Ibid.
26 See ss. 3.5.3, 3.5.5 and 5.1.3d above.
27 Ibid. Note that this philosophical way o f justifying the concept of personal vocation relies on the “natural 
law” extension o f Grisez’s cosmological argument, by which we come to see the Creator as personal and 
provident, and on Grisez’s understanding o f discernment as mandated and required by the natural law itself 
and not exclusively by faith.
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Because God’s will can be known not only in the general natural law, but also in the 
specific personal vocation that God calls each person to live by, each person should be 
open to God speaking through “providential signs” in his or her life’s uniqueness and 
concreteness.28 Discerning one’s personal vocation is important for every person, not 
only Christians, in judging between morally good options, working out which option 
would best suit one’s personality, circumstances, gifts, and responsibilities, so that one 
can do the will of God in each particular situation.
6.1.6b Religion and personal vocation can integrate one’s life as a whole 
Personal vocation does not help only in understanding individual choices in a particular 
way; it essentially consists of seeing one’s whole life as a unified response to God’s call 
through the natural law and the individual features of one’s life, (and, ideally, through 
Christian faith too). This is why personal vocation is connected to the good of religion, 
which we have seen Grisez emphasise as the basic good most suitable for organising 
one’s whole life as a unified whole:
A person’s life would be in integrated whole if he or she consistently acted in
accord with all the guidance God provides. Harmony with God would be the single
28 See Christian Moral Principles, 559-567, where Grisez explains what he means by “personal vocation” 
and places it in the context o f the natural law and the Church’s authority. Clearly, he expects any morally 
good Christian to discern his or her personal vocation in a way that never violates the truths of the natural 
law or any Church teaching, and he states explicitly that all Christians should follow the same moral 
standards and conform their consciences to the Church’s teachings. Grisez is not putting forward a moral 
theory or religious philosophy that privileges private revelation or bases itself on any kind of continuing 
revelation from God. See also Living a Christian Life, 43, 58-60 (in the context o f 55-61), and 113-129 
(especially at 121-125). Grisez has also written (with Russell Shaw) a popular-style book on the subject of 
personal vocation: Personal Vocation: God Calls Everyone by Name (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday 
Visitor, 2003). A useful synthetic treatment of Grisez’s concept o f personal vocation: Nicholas C. Lund- 
Molfese, “The Christian Duty o f Discerning, Accepting, and Faithfully Living a Personal Vocation,” 
American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 165-176.
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ultimate end intended in every choice such a person made. Because God guides 
everyone toward fulfillment in human goods, that ultimate end would lead 
everyone committed to it to authentic self-fulfillment, including good interpersonal 
relationships.29
This understanding of religion as integrating a human life leads Grisez to emphasise the 
fact that people’s willingness to act in accordance with God’s will (his guidance in the 
natural law, our own life’s providential signs, and also divine revelation) leads to a great 
variety of ways of organising our lives. Major commitments play an important role in 
unifying a life, and in helping individuals to discern among morally good options. 
Communities too can make commitments that organise their communal lives. So 
communities can and do organise their lives around an overarching religious 
commitment. The good of religion is not just something for individuals.
6.1.7a Bad religion: rationalizations o f sin, sinful religious structures
When people are only dimly aware of being guided by an unseen power and yet they are
unwilling to cooperate consistently with it, they rationalize to try to overcome guilt
feelings.30 They try to manipulate God, indulging in anthropomorphizing him, thus
making use of him and neglecting to treat him as an objective personal reality in his own
right. This rationalizing
eventually leads to polytheism, human sacrifice, and much else at odds with 
metaphysical truth, sound morality, or both. Wanting to know what to do, people 
practice divination rather than attending to available, God-given guidance. With 
groups of sinful people divided from and conflicting with one another, each group
29 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 17. Note, however, that Grisez moves modifies
this understanding of our natural ultimate end in his 2008 article: see s. 6.3 below.
30 See ibid.
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tends to fashion its own God, elaborate its own religion, and develop its own moral 
code.31
Grisez is very critical of religion and religions here. His moral theory does not present a 
simplistic idea that religion is straightforwardly, self-evidently good, and that all who 
grasp this basic human good are therefore aware clearly and consistently of the entire 
truth about God and his will. No, the good of religion is the object of a primary practical 
principle that helps each of us, and our communities, to search for knowledge of God’s 
will with a view to choosing in accord with it. It is possible that we can go wrong in our 
search for God’s will and in our efforts to live according to what we believe is his will. 
Rationalization of our sin is one of the reasons why our search to know God’s will can go 
wrong. Grisez acknowledges the development of what we might call sinful religious 
structures32 and institutions that embody and promote rationalizations and errors.
6.1.7b Theoretical mistakes can block our practical grasp o f religion 
Grisez also acknowledges the reality of “theoretical mistakes” with regard to the good of 
religion.33 He acknowledges that there are “truths presupposed by a sound religious 
commitment”, presumably including theoretical truths, and that these truths are not 
obvious, self-evident, or easy to discover and understand. One such theoretical mistake is 
monism,34 which holds that all reality is one, human selves being “fragments whose
31 Ibid., 17-18.
32 This term is not used by Grisez here.
33 See ibid. 18. Grisez in this article is clearer here on this point than he was in previous works.
34 This term is not used by Grisez here.
salvation lies in merging back into that [ultimate] One.”35 This way of thinking “has no 
place for harmony with God and precludes authentic religion”, because it does not allow 
for the proper distinction between Creator and creature, or for cooperation between God 
and man. Grisez’s criticism of monism, albeit brief, implies clearly that there might be 
some people who simply cannot grasp the good of religion as he has defined it. They 
cannot grasp its self-evidence because their philosophical worldview prevents them from 
understanding the terms “harmony with”, “God”, “choice” and even “the human person”, 
which are the essential terms of the concept “the good of religion” in Grisez’s moral 
theory. It is not just that monists will not develop deep insight into the good of religion; 
they will not be able even to begin to grasp the practical principle directing us to pursue 
and instantiate the good of religion.
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Grisez also criticizes Aristotle’s philosophy, “key aspects” of which “are equally
disastrous for religion and moral life”.36 According to Grisez, Aristotle’s view
simply has no place for God, the creator and more-than-human guide to human 
fulfillment. Aristotle’s highest God is not utterly mysterious; we can understand it 
well enough to know that we can have no personal relationship with it. It provides 
no guidance; we cannot cooperate with it. The very idea of harmony with it is 
meaningless.37
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. Scott McDonald, “Aquinas’s Ultimate Ends: A Reply to Grisez,” American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 37-49, at 75-80, argues that Grisez’s interpretation o f Aristotle is too harsh in 
some respects, and that Aristotle was more agnostic regarding the divine than Grisez thinks. Marshner, 
“Implausible Diagnosis,” 103, n. 17, also argues briefly that Grisez is too critical of Aristotle. We do not 
enter into matters o f the exegesis of Aristotle here, but simply say that, understood according to Grisez’s 
interpretation, Aristotle’s philosophy can have a detrimental affect on our understanding o f religion and its 
place in the moral life.
37 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 18-19, one note omitted.
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Also, “Aristotle does not recognize freedom of choice.”38 And so his understanding of
virtue, especially moral virtue, is deeply flawed:
Aristotle has no conception of genuine moral virtues: aspects of a person whose 
feelings, spontaneous mental functions, thoughts, and skills are integrated with a set 
of freely chosen and faithfully fulfilled upright commitments that organize his or 
her life.39
Grisez’s understanding of moral virtue emphasises the place that free choices and 
commitments have in shaping the character of the chooser and integrating the various 
elements of the person around the goodness of these free choices. Aristotle reduces virtue 
to the orders of already given nature and technical/creative excellence, neglecting the 
specifically moral order of free choices and commitments. Aristotle also sees human 
goods as “commensurable and ordered hierarchically”, and so “one’s priorities [are] 
determined by nature, nurture, and good fortune”.40 Grisez’s makes theses criticisms to 
show how Aristotle’s philosophy has no place for the good of religion. This makes it 
clear that Grisez’s understanding of religion emphasises those things that Aristotle’s view 
denies or overlooks: the importance of free choice and commitment, the true nature of 
moral virtue, the personal quality of God, God’s choosing to create freely, God’s choice 
to give us moral guidance, our ability to cooperate with God, the value of this 
cooperation.
38 Ibid., 19, note omitted. Emphasis in original.
39 Ibid., 20, (emphasis added), with reference to Christian Moral Principles, 50-59, and “Practical 
Principles,” 129-130, for a more detailed account of Grisez’s understanding o f  moral virtue.
40 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 19.
Once again, as with monism, it seems that a person or persons holding beliefs like those 
of Aristotle will be unable to grasp the good of religion. So, although Grisez is clear that 
our grasp of the good of religion is not derived from any prior theoretical knowledge, but 
is properly basic and practical, he is also clear that certain theoretical beliefs can block 
our grasp of the good of religion. We have already seen that certain kinds of experience 
are presupposed before one can grasp the good of religion, experiences such as wonder at 
the existence of things, sorrow at one’s moral failures, frustration at one’s inability to 
achieve what one hopes to achieve, sadness at one’s own and others’ mortality, and so on. 
To these we can now add that correct theoretical beliefs are presupposed before one can 
grasp the good of religion, correct beliefs about free choice, God, reality, the human 
person. Not having correct beliefs about such things, or even having very flawed beliefs 
about them, can disable one not only from developing an effective understanding of how 
to instantiate the good of religion, but even from grasping the good of religion dimly in 
the first place.41
6.1.8 The biblical worldview and the good o f religion
The fourth and final section of this article begins by outlining the biblical story and 
noting how it supports and develops “what can be known by rational inquiry about God
41 Patrick Lee, “Comment on John Finnis’s ‘Foundations o f Practical Reason Revisited,” American Journal 
o f Jurisprudence 50 (2005): 138, makes two interesting points concerning this aspect o f the Grisez-Finnis- 
Boyle natural law theory: “Firstly, although materialistic-naturalism is a defeater of many of our moral 
theses, nevertheless, epistemologically, one is not required to disprove all o f  the defeaters of a proposition 
before one is epistemically entitled to believe or affirm it. And, secondly, the knowledge that materialistic- 
naturalism is false is, in some way, implicit in, or perhaps implied by, the practical and moral principles 
themselves at the basis o f our moral knowledge.” Therefore, one does not have to be a good philosopher to 
grasp the primary practical principles of the natural law.
and humankind”.42 Looking first at the Old Testament, Grisez says: “[Its] worldview 
makes clear both the primacy of harmony with God and the intrinsic and irreducible 
goodness of other basic human goods.”43 Here, Grisez seems to be emphasizing both that 
religion is first in importance in a way, but also one of a set of incommensurable basic 
human goods. But how can religion be both first and yet not commensurable with other 
basic goods? The resolution to the apparent conflict is that religion has priority only in a 
certain sense: as an architectonic good for organising all of life as a unified whole that is 
lived in pursuit of the good in all its various, irreducible forms, which is simultaneously a 
life lived according to God’s will expressed in the natural law, one’s discernment of 
one’s personal vocation, and divine revelation. The good of religion has priority in this 
specific role, but its priority does not mean that every action must be done primarily for 
the good of religion itself and not for any other good. It is possible, and preferable, to 
pursue the good of religion along with other goods, and to pursue other goods along with 
religion. Loving God first is not incompatible with loving all the human goods in all 
people, or, in other words, with willing integral human fulfillment.
Looking at the New Testament, Grisez sees Jesus further developing the religious, 
covenantal worldview of the Old. “Harmony with God and neighbor are to be instantiated 
by fulfilling the new covenant’s primary stipulation: to love God with one’s whole heart, 
soul, and strength, and to love one’s neighbor as oneself.”44 What the good of religion
250
42 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 20.
43 Ibid., 21.
44 Ibid., with a footnote giving some biblical references and brief commentary.
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means for Christians is summarised by this statement: “The specifically Christian 
overarching religious commitment is the act of faith in Jesus and his teaching.”45 One 
who makes this act of faith, which is both a divine gift and a free human act, accepts the 
specifically Christian understanding of perfect love, and understands that we are called to 
live our faith commitment by abiding in God’s love, which is a pure gift of grace that can 
shape all human choices that intend the kingdom of God in hope.46 Again, loving God 
and loving one’s neighbour are not seen as being incompatible with each other, but as 
two sides of the one coin, so to speak.
6.1.9a Seeking the kingdom o f God first
Grisez is critical of the place of (philosophically understood) virtue in the context of the 
covenantal worldview of the Bible. According to him, the cardinal virtues are hardly 
mentioned in the Old Testament, for example. While the “errors and manipulative 
practices of religions corrupted by self-deception are strictly excluded” from the 
covenant, it calls on God’s people not to develop what was understood by philosophers as 
virtue, but to have “contrite and obedient hearts”, depending on God’s help and our 
religious fidelity and not on our perfecting our natural capacities.47 In the new covenant,
45 Ibid., n. 35.
46 See ibid., 21. Once more Grisez deals with the theological specification o f religion in the final section of 
an article that is primarily philosophical in approach, thus emphasising in the structure o f his writing the 
idea that faith specifies the natural law: compare ss. 4.7, and 4.9.2 above to the present article being 
analysed here.
47 See ibid., 21. However, in the final page of the article (36), Grisez says: “O f course, having and 
exercising the virtues is important in Christian life. But for Christian ethics, theoretical reflection on the 
virtues is far less helpful than practical reflection about how sinners, cooperating with grace, can find 
God’s plan for their lives, accept that plan, live according to it, and thus become the unique saints God 
wishes them to be.” Grisez sees “personal vocation” as far more central and practical than “virtue” in the 
Christian life. Personal vocation can be understood, in my opinion, as a specification o f the good o f religion 
in both its narrower and wider meanings simultaneously (as a specific good and as an architectonic good).
252
we are called to love and to live by the Holy Spirit’s gifts, taking up our crosses and 
following Jesus, accepting our vocations and faithfully fulfilling them.48 Grisez seems to 
put religion at the centre of living a truly good life, especially when our understanding of 
the good of religion, that is, harmony with God, is specified by a Christian understanding 
of grace. Grisez understands the Christian life to be one in which a faith perspective 
pervades one’s dispositions, deliberations, choices, commitments, relationships, and 
actions. He certainly is not putting forward a view in which a philosophical system of 
morality, a pure natural law theory, so to speak, is sufficient or appropriate for the 
Christian.49
In attacking virtue ethics, perhaps Grisez wishes to emphasise the pure gratuity and 
supernatural nature of God’s gift to us of divine love and the beatific vision and the 
essentially religious nature of our response to God’s invitation to live in the covenant. 
What is to come first in the Christian life is not seeking to develop virtue, especially if 
virtue is understood as some kind of human skill or aptitude, or to develop our 
philosophical understanding of goodness and human nature as such: what comes first is 
to seek the kingdom of God.50
48 See ibid., 22. This summarises what is in the original already a very concise summary of Grisez’s 
theological moral theory, so inevitably much of its richness is missing. In the footnotes to the pages being 
analysed here, Grisez outlines what he developed in much greater detail in the first four chapters of Living 
a Christian Life, and in the theological chapters of Christian Moral Principles.
49 See especially “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 22, n. 36, where Grisez cites with 
approval St Paul’s dismissal o f the Stoic philosophers’ wisdom and his recommendation that Christians 
depend on “God’s grace and Jesus’ redemptive death and resurrection”.
50 See ibid., 22., especially n. 37. Marshner, “Implausible Diagnosis,” 105, makes the point that Grisez is 
too harsh here on virtue and its place in how we understand the moral life generally and the Christian life in 
particular. Marshner points out that Aquinas inherited his understanding o f virtues not only from Aristotle, 
as Grisez seems to think, but also from the Church Fathers. Also, it is not to be expected that truly Catholic
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6.1.9b The kingdom o f God includes the beatific vision but goes beyond it 
At the same time, Grisez wants to criticise any reduction of the kingdom of God to the 
beatific vision. He completely rejects the idea that the ultimate end of human life is the 
beatific vision as a complete fulfillment of our human nature and its desires for 
happiness. Certainly, the happiness of heaven includes seeing God as he is. We will 
share, by God’s gift, in his divine nature, and so will be able to see him as he really is, 
because we will be like him.51 Grisez wants to distance his position from the position that 
holds that we are naturally oriented towards the beatific vision and that our only true 
happiness lies in this natural desire and potential being fulfilled by our human act of 
seeing God in heaven (even if such an act needs God’s supernatural help in order to come 
about).52 This is the position held by Augustine and Aquinas. Grisez holds, by contrast, 
the position that the
enjoyment of divine goodness naturally pertains to divine persons as divine. ... 
human persons can enjoy divine goodness only by sharing in the divine nature and 
the intimate life proper to that nature; and that sharing cannot be a human act 
fulfilling a person as human.53
How can we as humans be interested in the beatific vision, if it is not a fulfillment of our 
human nature? Grisez refers here to the Incarnation, which makes possible grace’s
theology will be narrowly scriptural, eschewing any Hellenistic influences for example. It is possible and 
beneficial to use our philosophical knowledge o f natural things such as virtues to illuminate our knowledge 
of grace and its workings, as Aquinas did. Marshner seems to have a point. It should be admitted that 
Grisez is attacking a very narrow version o f virtue ethics, perhaps even a caricature o f it.
51 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 22, n. 37, where Grisez makes reference to 1 
Jn 3:2 and 1 Cor 13: 11-12 and some commentaries on them. Grisez also cites 2 Pt 1:4 and Jn 1: 12 and 3: 
3-8.
52 See ibid., 25, n. 46.
53 Ibid, 25.
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building upon nature.54 We can share, by God’s grace, a human relationship with Jesus,
and this relationship fulfills us as human beings. Jesus offers us through our relationship
with him an intimate relationship with the Father, a relationship that includes not only
total human fulfillment, but also our sharing in the divine nature, by our becoming
children of God in Christ. We can enjoy, through union with Jesus, “the intimacy he
enjoys with the Father and the Holy Spirit”, and
[tjhough that gift itself cannot fulfill human nature, human persons committed to 
cooperating with God in all things have good reason to accept it, since they not 
only receive the offer from Jesus, their human Lord, but can recognize it as a gift 
God wishes them to accept.55
The good of religion lies at the heart of a Christian life committed to seeking the kingdom 
above all other things. Those who organise their lives around the good of religion are 
committed to cooperating with God in all things, and therefore they have a good reason to 
accept Jesus’ teaching and covenant, which includes the offer of sharing in the divine 
nature that union with Jesus makes possible. In other words, people who are committed to 
the good of religion as the overall organising principle of their lives, and who allow this 
principle to be specified by the gospel and hope for the kingdom, will be humanly friends 
with Jesus and will be interested in the beatific vision that Jesus as God-made-Man can 
share with us in the kingdom. Not only will such people be interested in the beatific 
vision, but they will be able to share in it by their sharing in God’s nature through grace.
54 See ibid., 26. When Jesus’ disciples saw him, (Grisez refers here to Jn 14: 9-10), they saw the Father, but 
this vision was not the beatific vision, but human vision of the Word of God made man.
55 Ibid., emphasis added.
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It is important to notice that Grisez’ understanding of the kingdom’s benefits includes 
both the beatific vision and rich, multi-faceted human fulfillment, which will fulfill our 
supernatural divine and natural human natures respectively.56 Part of this integral human 
fulfillment will be fulfillment in the good of religion, in other words, harmony with God 
instantiated through human action. We as humans can be interested in, and hope for, this 
rich human fulfillment, that begins in this life and will be ours perfectly in the kingdom. 
Hoping for this human fulfillment in the kingdom includes hoping for the fulfillment of 
our human relationship with Jesus, the Incarnate Lord. This fulfillment is our fulfillment 
in the good of religion specified by the gospel. And this brings with it a further, special 
divine gift, transcending our human potential and fulfillment, which is divine fulfillment, 
our sharing in the beatific vision. So, it is possible for us to be humanly interested in 
sharing in the beatific vision, even though it is not possible for us to share humanly in it, 
or for us to comprehend humanly what that vision will be.
6.1.9c The good o f religion mediates the divine good o f the beatific vision 
Grisez sees our divine and human fulfillments as distinct but not separate. Our hope for 
human fulfillment can include interest in and hope for divine fulfillment given as pure 
gift to us in Jesus. At the same time, the beatific vision indirectly though really, fulfills us 
as human:
In sum, though the beatific vision cannot per se fulfill the blessed as human, they 
are so [i.e. as humans] fulfilled by their friendship with God, and that friendship, 
perfected by their union with Jesus, involves all the gifts God gives through Jesus.
56 Grisez mentions, for example, that scripture presents a picture of heaven as including not only vision of 
God as he is, but also, more often, as involving our bodily resurrection and living in a perfect community 
with the saints: see, ibid., 23.
Among them are the blessed’s share in God’s very nature and their joy as his 
children in seeing him as he is.57
Grisez here distinguishes between “friendship with God” as a human good (the good of 
religion specified by the gospel, and so union with Jesus as human) and our “share in 
God’s very nature and ... seeing him as he is”, which is divine good. The human good 
“involves all the gifts God gives through Jesus”; in other words, the human good involves 
the divine good, not as a part of the human good, which is impossible, but as a divine gift 
mediated by the human good. Insofar as one shares in the divine good, one does so only 
because one shares in the human good, which is the human good of religion specified by 
union with Jesus, and the rich fulfillment in all the human goods that goes along with 
fulfillment in the human good of religion specified by union with Jesus.
This is why one can, as human, hope for divine fulfillment in the beatific vision, and act
for it. One’s hope is directly for human fulfillment in the kingdom, which includes human
fulfillment in a cooperative friendship with Jesus as Incarnate Lord:
The kingdom can be one’s overarching reason for choices because, as Jesus 
described it, the kingdom clearly includes human fulfillment: harmony with God 
unmarred by even the slightest sin, resurrection life, intimate friendship with Jesus, 
and the joy of living together in a perfect human community.58
However, one’s hope is /«directly for the beatific vision insofar as it is promised by Jesus 
as a gift given to his friends, a gift that is part of the kingdom’s benefit, though one that
256
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 27, emphasis in original.
257
transcends our human potential. One’s direct choices for the kingdom are indirect choices 
for the beatific vision, so to speak.
We can see from what Grisez says that the term “kingdom” can be used as another way to 
speak of the good of religion specified by the gospel: making all one’s choices for the 
sake of the kingdom ought to be one’s overarching commitment unifying one’s life as a 
Christian. One can do this because the kingdom is not a single good, but encompasses 
both divine good and human goods. Therefore, one can make choices in every 
department of life, so to speak, with a view to the kingdom, because the kingdom will 
include rich fulfillment in “all the good fruits of our nature and effort”,59 and so every 
department of human life can be relevant to our seeking the kingdom.
6.1.9d Disagreement with Aquinas on man’s ultimate end
The final pages of this article outline Grisez’s disagreement with Aquinas on the issue of 
the ultimate end of man.60 Aquinas attempted to synthesise the insights of Aristotle and 
Augustine. In doing so, Aquinas held that the human person has and can have only one 
ultimate end, which is the beatific vision. This means that Aquinas reduces man’s 
ultimate end to “an instantiation after death of one substantive good, namely, the human
59 This is a phrase from the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes, 39, which is often quoted by Grisez and 
forms one of the most important sources for his approach. See, for example, “Natural Law, God, Religion 
and Human Fulfillment,” 34, n. 64.
60 See ibid., 27-37. Grisez revisits a set o f questions he analysed earlier in “Man, Ultimate End o f ’: see s. 
2.2 above. Grisez mentions his earlier article in “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 32, 
n. 65, making the new point that he now thinks that “the controversies generated by Aquinas’ views on 
human persons’ natural and supernatural ends” are due to logical inconsistency in Aquinas’ “attempts to 
express these views”, and not merely to their “complexity and incompleteness”, as he had assumed in his 
earlier article.
good of knowledge.”61 This has the effect of downgrading “most of the specifically 
human goods for which Christians hope.”62 Because Aquinas sees the ultimate end of 
human life as embodied in the human intellect knowing God (albeit only with God’s 
supernatural aid), he has no coherent place in his Christian ethics for the other human 
goods. What necessary place is there in salvation for the resurrection of the body and the 
communion of saints, to mention two examples that are clearly established in scripture 
and Church teaching as integral to the gospel, (and which even Aquinas himself 
recognizes),64 if one’s soul’s contemplation of God is sufficient to satisfy all one’s 
desires, fulfill all one’s human potential, and thus be the ultimate end of one’s whole life? 
None, it seems. Thus, Aquinas’ Christian ethics is incoherent and insufficient.
A further criticism, arising from this, is that Aquinas’ position about there being only one 
ultimate end for all human willing, and that that end is an intellectual, single, substantive 
good, doesn’t allow one’s whole life to be integrated around one’s act of faith in Jesus, as 
a specification of the reflexive good of religion.65 If Aquinas’ view is correct, then it 
seems that only intellectual fulfillment, and individual intellectual fulfillment at that, is 
really important, and all other goods are merely means to this end. However, much of 
human life is not directly relevant to this end. Also, many if not most human choices, 
which are made for ultimate ends, are made for diverse goods, the basic human goods,
61 Ibid., 34.
62 Ibid., with a note referring to Vatican II’s teaching in Gaudium et Spes, 39, about the nature of the 
kingdom.
63 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 27, n. 52.
64 See ibid., 35, n.71.
65 See ibid., 34-37, but also 30-33.
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which are understood to be intrinsically good, and not mere means to another good. 
Grisez argues against Aquinas’ position by pointing out that sometimes people do have, 
and therefore can have, more than one ultimate end in view when they make choices.
Grisez’s position on the ultimate end is that there is not one ultimate end that fulfills the 
human person completely, such that all his desires are satisfied and all his potential 
reached.
On my view, human persons as human do have a natural ‘desire’ for rich 
fulfillment ... [As explained in the first part of the article], their capacities are 
naturally inclined toward the basic human goods -  friendship with God, knowledge 
of truth and aesthetic experience, and so on. But no single instantiation of any of 
these goods -  not even friendship with God -  can utterly fulfill anyone.66
Human fulfillment is not to be understood as a definite state of affairs in which people’s 
desires and potential are finally and completely fulfilled or ended. Rather, “the richest 
possible fulfillment for a human being is not something definite; it is openended and 
indeterminate.”67
6.1.10 The role o f the good o f religion in Christian life
The basic good of religion, specified by Christian faith,68 can form an organising 
principle of one’s whole life, thus providing one with a kind o f  ultimate end for all one’s
66 Ibid., 28. Note that Grisez refers to the good o f religion as “friendship with God”, thus assuming that the 
good is pursued in a morally specified way (i.e. integrally), and not as an isolated or fragmentary primary 
practical principle.
67 Ibid., 29.
68 See ibid., 34, n. 69, where Grisez makes the point that the commitment o f Christian faith does not 
“displace” the commitment “to act in accordance with all the guidance God provides in order to maintain 
and promote harmony with him in an ongoing cooperative relationship.” Rather, the commitment of faith 
“subsumes” the commitment specified by the good o f religion “by further specifying it”.
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choices and commitments.69 It does this not by replacing all the other ultimate ends, 
specified by the whole range of basic human goods, but by including them as distinct and 
irreducible goods in their own right, precisely as goods that God wills and that one wills 
in harmony with God, thus instantiating religion. Therefore, although one can have a 
single ultimate end for one’s whole life, the good of harmony with God, this is not an 
exclusive ultimate end for one’s life, but an architectonic ultimate end/good that includes, 
promotes, protects, and respects all the other ends/goods, which form ultimate ends in 
their own right.70 As well as this, the good of religion can mediate one’s sharing in the 
divine nature, which in its turn enables one to share the beatific vision (which is itself a 
kind of indirect ultimate end, capable to some extent of motivating human interest and 
good actions).
Another criticism of Aquinas that Grisez makes is that his Christian ethics does not deal 
adequately, if at all, with the issue of one’s deliberately organising one’s whole life as an 
integrated whole in which all one’s choices implement one’s commitment of faith.71
69 It is worth remembering in this regard how Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, dealt with the notion o f ultimate 
ends under three headings in “Practical Principles,” 131-136: “Ends ultimate in three diverse ways” . The 
three types of ultimate human end treated there were: integral human fulfillment (an ultimate end rectifying 
the will); the basic goods (ultimate reasons for acting); and, an integrated life organised by an overarching 
commitment (in pursuit o f the ultimate end o f the happiness for which people settle).
70 J.L.A. Garcia, “Topics in the New Natural Law Theory,” American Journal o f Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 
51-73, at 72, makes the suggestion that it is better to see the good of religion, which he defines as total 
devotion to God (which loves all the goods fully), as suffusing one’s whole life, and thus giving it a unity 
and richness, rather than using the term integrating one’s whole life. The term suffusion gets across the idea 
that devotion to God thus becomes internal to one’s pursuit and instantiation of all the various goods for all 
the various persons in one’s life, whereas the term integration might be too extrinsic. It is not clear that 
Garcia is correct in assuming an extrinsic understanding of “integration” in Grisez’s theory; the good of 
religion is seen by Grisez to permeate and shape all one’s pursuit of the goods from  within. This is 
particularly the case when the good o f religion is perfected by charity, by which one’s own will is united in 
a special way with God’s will.
71 See “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 35-36.
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Christian life, as an architectonic basic human good, specified by faith and the gospel,
that provides one with a practical principle to organise and integrate and motivate all
one’s good actions, in every department of life, without reducing all goods to religion or
intellect or contemplation, or even the beatific vision, and which thus enables one to live
a truly human life, open to all the gifts that God offers and makes possible.72 The key to
living a good Christian life, according to Grisez, is not found in a purely natural law
morality, nor in a virtue ethics that makes developing human abilities or attitudes
paramount. Rather, the key to living a good life as a Christian is to develop, with God’s
grace, our friendship with Jesus: “to know Jesus well, to undertake to follow him, and to
organize one’s entire life as cooperation with him and thereby with God.”73 Grisez
emphasises that this friendship with Jesus is a human friendship. It involves us
becoming acquainted with Jesus by knowing his friends and hearing/or reading his 
story (the Bible, particularly the New Testament, and especially the Gospels). For 
those who cooperate with Jesus, that acquaintance, once begun, grows into a human 
friendship with him. That cooperation takes many forms: seeking and enjoying 
Jesus’ help in overcoming all deliberate sin, participating in his actions in the 
liturgy, and playing one’s part in the Church’s apostolate, which continues to carry 
on his mission. One’s part in the apostolate is not limited to specifically religious 
practices. Secular activities -  that is, all those done to instantiate basic human 
goods other than religion -  must be integrated with living faith and hope. That 
integration is not brought about by one’s commitment to the true ultimate end. It 
depends on discerning, accepting, and faithfully fulfilling one’s personal vocation, 
while shaping all of one’s activities by conscious and active participation in the 
sacraments.74
Aquinas does not recognize the proper place and importance of the good of religion in the
72 It is not surprising therefore that Patrick Lee in his essay responding to Grisez’s article in the same issue 
of American Journal o f  Jurisprudence characterises Grisez’s approach as a “Christian Humanism”: see 
“Germain Grisez’s Christian Humanism,” 137-151.
73 “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 35.
74 Ibid., 35, n. 72. Immediately following this passage is a reference to Christian Moral Principles, 459- 
830, which forms a substantial part of that book, whose central theological moral theory is summarised in 
the passage quoted here. Grisez’s use here o f the phrase “the true ultimate end” is pejorative, referring to its 
use in the theory o f Aquinas he is criticising, which held that there was one true ultimate end, which was a
This short, densely written and biblically rich piece reiterates, clarifies and develops
some of the topics seen in the previous article. Grisez presents hope for the kingdom of
God (which Grisez mostly refers to simply as “the kingdom”) as the overarching
principle of all one’s choices and commitments. According to Grisez’s theological ethical
theory, hope for the kingdom specifies (in light of faith) the good of religion as the
architectonic principle of one’s life as a whole. An adequate and accurate theological
understanding of God and the kingdom allows us to
intend the kingdom as the ultimate purpose for whose sake one chooses whatever 
one chooses, and thus seek it first and in seeking everything else.76
Inadequate or inaccurate understanding makes this more difficult, or even prevents it.
6.2.1 How we come to know about God and religion
Once again, Grisez writes about a central feature of his development of his cosmological 
argument since Christian Moral Principles', how the natural law itself points to the 
existence of God.77
Knowing the first principles of practical reasoning ... people are aware of being 
directed toward what is good for them and their communities, and so are aware of a 
quasi-intelligent director. Aware too that their own efforts never suffice to realize
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6.2 “The Doctrine of God and the Ultimate Meaning o f Life” [2006]75
human act of contemplating God in himself, thus completely satisfying our natural desire to know and love 
God and our natural potential to do this, and, indeed, all our potential.
75 “The Doctrine o f God and the Ultimate Meaning o f  Life” in The Doctrine o f  God and Theological 
Ethics, ed. A. J. Torrance and M. Banner (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 125-37. This piece is not written 
in a way that makes its focus on religion explicit, in that the phrase “the good o f religion” hardly features at 
all. Clearly, however, it is about a theological specification of religion: hope for the kingdom o f God.
16 Ibid., 126.
77 See ibid. Grisez does not use the term “natural law”, but he does refer to the classic biblical reference for 
it: Rom 2.15-16.
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intelligible benefits such as survival and offspring, people pursuing such benefits 
find themselves depending on an unseen, powerful agent. Recognizing their 
dependence, they wish to be on good terms with that agent. God is identified and 
worshipped.78
Our grasp of the good of religion is grounded in our awareness of objective more-than- 
merely-human morality directing us towards our good, and our awareness of our 
inevitable dependency on a more-than-human helper if we are to instantiate the happiness 
we hope for in all our actions.
Grisez acknowledges that “rationalizations of unreasonable choices”79 can prevent us 
from grasping the existence of God, and especially his being the source of the natural law 
and our helper in pursuing and instantiating human fulfillment in its various forms. 
Rationalization can lead to the generation of idols, false religion. But he also thinks that if 
we can avoid this80 we will most reasonably identify the creator with the source of 
practical rationality and the one who makes fulfillment possible -  what Grisez calls the 
“guiding and helping power”.81
78 “Ultimate Meaning of Life,” 126. The first principles o f practical reasoning referred to here are the 
principles directing us to pursue and instantiate the basic human goods.
79 Ibid.
80 Grisez does not explain how in this piece. It could be said, however, that the whole piece is concerned 
with showing what is involved in avoiding idolatry, or any false understanding of God, insofar as it
emphasises the importance o f seeing with the eyes o f faith, in the light of adequate and accurate 
philosophical and theological understandings o f faith’s teachings. Perhaps most important in this regard is 
the acknowledgement o f God’s objective personality along with his utter mysteriousness: God is not to be 
used by us or ‘captured’ in any reductive idol or false image. Grisez also mentions that parsimony is one of 
the principles that would point us towards identifying the source of the natural law with the creator of all 
things: One ought not to multiply entities or causal explanations unnecessarily.
81 Ibid., 127.
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Grisez is at pains once again to emphasise that God is utterly mysterious because he is 
self-existent: “we do not understand what God is, and whatever we do understand must 
be denied of God”.82 We can understand how God is related to us, and how we should 
relate to him, especially in the light of divine revelation, but we cannot understand, either
O '!
by human reflection or divine revelation, what God is in himself.
6.2.2a Criticism o f Aquinas regarding religion’s place in the moral life 
Grisez reiterates and develops points he made in the previous article criticizing Aquinas. 
Aquinas went too far in his philosophical arguments for God’s existence, thinking he 
could apply positive attributes to God, arriving at the idea that God is “an unchanging and 
all-knowing mind to which the human spirit is naturally akin.”84 Aquinas rightly 
accepted scripture’s revelation that the kingdom of God will have as its “foremost 
blessing” seeing God,85 but he went beyond the bible in his development of what this 
means. In Aquinas’ theory, this vision of God is “transformed” into “a theological 
construct according to which supreme human good and fulfillment is in God attained by 
an act o f the human intellect gazing steadily forever at mind’s perfect object: divine 
truth.”86 Because of this, “other aspects of the heavenly kingdom became incidental”,
82 Ibid., 126.
83 See ibid., 126-127.
84 Ibid., 127, emphasis in original. Grisez sees Aquinas as heavily influenced by Aristotle, Augustine and 
neo-Platonism in this regard.
85 Grisez mentions four biblical sources in this regard: Mt 5.8; 1 Cor 13.12; 1 Jn 3.2; Rev 22.4: see 
“Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” 128, n. 10.
86 Ibid., 128, emphasis in original.
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aspects such as the resurrection of the body. This led to a narrow view of the ideal life,
which was seen to require us
to set aside all other goods as much as possible and concentrate on religious 
activity with the goal of nurturing union with God and, as it were, seeing him even 
now.87
Grisez seems to be accusing Aquinas of making religion the only important good, the 
ultimate goal of human life. This leads to a reduction in one’s understanding of morality, 
which is seen to be focused mainly on avoiding mortal sin. This is due to the fact that, 
although we cannot do anything to achieve the beatific vision, we can lose it by mortal 
sin. The kingdom gives ultimate meaning to human lives, in Aquinas’ perspective, by 
giving us a motivation to avoid moral sin and to repent whenever we sin. The avoidance 
of hell, rather than the pursuit of heaven, becomes our strongest motivation to be a good 
person.88 Thus, the good of religion is narrowed and mutilated, losing its full positive 
meaning and significance, and its inherent openness towards the other human goods.
6.2.2b Voluntarism misunderstands the good o f religion
Grisez does not think Aquinas’ view was totally wrong, especially as it acknowledged the 
links between keeping the commandments, abiding in God’s love, and willing the well­
being of others. So, Aquinas’ view in itself did not encourage legalism. But soon after 
Aquinas, the views of William of Ockham and others led to a serious theological
37 Ibid., emphasis added. Grisez is talking here o f religious activity understood narrowly, not inclusively.
88 See ibid. Grisez makes the interesting point that the alternative to heaven, hell, “repels many people more 
intensely than the beatific vision attracts them”. This is probably an accurate point about people in the 
recent past, when Aquinas’ view was held to be true. Many people now are influenced by a view o f the 
kingdom that Grisez looks at later in this chapter, in which everyone goes to heaven and there is no hell to 
worry about or avoid.
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reductionism, by which legalism flourished.89 This voluntarist approach, which thought 
God could be understood to be absolutely free, influenced “[m]any subsequent Catholic 
theologians and pastors” to see in the commandments only a kind of arbitrary test set by 
the all-powerful God to be passed in order to get to heaven and avoid hell.90 Thus, people 
lost sight of any intrinsic link between keeping the commandments and being united with 
God in heaven (and sharing in rich human fulfillment with others). Morality was reduced 
to a narrow “Divine Command Theory”.91 The human goods as motivations for free 
choice were denied or overlooked. The voluntarism of William of Ockham
misunderstands the good of religion and its place in the moral life.
6.2.2c The Reformers misunderstood the good o f religion
Grisez offers a somewhat tentative criticism of the Reformers’ views on the ultimate 
meaning of life.92 Their view of God as absolutely sovereign, (a view that was influenced 
by William of Ockham to some extent), and of man as incapable of freely choosing to do 
good or of our good works as in any way effective towards salvation, meant that the 
Reformers had no place for our “seeking the kingdom in the sense of intending it in every
89 Grisez relies on the work o f Servais Pinckaers with regard to this point: see “Ultimate Meaning of Life,” 
128, n. 16. Grisez had criticised William and nominalism in previous work: see, for example, Christian 
Moral Principles, 12-13. In this part o f the chapter, Grisez goes beyond what he said in his 2001 article,
which focussed on criticising Aquinas and did not go further historically: see s. 6.1 above.
90 See “Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” 128-129.
91 Grisez does not use this phrase in this piece in relation to William o f Ockham or those influenced by him, 
but it seems useful to describe the kind of understanding o f morality that voluntarism and nominalism leads 
to as a narrow Divine Command Theory of morality. This is also a way of describing a narrow view of the 
good of religion, which is the central good at stake in such a moral theory. Religion here is reduced to 
obeying a powerful God, mainly out of fear of being punished, without really understanding why he 
commands what he commands, or how our obedience is for our good and thus manifests God’s glory.
92 This tentativeness is due to his not being totally confident that he knows and understands their theology 
fully.
other good for whose sake one makes a choice”.93 In other words, they too misunderstood 
the good of religion, theologically specified as hope for the kingdom. For the Reformers, 
the kingdom was totally God’s gift, and man’s good works were a kind of witness to God 
and a way of showing gratitude for salvation. However, life was to be organised with 
this-worldly benefits in view. As with the narrow views of Aquinas and especially 
Ockham, any positive, intrinsic connection between our actions here and our life in the 
kingdom tended to be overlooked by the Reformers.
6.2.2d Modern approaches reduce religion to feelings and subjectivity
More recent theologies have developed that offer support to modern ideas of human
rights and morality, thus rendering secularism appealing. These theologies amputate
“parts of the body of Christian faith -  always including hell -  that seem ugly”,94 and
over-emphasise religious feeling and experience. The wooly “faith” that results, which,
strictly speaking, is no faith at all, leaves people supposing “that everyone will enter the
kingdom no matter what anyone does”.95 This view of the kingdom leaves it with no
motivating power for human choice and action; to the contrary, the view that all will be
saved no matter what they do only leads to the relativising of absolute moral norms.
Grace becomes so cheap that discipleship is subsidized: one may affirm oneself, 
evade one’s cross, and follow the crowd in pursuing comfort: ‘Let us eat and drink, 
for tomorrow we die -  and go straight to heaven.’96
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93 Ibid., 129.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
One can ignore one’s own sinfulness and concentrate on taking the moral high ground, 
even invoking God as the source of human rights, in supporting good causes that involve 
no real self-sacrifice.97 Once again, the good of religion is misunderstood: it is cheapened 
and rendered powerless to motivate specific choices and actions or to integrate one’s 
whole life in pursuit of any significant opportunity (significant because it can be lost). 
There is no need to pursue and make efforts to instantiate a good that is inevitably going 
to be handed to you anyway, no matter what you do or choose.
6.2.3 a Grisez’s view o f God and the ultimate meaning o f human life 
Grisez outlines his view, which he considers to be more adequately grounded in scripture, 
more suited to fight against secularism, and better able to motivate a good Christian life, 
compared to the previous inadequate theories. Grisez’s view tries to do justice to both 
God’s all-pervasive causality, especially his grace, and our human free choice, by which 
we can really cooperate with the God on whom we are totally dependent, even for our 
free choices.98 Human choices and actions matter in Grisez’s moral theory; they are 
effective with regard to our being in God’s kingdom. However, our choosing to do good 
Christian actions is not a matter of our bringing about the kingdom, but of our sharing in 
receiving it as God’s gift.99 It is not a matter of either God’s action or our actions being 
effective and necessary; no, in Grisez’s moral theory, our actions are never an alternative 
to God’s actions. God’s essentially mysterious nature allows his primary causality to
97 See ibid.
98 See ibid., 131.
99 See ibid. Grisez is speaking specifically about the choices o f a catechumen to make the act of faith, but 
what he says applies clearly to all Christians and all their choices.
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operate, so to speak, along with our own secondary causality, making it possible, and 
shaping it specifically and fully when it is morally good.100 Our good works are always 
done with God’s guidance and help. Therefore, our intention in making the act of faith 
and in carrying out the implications of being a member of the Church, and thus being in 
the new covenant community with its intrinsic “stipulations”, is that of “hope in God for 
the kingdom”.101
Thus, hope for the kingdom can be the ultimate meaning of our human lives, the 
overarching purpose of all our choices: “Christians implicitly intend the kingdom 
whenever they choose to do the truth of faith in love.”102 Even if one’s theological 
position is inadequate or incomplete with regard to this understanding of the ultimate end 
of human life, if one is living out an authentic Christian faith, then one will inevitably 
intend the kingdom in one’s choices. Still, it is better to do so with a clear understanding, 
which helps one to be stronger in one’s motivation to love and more intense in one’s hope 
in God.103
100 Grisez does not speak in terms of primary and secondary causality in this piece.
101 Ibid. Our hope is not therefore in our own goodness or our own actions or abilities, seen as somehow 
independent o f God.
102 Ibid., 132. In all probability, Grisez here means “at least implicitly” rather than “implicitly”, as it is clear
from what he writes in the following paragraphs that he acknowledges the possibility, and recommends it, 
of explicitly intending the kingdom in all one’s choices.
103 See ibid.
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Should one hope (in a practical way) for seeing God in the kingdom? Grisez denies that
seeing God is the ultimate human fulfillment. It is beyond human capacities and human
nature. However, he does suggest that we should pray and hope for seeing God in the
kingdom.
The ultimate fulfillment of the blessed will be in God himself. But while seeing 
God will be the consummation o f friendship with him, which is a sublime human 
good, seeing God will not be an act of the human intellect, or, indeed, a human act 
of any sort. Instead, it will be unimaginably intimate communion with the divine 
persons, a sharing in their own incomprehensible family life, enjoyed by human 
persons not by any capacity or elevation of their human nature, but by the very 
uncreated divine love, poured forth at baptism by the Holy Spirit into their hearts in 
such a way that it really is their own.104
This passage mentions something new in Grisez’s understanding of the good of religion, 
or at least clarifies what he has said in earlier works. In this passage, Grisez mentions a 
connection between the good of religion and the vision of God shared by the blessed as a 
pure gift in heaven. He describes the vision of God, the beatific vision, as “the 
consummation” of friendship with God, or, in other words, as a consummation of the 
good of religion, (when this human good is morally and theologically specified).105 This 
suggests that the good of religion is in some way, though without denying the sheer 
gratuitousness of the beatific vision or its purely supernatural character, a preparation for 
the beatific vision, which completes it in some satisfying way (i.e. it consummates the 
good of religion). At the same time, this vision of God transcends the good of religion,
6.2.3b The beatific vision as the consummation o f the good o f religion
104 Ibid., 133, one note omitted. The first emphasis (“the consummation o f friendship with him”) is added.
105 Grisez mentions explicitly, indeed, he stresses the fact, that “friendship with him [God]” is “a sublime 
human good”, thus indicating clearly that it is the good of religion that is meant here. Obviously, Grisez 
assumes here that the good of religion, fulfilled in the kingdom, will be virtuous and fully specified by the 
truth about God.
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being a special gift beyond human capacities, whilst not replacing or reducing the good 
of religion.
6.2.3c The Way o f the Lord Jesus
If this interpretation of Grisez’ moral theory is accurate, our choices to pursue and
instantiate the good of harmony with God, specified by moral goodness and religious
truth, are a kind of way towards the ultimate, beyond-human fulfillment of our sharing in
God’s very life and love in heaven. This way is not of our own doing or making, but a
gift of God’s, and we depend on God all along this way, creating, directing and helping
us (and redeeming us too). It is The Way o f the Lord Jesus, which is the title of Grisez’s
four-volume moral theology.106 This way is specified by
the good works that God provides to be the way of life of those who, in being 
justified by his grace through faith, have been recreated in the Lord Jesus.107
What place do the basic human goods have on this way? Grisez writes briefly about 
personal vocation in its penultimate paragraph in a way that suggests part of the answer. 
“Genuine human needs ... are marked out by intelligible human goods”.108 Our good 
works, prepared by God as the way for us to follow Jesus and cooperate in our salvation
106 Grisez does not make this explicit connection in the chapter under discussion, but it seems reasonable to 
see it suggested in the passage we are analysing at this point, and indeed in the final two pages of the 
chapter in full.
107 Ibid., 134, followed by a footnote giving numerous New Testament references about the way o f the Lord 
Jesus. These references do not include Eph 2.10 (“For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for 
good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them”), which Grisez often quotes 
elsewhere, and which his words here echo.
108 “Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” 134.
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needs of others (and ourselves).
Bearing in mind the stipulations of the new covenant and prayerfully discerning, 
not once but repeatedly throughout life, how to use gifts and resources to meet 
genuine needs, each Christian can find the particular life of good deeds to which 
God calls him or her.109
One’s grasp of and understanding of the basic human goods, and indeed all human goods 
insofar as they are intelligible,110 is an important part of one’s grasp of one’s personal 
vocation, which marks out the way of the Lord Jesus in one’s own unique life. Personal 
vocation can be seen as a specification of the good of religion, which includes the pursuit 
and instantiation of all the human goods, insofar as they are willed by God and part of his 
providential and wise plan for us.111 Personal vocation can be seen also as a specification 
of what hoping for the kingdom means for each individual Christian precisely as 
individual and unique (even though still part of an ecclesial body with a shared faith and 
morality).
6.2.3d The richness o f the good o f religion
The kingdom is the ultimate good of life, though a good that includes a range of human 
goods making up integral human fulfillment, as well as a divine good that is our sharing 
in God’s very nature and joy. We can hope directly for the kingdom insofar as it is a 
fulfillment of our human potential; and we can hope indirectly for the kingdom for its
109 Ibid.
110 Grisez’s use o f the term “intelligible human goods” (n. 108 above) suggests that instrumental goods are 
included as well as basic goods.
111 See ss. 3.5.2-3, 5.1,3d, 5.3.5 and 6.1.6b above.
and the salvation of the world by working with and in Jesus, are done to meet the genuine
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divine fulfillment insofar as this divine fulfillment is mediated by our fulfillment in 
human friendship with God (the good of religion). Grisez finishes the chapter by 
outlining three ways that we can hope for the kingdom, intending it as our ultimate good.
First, we should intend “to bear credible witness to the faith” by our good deeds, thus 
occasioning others’ “accepting the grace of faith and entering the kingdom”.112 So, our 
pursuit of the good of religion (specified by hoping for the kingdom), is not a selfish 
concern for our own individual harmony with God, but a concern for the good of 
harmony with God for all others too. A proper pursuit of the good of religion, therefore, 
is expansive and loving, not selfish: it intends a communal kingdom not a private bliss.
Second, for Christians, intending the kingdom includes intending their own participation 
in their salvation:
[F]or though justified by grace through faith, [Christians] cannot become the 
glorified members of the risen Jesus into which God plans to transform them unless 
they accept and do the good works he gives them so as to prepare them as stuff to 
be transformed.113
So, intending the good of religion (specified by hoping for the kingdom) includes our 
intending our acts of love to be cooperative acts in union with the acts of Jesus, thus 
effecting our own salvation through, with, and in Jesus. This means that all our good 
works, not just those that are obviously religious, are religious in their ultimate
112 Ibid, with reference to Mt 5.13-16, Rom 10.8-15, and 1 Pet 2.12.
113 “Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” with reference to Rom 2.6-7; 1 Cor 3.8; and 2 Tim 4.8, as well as the 
Decree on Justification o f the Council o f Trent.
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significance. Our pursuit and instantiation of all the human goods can be and should be 
shaped and motivated by the good of religion.
Third, there is a sacramental aspect to our pursuit of the good of religion (specified by
hoping for the kingdom). All our good deeds are seen to be a part of Jesus’ preparation of
a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to the Father, that Jesus’ disciples join with 
him in offering each time they gather as his Church to do the Lord’s Supper as he 
commanded.114
All Christian life is Eucharistic, in other words, a sacrifice through Jesus and with Jesus 
and in Jesus, offered to the Father. Again, the good of religion is to the fore, particularly 
in the language of sacrifice, which is natural and specific to the good of religion.115 All of 
Christian life is shaped by a perspective that sees life as essentially religious, though in a 
way that includes all the human goods without reducing them to one good, but allowing 
them to be themselves, so to speak. In this way, we can offer up all aspects of our human 
lives to the Father in union with Jesus’ offering of himself and his human life to the 
Father. This includes avoiding sin, of course, especially mortal sin, and it includes 
remembering that all is God’s gift and grace, but it also allows our own choices, 
commitments and actions to have ultimate significance, religious significance as well as 
moral significance.
114 “Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” 134.
115 See above s. 3.5.3.
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6.3 “The True Ultimate End of Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone” 
[2008]116
Grisez’s most recent publication contains a very important development in his moral 
theory, a development in his understanding of religion linked his new understanding of 
man’s ultimate end. Much of the first part of this article concerns exegesis of Aquinas in 
response to some criticisms of an earlier paper by Grisez in 2001 (which was examined 
above at 6.1).117 Arising out of this, Grisez seems to acknowledge more clearly than 
hitherto that one can have a set of goods as one’s ultimate end, and that this set can 
include God and his goodness in some way.118 Grisez continues to argue (against 
Aquinas) that people can have more than one ultimate end in view when they make a 
choice, which is demonstrated in particular by any choice to commit a venial sin.119 
However, Grisez agrees with Aquinas “that there is something that all human beings 
should take as their sole ultimate end”.120 Whereas the sole ultimate end according to 
Aquinas is God alone, Grisez argues that the kingdom of God should be our sole ultimate 
end. The final part of his article outlines what Grisez himself thinks about man’s “sole
116 G. Grisez, “The True Ultimate End o f Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone,” Theological 
Studies Vol. 69, no. 1 (March 2008): 38-61.
117 We do not look at this aspect o f Grisez’s paper here, but simply note a point that is relevant to our direct 
concern. Also, we do not look in any detail at Grisez’s five arguments against Aquinas’s position on the 
beatific vision as man’s true ultimate end, which develop aspects o f Grisez’s arguments in his 2001 paper. 
We take note o f how certain insights from these arguments are taken up in his new position on man’s 
ultimate end.
118 See ibid., 44.
119 See ibid., 44-46.
120 Ibid., 53., emphasis added.
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ultimate end”, first of all by natural reason only, and then in the light of divine
• 191revelation.
6.3.1 The sole ultimate end as naturally known: preliminary aspects 
Grisez understands man’s true ultimate end to be openended and developing, not static 
and finished.122 This ultimate end includes the good of all persons, not just one’s own 
individual good, because we humans are social by nature, we need others, and we need to 
cooperate with others as persons (and not use them as things) if we are to pursue our 
fulfillment. One’s own integral fulfillment is not an exclusively individual good, but a 
good that necessarily includes the good of others as a constitutive aspect of one’s own 
good (even whilst remaining distinctly good for other persons in their own right). In other 
words, one’s own integral fulfillment is necessarily part of the common good of all
123 *persons. The primary practical principles of the natural law direct us “indiscriminately”
121 See ibid., 53-57 and 57-61 respectively.
122 See ibid., 53. Here Grisez rejects Aquinas’s position that one’s ultimate end must be so totally satisfying 
that one cannot desire anything more, or be further fulfilled, once one has the beatific vision, once one has 
attained God, so to speak. Grisez argues, for example, that those who even now enjoy the beatific vision 
(i.e. Mary and the saints) can and do desire more in that they pray for us (see 46-47); he also argues that the 
blessed souls in heaven can be fulfilled further when their bodies are resurrected, and can desire this even 
whilst they enjoy the beatific vision. Thus, the beatific vision, though it is an “end”, does not totally satisfy 
and fulfil persons as human (see 49-53).
123 See ibid., 54. It is interesting that Grisez here makes reference to our being social “by nature”, thus 
showing that his moral theory takes account of what is naturally given. Grisez mentions the example of 
marriage, which requires one to be interested in the good o f another and not just in one’s own good; 
marriage requires husband and wife to be interested in a common good that includes each o f their own 
individual goods as constitutive aspects o f the common good of the marriage. Friendship is similar (see s. 
7.2.1 below). It should be noted that Grisez uses the term “common good” in this article in a way that is 
distinct from its usual use in Catholic Social Doctrine, where it tends to refer to a set o f political conditions 
necessary for people to pursue and participate in their human fulfillment. This political common good is a 
very important instrumental good. In this article, Grisez uses the term to refer to a complex intrinsic good 
that can be shared by all persons as their ultimate end: integral communal fulfillment. For Grisez’s earlier 
thoughts on the term “common good” and its various meanings, see Living a Christian Life, 339-347. 
There, he defines the common good o f the kingdom of God as the fulfillment o f all things in Jesus (343), 
which is a specification in light o f faith of what he now calls “integral communal fulfillment”.
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toward the good of all. In addition, these principles direct us also towards the full range 
of goods.124
6.3.2 God
Once again, Grisez acknowledges that we can know a lot about God by reason: that he is 
the “Creator and provident Lord” who offers us “divine guidance” through “the principles 
of practical reasoning” (i.e. the natural law) and through our “unique gifts and 
opportunities” (i.e. one’s personal vocation). Clearly, the natural law theory that Grisez 
presents does not exclude God or restrict our knowledge of God to faith in revelation.
6.3.3 Religion
When we intend the good of religion, even without divine revelation, “we can intend 
divine goodness in at least two ways.”125 These two ways are: firstly, “to give God his 
due” by praising and thanking him; and secondly, to “cooperat[e] with God” in following 
natural law and one’s personal vocation.126 Here, Grisez presents the good of religion in a 
way that clarifies certain aspects of it. It does not consist only of being morally good 
towards oneself and other people, but includes one’s praising God and acknowledging his 
Lordship. The good of religion includes both worship and a good moral life, both of 
which are good for God, so to speak, contributing towards “divine goodness” insofar as 
we can intend his goodness.
124 See “The True Ultimate End”, 54. The idea that we should pursue the full range o f goods, and not settle 
for any one o f them as ultimate, is a central theme of this article, as it is in all Grisez’s work.
125 Ibid., 55.
126 Ibid.
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Grisez does not mean by this that we can intend the ultimate end of the beatific vision -  
he argues strongly against this here as in his previous works. He means that we can 
intend God’s will for the sake of his own divine fulfillment as our friend, with whom we 
are in harmony, as part of the common good of our friendship that all our actions can 
intend as our true ultimate end.127 Grisez seems to be developing his thought on the 
ultimate end of man by his use of this concept of “common good”. He says: “ ... in 
cooperating with God we will intend a common good that includes whatever divine good 
God intends in providing guidance.”128 Our pursuit of religion involves us willing as God 
wills; what God wills is the ultimate common good of the universe; by willing this 
common good, we cooperate with God in friendship.
6.3.4 A common good for a wide community ofpersons
This common good, which we can and should intend as our ultimate end, can include 
more than human persons. This is a new development of Grisez’s moral theory. Up until 
now, he had always presented “integral human fulfillment” as the moral ideal we wish for 
in our morally good choosing. “Integral human fulfillment” was understood to be 
constituted by a community of human persons sharing richly and harmoniously in all the
127 Grisez is developing an insight that he, along with Boyle and Finnis, presented in 1987 in “Practical 
Principles,” where he explained how one’s human life could be a kind of cooperation with God in which 
one respects God as a person in his own right and wills God’s good along with one’s own good: see 
“Practical Principles,” 143-146, which was examined above in s. 4.5. What Grisez adds in the present work 
is a more developed sense o f our pursuing a common good that includes God’s good as our sole ultimate 
end. Of course, Grisez is not saying that we can literally give God something he lacks; rather, he is 
speaking of our relationship with God using the analogy of friendship, accepting the analogy’s necessity 
and value alongside its inherent limitations: see “Practical Principles,” 144. See also s. 7.2.1 below for 
Finnis’s analysis o f friendship, which (implicitly) supports Grisez’s position.
128 “The True Ultimate End”, 55.
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human goods.129 Now, Grisez states that we can and should intend the good of any and all 
“nonhuman, created persons” (who could include extraterrestrial persons, should they 
exist, and angels, insofar as we can cooperate with them and act for their good).130
Grisez’s conclusion is that
[W]e reasonably take as our ultimate end an inclusive community of human 
persons along with other intelligent creatures and God -  insofar as we know [them] 
and can cooperate with them and/or act for their good.131
Thus, Grisez seems to be moving away from “integral human fulfillment” as a central 
concept in his moral theory, which referred to a community of humans, to the concept of 
a wider, more inclusive community. It could be argued also that Grisez is moving away 
from a term that unwittingly might suggest individual fulfillment to a term and concept 
that emphasises more clearly the communal nature of true fulfillment.
6.3.5 Integral Communal Fulfillment
This new concept and term is “integral communal fulfillment”. It is new, and differs from 
“integral human fulfillment”, not just because it includes a wider range of types of person 
in the community, but also because it can be intended by us in choices. As it was seen 
purely as an ideal, “integral human fulfillment” could not be intended, but only wished 
for, in our choices, which, in order to be morally good, had to be compatible with it.
129 See “Practical Principles,” 129-130.
130 “The True Ultimate End”, 55. Grisez is not clear yet on how “to explain and defend” his view on this, so 
it would seem this development o f  his theory is still in its early stages, and needs further development. A 
key thought o f his seems to be that we humans can share something in common with all persons, insofar as 
we are persons, and that this entails that we should respect all persons as persons.
131 Ibid. This is what the “communal” in “integral communal fulfilment” refers to.
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Now, Grisez recognises that we can intend a sole ultimate end that is not an ideal to the 
extent that “integral human fulfillment” was.132 Whereas before now Grisez thought that 
we could intend only the instantiation of the basic human goods, and not integral human 
fulfilment, now he holds that we can intend an integral common good (though it is one 
that is not instantiated in an exclusively human community).
Although in one respect it is wider in scope than “integral human fulfillment”, in another 
respect integral communal fulfillment is narrower in scope. Integral communal 
fulfillment includes only those persons that we can realistically hope to benefit by our 
actions and “excludes created persons whom we can neither cooperate with nor affect by
• 133 *our actions”. Thus, it is still acknowledged in Grisez’s moral theory that we cannot 
hope to affect all persons by our intended acts.
6.3.6a Integral communal fulfillment versus religion as our ultimate end 
Another important thing about integral communal fulfillment is that in Grisez’s revised 
moral theory it replaces religion as our true ultimate end. Grisez seems to be reversing 
what he had said in his 2001 article, where he said that harmony with God (religion) 
should be our true ultimate end.134 In 2008 he says:
132 It seems true, however, that integral communal fulfillment is still a moral ideal, insofar as it is not 
something that any one o f us can achieve in our choices or commitments, but only something that we can 
hope for, and contribute towards in our actions. In principle, however, “integral communal fulfillment” is 
achievable, unlike “integral human fulfilment”. The former is more realistic than the latter.
133 Ibid., 57, n. 58, a very important footnote as it summarises the new development in Grisez’s moral 
theory. However, neither it nor the main text explain fully how he came to change his thinking or what the 
full implications o f the development are.
134 See “Natural Law”, 17, which Grisez refers to in “The True Ultimate End”, 57, n. 58. Also see ss. 6.1.5 
and 6.1.6a and 6.1.6b above.
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I now propose that human persons and groups can and should take integral 
communal fulfillment... as their concrete ultimate end.135
Integral communal fulfillment includes the good of religion but it includes all the other
basic human goods too. Here is how Grisez specifies the good involved in integral
communal fulfillment:
[This fulfilment includes] divine good together with the well-being and flourishing 
of created persons in respect to all their fundamental goods.136
The term “fundamental goods” does not here fully replace the term “human goods”, but it 
is a wider term: it includes the goods of non-human persons. At other points in the article, 
Grisez speaks of the fundamental goods o f humans as human goods.137 Why does Grisez 
continue to speak of the goods we can intend as human goods, if they include the goods 
of nonhumans? He does not address this question directly but it seems that insofar as we 
can intend these goods (of God and other nonhuman created persons) as part of our 
common good, they can be spoken of as human goods (when seen from our human 
perspective). They are goods that can interest us as humans, they are benefits for which 
we can hope as humans, they can be aspects of our happiness as humans -  whilst still 
remaining goods for God and nonhuman persons in their own right and as members of 
the ultimate community sharing in the ultimate common good. Grisez now clearly states 
that we can intend as a concrete end (i.e. not as an ideal rectifying the will, as in “integral 
human fulfillment”) to affect positively, and avoid affecting negatively, integral
135 “The True Ultimate End”, 57, n. 58. (The ellipsis takes the place of the term in capitals.)
136 Ibid., 57. The term “divine good” here refers to God’s fulfillment or flourishing as our Creator and 
friend. Grisez is speaking using analogy: see n. 127 above.
137 See the first complete sentence on page 59, for example, where Grisez speaks o f “fundamental human 
goods”.
communal fulfillment. For each one of us, this, rather than the good of religion, is to be 
the focus of our life as a whole. It ought to be the ultimate end intended in every choice 
we make.
6.3.6b Why the change in Grisez’s theory?
Why has Grisez moved away from seeing religion as our ultimate end? He does not fully 
address this question but we can work out an answer based on what little he does say. It is 
clear that Grisez wishes to avoid any impression that our true ultimate end is found in any 
one good. Much of this article is spent arguing against the reductive view of Aquinas 
(and some of his modern interpreters) that our true ultimate end is to be found in the 
fulfillment of our intellects, by our seeing God in the beatific vision. Grisez insists that 
the full range of basic human goods is constitutive of our human fulfillment, and this full 
range includes both our bodily reality and social harmony (which will be fulfilled in 
heaven in the resurrection of our bodies and the communion of saints, respectively). It 
could be that Grisez had second thoughts about presenting religion as the true ultimate 
end because he thought that such a view lends itself too easily to the mistaken idea that 
our true ultimate end is to be found exclusively or primarily in only one basic human 
good. It seems that Grisez is thinking here of the narrow, specific meaning of “religion” 
as a particular basic human good, distinct and separate from the other basic human goods. 
Understood narrowly, the good of religion cannot be an adequate true ultimate end of all 
our choices and of our lives as wholes.
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Perhaps Grisez is forgetting here about the wider meaning of “religion”, namely, as an 
architectonic or overarching good that can form the integrating focus of one’s whole life 
as cooperation with God in the pursuit of all the goods for all persons.138 This wider 
meaning of “religion” was developed by Grisez in his work beginning with “Practical 
Principles” (1987), but it seems that now (in 2008) he wishes to move away from it, at 
least to some extent, and argue that something else is our true concrete ultimate end: 
integral communal fulfillment.
6.3.6c How different is Grisez’s theory now?
However, arguably Grisez’s new understanding of our ultimate end (integral communal 
fulfillment) is not completely different from the wider concept of religion (as an 
architectonic good, inclusive and supportive of all the other goods). That the two 
concepts are similar is supported both by the argument offered by Grisez in this article 
leading up to his introduction of the concept and by important remarks made by him at 
the very end of it.
Firstly, we look at the argument offered by Grisez that leads to his introduction of the 
concept of integral communal fulfillment as a concrete end that we can intend in choices. 
He focuses in particular on the fact that people can make choices to contribute to the 
common good (of a family, or of a larger group, and even of the whole human race). We 
can do so by making choices to make a limited but real contribution to a particular aspect
283
138 There would be no difficulty in including a concern for the good o f non-human persons in one’s 
cooperation with God, seeing as God is the Creator o f these persons and he loves them.
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of that particular common good.139 We are able to make each of our choices intending
either the specific limited end of that particular choice “or something ulterior to it as [our]
ultimate end”.140 The most inclusive and extensive ulterior motive we can have, which
Grisez presents therefore as our true ultimate end, is integral communal fulfillment. This
leads to an overall moral principle that, it would seem, is to replace the first principle of
morality as previously found in Grisez’s writings since Christian Moral Principles.141
This new first principle of morality could be formulated as follows:
Persons and groups making choices can and should always play their part in the 
vast community of persons by making their contribution to integral communal well­
being and flourishing, and they always can and should avoid intentionally impeding 
or detracting from integral communal fulfillment.142
In other words, all morally good choices are morally good insofar as they make a 
contribution to integral communal fulfillment and avoid intentionally impeding or 
detracting from it.
Grisez has arrived at the concept of integral communal fulfillment by noticing that people 
can intend both in a narrow way and, simultaneously, and either implicitly or explicitly, 
in a wider way. The narrower intention is for the instantiation of the specific basic human
139 See ibid., 56-57. Again, it is important to note that the “common good” referred to here is not the 
instrumental good of a set o f political conditions, which is what the phrase usually refers to in Catholic 
Social Doctrine. Here, the phrase “common good” is used in a wider sense to refer to intrinsic fulfillment or 
fulfilments shared by persons in community (of various sorts).
140 Ibid., 57.
141 Grisez does not discuss the first principle of morality in this article, but it seems fair to say that it is 
going to have to be formulated differently now that integral communal fulfillment has replaced integral 
human fulfillment in Grisez’s moral theory.
142 Ibid., 57, (first three words of the original are omitted: “In other w ords...”). It is this sentence to which 
the important footnote explaining the concept o f integral communal fulfillment, footnote 58, is attached. 
Grisez does not present this sentence explicitly as a new formulation of “the first principle of morality”.
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good that forms the object of that particular choice; the wider intention is the intention of 
an ulterior motive. At its most inclusive and extensive, our ulterior motive in all our 
choices can be integral communal fulfillment, which can thus be our ultimate end. This 
seems to be very similar to what Grisez said in previous writings about how we can 
intend to pursue the instantiation of a specific basic (non-religious) human good in any 
choice whilst simultaneously intending the good of religion as an architectonic good in 
that choice, inclusive of and motivating the specific (non-religious) good. An 
architectonic motive/good is much the same things as an ulterior motive/good. Further, 
religion has an “ultimate” character in that it is constituted by harmony with God, who is 
ultimate. It could be argued therefore that the wider meaning of “religion” is not totally 
dissimilar to integral communal fulfillment.
6.3.6d Integral communal fulfillment is not found apart from God 
Grisez’s remarks in the final paragraph of the article make the similarity between the 
good of religion (in its wider sense) and integral communal fulfillment even clearer. We 
look at its context first. The last section of the article outlines what divine revelation tells 
us about integral communal fulfillment, namely that it is the kingdom of God.143 Our rich 
fulfillment in the full range of human goods, in community with all other persons and 
with God, will be found in the kingdom.144 Therefore we can and should make the 
kingdom the ultimate end of all our choices, our choices for the various human goods.
143 See ibid., 57-61.
144 Grisez once again refers to Gaudium et Spes, especially 38 and 39, for his eschatological understanding 
of how heaven will be both continuous and discontinuous with this world: it will include “all the good 
fruits o f our nature and enterprise” but “freed o f stain, burnished and transfigured”: see “The True Ultimate 
End”, 58, nn. 60-64.
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The kingdom can be this ultimate end for every human life “for it is not alien to integral 
communal fulfillment but is an unimaginably wonderful specification of it.”145 People 
who are ignorant of divine revelation, but who intend integral communal fulfillment in 
their choices and commitments, can be understood to be preparing material for the 
kingdom unawares.146
The kingdom includes the beatific vision as a special gift from God that will fulfil human 
persons (though not precisely their human nature).147 Still, the kingdom is not to be 
identified with the beatific vision, as the kingdom includes rich and increasing fulfillment 
in the whole range of human goods, such as our bodily life and social life.148 Grisez once 
again suggests the good of religion is a kind of link, or bridge (my term, not his), between 
our human fulfillment and the pure gift of divine fulfillment. By our faith and hope we 
are humanly fulfilled in the good of religion, but we are able also “to accept that gift [of a
145 Ibid., 59. In this article, Grisez writes only a few lines on the details o f the theological specification of 
integral communal fulfillment as “the kingdom”. Clearly, it is Christocentric (see ibid., 58, 60), but this 
aspect is not emphasised here.
146 See ibid. Note, however, that Grisez denies that people who have no explicit awareness o f God can have 
God as their implicit ultimate end. He holds that one’s ultimate end can be only what one understands, and 
such people do not have any understanding of God as their end. Still, they can have integral communal 
fulfillment as their ultimate end, insofar as they are morally good. Further, integral communal fulfillment, 
without their knowing it, is actually the kingdom of God. So a commitment to integral communal 
fulfillment, which consists in following one’s conscience to the best of one’s ability, can be seen as “an 
implicit act o f faith”: see ibid., 49. However, it is not clear how one can have an implicit awareness of 
integral communal fulfillment without some implicit awareness o f God as an aspect of one’s ultimate end, 
considering that God is included in the concept o f integral communal fulfillment. It would seem that Grisez 
will have to allow that one can have an implicit understanding o f God to some extent in one’s 
understanding of one’s ultimate end, notwithstanding his apparent rejection of the concept o f implicit 
understanding of God in this article and his rejection o f the concept o f implicit grasp o f practical principles 
in “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 10, n. 17.
147 See “The True Ultimate End”, 59.
148 See ibid., 59-60.
share in divine intimacy] and anticipate enjoying it”.149 It is because we can be humanly 
interested in religion that we can be humanly interested in the beatific vision. It is clear 
that religion plays a crucial role here, in that, when fully specified by revelation and 
Christian faith and hope, the good of religion involves our friendship with Jesus (our love 
of him) and our membership in the new covenant community of the Church (our love of 
Jesus’ body), and thus it forms the focus of our human interest in the kingdom and all this 
kingdom offers, including the beatific vision. It is clear that religion is a very important 
aspect of integral communal fulfillment as specified in the kingdom. Grisez’s presents the 
kingdom as a complex reality, offering both integral human fulfillment and divine 
fulfillment for us human persons, fulfillment that increases continually.150
Such is the context for Grisez’s final paragraph. Grisez makes it clear that our beatitude is
not to be found in God alone, and so God is not to be our ultimate end. Our beatitude is to
be found in the kingdom, which is not to be identified with God alone. Still, in the final
paragraph, Grisez makes it clear that the kingdom is not a reality apart from God:
If the true ultimate end of human beings is the kingdom rather than God alone, it 
does not follow that human beatitude is to be found in something apart from God. 
Even now, it is in God that “we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).151
Grisez is clear that the goods that constitute our true fulfillment in heaven are “and 
always will remain distinct from their Creator”, but he insists that this is not to say that 
they are somehow rivals to God or that their goodness in any way takes from God’s
149 Ibid., 60, emphasis added. Thus, we are humanly fulfilled not only by faith and hope, but by love too 
(which anticipates in this earthly life our sharing fully and intimately in God’s divine life in heaven).
150 Ibid., 60-61.
151 Ibid., 61.
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goodness or his infinite power. Grisez ends with the following assertion about the status
of created goods in heaven (in other words, the basic human goods as fulfilled in Christ):
[T]hose goods will not be things apart from God, and it seems to me reasonable to 
suppose that blessed creatures’ joy in created goods will somehow be within, 
although distinct from, their joyful intimacy with the divine Persons.152
Our sharing in God’s divine life, in the beatific vision, in some way includes our human 
fulfillment (with regard to the full range of basic human goods, which, we note, includes 
the good of religion). Grisez finishes with an understanding of the beatific vision that is 
inclusive of all goodness and all fulfillments, not in a way that negates or substitutes for 
the various human goods, but in a way that respects their distinct goodness and includes it 
within God’s own goodness.153
Grisez’s final understanding of our beatitude is one in which God is central, even though 
he refuses to see God alone as our ultimate end. This might be one reason why he has 
moved away from presenting religion as the ultimate end of human life, as an 
architectonic good that can and should form the integrating focus of one’s whole life 
commitment. To see religion as that important, as the ultimate end, might suggest that 
God alone is the end of human life, and that the other human goods and human persons 
are not essential, or that they can be reduced to God. And this is something that Grisez 
wants to avoid. Therefore, he now presents integral communal fulfillment as the ultimate
152 Ibid., emphasis added (and note omitted). This is the very final sentence o f the article; its importance is 
thereby emphasised.
153 It could be argued, therefore, that Grisez has moved closer in this article to an aspect o f Finnis’ 
interpretation o f Aquinas’ position on the ultimate end as inclusive o f all goods within the goodness of God 
See Finnis, Aquinas, 313-319 and s. 7.3.6 below. Still, Grisez continues to disagree with Aquinas’ claims 
that man’s ultimate end is the beatific vision alone, that it is naturally desired, that it is totally satisfying, 
and that it is necessarily willed in every choice as its ultimate end.
end of human life, an end that can be specified by faith as the kingdom of God. Integral 
communal fulfillment is better able to perform the role of ultimate end because it allows 
clearly for the whole range of goods to be aspects of our fulfillment as persons: the 
various basic human goods, which fulfil us as human, and the good of our sharing in 
God’s own life by the special gift of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts (see Rom 5:5), 
which fulfils us insofar as God enables us to share his divine nature. However, the good 
of religion plays a very important role even still in Grisez’s moral theory. It forms a kind 
of bridge between our human fulfillment in friendship with Jesus in the new covenant, 
and our subsequent acceptance and sharing in the gift of new divine life as God’s 
children, the latter of which is to be fulfilled in heaven in the beatific vision.
Grisez acknowledges that all goods are from God and exist only within God’s will. 
Nothing good is good apart from God. Therefore it seems right to see the good of 
harmony with God, which is a human good that is consummated in the divine good of our 
intimacy with God in the beatific vision,154 as very similar to integral communal 
fulfillment, which includes God at its centre and as its ground, and which can be intended 
by us as our ultimate end in all our choices.
6.3.6e Which is a better understanding o f our ultimate end?
Religion has the advantage (over integral communal fulfillment) of being a specific basic 
human good, instantiations of which a person or persons can intend in choices or 
commitments, or set of choices or commitments. Also, as it is God who directs us to our
154 This is how Grisez puts it in “The Doctrine of God and the Ultimate Meaning o f Life,” 133, as examined 
above in s. 6.2.3b.
289
integral fulfillment, seeking harmony with him is equivalent to seeking our integral 
fulfillment, so it seems that religion is a good candidate for how we should understand 
and name the ultimate end for us to focus our whole life on, as the integrating motive for 
our whole life. The good of religion clearly keeps God as the ultimate focus.
However, integral communal fulfillment also has points in its favour as our ultimate end. 
It is an ultimate end that can include the good of religion as a specific, narrowly pursued 
good, and as an architectonic good. (Grisez has not completely forgotten or rejected the 
wider meaning of religion in this article, or the value of understanding one’s whole life as 
a kind of cooperation with God.)155 But it also goes beyond the good of religion, and the 
term “religion”, to more explicitly include the full range of human goods as constitutive 
of our ultimate fulfillment. However, perhaps integral communal fulfilment, as a term, 
fails to acknowledge clearly enough the ultimate place of God, who is the Creator, the 
Redeemer, the Sanctifier, the Lord, the King of the kingdom that is the specification of 
integral communal fulfilment.
6.4 Conclusion to the chapter
The three articles analysed in this chapter show Grisez coming to emphasise more and 
more clearly the kingdom of God as the ultimate end of Christian life, an end which we 
are called to intend in all our choices and commitments. Hope for the kingdom should 
form the integrating focus of one’s life as a follower of the way of the Lord Jesus. Grisez 
strongly criticises Aquinas’ view which Grisez thinks makes the beatific vision,
155 See s. 6.3.3 above.
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understood narrowly as a human act fulfilling one’s intellect (and thus a single 
substantive good) the sole ultimate end of human life. This position and other similarly 
inadequate theological positions overlook or deny the importance of non-religious human 
goods, especially bodily goods and community, and fail to recognise the significance of 
human free choices and the intrinsic connection between life in this world and life in the 
kingdom of heaven. Grisez’s position is that all the basic human goods, including bodily 
goods and community, have their rightful place in this life and in the kingdom. A correct 
understanding of the good of religion will acknowledge the importance of all the human 
goods and the eternal significance of all our choices. Thus religion could be the focus of 
one’s life as a whole, acting as an overarching or architectonic good that helps one to 
organise all one’s life with a single end in mind: fulfillment in all the goods for all 
persons, precisely as willed by God.
However, recently Grisez has moved from seeing religion as one’s ultimate end, the 
focus of one’s life, to seeing integral communal fulfillment as this sole ultimate end. 
Perhaps more clearly than the term “religion”, “integral communal fulfillment” speaks of 
the whole range of fundamental goods as intrinsic and integral aspects of our ultimate 
end. It also speaks clearly of the communal nature of the ultimate end, which includes the 
good of all persons. This good includes God’s own good, understood by analogy with 
friendship, which is fulfilled by his creation’s flourishing in goodness. Thus, integral 
communal fulfillment includes the good of religion, and is an essentially religious 
concept. The kingdom of God is a specification of integral communal fulfillment in the 
light of divine revelation and faith.
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The question remains whether this recent development of Grisez’s theory reverses 
completely the trajectory of his theory’s development in previous works, as outlined and 
analysed in the present work. The present author tends to think it does not, but more 
discussion of this will have to wait until our final chapter. Before then, we look at the 
work of two of Grisez’s collaborators (chapter seven) and some criticisms of his work 
(chapter eight).
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GRISEZ’S COLLABORATORS
We analyse now some of the works of Grisez’s two closest collaborators, John Finnis and 
Joseph Boyle. These works support, clarify, apply and extend what Grisez has to say 
about the basic human goods in general, and religion in particular, as well as clarifying 
Grisez’s moral theory as a whole.
7.1 Finnis - Natural Law and Natural Rights [1980]1
7.1.1 Religion as a broad blit distinct category o f good
Following the lead of Grisez, Finnis holds that basic goods are the objects of the primary 
principles of the natural law, and he includes religion as one such basic good.2 Fie notes
• • • 3 •that a concern for religion is universal, but it is not the only human concern. Various 
universal human concerns are picked out by the basic values or goods that shape human 
choice and action: Life; Knowledge; Play; Aesthetic Experience; Sociability 
(Friendship); Practical Reasonableness; Religion.4
1 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 1980).
2 On p. vii o f the preface of this book, Finnis explicitly acknowledges his debt to Grisez’s “vigorous re­
presentation and very substantial development of the classical arguments on these [i.e. natural law] 
matters”.
3 See Natural Law and Natural Rights, 84-85.
4 See ibid., 86-90. Finnis acknowledges that his list is similar to that o f Grisez, which Grisez developed 
initially, and presented with Shaw in their book, Beyond the New Morality (1st edition, 1974), which was 
examined above in s. 2.4. It should be noted that Finnis is not arguing from the universality of human
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the establishment and maintenance of proper relationships between oneself (and the 
orders one can create and maintain) and the divine.5
Religion involves the pursuit of the answer to the question of whether one’s freedom,
which is transcendent and truly free and intelligent,
is itself somehow subordinate to something which makes that human freedom, 
human intelligence, and human mastery possible (not just ‘originally’ but from 
moment to moment) and which is free, intelligent, and sovereign in a way (and over 
a range) no human being can be.6
Even if the answer one gives to these questions is an agnostic one, or perhaps even an
atheistic one, it is still
peculiarly important to have thought reasonably and (where possible) correctly 
about these questions of the origins of human freedom and reason.7
This is so because if a “transcendent other and its lasting order” exists then it is of the
highest value to each human person to bring his life and actions into “some sort of
harmony with whatever can be known or surmised about that transcendent other and its
lasting order”.8 Not only has religion thus understood been a universal concern of
virtually all cultures in history, but, the very fact of human responsibility, insofar as it
concern for religion that religion is therefore a basic human good. The universality o f the concern is a 
matter of fact, which can be supported by empirical studies, but the prescriptive nature o f the primary 
principles of the natural law are not facts, or deduced from facts, but grasped as essentially practical 
insights into experience: see ibid., 29-36 and 81-86.
5 Natural Law and Natural Rights, 89.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. Note that Finnis does not reduce religion to (theoretical) knowledge.
Religion as a basic value involves
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cannot be reduced to merely human choice, and thus is objective and obligatory, points 
beyond itself to the transcendent objective “something” that grounds that very 
responsibility in some way.
Finnis mentions the importance of harmony, which is the main term Grisez uses to 
describe the benefit sought in the good of religion. Finnis seems to allow for even 
agnostics and atheists to grasp the good of religion, however, which is an issue not dealt 
with explicitly by Grisez, though it is not contradicted by his understanding of religion.9 
Finnis’ understanding of the good of religion allows it to be grasped in a very minimal 
way, as a practical opportunity of sorts, even a conditional opportunity, that an atheist or 
agnostic could grasp: i f  there is a God, then it would be good to live in harmony with him. 
Even atheists and agnostics, if they are reasonable at all, can see what “religion” is and 
why intelligent people find it worthwhile to pursue the good of religion. Their very broad 
understanding of the good of religion, at least in its initial reality in people’s lives, makes 
it easy to see why Grisez and Finnis include it in their list of basic human goods. It is
9 Finnis’s position is shared by two others in the Grisez school: Joseph Boyle (see s. 7.4.1 below) and 
Robert P. George: see his Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 219-228, at 220. Other natural law theorists have come to a different 
conclusion: that religion can be considered a basic human good only if  it is understood in a full theistic 
sense: see M.C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2001), 
131-133, and A. Gomez-Lobo, Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural Law Ethics 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 24-25. Murphy’s and Gomez-Lobo’s positions on 
religion depend on their seeing the harmony involved in it as being very similar if  not identical to 
friendship, which is interpersonal. However, the understanding o f  religion in the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle 
natural law theory, whilst holding that the good of religion is most richly instantiated and pursued with a 
theistic understanding o f God and an understanding o f religion as a friendship with God, holds that religion 
can be instantiated and pursued, albeit less richly and less effectively, even with a non-theistic 
understanding of religion. Grisez’s (and Finnis’s and Boyle’s) understanding o f religion at its most basic 
and even impersonal is similar to the understanding o f the “Tao” which all men at least implicitly know and 
follow, as believed in some eastern religions and as presented (as a synonym for the natural law) by C.S. 
Lewis, The Abolition o f  Man, (1943; repr., London: Collins/Fount Paperbacks, 1987).
difficult to see anyone denying that consideration of religious or philosophical questions 
is unimportant, unintelligible, or practically insignificant.
7.1.2 Towards a fuller understanding o f religion
In his final chapter Finnis presents a fuller concept of the transcendent “something” that
grounds human responsibility and that forms the object of religious concern.10 Practical
questions arise out of the fact that our participation in the basic forms of human
flourishing is for us as individuals and members of communities “even at best, very
limited”.11 The effects of time and decay lead us to wonder
whether my good (and the well-being of my communities) has any further point, 
i.e. whether it relates to any more comprehensive human participation in good.12
In addition, our commitment to the good seems to be brought into question by “conflicts 
of opportunities” that call for us to sacrifice ourselves and our well-being for the good of 
others who are our friends, even though we know that these others and their good will 
also come to an end.13 We are inevitably moved to question: what is the ultimate good of 
being moral? Further, each of us is part of a universe, and the question arises whether “it 
too has a good, a point, a value” and whether and how it might relate to my good and the 
good of my communities.14 If there are no answers to such questions,
10 In an earlier chapter, Finnis had called his remarks on religion “no more than a place-holders”. See 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 90.
11 Ibid., 372.
12 Ibid.
13 See Ibid.
14 See ibid., 373.
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the basic human values will seem, to any thoughtful person, to be weakened, in 
their attractiveness to reasonableness, by a certain relativity or subjectivity ... the 
‘subjectivity’ of the ‘merely relative to us’.15
The myth of historical progress towards a future utopia, which is a kind of subjective 
projection or wishful thinking, does not make up effectively or adequately for the 
weakness of all human effort and the fragility of human flourishing.16
Finnis anticipates what Grisez (sometimes in collaboration with Finnis) was to say 
regarding the genesis of our grasp of the good of religion in our experience of conflict, 
tension and limitation.17 The only adequate way of dealing with inevitable and universal 
human limitations and frustrations, in the context of individual human dignity, the 
objectivity of morality, our experience and appreciation of friendship and self-sacrifice, 
and our cosmic-scale sense of wonder, is to seek a more-than-human solution. The only 
adequate way, in other words, is in the good of religion (along with truth or knowledge).
7.1.3 The Stoic understanding o f religion
The problem with the Stoic response to the problem of the always limited ‘subjectivity’ 
of human effort is that it calls on us to be virtuous, to conform ourselves to “intentions of 
the superintending universal-intelligence”18 by conforming to ‘nature’, without really 
addressing the question of why we should do this. Why should we conform ourselves to a
15 Ibid., emphasis in original.
16 See ibid., 373-374. Finnis is in critical dialogue with ideas from Mill, Marx and Kant in this section of 
his chapter.
17 See ss. 3.3.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.4, 6.1.4, and 6.2.1 above.
18 Ibid., 377.
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world-order “whose order might well be regarded as not altogether admirable, and whose 
outcome might equally be regarded as a matter of indifference to us”?19 In saying this, 
Finnis implicitly acknowledges the importance of sound philosophy and real revelation to 
our understanding of the good of religion.
7.1.4 Finding an adequate understanding o f religion
To find a sufficient response to the practical questions that the natural law raises, it is
necessary to attend to some theoretical questions. These questions concern firstly the
source of the orderliness of nature,20 an orderliness that enables us to understand nature
and its order. Finnis concludes that
direct speculative questions about the significance, implications, or source of the 
orderliness of things yield, by themselves, no clear or certain answers.21
This is mainly because there is a significant lack of order in nature too, that needs to be 
explained. Finnis then looks at the question of the source of the sheer existence of things. 
Fie presents an argument to show that an uncaused cause must exist, with rational 
necessity rather than logical necessity, in order to account for the existence of contingent 
things.22
19 Ibid., 378.
20 By “nature”, Finnis means an order o f relationships “external to our understanding, which our 
understanding can only discover”. Alongside the order o f nature, there is also “the order of human 
artifacts”, “the order o f attitudes, habits (‘second nature’), commitments, and principles o f action”, and “the 
order o f logic, of investigations, critiques, analyses, and explanations (including the reflexive explanation 
of this order itself, as well as of the others)”, ibid. 380. This division o f reality into four orders follows 
Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s 'Nicomachaen Ethics’, trans. C J  Litzinger, rev. ed. (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 1-2, and Grisez, Beyond the New Theism, 230-240 and 353-356. See 
above s. 2.6.
21 Natural Law and Natural Rights, 382, emphasis in original.
22 Finnis’s argument is a summary o f Grisez’s argument in Beyond the New Theism : see above s. 2.5.2.
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As with Grisez’s argument, this one ends with a “thin” concept of God. All that can be 
said about this uncaused cause is that “it has what it takes to make all other states of 
affairs exist”.23 Like Grisez, Finnis seems to say that the most sound philosophical way to 
know God exists is a pure cosmological argument based on the contingent existence of 
things, rather than any argument from design, or the order of things, or any argument 
from the objectivity of morality and the reality of goodness.
7.1.5 The Eternal Law is expressed in the four orders
Like Grisez, Finnis speculates that God’s causing is “in some respects analogous to the
free choices of human persons”.24 Finnis then links this speculative insight with “the
theory of Eternal Law” developed by Augustine and Aquinas:
... the theory of Eternal Law proposes that the laws, principles, requirements, and 
norms of the four orders be regarded as holding for their respective orders precisely 
because they express aspects, intelligible to us, of the creative intention which 
guides [God’s] causing of the categorically variegated “community” of all entities 
and all states of affairs in all orders.25
What Finnis says here about the four orders as expressions of the Eternal Law suggests
that our understanding of God’s existence and nature can be based on aspects not only of
nature, but also aspects of logic, morality, and technical/creative reasoning. We can learn
23 Natural Law and Natural Rights, 382.
24 Ibid., 389.
25 Ibid., 389-390. Finnis refers to God as “D” in the original, to emphasise his otherness.
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from the “laws, requirements, and norms” of all four orders, not just the natural order,
Oftsomething of the existence and nature of God.
Finnis is careful to emphasise that the theory of the Eternal Law does not give us detailed 
information about reality in any of the four orders; nor does it enable us to understand 
God’s creative plan, which includes elements that appear to us as coincidental or “evil”.27 
The theory of Eternal Law, insofar as it is a philosophical theory, is very limited and not 
fully secure. Still, its concept of God as making choices suggests that God knows, acts, 
and lives a personal life. It also suggests strongly that God has a plan for our flourishing, 
and the flourishing of creation in its various aspects and widest scope. And these points 
leads to the further speculation: would or could this God choose to communicate with his 
rational creatures? It would be good to have such revelation, taking us beyond the 
somewhat uncertain conclusions of mere philosophy.
7.1.6 The Natural Law’ and human understanding
However, the philosophical beginnings of natural law theory did not presuppose any such
direct divine revelation:
Plato and Aristotle do not use the existence of God or the gods as an argument to 
justify their claim that there are objective norms of human flourishing and 
principles of human reasonableness. But their arguments in justifying that claim, 
and their reflection upon the nature, point, and source of those (and all such) 
arguments, lead them to affirm that there is a transcendent source of being (i.e. of 
entities and states of affairs, and of their existing) and in particular of our capacity
26 This foreshadows Finnis’s and Grisez’s development of the cosmological argument by seeking to 
combine the notions o f God as the transcendent creator with God as the transcendent guide and helper: see 
ss. 4.2, 6.1.4 and 6.2.1 above.
27 See ibid., 390-391.
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and desire to understand being (or nature) and its many forms of good. Thus in 
realizing one’s nature, in flourishing (eudaimonia), and (what is the same thing 
from another aspect) in recognizing the authoritativeness of practical 
reasonableness, its principles, and its requirements, one is responding to the divine 
pull and recognizing the mastery of God. 8
This seems to link “religion” and “morality” very closely indeed. The “originators of 
natural law theorizing”,29 (Plato and Aristotle), were able, without the help of specific, 
historical divine revelation, to grasp the truth that the very use of intelligence or 
understanding by human persons puts them in relationship with the transcendent Source, 
even sharing in his activity.30 It seems that Finnis is much more positive than Grisez, 
though not uncritically so, towards the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Finnis allows 
for a religious aspect to the philosophical understanding of the natural law developed by 
these two ancient philosophers; he sees a kind of natural mysticism in their thought.
7.1.7 The limitations yet suggestiveness o f philosophical understanding 
Still, purely philosophical knowledge of “God’s nature and relation to this world and its 
goods” is deeply uncertain.31 It is not clear that a human person could be God’s friend in 
any true or substantial sense of friend; nor is it clear how the good of contemplation (i.e.
♦ 32 * *understanding) is related to the practical life of all-round human flourishing. Finnis 
does not consider Plato or Aristotle to have come to an adequate understanding of the
28 Ibid., 395-396, (references to Plato’s and Aristotle’s works are omitted).
29 Ibid., 392.
30 See ibid., 393.
31 Ibid., 397.
32 See ibid., 398, with particular critical reference to Aristotle’s philosophy. Finnis shares much of Grisez’s 
concerns about weaknesses in Aristotle’s approach even though he has more to say o f a positive nature too.
good of religion,33 which would involve grasping the possibility of being friends with 
God and would also involve seeing the good of religion in its proper relationship to the 
other goods. Knowing the possibility and opportunity of friendship with God is especially 
difficult from a merely philosophical perspective, as it tells us so little about God.
The theoretical philosophical argument for God’s existence “does not directly assist us in
answering those practical questions” -  namely, the questions regarding
the possibility of a deeper explanation of obligation; the reasonableness of self- 
sacrifice in human friendship; the relevance of our limited place in human history 
and the universe; the point of living according to the principles and requirements of 
practical reasonableness.34
These four points seem to be a kind of summary of what Finnis might accept as
essentially religious challenges.35 These challenges indicate the scope and scale of the
good of religion, and how it can include and promote the other goods whilst respecting
their irreducibility and distinctiveness. These challenges seem also to point towards the
need for divine revelation for us to grasp the fullest understanding of the good of religion.
Still, we can grasp some philosophical points with confidence. Even though the 
limitations of natural reasoning leave the natural law somewhat subjective and 
questionable, still the natural law is objectively structured and reasonable. The natural 
law is not constituted by the fact that we humans happen to have inclinations that just 
happen to lead us to act for our well-being; rather, it is constituted by our intelligent grasp
33 Finnis does not express this point in this way, with explicit reference to “the good o f religion”.
34 Ibid., 405.
35 Finnis does not present them explicitly as such. They can be compared with Grisez’s account o f the four 
experiences grounding our religious awareness in s. 3.3.3 above.
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of these goods (that our natural inclinations point towards) as goods, by our 
understanding as rational beings that the objects of our inclinations can be worth pursuing 
reasonably. In the light of divine revelation, Aquinas described this natural law as 
participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura (“The participation of the Eternal Law in 
rational creatures”).36 Already believing in divine revelation, Aquinas was able to see that 
our ability to reason and choose practically and morally was grounded in the reasonable 
providence of God, and was in fact a participation in God’s providence.
7.1.8 Hope for divine revelation
Another philosophical point that is certain is that observing the similarity of the Creator’s
causing to our freely and intelligently choosing, leads us to wonder if it/he might freely
and intelligently communicate with us. This, in its turn, leads us
to hope that the uncaused cause might reveal itself to be lovable, and that the ‘ideal 
observer’ which practical reasonableness postulates as a test of arbitrariness might 
prove to have a real and substantial counterpart.37
We would hope for this because such a divine revelation would make possible “a more 
basic account of obligation”.38 This account would assure us that even though we know 
our friends are imperfect and our communities impermanent, we could understand our 
obligation to pursue the common good, and the good of friendship even to the point of 
self-sacrifice, as grounded in God’s favouring the good of all and in our being God’s
36 Aquinas’ understanding o f natural law, and its similarities to, and differences from, that o f Plato and 
Aristotle, is the theme of part 4 o f Finnis’ final chapter, at 398-403.
37 Ibid., 406. Perhaps another way o f expressing this latter point is that people often hope for an objective, 
transcendent Justice, knowing that our own human justice is so imperfect, yet also knowing that human 
justice always seeks true justice.
38 Ibid.
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friends, and so sharing his good as our common good (as an integral part of our 
friendship).39
7.1.9 Religion involves participating in God’s goodness and truth
We cannot do something for God’s good in the sense that he needs anything or lacks 
anything. Still, our understanding good and choosing good can be a participation in 
God’s goodness. In light of divine revelation, bearing in mind also the insights gained 
from philosophy, we can come to understand more deeply the basic goods. We can come 
to see how they can be part of a common good that is shared with God.40 According to 
Finnis, when we come (if we come) to know that God is real and values all the goods in 
his own supremely correct and sound way, then our own pursuit and instantiation of them 
can be rendered even more correct and sound insofar as we are in harmony with God (i.e. 
we participate in the good of religion).
7.1.10 Knowledge, religion, practical reasonableness and play
Finnis points out the interrelationship between three basic goods: practical
reasonableness, play, and religion.41 In light of this interrelationship, moral obligation is 
no longer to be seen as
39 See ibid., 406-407. Finnis is using the term “common good” here in a different way than it is used in 
Catholic Social Doctrine, where it tends to be used to refer to a set o f political conditions.
40 This notion of common good is an important part o f his book as a whole; Finnis emphasises it more in 
his expression of natural law theory than Grisez does in his. Flowever, it can be said that most recently 
Grisez has begun to think about God and the common good in a manner similar to Finnis: see s. 6.3 above.
41 See ibid., 409-410. Finnis builds his analysis on the foundation of the work o f  Plato in his last work, the 
Laws.
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the framework or finally authoritative category of ‘moral’ thought. The 
requirements of practical reasonableness have a ‘point’ beyond themselves. That 
point is the game of co-operating with God. Being play, this co-operation has no 
point beyond itself, unless we wish to say that God is such a further ‘point’.42
Morality is to be most adequately understood in terms of co-operation with God for its
own sake: in other words, morality is to be understood in terms of the basic good of
religion. However, this basic good of religion is to be understood in terms of another
basic good, the good of play. And play, in its turn, throws light on how we are to fully
understand practical reasonableness (i.e. morality) itself:
Practical reasonableness, therefore, need not be regarded as ultimately a form of 
self-perfection. That is not its final significance. Nor, on the other hand, are its 
requirements sheer categorical imperatives; they gain practical force from the most 
basic explanation that can be provided for them -  that they are what is needed to 
participate in the game of God.43
7.1.11 Religion is not the only or best good
Nevertheless, Finnis is careful to end his book with a warning: understanding morality in 
terms of the basic good of religion (seen in terms of play) is not to be taken as making 
religion the best or highest good.44 One may never choose against any of the basic goods 
for the sake of religion; nor may one ever ignore any of the other requirements of 
practical reasonableness for the sake of religion. Like Grisez, Finnis wants to safeguard 
morality from being swallowed up, so to speak, by religion, especially religion
42 Ibid., 409. Finnis does not deal here with the issue of how and whether the beatific vision (of God 
himself) is distinct from human fulfillment. Some of what he writes in these final pages o f Natural Law and 
Natural Rights suggest he is commingling them to some extent.
43 Ibid., 409-410.
44 A less than careful reader might miss this point and think that Finnis presents religion as the highest 
good. See, for example, the misreading o f O. Anderson, “Is Contemporary Natural Law Theory a 
Beneficial Development?” New Blackfriars 86, no. 1005 (Sept. 2005): 478-492, at 483.
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understood narrowly. When it is understood more widely, in a way that includes the other 
goods and respects their own distinctiveness and value in their own right, then religion 
can have its own rightful place in moral theory and practice, as one of the basic goods, 
albeit one that has its own distinctive and inclusive character. The good of religion has a 
central role to play in any adequate moral theory, whether it be a mainly philosophical 
theory (such as the one presented by Finnis here) or a theological one (hinted at in his 
final chapter, and developed in later works by Grisez). Such moral theory will be 
permeated by the good of religion, as well as shaped by it, and supported by it insofar as 
moral obligation and cosmic intelligibility and significance are guaranteed only by the 
existence and love of God.
7.2 Finnis -  Fundamentals o f  Ethics [1983]45
7.2.1 The common good o f friendship
Philosophy can help us to understand more clearly what friendship is, in particular by 
elucidating the concept of “common good” in the context of friendship.46 In any 
friendship, there is “a sharing, community, mutuality and reciprocity not only of 
knowledge but also of activity (and thus, normally, of enjoyment and satisfaction)”.47 
Each of two friends (to take the simplest example) wills the good of the other for the sake 
of the other. For two friends, A and B, their common good includes the good of each
45 J. Finnis, Fundamentals o f  Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1983).
46 See ibid., 147-149. The theme o f friendship is also treated in Natural Law and Natural Rights, 141-144.
47 Fundamental o f  Ethics, 147.
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other, so that each must value both his friend’s good and his own good for the sake of the 
friend, as part of the friendship.48 It is as though a friend can love himself in an unselfish 
way as part of a true friendship, by seeing himself and loving himself through the eyes of 
his friend.
We can apply aspects of human friendship to a friendship between God and man. 
However, unlike man-to-man friendship, a friendship between God and man cannot share 
equality in its mutuality: no human being can act for God’s well-being, in the same way 
that one human friend can and should act for the well-being of his human friend, as an 
integral aspect of their friendship. Yet we humans can act “for the sake of God” which 
means to act
out of regard for and affection for God as such, and out of concern that God’s 
concerns be advanced, i.e. that the goods that God favours and chooses should be 
favoured and chosen by me, out of friendship.49
What this means is that we can share a common good with God, where his good is our
good, and vice versa, in the endless mutuality and reciprocity of friendship. This
friendship, from God’s point of view, is a kind of play, seeing as there is no need for him
to engage in it and nothing for him to gain from it, as he lacks nothing.
Thus any friendship with God must be regarded as a sharing, in a limited way, in 
the divine play -  a sharing already envisaged, in a particular form, by Plato, as the 
only really serious thing to be concerned with.50
48 See ibid., 148-149.
49 Ibid., 148.
50 Ibid, (with reference to Plato’s Laws, VII, 803b-c). See s. 7.1.10 above.
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Such a friendship with God would have a very beneficial effect:
Such a friendship with God would relativize our self-love and would dispel the 
anxiety that most insidiously undermines any and every ethics, the anxiety that 
concern to be practically reasonable (virtuous, upright ...) is ultimately no more 
than a refined form of self-cultivation. That anxiety would be allayed, because 
every form of genuine friendship relativizes our self-love without destroying or 
discrediting it.51
It matters that you love yourself because you are friends with God who loves you, so you 
love yourself out of love for God. So too with love of others, who can be loved for the 
sake of God, their creator, your friend, who loves them. You love what your Friend loves. 
Considering that your Friend is God, your love is therefore given a divine soundness and 
foundation that it would not otherwise have. Ethics is no longer merely subjective, 
merely anthropocentric, but anthropocentric and theocentric.52 (In fact, it is truly 
anthropocentric in being theocentric: one loves the God who loves man.)
7.2.2 The good o f religion as an overarching good
This understanding of friendship and its common good leads to understanding the good
of religion to have an overarching significance:
... one’s concern to be practically reasonable would not need to be regarded either 
as a search for self-perfection or self-cultivation, or as obedience to sheer 
categorical imperatives unrelated to any participation in intelligible good(s). Rather, 
it could be seen as what is needed to participate in the play of God, to favour and 
participate integrally in the human goods, which God’s creative activity (subject to 
our free choice so to favour and participate in them) makes possible.53
51 Fundamental o f  Ethics, 149. In the original, the second sentence begins a new paragraph.
52 Finnis does not speak in terms o f theocentric and anthropocentric.
53 Ibid.
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Once again, Finnis combines several of the basic goods -  practical reasonableness, play, 
friendship between people, and friendship with God (i.e. religion) -  letting each shed 
light on the other.54 Religion shares in some of the characteristic goodness of friendship 
and play, and precisely as such, can both include, promote and guarantee practical 
reasonableness in its pursuit of all the human goods in their integral goodness.
7.2.3 Transparency
Yet Finnis does not explicitly say in either of his first two books that the good of religion 
is, or ought to be, the overarching basic good that organises and shapes and motivates our 
integral pursuit and participation in the other goods. That role seems to be reserved for 
the good he calls “practical reasonableness”. This is both a basic good in its own right 
and a kind of master principle for understanding how we are to pursue all the basic goods 
well (i.e. morally, with right reason).55
Practical reasonableness is a good that can be “transparent” for the other goods. It can be 
a kind of lens that enables us to see the other goods and pursue them well.56 We need this
54 See 7.1.10 above.
55 See ibid., 70-74. In Grisez’s version of this natural law theory, the master principle is the first principle 
of morality, which is distinct from any one of the basic goods; also, what Finnis calls “practical 
reasonableness” is replaced in Grisez’s list o f basic goods with a more restricted kind o f good, which is 
inner consistency and good conscience.
56 This metaphor is not Finnis’s, but is suggested by his use of the term “transparent” and his explanation of 
why practical reasonableness is necessary: see ibid., 73. In a later work, Finnis makes the point that 
transparency can also be applied to persons. Thus, the principles o f practical reason are transparent for 
persons, or, in other words, the basic goods provide the reasons why we act for the sake of persons’ well- 
fare and flourishing. The concept of “transparency” can therefore be applied in Grisez’s moral theory not 
only to practical reasonableness and religion, as discussed in this and the following section, but also to 
show how this natural law theory is not focussed on only goods, but on goods and persons. See J. Finnis, 
“Foundations o f Practical Reasoning Revisited”, American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 50 (2005), 109-131, at 
128.
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lens because we are easily blinded by unreasonable emotion, and thus unable to 
accurately see the good and pursue it well. With the lens of practical reasonableness we 
can order our emotions correctly and see the good truthfully. This seeing is itself a good, 
a form of human fulfillment to be valued in its own right. At the same time, however, and 
this is the primary point of transparency, it is a good that is good precisely in its enabling 
us to see other goods. It is a good that, by its very nature, opens out towards the other 
goods, seeks them, and enables us to be fulfilled by them. This is why any failure to use 
the lens of practical reasonableness is a failure to find true and integral fulfillment in the 
other goods, such as life, knowledge, and so on; further, it is a moral failure if it is 
voluntary.
Ethics can be said to be summed up by the term “practical reasonableness”, but it is not
therefore the highest or supreme good.
The present importance of transparency is simply this: When we talk in ethics about 
practical reasonableness or “right reason” ... we must not be taken to suppose that 
practical reasonableness is the supreme good. Ethics is not just, or even 
particularly, for intellectuals or rationalists, for people who want to cultivate a 
special (“the highest”) part of their make-up. The point of being practically 
reasonable is not: being practically reasonable, full stop. Rather, it is: participating 
in all the human goods well. “Well”, here, expresses the implications not of some 
further, external (e.g. moral) standard, but simply of all those human goods to be 
participated in, integrally, in each and all of one’s self-constitutive choices.57
57 Fundamentals o f  Ethics, 72. Finnis is here distinguishing the natural law theory developed by himself 
and Grisez from what they see as the over-emphasis found in Aristotle on self-cultivation o f one’s intellect 
as the highest good, and the emphasis found in Kant on following reason for its own sake. These mistakes 
of Aristotle and Kant lead to serious neglect o f the other goods. Much o f Fundamental o f  Ethics is a 
dialogical reflection on Aristotle and Kant. What Finnis has to say about the transparency o f practical 
reasonableness, and what we say here about the transparency of religion, goes a long way towards 
answering those critics o f Grisez’s theory who accuse it of being Kantian. See, for example, B.V. 
Johnstone, “’Objectivism’, ‘Basic Fluman Goods”, and ‘Proportionalism’, and Interpretation o f the 
Contemproary History o f Moral Theology,” Studia Moralia 43 (2005): 97-126, at 114-119. Johnstone 
misunderstands the basic human goods, which he says are “not moral at all” (114), are “non-moral 
structures” (115), are “constructions of the reason o f the subject” (115), are “abstract ideas o f goods, which 
exist in the mind o f the subject” (116), and are therefore unrelated to the fulfillment of other persons (117).
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The first principle of morality functions in Grisez’s moral theory in a transparent manner 
in much the same way that practical reasonableness functions in Finnis’ theory, at least 
insofar as practical reasonableness is seen in Finnis’ theory as a transcendental kind of 
good, with an architectonic role, acting transparently as a kind of “lens” as discussed 
above. It could be then that the two theories are not really all that different, but just 
different in their terminology.58
7.2.4 The transparency o f  religion (friendship with God)
Neither Finnis or Grisez applies the concept of “transparency” to the good of religion, but 
what Finnis says about it applying to practical reasonableness can very easily and aptly 
be applied to the good of religion. The good of religion can be seen as both a basic good 
in itself and as a good transcending all the other goods. Religion’s transcending, 
integrating and motivating all the other goods in one’s life as a whole -  this is religion’s 
architectonic role.59 Thus, religion is both a distinct form of human fulfillment, not to be 
confused with the other human goods, and not to substitute for them or deny their 
goodness, and an architectonic good that allows persons and communities to integrate life 
around all the goods. Maybe it is correct to see the good of religion as a kind of “lens”
None of this is a fair reading o f Grisez’s, Finnis’s and Boyle’s “basic human goods” theory. See also ss. 8.1 
and 8.2 below, where similar criticisms by Hittinger and Di Blasi are outlined and discussed.
58 This is supported by a remark of Grisez’s in the bibliography appended to ‘“ A Contemporary Natural 
Law Ethics” in Moral Philosophy: Historical and Contemporary Essays, ed. William C. Starr and 
Richard C. Taylor (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989), 125-43, at 141-142, where he says that 
there are “some differences in ethical theory between Finnis, on the one hand, and Grisez and Boyle, on the 
other. But most differences are in formulation rather than in substance.”
59 See s. 4.6 above for Grisez’s and Finnis’s (and Boyle’s) clear development o f this theme in 1987. We 
have seen clear anticipations of this development in Finnis’s earlier work: see ss. 7.1.9 -  7.1.11 above.
that allows us to avoid a kind of blindness that we would otherwise suffer from, and 
“see” the basic goods, at both their primary, merely practical level, and the fully moral 
level. Thus the good of religion would be transparent for all the other goods. In this way, 
parallel with what Finnis says about practical reasonableness, religion would be the 
highest good in some respects, but not the highest good in every respect. Also, when 
religion is instantiated as true friendship with God, this friendship itself is the lens 
through which we can see the good properly, as the common good willed by God when 
he wills the flourishing o f his friends.
7.2.5 Religion or practical reasonableness?
Do we have to choose between religion or practical reasonableness as transparent goods? 
No, we do not have to choose only one of the basic human goods as both individual and 
transcendent. Perhaps it is simply the case that more than one o f the basic human goods 
can be transparent for the other goods and perform a special role beyond its role as a 
specific-basic-human-good-amongst-others.
The architectonic role played by the good of religion is different, but related, to the 
architectonic role o f practical reasonableness. A purely anthropocentric ethics suffers 
from a kind of incompleteness or instability, even though it is still objectively true and 
sound. Our mortality and human limitations lead us to wonder if our choices really matter 
in the widest context and longest term. Religion helps us cope practically with such 
issues. This can happen if God reveals himself as “the cause of all human goods, and as
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offering the gift of friendship with all human beings of every time and place”.60 Given
divine revelation, we could escape the subjectivism and relativism that seems to haunt a
purely anthropocentric ethics. Given divine revelation,
we could be confident that the participation in human good(s) that we can realize 
by our own free choices is a good which will indeed “have a place” and “have a 
point” in the overall pattern and common good of the created universe -  a pattern 
and common good not now understood by us, but understood and chosen by the 
same God who is responsible for all the goods that we can, at least partly, 
understand and value.61
Thus, for Finnis, the good of religion (along with knowledge to an extent too) seems to 
have an important and distinctive role to play in ethics as a whole.
7.2.6 Religion as a basic and an instrumental good
This role of religion as transparent and architectonic, like the special, transcendental role 
of practical reasonableness according to Finnis, seems to have a strong instrumental 
dimension. It would be a mistake then to over-emphasise the intrinsic goodness of the 
basic human goods, including religion, to the exclusion or neglect of their instrumental 
goodness.62 To do so might mean we miss or misunderstand the properly instrumental 
goodness human goods can have whilst not losing their intrinsic goodness, a properly
60 Fundamental o f  Ethics, 150. It is not clear that Finnis means to say that it is only in the light o f revelation 
that we can come to know God as the cause o f all the goods and as offering friendship to us; perhaps he 
considers only the latter to be made clear by revelation alone.
61 Ibid.
62 This is one way o f reading Peter Simpson, “Grisez on Aristotle and Human Goods,” American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 75-90, at 84-85, where he points out that the basic human goods, whilst 
continuing to be properly basic and thus essential to the whole, can be compared with one another with 
regard to their instrumental goodness. Thus it is possible to see a kind of natural hierarchy in the goods, 
with some of them suitable as instrumental goods for the sake of others. The argument in the previous 
sections o f this present work is that religion (and practical reasonableness) can be intrinsically good as 
distinct and incommensurable basic human goods, on the one hand, and also instrumentally good (in their 
transparency) with regard to the other basic human goods, on the other hand.
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instrumental goodness that is embodied in a special transcendental role that these various 
basic goods can play, when they allow us to understand, pursue and instantiate the other 
basic goods in a better way than we would have available to us otherwise.63
7.3 Finnis -A quinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory [1998]64 
“The good of religion” does not feature explicitly to any great extent in this book, but it 
contains many less explicit things that are relevant for the present work.65 Further, 
although Grisez presents and develops his own moral theory as his own, and not merely 
an exegesis of Aquinas, it is interesting, nonetheless, to see how Grisez’s work is 
indebted to, similar to, but distinct from, Aquinas’s thought.66
63 The points in this section are not adverted to by either Finnis or Grisez. How basic human goods other 
than practical reasonableness and religion could have special transcendental roles in moral theory and 
practical rationality is not a matter that will be investigated here, but it seems that at least some of the 
others could be transparent for the basic goods as a whole in much the same way as practical 
reasonableness and religion. If  so, then “life” or “health”, or “justice”, or “excellence in action”, or 
“knowledge”, when understood as instrumental goods, could play special roles in helping us both to 
understand all the basic goods and morality itself and to act morally.
64 J. Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998). Finnis’s ideas on Aquinas are more succinctly found in his article: “Aquinas' Moral, Political, and 
Legal Philosophy” (2005), which is available online as part of the Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy at 
http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ [accessed 17th July 2008], One might also 
consult Finnis’s earlier treatment: “Practical Reasoning, Human Goods, and the End o f Man,” Proceedings 
o f the American Catholic Association, 58 (1984): 23-36.
65 There are only two references in the index to “religion, basic good o f ’: see Aquinas, 380. However, there 
is much more on religion here than these two references suggest.
66 It is helpful to consult another work in this regard: W.E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 2nd 
ed. (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 2003), especially chapter two, where May treats the natural law 
theory of Aquinas, Grisez et al., Martin Rhonheimer (briefly), and Pope John Paul II, bringing out their 
similarities.
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7.3.1 The basic good o f  religion is a kind o f  deep harmony
Finnis outlines a number o f basic human goods that Aquinas recognised,67 which provide
basic reasons for human action, picking out intrinsically worthwhile benefits to be
pursued by human action. These goods include life and health, marriage, knowing the
truth (especially about God), living in society with others, but also other goods.68 One of
these others is the good of religion:
Harmony with the transcendent source of the universe’s existence and order is a 
good which Aquinas judges basic and the object of natural inclination; it probably 
should not be reduced to ‘knowledge about God’ or societas and friendship, for it 
goes beyond knowing and loving to becoming like {assimilation}.69
Religion here is seen as a kind of harmony, specifically harmony with the Creator, the 
source of all existence and order. The harmony that Aquinas speaks of is a very deep 
harmony, however, even extending as far as being assimilated to God.70 This good is 
“basic” and “the object o f natural inclination”.
67 See Aquinas, 79-86. Although there is no one section of any work o f Aquinas that treats the whole range 
of basic human goods in detail, Finnis considers Aquinas, in his work viewed synthetically, to have 
“identified such reasons [for action] with unprecedented explicitness and care”, see ibid., 95. Aquinas never 
offered a complete inventory o f such goods as he was mainly interested in working as a theologian, rather 
than a moral philosopher: see ibid., 79-80.
68 See ibid., 81-83, where Finnis analyses the famous part o f Summa Theologiae (I-II, q. 94, a. 2) where 
Aquinas discusses the natural law and its several primary principles. Finnis is clear that Aquinas does not 
purport to offer a complete list of such principles in this part o f his work, as is sometimes thought. Clearly 
the idea of there being several basic goods, including religion, is Thomistic.
69 Ibid., 85, two notes omitted. The first omitted note is a reference to Aquinas, De Perfectione Spiritualis 
Vitae (On the Perfecting o f the Spiritual Life), written in 1269-1270. This is the only reference by Finnis to 
a work o f Aquinas mentioning the good o f “religion” as such. Finnis introduces this citation with “e.g.” 
indicating that there are other citations from Aquinas’ works that explain what the good o f religion is, but 
Finnis does not list any. The second omitted note is to the final chapter o f Aquinas where Finnis discusses 
how we are to seek assimilation to God: we will treat this below when we look at this final chapter. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Finnis does not deal at all with Aquinas’s treatment of religion as a virtue.
70 This depth or transcendent quality o f the harmony involved in Aquinas’s understanding of religion is 
treated below at s. 7.3.6b.
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All the basic goods, including the good of religion, are basic insofar as they are self-
evident principles, truly primary principles of practical thinking. They form the starting
points of all practical deliberation and action, shaping it from the very beginning.
This does not mean that they are data-less intuitions, or “felt certainties”, or that 
one cannot be mistaken about them, or that they cannot be defended by rational 
considerations. On the contrary, Aquinas firmly holds that they are understood by 
what he calls “induction” of principles, by which he means insight into data of 
experience (data preserved, after the direct experience, in the memory).71
To speak of the self-evidence of the basic goods is not to claim that everyone knows them 
correctly or easily. It is necessary to have experience (and memory o f this experience) in 
order to grasp the point of the various forms of human flourishing, including the good of
• » TJ «religion. It is possible to be mistaken about the basic human goods, at least to some
degree. Finnis acknowledges that Aquinas wrote more than once that “no one makes
mistakes about principles, or first principles”,73 but Finnis argues that
this must be understood narrowly, since (often in the same works, and sometimes in 
the same passage) he also says that error about even first principles is possible (and 
can even be difficult to overcome, for want of more obvious considerations by 
which to disprove the mistaken belief).74
7.3.2 Religion is a self-evident basic good
71 Aquinas, 87, two notes omitted.
72 Finnis does not explicitly refer to the good o f religion being included in his analysis o f the basic human 
goods in general, but obviously what he says about them applies to religion too, so religion is emphasised 
here even though perhaps this gives the false impression that it is explicitly and comprehensively treated by 
Finnis (as part o f the work o f  Aquinas).
73 Ibid., 100, with six references to Aquinas’ work, including Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 100, a. 11.
74 Aquinas, 100, with six more references to Aquinas’ works, including Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 72, a. 5.
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Errors about first principles can be caused by reasoning being clouded by emotions, for 
example, or by one’s assuming something false or imaginary.75 Therefore, Aquinas’ 
insistence that one cannot be mistaken about first principles, that these principles are 
known to everyone, “must be understood as stating what is the case ‘in principle’ or 
under favourable conditions”.76 All this can be applied to the good of religion.
7.3.3 Religion is the object o f  a natural inclination
Aquinas saw religion as a basic perfection of human nature, which precisely as such 
provides us with a reason to pursue it and instantiate it in actions. Finnis emphasises that 
Aquinas did not put forward the idea that we first come to know our nature in a 
theoretical manner, and then come to know the goods that are perfections o f our nature.77 
No, we first come to know the objects of our actions as opportunities for fulfillment, and 
only then come to know these fulfilments as indicating truths about our nature as human 
beings. Our capacities as human beings, which are grounded in our human nature, are 
expressed in our “natural inclinations”. The good of religion is not itself an inclination; it 
is pointed to by an inclination. Finnis says that Aquinas did not make clear what kind of 
inclination provides the object of any particular basic human good.78 However, Finnis
15 Errors made in practical reasoning can also contribute to future errors in grasping first principles, by a 
kind of corruption of one’s nature, even though one’s basic nature is not thereby fully corrupted and 
continues to witness to the falsity o f one’s erroneous practical reasoning based on false first principles: see 
Aquinas, 100-101.
76 Ibid., 101. Finnis (presuming that he agrees with Aquinas here, which seems likely) is more clear than 
Grisez on the point that one can be incorrect in one’s grasp of even first principles.
77 See ibid., 90-94 and 101-102.
78 See ibid., 93.
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does say that, according to Aquinas’ understanding of inclinations and goods, “the goods
cause the inclinations” and that
the important point to understand is that the discussion [in Summa Theologiae] 
neither asserts nor implies that one knows which inclinations are ‘natural 
inclinations’ (in the relevant sense) prior to or independently o f an understanding 
of the intelligible goods which are their objects.79
The point here seems to be that one’s grasp of the goodness of any basic form of human 
fulfillment is a thoroughly practical grasp, a practical insight into why some option for 
choice might be worthwhile to pursue by action, rather than a theoretical insight into the 
way things are independently of any potential, and potentially fulfilling, action o f one’s 
own. It is also clear that one’s grasp of a primary practical principle is a grasp of a good, 
not of one’s inclination, as such.80
Aquinas was not talking about idiosyncratic inclinations shared by only some human 
beings (due to illness, for example), or about inclinations to sin. Such inclinations are not 
natural in the sense meant by Aquinas in his discussion of the goods, because they do not 
point to reasons for action.81
7.3.4 Practical insight into religion presupposes non-practical knowledge
Finnis does not claim, however, that Aquinas wishes to restrict the goods to the purely
existential order, the order to do with our choices and commitments, thereby denying that
79 Ibid., making reference to Summa Theologiae I-II q. 23, a. 4 and II-II q. 47, a. 15.
80 One might even be unaware of having an inclination when one grasps the point o f pursuing a good.
81 See Aquinas, 93. Note therefore that Aquinas’s understanding o f natural law as natural is intrinsically 
linked to the idea o f reasons for action being naturally accessible.
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any theoretical knowledge is necessary for grasping them as goods or pursuing them 
effectively. In Aquinas’ epistemology, all our knowledge, even knowledge of primary 
principles, depends firstly on the senses, even though we are bom with an innate ability 
to experience and know.82 Our practical knowledge of first principles “will outrun, by 
anticipation, the theoretical knowledge it presupposed”, but some non-practical 
knowledge and experience is presupposed by all practical knowledge.84
7.3.5 Religion is a search fo r  the objective truth about God and life
Finnis adds to his definition of the good of religion as harmony with the transcendent
source of reality, the following phrase:
the basic good of religion as a personal search for, appropriation of, and adherence 
in practice to the truth about God as one can grasp it. 5
Following Aquinas, one of the things that both Finnis (and Grisez) insist on is that the 
basic goods are open-ended fields of human opportunity, and as such, we do not grasp
82 See ibid., 101-102.
83 Ibid., 94. This is so because the goods are open-ended opportunities for fulfillment, so the initial 
experience that is presupposed will be only a starting point for pursuit, not the full reality o f the good.
84 Aquinas (read by Finnis) seems to go further than Grisez here in his saying that some non-practical 
knowledge is presupposed by practical knowledge. However, if we keep it clearly in view that practical 
knowledge is not deduced or derived from such non-practical knowledge, but that the non-practical 
knowledge is needed as a kind o f material for the practical reasoning to work with, then it would seem that 
Grisez is not that different from Aquinas and Finnis after all. See Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical 
Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” Natural Law Forum, 
10(1965), where he says: “the basic precepts of practical reason accept the possibilities suggested by 
experience and direct the objects of reason’s consideration toward the fulfilments taking shape in the mind” 
(179) and “The direction o f  practical reason presupposes possibilities on which reason can get leverage, 
and such possibilities arise only in reflection upon experience” (180).
85 Aquinas, 293. The context here is one in which Finnis is discussing the freedom o f the act o f faith, and 
issues surrounding Aquinas’ position on the treatment o f heretics. Finnis holds that Aquinas was seriously 
mistaken with regard to such issues, especially in light of the insights o f  Vatican II’s “Declaration on 
Religious Freedom” (Dignitatis Humanae), which Finnis explicitly refers to, and echoes in the phrase 
quoted here.
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these goods definitively at first; in fact, we do not ever grasp them definitively or 
instantiate them completely. This suggests that the goods all share the quality of an 
ongoing search, on which one can make progress (or go astray), but which one never 
finishes (at least in this life, and maybe not even in the next). Applying this to religion, 
we can see how the idea o f it being a search, at least initially and to some extent always, 
is clearly appropriate.86
Finnis’ use o f the word “truth” in his reference to religion reminds us of the objectivity of 
the good of religion. Anyone who conscientiously pursues the good o f religion, and who 
wills to effectively instantiate it, is concerned with finding the truth about God and about 
how to live in harmony with God. Such a conscientious and religious person is not 
content with merely being subjectively sincere and well-intentioned.
The final chapter of Aquinas offers some discussion of matters relevant to the truth about 
religion and about God. One of the first things Finnis does there, is to make sure that we 
do not envisage practical rationality as a matter purely of the existential order.87 Although 
matters to do with deliberation and choice are primarily third-order matters, “no course of 
reflections [such as those in Aquinas] could reasonably remain confined to the practical, 
to third-order considerations.”88 The existence of moral principles is both a matter of the
86 In a sense, all the basic human goods involve a search, as they all can be pursued, and not just 
instantiated or done.
87 See Aquinas, 294.
88 Ibid. Finnis’ reference here to “third-order” is a reference to the ontology presented by Aquinas in his 
prologue to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics. Finnis discusses this ontological schema in Aquinas, 20- 
23. First order matters are matters to do with given nature, matters that reason considers but does not affect. 
Second order matters are matters o f logic. Third order matters are matters to do with practical rationality,
existential order, and thus thoroughly practical in that respect, but also a matter of the 
first-order, the order of nature, of the given (independently of our use of reason), and thus 
theoretical in that respect. Our capacities, which ground our deliberations and choices, 
are matters that are to some extent given, “independently of our thinking and willing”,89 
and so are matters of the first-order. The basic human goods “in important respects are 
what they are independently o f one’s deliberation and choice”,90 and so are first-order 
matters too. Also, one needs theoretical knowledge (knowledge o f the first-order, of the 
given) of possibilities if one is to be able to deliberate and choose (in the third-order). It is 
clear that for Finnis, as for Grisez,91 the four orders are not sealed off from each other. 
Neither Finnis nor Grisez is an existentialist, thinking that choices are independent of 
objective reality, or existence separate from essence.
Factors in the third order point beyond practical reasoning,92 or, in other words, beyond 
the existential order. Do our capacities and possibilities, human goods and moral 
principles, just happen to exist and be as they are, or do they exist, with the character they 
have, for some more-than-human reason, by some more-than-human cause? Further, why 
is it that practical and moral principles oblige us to seek integral human fulfillment? 
Aquinas sees the answer to these kinds of questions, which are about the widest reaches
order introduced by human reason into our deliberation and choosing. Fourth order matters have to do with 
things we make or design, matters to do with technical or artistic skill. See s. 2.6 above for Grisez’s 
approach to this in Beyond the New Theism.
89 Aquinas, 294.
90 Ibid., 294-295.
91 See ss. 2.6.3 -  2.6.5 above.
92 The title o f the relevant section o f  Aquinas [X.l] is called “Beyond Practical Reasoning”, 294.
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of reality and the overall context of our deliberating and choosing, to be answered 
adequately only with reference to God.93
Finnis outlines the five ways of Aquinas demonstrating the existence of God.94 One of his 
reasons is that he sees a very close “fit” between first-order positions and third-order 
positions.95 A person’s (or group’s) position on theoretical matters, such as whether 
reality is purely material or is created by God, will affect substantially that person’s (or 
group’s) understanding of practical rationality. And vice-versa. It matters for practical 
rationality what one thinks theoretically about God; and it matters for one’s thinking 
about God what one thinks about practical rationality. Although Finnis does not say so, 
this last point is particularly true for one’s practical grasp of the good of religion and the 
way one ought to pursue and instantiate it. Clearly, if  one holds the philosophical position 
of a materialist or a Nietzsche, or some post-modern worldview, to mention only the 
positions criticised by Finnis in this chapter, this will affect one’s view of the good of 
religion, as well as one’s view of practical rationality and morality in general. Truth 
matters to the good of religion. The basic goods of knowledge and religion are closely 
related.
93 Reflections about God come last in a philosophical education, according to Aquinas, after we have 
reflected on creatures (and, according to Finnis, also on our practical rationality): see ibid., 296. This why 
Finnis (and Grisez) most often place their thoughts on God and religion at, or towards, the end of their 
philosophical texts. Finnis makes the point too that in a theological text, by contrast, one could 
appropriately, in fact most appropriately, place matters to do with God first, as theology is based on divine 
revelation, not on reflection on creatures.
94 See ibid., 298-304, and (for the fourth way) 332. In the previous two books by Finnis, examined above, 
he followed Grisez’s cosmological argument for God’s existence; here, not surprisingly in a book on 
Aquinas, he specifically follows Aquinas’ five ways, which are similar in some respects, but not the exact 
same, as Grisez’s argument.
95 See ibid., 296.
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Like Grisez, Finnis emphasises that the God whose existence we come to know through
reason (in Finnis’ case here, following Aquinas’ five ways) is a very mysterious reality.
“God exists as pure act” but “this existence and act cannot be like any existence or
act(uality) otherwise known to us”.96 Nevertheless, in following Aquinas, Finnis seems to
be not as strict as Grisez on this point.97 The arguments from change needing to be
explained by the unchanging, existence needing to be explained by the necessarily
existing, the fact that a universe (of contingent beings) with no beginning would at some
time ceased to exist and so nothing now should exist unless there is a necessary being, the
ordered nature of things which exist at various levels of excellence and being, and their
orderliness and directedness -  these being the five ways of Aquinas -  all seem to point to
a God who is pure act, without any unactualised potential. The five ways begin from
factors in our experience, and they end up showing us that:
Only that [divine] government and that shaping and sustaining providence can 
explain the actuality, existence, specific reality, goodness, and orderliness of every 
being without exception.98
Finnis thinks that the five ways point clearly to a God who “must be pure mind without 
mutability (or inertness!) or any trace of bodiliness -  for the potentiality to be changed ...
7.3.6a The five ways and God as pure mind
96 Ibid., 305.
97 See ibid., n. 45: Finnis says “Aquinas takes his own warning [about how we can know almost nothing 
positive about God, but only what he is not] less austerely than Grisez”, with reference to Aquinas’s work 
and to Grisez, Beyond the New Theism , 241-272.
98 Aquinas, 305, echoing the five ways.
is intrinsic to being a body.”99 This means that God’s action in creating, governing and 
sustaining the universe is the act of a mind, an intellectual act that includes practical 
understanding and willing, though on a scale beyond any human understanding and 
willing.100
Finnis sees a very close parallelism between God and man. Man has natural capacities to 
understand and to will in accordance with practical reasonableness. Thus he is able to 
share in God’s action, and this sharing in God’s action (of creation, providence and 
governance) is our imperfect fulfillment in this life, but our perfect fulfillment in the next. 
Following Aquinas closely, Finnis thus tends to see our ultimate fulfillment as a singular 
reality, a sharing in God’s act, in God’s own reality and life, which can begin now and 
will be perfected by God’s act in the next life.101
7.3.6b Practical reasonableness is our sharing in the eternal law
Following Aquinas,102 Finnis speaks of the governance and sustaining of the universe as 
“the eternal law” o f God. Each of the orders of reality (the natural, the logical, the 
existential, and the technical/artistic) has its order from God’s impressing onto it the
99 Ibid, Grisez, by contrast, is not happy in speaking o f God as a “mind”: see ss. 6.1.9d and 6.2.2a above.
100 See ibid., 305-306. Thus Finnis seeks to retain the sense o f  God as utterly mysterious.
101 Grisez, by contrast, sees our fulfillment in this life and the next as having two quite distinct aspects, one 
of which is a natural fulfillment of our nature and the other a supernatural fulfillment that goes beyond our 
human nature. The former includes fulfillment in the good of religion, and thus a rich harmony with God in 
and through human action, and also a fulfillment in all the other basic human goods; the latter, the strictly 
supernatural fulfillment, is a special gift o f God to us, not a human action at all, as it is the vision o f God 
offered to the blessed as their share in God’s life and love by pure grace.
102 For simplicity’s sake, mainly Finnis is referred to in the following paragraphs, with the understanding 
that his thoughts are presented by him as an accurate interpretation of the thought of Aquinas, with whom 
Finnis agrees.
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appropriate principles or “laws” of that order. The laws of the various orders of reality, 
expressing the eternal law of God in his own perfect practical reasonableness, direct 
towards “the common benefit of the universe as a whole (and thus of its parts).”103
We move from here to the idea that we can share by our judgement and willing 
(themselves God’s gifts) in God’s legislation, his eternal law, and thus his governance 
and providence. Insofar as it is accessible to unaided reason, this sharing in the eternal 
law, in God’s providence and plan, is called “the natural law”, meaning the natural moral 
law (and not the natural laws of science, or the laws of logic, or of technical or artistic 
production, all of which are orders distinct from the existential order).104
What Finnis is moving towards here is a religious way of understanding practical
rationality and morality.
The principles of practical reasonableness are now understandable as having the 
force and depth o f a kind o f  sharing in God’s creative purpose and providence. The 
good of practical reasonableness {bonum rationis} is now understandable as good 
not only intrinsically and for its own sake but also as a constituent in the good of 
assimilatio and adhaesio to the omnipotent creator’s practical wisdom and choice. 
The truth o f the practical principles is now understandable not only as the 
anticipation of the human fulfilment to which they direct us, but also as their 
conformity to the most real o f  all realities, the divine creative mind, the mind which 
is nothing other than the very reality of that pure and simple act, God.105
103 Ibid. Particularly in the existential order, the term “law” and the image o f God as a legislator of the 
universe, is appropriate for this providential governance, insofar as law in its central sense “is something 
addressed by one mind and will to others -  by one freely choosing person to other freely choosing 
persons... It is always a plan for co-ordination and free cooperation”, ibid., 307-308 (emphasis in original; 
note omitted).
104 See ibid., 309, n. 64, quoting from Summa Theologiae I-II q. 91, a. 2.
105 Aquinas, 308-309, two notes omitted, emphases added. What Finnis seems to be saying here is that the 
good of religion (as assimilation to, and adherence to, God) involves us understanding the basic human 
goods and moral truth to be such because of their conformity to God’s creative mind and act.
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Finnis states that practical reasonableness, which is a basic good in itself as well as an 
overall term for moral goodness with its integral love of all goods and persons, can be 
understood in a new way by reference to the good of religion. The key term is 
assimilation, which Finnis had clearly used to specify the harmony constituting the good 
of religion in his earlier definition.106
Even though Finnis does not use the term “good of religion” in his final chapter, then, we 
can be sure that this good is what he is talking about when he talks about the good of our 
assimilation to God in our pursuit and instantiation of practical reasonableness.107 When 
we are truly practically reasonable, truly morally good, we are like God in a very 
important way, sharing his intellect and will, so to speak, and conforming in our own 
judgements and choices to his wisdom and choice. Being like God is the good of religion 
and it is a transcendent aspect of the good of practical reasonableness itself too. The good 
of religion helps us to understand the truth of practical principles because it makes clear 
that practical principles, both in their basic practical sense and in their fuller moral sense, 
are true in their conformity to the mind of God,108 the mind that projects and chooses our 
human fulfillment as part o f his eternal law (which is God’s providential plan for the 
common good, or flourishing, of the whole universe). This is why natural law is natural 
and law. Practical rationality is created by the author of our nature. The reasonableness of
106 See 7.3.1 above (n. 69), and Aquinas, 85.
107 One should remember too that our pursuit of practical reasonableness is not a pursuit o f  reasonableness 
in and for itself only, but a pursuit o f integral fulfillment in all the goods. Practical reasonableness is 
transparent for the full range of goods, substantive and existential: see s. 7.2.3 above.
108 See ibid., 100. See also Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, “Practical Principles,” 115-120.
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natural law is a sharing in the reasonableness of God the creator o f nature, who impresses 
the principles o f his wisdom and providence into nature in various ways, to direct it 
towards its fulfillment and flourishing, its common good.109 Thus, our being practical and 
moral is a kind of cooperation with God in his providential plan for the happiness of all 
his creation. The natural law is a kind of “bond or covenant... with God”.110
7.3.6c Cooperation with God through religion and practical reasonableness 
Clearly Finnis sees practical reasonableness as embodying the good of religion, which is 
harmony with God, assimilation to God, adherence to God’s will, a bond with God, a 
covenant with God -  even at the level of a strictly philosophical understanding of the 
natural law. It is possible to grasp by philosophy alone that God is a person (albeit utterly 
mysterious), who creates purely for the sake of expressing the fullness o f divine being by 
bringing into (and maintaining) in existence beings who can share various kinds and 
levels of likeness to God in their various kinds of flourishing.111 The God demonstrated 
by the five ways of Aquinas is surely not less than personal, particularly when we take 
into account that creation must be a freely chosen act, thus exhibiting intellect and will; 
also, such an ultimate being must not lack anything, being pure act, and so must have 
created only for the sake of freely expressing his own fullness of being and goodness. 
Therefore it is not “arbitrary or anthropomorphic” to understand God as personal, or to 
see our own acts of intellect and will (especially insofar as they are morally good, fully
109 See Aquinas, 309.
110 Ibid., 309, n. 68.
111 See ibid., 310 and 311. Finnis is more confident now, about knowing philosophically that God is a 
person, than he was in Natural Law and Natural Rights: see s. 7.1.7 above. This probably stems from his 
recent in-depth study o f Aquinas’ work.
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open and loving towards being, as God is) as sharing in God’s intellect and will. Further, 
it is not impossible or wrong for us to think naturally and philosophically that “some kind 
of interpersonal co-operation with the divine is possible, and, since possible, an important 
good and something supremely to be hoped for.”112
We might not know for sure philosophically if  the good of religion is fully achievable, 
but our grasp of its possibility and benefit can lead us to wonder if this God has 
communicated with us “in a way more intelligible and more personal than the unfolding 
of this ordered universe”, to help us to know more about the good of religion and how to 
instantiate it.113
7.3.6d The point o f  human existence is to be as like God as we can be 
Aquinas’ five ways take us beyond the limits of Aristotle’s understanding of God, and so 
make it possible for us to grasp by unaided reason the good of religion in a way not 
possible for Aristotle’s philosophy. Grasping the good of religion enables us to come to a 
deeper understanding of practical rationality as a distinctively human (rational) way of 
sharing in God’s wisdom and love. Love of God is the overall context and rationale for 
love of neighbour, which is the master principle of morality.114 It is right that we should
112 Aquinas, 311. Finnis is here referring to the good o f religion, which he speaks of as a great benefit 
“supremely to be hoped for”. Finnis also points out (311-312) that it is not merely arbitrary or 
anthropomorphic to acknowledge our utter dependence on “the divine cause o f nature’s existence and 
orderly fecundity” in all our projects and hopes.
113 Ibid., 311.
114 On love of neighbour as master principle o f morality (in Aquinas’ account o f morality), see ibid., 126- 
128; see also ibid., 131, where he states that the “love o f neighbour as oneself’ principle is similar in 
content to the first principle o f  morality in the moral theory shared by himself, Grisez and Boyle.
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love God above all things, as God is the perfect creator o f all things, and thus the ultimate 
cause of their goodness, of all created goodness, or “loveableness”. However, in loving 
God we also love the good things he has created as an expression of his goodness. We 
thus can, and ought to, love our neighbours because we can see the divine goodness in 
them:
... the master principle or first precept of the natural moral law can now be more 
adequately stated: one should love one’s neighbour as oneself by reason o f  the 
divine goodness as it is participated, reflected, and imaged in that neighbour as in 
every human being -  a goodness that can be both respected and nurtured in those in 
and for whom one can do good.115
Our grasp of the good of practical reasonableness is deepened and strengthened by our
seeing it in the light of the good of religion, the good of our loving God in our neighbour,
loving with a love that is truly God-like. Finnis sees practical reasonableness as having “a
further overarching p o i n t 16 beyond its own intrinsic, specific goodness.
This further, more ultimate point {finis} is to be as like God as human persons can 
be. For that is how we can participate well in -  and give our own life the 
characteristics of -  that activity which not only is supremely intelligent, free, self- 
possessed, and generous, but also must make best sense of everything.117
The point of human existence then is to participate in God’s activity, which is a kind of 
participation in God himself, who is pure act. We do this by practical reasonableness, 
seen as a kind o f participation in the good of religion.
115 Ibid., 314, emphasis in original. (Three notes omitted.)
116 Ibid., emphasis in original.
117 Ibid., 315, emphasis in original. (Two notes omitted.)
Yet this does not mean that we ought to be concerned only with the good of religion, or 
only with the good of practical reasonableness, for their own specific sakes. On the 
contrary, this participating in the goods of practical reasonableness and religion (and thus 
in God’s free, wise, creative and loving actfivity]) is totally open to the full range of 
human opportunities for fulfillment. The further overarching point of practical 
reasonableness, which is to be like God, “subsumes, embraces, confirms, and explains all 
the other reasons for action” at both the individual and social levels.118 The 
reasonableness of the various human goods, in all their distinctness and incommensurable 
diversity, is not destroyed by the overarching religious point of practical reasonableness, 
but affirmed and included and rendered even more reasonable, and thus stronger as 
motives for living a good human life. The good of religion gives meaning to living a 
good human life because it places all of human life in the context of loving God, and this 
is a love that includes all other loves, and strengthens them.
7.3.6e The beatific vision and human fulfillment
What Finnis says in his positive interpretation of Aquinas thus far is broadly supportive 
of Grisez’s moral theory and his view of religion as a basic human good. Still, there are 
some questions that arise. Does Finnis, following Aquinas, go too far in understanding 
God to be a mind, in attributing to God perfections that we find in human beings, such as 
intellect and will? Does Finnis, subsequently, understand our participation in God’s 
actions through practical reasonableness (and religion) to be our sharing in God’s very 
life as God? If the answer to these two questions is yes, then there would seem that 
Finnis/Aquinas do not support Grisez’s moral theory or his view of religion totally,
1,8 Ibid., 314.
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because Grisez emphasises in several of his works, as we have seen above,119 that the 
good of religion is a natural human good instantiated in human acts. It is a good that can 
be instantiated only with God’s help, and it will not be perfected in the kingdom until 
God recreates his creation and raises us up to everlasting life, but it is still a precisely 
human fulfillment. As such, it is not a complete sharing in God’s own divine life, which 
remains ultimately mysterious and utterly distinct from the human. We can share in 
God’s own life by grace, by God’s act, not our own human act(s). This sharing in God’s 
own life is perfected in the kingdom as a fulfillment in addition to the rich human 
fulfillment in all the human goods. Grisez criticises Aquinas for holding a view that 
seems to reduce the beatific vision to a human act (albeit done with necessary divine 
help) that fulfils us as human. Does Finnis follow Aquinas here, or does he support 
Grisez’s position?
Finnis broadly supports Aquinas’ position, but he criticises aspects of it, pointing out
some of the same weaknesses in it that Grisez points out too.120 Finnis seems to accept
Aquinas’ “long argument”121 that perfect fulfillment,
a condition in which all human desires are fulfilled and all human efforts find their 
completion, consists in an uninterruptible vision of God (and in God of the other 
truths that we naturally desire to know), a vision which would be possible, by 
divine act, after one’ bodily, active, and secular life ... is ended in death.122
119 See above, ss. 3.1.3, 3.1.5, 3.4.6, 3.5,4.7.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.9c, 6.2.3b.
120 See Aquinas, 315-319.
121 Finnis refers to Aquinas’ argument in Summa Contra Gentiles I I I ,  (chapter twenty five onwards), in 
which he reviews our human desires and eliminates as candidates for the integrating role o f giving meaning 
to human life “all those objects o f desire (e.g. power, reputation, sensory pleasure) which cannot make fully 
satisfactory sense o f one’s own or one’s community’s whole life” (Aquinas, 315).
122 Ibid., 315-316, note omitted.
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However, Finnis accepts this conclusion “only when understood restrictively”.123 
Aquinas’s argument succeeds in some ways, but fails in others. Firstly, it successfully 
shows “that human beatitudo perfecta must be structured around seeing God ... and be 
free from susceptibility to illness, injury, loss, or death.”124 Secondly, it shows that such 
perfect fulfillment “would be a further dimension of likeness, assimilatio, to God”, as 
God’s life is “the activity of an understanding totally intelligible to (and fitting object of)
1 c
itself’. Thirdly, the argument for the beatific vision as the ultimate end of human life 
succeeds in showing
that our beatitudo would also add to assimilatio a much closer relationship, a kind 
of joining up, cleaving, adhaesio, to God inasmuch as one would understand God 
and not only understand but also, inevitably, love him -  something not possible for 
subrational created realities.126
We can begin this assimilation to God and this adherence to him in love even now in this 
life, and can be motivated thereby to love our neighbour for a transcendental reason: 
because we recognise “that every human being is, like oneself, the object of this special, 
interpersonal divine providence and possible fulfillment in relationship with God.”127
123 Ibid., 316.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. This seems to suggest that there could be less than perfect assimilations to God, which we can 
perhaps see as constitutive o f the natural good o f religion.
126 Ibid., note omitted. Here Finnis seems to see adhesion to God as a further perfection o f our relationship
with God. Thus there seem to be gradations o f perfection within beatitudo itself, with adhesion (or union 
with God) as the highest. However, this is not totally clear from Finnis’ treatment. Perhaps this is simply 
the inevitable limitations of human language trying to express truths about God and heaven.
127 Ibid., 317, note omitted.
Finnis follows Aquinas much more closely than Grisez here, in that he seems to agree 
with Aquinas that our complete fulfillment can be found, and, indeed, must be found, in 
the beatific vision, because we are to be defined primarily as human by our intelligence 
and the beatific vision is the perfect fulfillment of our human capacity to understand, and 
thus be like God, who is perfect self-understanding. Grisez criticises Aquinas on these 
points because he thinks Aquinas too narrowly defines God and man by reference to the 
intellect, and thus reduces human fulfillment to one dimension o f our full humanity, as 
well as reducing God to a category of our experience, intellect. Also, Aquinas’ approach 
presents the beatific vision as a perfection of a purely human capacity, and a sharing in 
God’s own divine life by this human fulfillment, whereas Grisez has argued that our 
sharing in the vision of God, and sharing in God’s own divine life, is possible not as a 
human fulfillment, but only as a divine gift that transcends our human capacities and 
actions. So Grisez wants to see two distinct dimensions to our fulfillment in the kingdom, 
one a human fulfillment, including the perfecting of our human harmony with God in the 
good of religion, and a divine fulfillment in the beatific vision. The question might be put 
like this: does Finnis, following Aquinas, equate the good of religion with the beatific 
vision, in contrast to Grisez, who sees the two as distinct?
7.3.6 f Finnis ’ critique o f  Aquinas on the beatific vision
Finnis says he thinks Aquinas’ argument is successful only if it is understood 
restrictively. Firstly, Finnis thinks that Aquinas has not shown philosophically that 
perfect human fulfillment (in a vision of God) is actually a reality, and not merely an
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attractive possibility.128 Secondly, and here he draws closer to Grisez’s thinking, Finnis 
states that
the arguments for a purely contemplative human fulfillment must be taken together 
with the reasons which Aquinas himself provides for significantly widening
beatitudo 's content.129
Like Grisez, Finnis does not want to define perfect human fulfillment in terms of only
contemplation. He mentions the fact, for example, that one’s soul, separate from its body,
is imperfect, so that bodily resurrection must be part of one’s perfect fulfillment.130
Thirdly, Finnis argues that, as God is active in loving his creation and creatures, our
being like God in sharing the beatific vision must include our loving, actively, other
creatures as God does.
How then could beatitudo perfecta fail to include, over and above contemplation 
and love of the God thus seen, a willing sharing of goods with other human 
persons, in friendship?”131
Finnis admits that Aquinas did not deal well with these issues.132 He thinks that Aquinas’ 
argument that our perfect human fulfillment is to be found in contemplation of God is a 
kind of incomplete argument. It is as if Aquinas were arguing a hypothetical case, an 
artificial case: whether, if all that existed were one’s soul and God, one would be 
perfectly happy in contemplating God. To this question the answer must be yes, and
128 See ibid. Finnis is not impressed or convinced by Aquinas’ argument that man’s natural desire to know 
God, because it is natural, cannot be in vain.
129 Ibid.
130 See ibid., 318. Finnis sees him self as following the lead of Aquinas in all this, and provides references to 
Aquinas’s works in his text.
131 Ibid., emphasis added. See also, ibid., 329-330.
132 See ibid., 318-319.
Aquinas’ argument, with its emphasis on God’s perfection, shows this. But the fact is that 
none of us is a solitary creature; nor is any of us a disembodied soul. Finnis seems to 
accept that Aquinas’ philosophical treatment of the beatific vision is weakened by his 
failure to deal with these facts and to integrate them properly into his arguments and 
conclusions.
However, Finnis thinks that when Aquinas engages in theology rather than philosophy, 
his thinking was more adequate concerning human fulfillment. In the light of revelation, 
the radically social nature of our fulfillment after death, which can be expressed in 
biblical metaphors such as “kingdom”, was much more clearly seen by Aquinas.133
7.3.6g Aquinas is partially supportive o f Grisez’s theory
It could be said then that Finnis in this book, following Aquinas closely, is only partially 
supportive of Grisez’s moral theory and his understanding of the good of religion. Like 
Grisez, Finnis and Aquinas acknowledge the idea that we can gain a deeper 
understanding of, and stronger motive to engage in, practical reasoning by seeing it in the 
light of our calling to be like God, to share in God’s thinking and willing, his wisdom and 
love. Finnis (and Aquinas) seem to identify this being-like-God with our sharing in the 
divine life in the beatific vision, a sharing that can begin even now, and which could be 
called the basic human good of religion, and which will be perfected in heaven. Finnis 
argues that even though Aquinas identified this vision of God with contemplation, it is 
only adequately understood to be perfect and real fulfillment when we see it as a vision
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133 See ibid., 320 and 327-331. Aquinas’ theological thought is treated only briefly in Aquinas.
of God that allows us to share in God’s love of creation and creatures in a more integrally 
human way than the word “contemplation” might denote. Thus, Finnis shares Grisez’s 
concern that the full range of basic human goods should constitute our perfect fulfillment 
in heaven, and not just the fulfillment of our intellects. Finnis also states that he accepts 
(following Aquinas) that our sharing in God’s divine life is a pure gift, rather than a 
human achievement.134
Still, Finnis’ thought in this book does not indicate any major distinction between the 
basic human good o f religion and our vision of God in heaven, except insofar as the 
beatific vision is a perfection o f  our seeing God in this life; Finnis seems to see both the 
(practical) good of religion and the perfect beatitude of our vision of God in heaven as 
assimilatio, or assimilation, to God. Grisez , on the other hand, seems to see the beatific 
vision as quite distinct from the good of religion, which might be understood as our 
harmony with God in and through human actions, with the term “harmony” being 
understood as a narrow and limited reality, as a kind of naturally available harmony 
between our choices and God’s will.
Nevertheless, Finnis (following Aquinas) agrees with Grisez in considering the good of 
religion to offer an overarching purpose for human life, integrating life as a whole. This 
overarching purpose is a kind of natural union with God, a union that includes all the 
human goods, especially that of friendship and society. Understanding our lives as
336
134 See 331, n. 174.
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essentially religious helps us to understand morality in a way that supports, illuminates, 
and elevates morality, and to understand life as a whole.
7.4 Boyle “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and 
Groups” [1998] 135
This article is the most sustained philosophical piece by any o f the Grisez school on the 
good of religion, and helps to clarify and extend what has been seen thus far.
7.4.1 A broad definition o f  religion as harmony
Boyle firstly argues that religion can be an end, and not just a means to an end. Religion
has a distinctive benefit:
I propose that a religious benefit is a harmony between a person or persons and the 
divine, that is, God or the gods or whatever is understood to be the ultimate 
principle of reality and meaning in the universe.136
Religion is centrally concerned with a particular practical response to the “divine”: 
human seeking to be in harmony with it. The “divine” need not be understood as referring 
to a God or gods, especially as these terms are assumed to refer to personal or quasi­
135 J. Boyle, “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” American 
Journal o f  Jurisprudence 43 (1998): 1-24. Footnote 5 points out explicitly the relationship between 
“Practical Principles” (1987) and this article. See chapter four above for analysis and summary of 
“Practical Principles” . Boyle has been a substantial contributor to Grisez’s theory over many years; in 
particular, he was one o f the main collaborators on Christian Moral Principles.
136 “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 3, making comparative 
reference (in footnote 3) to Cicero’s definition of religion, which Aquinas used in Summa Theologiae, II-II, 
q. 81, a. 1: “religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call 
divine”. Boyle draws here on a standard dictionary definition (Webster’s) o f religion. He also refers to 
William Alston’s idea that religion should be defined by pointing out several “religion-making 
characteristics” that combine, in various ways and to various degrees in specific instances, to define 
religion: see “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 2, n. 1.
personal realities. A person can seek the benefit of religion by seeking to be in harmony 
with an impersonal ultimate principle of reality and meaning, or even more than one such 
principle. Pantheists, who typically identify nature as the ultimate principle of reality and 
meaning, can pursue the good of religion by seeking to live in harmony with nature, thus 
exhibiting “a kind of natural piety”.137 Even atheists can seek the good of religion insofar 
as they can seek to live in harmony with an “impersonal principle of [objective] 
goodness”.138
7.4.2 Grounded in our experiences o f  sin and failure
We experience ourselves as sinful and, thus, alienated from the divine. We also 
experience the failures o f our initiatives, and quite naturally link these failures with our 
sinfulness: “Success is often taken as a sign of divine approval, failure a sign of divine 
displeasure.”139 We might experience this alienation emotionally, or we might suppress, 
ignore, or explain our psychic discomfort in non-religious terms. However, many people 
seek to overcome this alienation by religious acts such as repentance and sacrifice to the 
gods. Even people who do not belong to organised religions can experience sinfulness, 
failure, and grasp the point of trying to seek harmony with the ultimate principle of 
reality.
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137 Ibid., 4.
138 Ibid., 3. In this respect, Boyle is similar to Finnis and George: see s. 7.1.1 above.
139 Ibid.
People can choose aspects of religious practice and even the benefit o f religion itself as a 
means to other non-religious ends. Such ends include good community relations, the 
beauty of ritual, and “peace of mind or survival”.140 Still, many people criticise religious 
practices that are carried out exclusively for non-religious purposes. Such practices seem 
to miss the central point of religion. They also fail to recognise the “ultimacy of the 
divine with which harmony is sought”.141
Is religion the same thing as knowledge of the divine? Boyle argues that it is not, 
summing up his view in a pithy phrase: “The devil knows a lot about God.”142 Knowing 
about the divine is not the same thing as being in harmony with the divine. Still, 
knowledge of the divine is a necessary condition for anyone to pursue effectively 
harmony with the divine. However, cognitive states are not sufficient for harmony with 
the divine. Religion and knowledge are two linked but distinct basic human goods.
Is religion reducible to other kinds of harmony, within the self or between self and 
others? No, religion is its own distinctive good, offering a benefit that can be related to 
the other reflexive goods, that can even contribute to them, but only insofar as it is a 
distinct good.143 One can recognise “a different and more radical kind of transcendence” 
in the divine than in oneself or one’s fellows:
140 Ibid., 4.
141 Ibid., 5.
142 Ibid.
143 See ibid., 6.
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7.4.3 Religion as a distinct end
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The goodness o f friendship and of personal peace and integrity is objective; as such 
it points to a transcendent principle of objective goodness. The possibility of 
harmony with that principle cannot be simply an instance o f friendship or personal 
peace; the divine is too different from other people and from  the elements o f  oneself 
to permit such reductions.144
Reducing religion to other goods makes some benefits impossible. For example, people 
who become aware of their mortality often seek the distinct good of inner peace. 
However, if people want to pursue this distinct good effectively and thoroughly, they 
want to pursue it in a way that is “in accord with the truth about reality”.145 Such a 
concern, to be in accord with the truth about reality, and so to achieve a true and lasting 
inner peace, “leads naturally to a concern to be in a proper relationship with the ultimate 
principle of this truth”.146
Boyle also gives a second example of how the divine is often seen as quite distinct from 
the self or other people. When we hope that the divine will bless our undertakings with 
success, we also recognise that the divine “may have other plans” than our own, and yet 
we still hope to initiate or maintain a relationship with this objective, transcendent Other. 
People often make a clear distinction between God’s will and our own will(s).147
144 Ibid., emphasis added.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 See ibid.
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Boyle distinguishes reasons for action from subjective desires, and goes on to show that
the good of religion, along with the other basic human goods, is objective and normative.
Boyle is not denying that emotional desires are important in human motivation; in fact,
emotional desires are essential.148 But the human goods that provide us with reasons for
action, and thus motivate us rationally, are not reducible to mere desires that one happens
to have. Boyle wishes to emphasise the role of judgement in our grasp of, pursuit of, and
instantiation of the human goods, including religion.149 The basic goods are intelligible
benefits. As such, we can pursue them even in the face of emotions that impede such
pursuit. We can pursue them even when our emotions vary in intensity over time. We can
pursue them in groups even though the different members of such groups vary in their
emotional motivation.150 When one has a reason for action, one grasps the point of such
action: one grasps its prescriptivity, or normativity. Such an action “is to be done”.
This is not the unconditional prescriptivity of moral obligation, since the reason 
may compete with other, undefeated reasons, but it is a ground for action 
irreducible to the fact that someone happens to be in a certain affective state toward 
some action or outcome.151
The basic goods, which are reasons for action, are normative then in a way that desires 
are not. We can explain to a third party (and/or to ourselves) why a particular good ought
148 See ibid., 8-9. Boyle has treated the distinction between goods (as reasons for actions) and emotional 
motivations in “Reasons for Action: Evaluative Cognitions that Underlie Motivations,” American Journal 
o f Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 177-197.
149 See “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning o f Individuals and Groups,” 7.
150 See ibid., 8. These three examples are given not to disparage emotions and emotional motivation but to 
emphasise the distinction between rational and emotional motivations and the importance o f the former 
along with the latter.
151 Ibid. Note that this means that no-one is morally obliged in every situation to pursue all or any o f the 
goods.
7.4.4a Practical judgement is not reducible to simply having certain desires
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to be pursued or instantiated; we do not simply point out that we feel a certain way, but 
we point to the intelligible benefit we rationally anticipate participating in through or in
152our action.
The rational element in this basis of motivation, that is, the intelligibility and 
normative character described above, holds out a promise that reasons for action are 
not simply subjective but importantly objective and interpersonal. The presence 
within reasons for action of intelligibilities that allow different persons to consider, 
assess, and argue about the same normative realities provides for the possibility of 
objectivity in this arena of reason and judgment. But objectivity also includes the 
idea that there is a rational method for correcting opinion and confidently 
approximating the truth.153
Boyle argues that the objectivity and normativity of these reasons for action make it 
imperative that we “clarify and scrutinize basic judgements about the nature of various 
sorts of benefits”.154 Such rational reflection on the basic goods is necessary if we are to 
pursue them as real benefits. It is necessary for us to correct mistakes about these benefits 
and how to instantiate them effectively. Such correction is possible when we take into 
account “past pursuit of goods by others, and the practices and institutions which provide 
the framework within which people pursue many benefits”.155
Boyle acknowledges here something that is implicit in Grisez’s moral theory, but not 
clearly expressed before now, namely that we can learn, indeed, we are required to learn,
152 See ibid., 9. When we explain our actions, we point to the goods we seek, not to the inclinations we 
have. We justify the appropriateness o f our inclinations (desires) with reference to the benefit or point of 
our act. Simply saying “because I feel like it” is not usually considered a good justification for acts.
153 Ibid. We might add that there could be several rational methods for correcting opinion and attaining 
truth, and not just “a rational method”.
154 Ibid., 9-10.
155 Ibid., 10. This is so notwithstanding the fact that basic goods are open-ended and our anticipation of the 
benefits of these goods is not totally predictable, as Boyle mentions (ibid.) and he, Grisez and Finnis 
insisted on in “Practical Principles,” part VI.
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from the practical reasoning and actions of others, in order to reason practically ourselves 
in any effective way. In fact, it is more than just a matter o f being effective: we are 
required as a matter of practical reasoning itself to seek to instantiate as effectively as 
practically and morally possible the good(s) we are pursuing in an action. Not to do so 
would be to fail to be practical or moral.
7.4.4b Religion is a normative and objective good, not a merely subjective desire
Boyle then goes on to specifically apply these insights to religion:
The intelligibility, normativity, and objectivity of reasons for action imply that 
religion, like other basic benefits people anticipate in reasons for action, is not 
simply a benefit some happen to want but a human good that can make rational 
demands on anyone.156
In other words, it is possible and necessary for people to think critically about the good of 
religion. The good of religion itself demands as much.157
The intelligibility, normativity and objectivity of religion as a basic good mean that we 
can recognise and criticise inadequate understandings and instantiations of the good of 
religion. Boyle points out that we can pursue the good o f harmony in numerous ways, 
depending on which element o f the harmony we choose to make dominant. If we choose 
to make our own will dominant, for example, in pursuing the good of religion, then we 
will end up with an inadequate kind of harmony with the “divine” because we will shape 
this divinity and its “will” in our own image, so to speak, and end up trying to manipulate
156 “The Place o f  Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 10.
157 This clarifies what was perhaps not explicit enough in Grisez’s moral theory until now.
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the divine into agreeing with our own (independent) will. This can develop into our using 
religion to rationalise immorality.158
The fact that religion is a basic human good does not legitimise each and every attempt to 
pursue this good. Untrue ideas about God and about how to pursue harmony with him 
have a devastating effect on our grasp of, and, in particular, our instantiation of, the good 
of religion:
[I]n religion, false views about the divine are perhaps impossible altogether to 
correct without divine assistance, and such views will make harmony with the 
divine less than satisfactory. When such views are developed to rationalize 
individual or social immorality, the harmony people seek is hardly the friendship of 
the righteous with God.159
7.4.5a Religion needs community and tradition
Boyle makes a further point which was only implicit in Grisez’s explication of his moral 
theory until now:
Furthermore, the very transcendence of the divine makes religious activity more 
dependent than activities for other goods on inherited beliefs and practices.160
Here, Boyle recognises a problem with the good of religion that does not seem to be such 
a difficulty with the other goods, including the other reflexive goods: How does one 
know if one’s religious activity actually instantiates harmony with the divine? Boyle
158 See ibid., 10-11. Boyle also outlines how this happens with friendship and inner peace, which can be 
pursued in inadequate forms, thus instantiating merely domination or denial o f the truth.
159 Ibid., 11. Perhaps the word “satisfactory” is unfortunate here, as Boyle is so careful in this article to
insist and argue that our grasp o f the basic goods, which is essentially rational, is not reducible to emotional 
desire, and so it is not appropriate to describe fulfillment in the basic goods only in terms o f “satisfaction”, 
which might suggest purely emotional contentment.
160 Ibid.
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recognises (albeit briefly, at this point) that it is very difficult to answer this question, 
precisely because the divine is transcendent, and so not part o f our direct experience, or 
understandable in the way that other items in our experience, or in our reasoning, are 
understandable. Therefore, we are going to need help in knowing about the good of 
religion and how to pursue it effectively. This means that we are going to need 
community and tradition.
This is obvious in Grisez’s moral theology, where he often emphasises the importance, 
and witnesses to it in his own writing, of Christian tradition and community. However, 
the importance of community and tradition is not so obviously treated in the natural law 
writings of Grisez, particularly in relation to the good of religion in general.161 The good 
of religion is not something that we grasp or understand as individuals only; it is a good 
that one grasps and increasingly understands or misunderstands as part of a community 
and in the light of tradition. When the community and its tradition are in good shape, then 
our grasp of religion and our knowledge of how to instantiate it, will be too.
7.4.5b Religion is open to and needs divine revelation
Boyle makes the additional, related point:
Of course, God may have something to say about how to get religion right. But 
even for those of us accepting divine revelation, the demands o f the naturally 
understood good of religion provide reason fo r listening to what God has to say
161 It should be noted that the natural law writings of Grisez are shorter than his moral theology writings. 
Still, it should also be noted that Grisez’s book, Beyond the New Morality, co-authored with Russell Shaw, 
which outlines his natural law theory in popular form, does give a clear idea of the importance of 
community and tradition: see chapters five, fourteen, sixteen, and eighteen o f the third edition (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1988). In Grisez’s moral theology, presented in his “The 
Way of the Lord Jesus” series o f  books, he focuses on Christian community and tradition, rather than on 
community and tradition in general.
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and seeking to bring our religious practice and our lives as a whole into line with 
it.162
Boyle’s (and Grisez’s) philosophical natural law theory recognises the importance and 
value, indeed the necessity, o f God guiding us in our understanding of religion and how 
to pursue it, and helping us to avoid mistakes and errors. Still, Boyle insists that we 
would have no rational motive to listen to God, or to take his revelation seriously, and to 
conform our lives to his revealed will, unless we already had some basic grasp of our 
need for harmony with God and some understanding, however dim, of the benefits of 
accepting revelation in faith.
7.4.6a Religion and other human goods
Boyle says that the relationship of religion to the other goods is “complex”:
Religion is one good among others and so does not negate or subsume the 
irreducible goodness of the others, but religion can embrace the whole of the life of 
a morally good person in a way that other human purposes cannot. Consequently, 
religion has moral priority among human goods without having more o f anything 
that could be called “goodness” in a univocal sense.163
Boyle acknowledges that we often act for goods other than religion. Still, we also can see 
that non-religious activities, such as visiting a friend, can be chosen for religious motives 
as well as non-religious motives.164 The non-religious motive, which is provided by one 
of the basic goods other than religion, remains in its own distinctness and irreducibility. 
Indeed, the distinct and irreducible goodness of friendship, life, knowledge, and the other
162 “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning o f Individuals and Groups,” 11, emphasis added.
163 Ibid.
164 See ibid., 12.
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non-religious goods, is “rooted in the divine principle of reality and meaning just as is the 
goodness of religion”.165 All the basic goods have something to do with God. God is the 
source of all the principles of the natural law, the creator of all forms of goodness. The 
good of religion can pick out this insight and can include it as an additional motive for 
actions in pursuit of forms of goodness that could be pursued independently of the good 
of religion, but which are given strengthened motivation by being understood religiously.
7.4.6b Religion as a super\>enient motive
Boyle calls such an additional motive a “supervenient motive for doing otherwise 
beneficial things”.166 One can sometimes grasp one substantive good, such as knowledge, 
as both instrumentally good (to pursue health, for example) and as intrinsically good too, 
and “one can then act in anticipation of both benefits”.167 With regard to reflexive goods, 
acting for the sake of goods other than the operative reflexive good “is often constitutive 
of the harmony”.168 In other words, pursuing a reflexive good is even more likely to be 
interconnected with the pursuit of some other good.169
Applying this to the good of religion, Boyle argues that one can pursue this good whilst 
pursuing another (seemingly non-religious) good, without rejecting the status of that
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid. Boyle means both the intrinsic and instrumental good o f knowledge in a single instantiation o f it, 
whilst pursuing another good simultaneously.
168 Ibid., 13. The term “operative” is not Boyle’s.
169 See ibid. Here Boyle is developing ideas found in Christian Moral Principles, chapter five, where the 
relationship between substantive and reflexive goods was treated by Grisez: see s. 3.1.7 above.
other good as a basic good in its own right. One pursues the seemingly non-religious 
good “in a certain spirit or frame of mind”.170 Such a frame of mind might be minimal or 
rich. One might pursue friendship, for example, for the sake of friendship itself along 
with a readiness to reject any sinful aspect of it. This would be a minimal type of pursuit 
of religion. Or, one might pursue human-to-human friendship in a manner that explicitly 
sees it as a constitutive aspect of one’s relationship (of harmony) with the divine. The 
latter would be a richer interrelationship of the two distinct goods of friendship and 
religion. In either case, the goods of friendship and religion would combine both 
instrumental and intrinsic goodness.171
7.4.6c Respecting other goods in their own right is essential
It is only when we respect non-religious goods in their own right that we can properly 
grasp religion as a supervenient motive for their pursuit. For example, it is only when we 
value true friendship, excellent work, and honest inquiry as goods in their own right, that 
we can offer them truly as “the stuff of proper human sacrifice”.172 Thus, respecting the 
“irreducible plurality of intrinsic goods” is an essential part of respecting the good of 
religion in its own right and instantiating it effectively.
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170 “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 13.
171 See s. 7.2.6 above.
172 Ibid. Note the link between life as religious and life as sacrificial: see s. 3.5.3 above.
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As a supervenient motive, religion can motivate all the voluntary actions of the life of 
each of us: “it provides a common, unifying motive for the totality of a person’s 
actions.”173 But is religion merely suitable for this, or is it morally required for doing so? 
A major part of Boyle’s article aims to answer this question.174
Boyle does not think that there is any easy deduction from moral principle for the 
conclusion that religion should be the good that unifies one’s whole life. He begins by 
looking at the more basic norm: “that all have the obligation to seek the truth about 
religion and live by it”.175 Only if this more basic norm is true, is it true that religion is 
required for us to integrate our lives. How can the more basic norm be justified? Boyle 
presents three reasons.
7.4.7b Being an existential good, religion is pervasive as an interest
Firstly, there is “the pervasiveness of the rational appeal of the reflexive goods”.176 This
refers to a characteristic of the reflexive goods, namely the fact that “one will have a
7.4.7a As a supervenient motive, religion can integrates one’s life
173 Ibid.
174 See ibid., 14-20.
175 Ibid., with reference to Dignitatis Humanae, par. 3. Here, Boyle touches on a moral norm that is also 
treated in detail by Robert George in his Making Men Moral, 219-228 and “Religious Liberty and Political 
Morality”, in R.P. George, In Defense o f  Natural Law (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press), 125- 
138. Like Boyle, George deals with religious liberty in light o f Grisez’s understanding o f religion, which he 
sees as substantially the same as the Council’s understanding (insofar as the Council saw religion as a good 
and as a good involving free choice essentially).
176 “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning o f Individuals and Groups,” 14. Boyle is using his 
own language, not claiming that his approach is a paraphrase or exegesis of Dignitatis Humanae. The terms 
“existential” and “reflexive” are used interchangeably here, though Boyle tends to favour “reflexive”.
motive to act for these harmonies in any situation of life”.177 One will always find that 
avoiding conflict or finding harmony is at issue in situations o f choice. There will always 
be choices left not chosen, which causes tension or conflict.178 In one’s decisions, one 
will always have a rational interest in “an inner life that runs smoothly and is free of 
conflict”; one will also find that relationships with others make pervasive demands on 
oneself as a moral agent. Even if we choose for other reasons (goods), a concern for 
harmony within the self and with others will always be at stake, even if only implicitly.179
The same is true of harmony with God. It too is at stake, even if only in the background
so to speak, in all our decisions. This is very clearly true of those who hold that the divine
is personal, but it also applies to those who hold a nontheistic view of the divine:
For even those whose conceptions of the divine are confused, implicit, or very 
minimal are aware that they sin, that is, act against the objective morality rooted in 
the divine, and that objective factors beyond human control often foil their hopes 
and plans.180
The good of religion is inescapable; we cannot rationally avoid dealing with it. This is 
one reason why we ought responsibly to seek religious truth and live by it.
177 “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning o f Individuals and Groups,” 14, emphasis added.
178 See ibid., 14-15.
179 Ibid., 15. Here, Boyle seems to contradict what Grisez had said about the non-religious reflexive goods 
not being at stake in all our choices, as religion can be: see ss. 2.4.6b and 4.6 above.
180 Ibid. In a footnote appended to this sentence, Boyle makes the point that his argument would be easier if 
he assumed an articulate theistic conception o f a personal God, as “Practical Principles” did, but he wants 
in this article to show that even a minimal conception o f the divine can still make possible an awareness of 
sin and our vulnerability and dependence on the transcendent. Arguably, Boyle’s claims here are in need of 
empirical support, but as his is a philosophical approach, he merely depends on the reader to accept the 
truth of his claims as backed up by ordinary and common experience.
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7.4.7c Effective instantiations o f  reflexive goods include upright willing 
Another reason for this natural law obligation to “seek the truth about religion and live by 
it” is the connection between reflexive goods and morality. Only choices made in a 
morally upright way can instantiate effectively the benefits one seeks in the reflexive 
goods.181 Evidence for this is seen in the widespread assumptions that “the moral virtues 
are the forms of valuable self-integration”.182 Of course, people “can seek a limited 
version of these benefits in harmonies that do not include upright willing”.183 One can 
therefore seek a kind of limited religious harmony by desiring “divine approval for one’s 
plans, however rationalized or immoral”.184 However, obviously such religious 
“harmony” is not a real, lasting harmony with the divine.
Even when one settles for a limited version of harmony, by self-deception,185 or 
manipulative or dominating relationships with others, or by false religion, one will 
always have the genuine benefit of the harmony as a kind of norm acting as a standard 
calling one back to the genuine benefit that one has foregone by one’s settling for the 
limited, merely apparent reflexive good.186 For example, the very possibility, value, and 
necessity of objectively true religion will continue to act as a moral standard throwing
181 See “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 15-16.
182 Ibid., 16.
183 Ibid., 15-16.
184 Ibid.
185 Boyle tends to treat what Grisez usually lists as the two basic goods to do with harmony within the self 
(inner peace and inner consistency) as one good. Therefore he tends to see the reflexive or existential goods 
as having to do with three levels of harmony: within the self, between human selves, and between the self 
and selves with God.
186 See ibid., 16.
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light on any immoral settling for false religion as an apparent good: it will call one to 
repent. Therefore, one has a good moral reason to try hard to seek the truth about God 
and religion and to live by it.
7.4.7d Finding religious truth demands effort
A third reason why one should make the effort to seek religious truth and live by it is that 
finding religious truth is not easy and so needs effort. Our grasp o f religious truth can be 
hampered by the very alienation from the divine that makes the good of religion so 
necessary and so rationally appealing. Because the good of religion is so pervasive, and 
because its real instantiations include upright willing, we need to know religious truth 
accurately. We cannot rightly ignore or neglect the moral obligation to make the effort 
necessary to find and live by religious truth. This will include reflection, inquiry, and 
criticism, and openness to “expose the rationalizations that can easily flaw religious 
motivations and prevent true harmony with the divine”.187
7.4.7e Organising one’s life as a whole is a very valuable kind o f  harmony 
Having shown that virtuous, conscientious pursuit of religious truth is rightly 
presupposed as obligatory, Boyle goes on to examine why such “good religion” (virtuous, 
reflexively conscious, concerned with objective truth) is required for integrating one’s 
life. First, he looks at the integrative role of reflexive goods in general.188
187 Ibid., 17.
188 Boyle develops what was said only rather briefly in “Practical Principles” : see s.4.6 above.
One reason why we should organise our lives around a reflexive good that brings our 
choices into unity is that such unity is itself a kind of harmony, and therefore an aspect of 
the benefit one can seek in reflexive goods. The reflexive goods are concerned with more 
than just avoiding conflict; they are concerned also with “positive integration o f the 
elements of the self and the development of a positive set o f relationships with other 
people and with the divine”.189 There is “an integrating thrust” to the reflexive goods, 
which reaches out to anything in one’s life that “affects or is affected by one’s pursuit of 
these goods”.190 Seeking the reflexive goods in only single acts, or choices viewed only 
as isolated events or individual challenges, tends to lessen the benefit of the goods. A 
unified life is a more harmonious life than a fragmented or non-integrated life. A life 
unified around limited, false versions of the reflexive goods (“self-deception, 
manipulation of others, impious religiosity”) 191 will not effectively instantiate harmony 
and so these false goods are not suitable as principles to organise a truly harmonious life 
around. Reflexive goods, specified morally as virtues, can provide appropriate 
supervenient motives around which a whole life can be unified, thus instantiating 
harmony in its fullest measure.
7.4.7f Supervenient motive provide additional grounds fo r  acting morally
Secondly, Boyle notes that a supervening motive can unify a whole life by giving the
person an additional reason to always choose morally. One way of summarising the
189 “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 17.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid. Note that Boyle here refers to imperfect instantiations of the three levels o f existential harmony: 
within the self, between self and others, and between self and God.
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supervening motives provided by the reflexive goods is to consider how the following 
three additional motives can be operative in all of our choices: Never to act 
dishonourably; never to act unfairly; never to sin.192 A person tempted to act against the 
good of life, for example, has a motive grounded in the good o f life to resist this 
temptation. There are additional motives provided by the reflexive goods, however, that 
can strengthen such a person’s motivation to act morally for the sake of life. These 
supervening motives bring to mind aspects of various forms of harmony as additional 
aspects of goodness at stake in the choice concerning life. Acting against life can also be 
understood as acting against conscience, and/or acting unfairly, and/or sinning, and so an 
act against life can be understood as simultaneously an act against one and more of the 
reflexive goods.
7.4.7g The reflexive goods are mutually constitutive and mutually supporting 
Boyle acknowledges that each of the reflexive goods can provide a supervening motive 
as a unifying motive for one’s whole life. One can organise one’s whole life around the 
goods of personal integrity, justice, or religion. Nor is it necessary to focus only on one. 
Although they are three distinct and irreducible goods, the reflexive goods are mutually 
constitutive and supporting. Following one’s conscience, for example, can be one way,
192 See ibid., 18. As noted above, Boyle treats the reflexive goods o f inner peace and inner consistency as 
one good: harmony within the self. This is the good violated by dishonourable acts.
193 This is one point that is completely overlooked by Tracy Rowland in her criticism o f Boyle’s treatment 
of religion as a supervenient motive: see T. Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 145. Rowland misunderstands completely what Boyle (and Grisez and Finnis) 
mean by existential goods: she thinks that they are distinct from reflexive goods and that they are “not 
directly related to each other” (196, n. 41). With such blatant misreading o f Grisez’s basic theory, it is 
hardly surprising that Rowland fails to see how his moral theory has a very important place for religion 
with regard to all the other goods (religion is infrastructural, not just extrinsically “superstructura!”, as she 
claims). She also overlooks how his natural law theory flows into his moral theology, and allows and
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a very important way too, of instantiating harmony with God; and once one realises that 
God wishes us to choose in harmony with his will, one is motivated to pursue the good of 
religion conscientiously. Respecting any one of the reflexive goods will tend to involve 
respecting them all. Boyle is not arguing that the good of religion should be given priority 
to the exclusion of the goods o f personal integrity and justice.
7.4.7h Religion has moral priority as a supervenient motive
Still, Boyle does argue that the good of religion has a certain kind of moral priority. 
Religion can supervene on the other reflexive goods and on the whole of morality. This is 
because God is the source of all the goods and of morality itself. We do not invent or 
control practical rationality, the natural law, but we acknowledge it as an objective and 
obligatory reality.194 “Acting morally is a requirement of harmony with the divine.”195 
People with no real grasp of the objective reality of the transcendent source of everything 
will be deprived of a supervening motive for organising their whole lives, and they, and 
people who hold a very minimal conception of the divine, tend to focus on personal 
integrity or interpersonal harmony as the supervening motive for organising their lives as 
a whole. Still, religion provides the most suitable supervening motive of all because it is 
focused on the transcendent source of all practical rationality, the practical rationality 
that grounds all deliberation, choice, and action. It is easy for us to understand our 
responding to the integral directiveness of the human goods as always and necessarily an
requires strong criticism o f modern and postmodern culture insofar as that culture is atheistic, agnostic, and 
immoral. See Culture and the Thomist Tradition, 144-148 for her main criticisms.
194 See “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 19.
195 Ibid., 18.
instantiation of the good of religion. Thus religion provides us with a supervening motive 
for always acting morally.
Another reason for giving religion moral priority as a supervening motive is that religion 
provides an answer to the questions: why be moral when our efforts are ultimately futile 
and often lead to suffering for us? Such questions are bound to arise in our fallen world. 
The good of religion, because it points to a transcendent reality, can deal with these 
questions, and can ground practical rationality (and justify its integrity) in a transcendent 
and objective Source capable of rising above our natural limitations and fallenness.196
A final reason to see religion as the most appropriate basic human reflexive good for
organising one’s life as a whole is that this good “is concerned more centrally than the
other reflexive goods with the reality and objectivity of moral norms.” 197 Again, it is
important to stress that Boyle is not arguing that it is only religion that grounds the
objectivity of practical rationality:
... because of religion’s object, the divine source of meaning and reality, it has 
pride of place even among the reflexive goods. Of course, “never sin” will not 
override imperatives such as “never violate conscience” and “never wrong others”. 
But “never sin” involves taking a perspective from which it is more difficult to 
avoid the implications of the real goods all moral norms prescribe, and possible to 
find grounds for trusting reason in humanly hopeless cases.198
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196 See ibid., 19.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., 20.
Boyle also treats religion as a social good, and outlines the political implications of 
this.199 One way that religion is a social good is that, precisely as a supervening motive, it 
can motivate “the various acts of obedience and authority which constitute the voluntary 
lives of people as family members, members of voluntary associations, and citizens”.200 
So, at various levels o f social organisation, from family, through civil society, to political 
society, religion can indirectly motivate acts performed for one or more of the other 
goods.
However, religion can provide a direct motive for social action too. The harmony 
constituted by the integration of all aspects of life under the supervening motivation of 
religion provides a reason for communities, as well as individuals, to pursue the good of 
religion. Certain conditions need to be met, if this integrative pursuit of religion is to be 
effective and morally good. In particular, the various goods involved must be respected in 
their integrity. The true good of the community, for example, must not be subordinated to 
the good of religion, or vice versa.201 Still, if necessary conditions are met, then 
community action for the sake of religion can be beneficial and necessary, and can make 
it possible to participate in the good of religion in a way that purely individual actions 
cannot.
199 Boyle covers ground similar to Robert George: see n. 175 above. The social nature of the goods is often 
overlooked by critics o f Grisez’s moral theory. For example, Rowland, 136-138, claims that Grisez’s 
theory has no place for culture, as if  people grasped, instantiated and pursued the basic goods in total 
isolation from culture, social structures, community, and tradition. This is a serious misrepresentation of 
Grisez’s theory.
200 “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 20.
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7.4.8a Religion and human communities
201 See ibid.
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Our participation in the good o f religion is very dependent on social factors. The 
transcendence of the divine can make it somewhat difficult to grasp the good of religion 
and particularly difficult to know how to pursue it effectively. So we depend a great deal 
on help from others. Boyle emphasises this when he points out that the religious beliefs 
and practices on which we depend for having any relationship with the divine “are 
essentially social since they depend upon established social forms.”202 In fact, without 
such social forms, it would be impossible to pursue the good of religion. Religion is 
essentially a social good. We cannot pursue it effectively except as part of a community. 
This implies that “the existence of organized religions, the social opportunities for people 
to join them, and so on are significant social goods.”203 It is easy to see, therefore, why 
the good of religion can be, and ought to be, a social concern for communities at various 
levels.
7.4.8b Political society and religion
What about the political level in a pluralist society? May it concern itself with the good of 
religion? Writers such as John Rawls have answered negatively here.204 Boyle’s answer 
is yes, under certain conditions religion may be a concern at the political level in a 
pluralist society.
202 Ibid., 21.
203 Ibid.
204 See ibid., n. 15, where Boyle refers to Rawls. Boyle insists that his own approach is a matter of soundly 
understood “public reason”, and thus respectful o f all people, in that “it is addressed to anyone who will 
pay attention to it and criticise it”. Rawls’s concept of public reason, which functions as a criterion for what 
is acceptable in political life and action, allows no place for religion or any argument from a comprehensive 
moral theory.
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One of the conditions is that of religious liberty. Here, Boyle, like Robert George, follows 
the lead of Dignitatis Humanae, the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Liberty, which 
declared that immunity from coercion in matters to do with religion should be a civil 
right for all.205 Like George, Boyle sees the right to religious liberty as grounded in the 
very nature of the good of religion. Coercion would destroy the good of religion by 
making free choice and personal responsibility regarding religion impossible or 
extremely difficult.206 Political society may intervene in religious matters if this is strictly 
necessary for protecting human rights or maintaining public order. Still, ordinarily, 
political society may not command religious belief/practice, or prohibit religious 
belief/practice.
Does this mean that political society must be religiously neutral? Does it mean that
politics must be non-believing or unbelieving? Boyle says no:
But a protected liberty to find out the truth about the important things in life and 
live according to it, a liberty o f worldview for all, including nonbelievers, does not 
imply that the public domain must be a realm of nonbelief.2 7
Boyle’s reason for holding this position is that political society has a moral responsibility 
to create a space where people can fulfil their obligation to seek religious truth and live 
by it, but it cannot carry out this responsibility if a particular answer to the religious 
question is assumed to be true. Nonbelief, or even religious scepticism, is a particular
205 See ibid., footnotes 16 and 19. See n. 175 above too.
206 See ibid., 21.
207 Ibid., 22.
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position regarding religion. So, if political society assumes that nonbelief, or even 
agnosticism, is true, it has already forestalled the religious quest, so to speak, and will act 
in ways that interferes with citizens’ religious quests, thus violating their right to religious 
liberty.
This is an important point in Boyle’s final section, and it goes beyond what George, or
Grisez, or Finnis, had written up until that time.208 In an earlier version of his argument,
Boyle had argued for political neutrality with regard to religion, but in the published
version, he rejects this idea:
No doubt strict neutrality between the variety of worldviews, religious or other, 
which have bearing on such matters [as child care and education, abortion and 
euthanasia, and the use of religious symbolism in public places] is impossible. 
Political choice is needed on these matters and it is bound better to fit one rather 
than others of the competing worldviews.209
We might give an example here: if a decision has to be made on whether to legalise 
abortion, then the decision taken cannot be neutral if one worldview argues for the 
banning of abortion on the grounds that is the killing of the innocent, whilst another 
worldview argues that it is not such killing and should be legally allowed. Allowing
208 However, Finnis has commented since on Boyle’s article. See his “Religion and State: Some Main 
Issues and Sources,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 51 (2006): 107-130. One major point Finnis 
makes is that if a state is confronted with a religion that teaches its members to act in a way detrimental to 
the public good (by intimidating those who leave that religion to join another, for example, or calling for 
violence towards those who criticise that religion), then that state will have to make a judgement on the 
truth of the religion in question. Because such a religion, at least insofar as it teaches what is morally false 
and socially harmful, is judged to be wrong, and must be so judged, the state in this circumstance cannot 
remain non-judgemental regarding religious matters: see ibid., 124-127 (section VII).
209 “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning o f Individuals and Groups,” 23. In the footnote 
appended to the final sentence o f this quotation, Boyle mentions how he originally argued in terms of 
political neutrality, but now sees this as mistaken (see ibid., n. 17).
abortion, even in restricted circumstances, cannot fail to show favour to the latter view, 
and disfavour towards the former (and the former view might be a religious one).
Boyle does not elaborate on these matters but makes some brief remarks that indicate 
how such difficulties might be tackled politically. He favours the idea that political 
authorities should create the conditions for good public debate and deliberation, 
conditions that do not prejudice any particular religious position, or any non-religious 
position, and that any political decisions on controversial matters would take into account 
all the relevant arguments, in the light of reason.210 Boyle does not treat these issues in 
enough detail for us to evaluate or analyse his position on them here. He does state 
clearly, however, that the state must be ready to show respect, or at least avoid disrespect, 
towards religious views and communities, and that if a state did this, it would make a 
substantial difference to the quality of public deliberation and public policy in that 
society. Boyle seems to be hinting that in present circumstances the state tends often not 
to respect religion as a good, and this lack of respect, embodied in an assumption of 
supposed neutrality or religious scepticism, leads to flawed political deliberation and 
policy.
The state has a moral obligation to create the social space for citizens to meet their 
religious responsibilities as individuals and members of groups. One aspect of this 
obligation is that the state has to help keep peace between religions; another thing the
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210 See ibid, n. 18 especially on this, but note how Boyle in n. 19 seems somewhat vague.
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state can do is to promote religious, moral and philosophical inquiry.211 Boyle, like
George and Grisez,212 seems to allow for state aid to religious schooling, as long as this
does not violate religious liberty. Boyle makes the point that
if a polity creates and protects the social space people need to discover and live out 
the truth about their relationship with the divine [by facilitating] honourable 
religious practice, then it constitutes itself as a community ready to submit to the 
transcendent source of reality and meaning.213
A state can pursue and instantiate the good of religion in its own appropriate way, by 
political means that respect religious liberty and the value of the good of religion for all 
its citizens. Boyle contrasts such a “religious” state with one in which religion is viewed 
as “an eccentricity o f certain individuals and groups that must be put up with only to 
respect their privacy, freedom of expression, and rights of association”.214 This latter kind 
of polity is one which fails to understand or acknowledge the true value of the good of 
religion, and it is one that will tend to express this lack of respect in its policies and 
actions, which will tend to disfavour religious belief and practice. Boyle argues in favour 
of a polity (which includes both legislators and judges) that recognises the moral 
goodness of pursuing the good of religion in appropriate ways. He does not argue directly 
in favour of a paternalistic state, as does George, but he seems to come to much the same
211 See ibid
212 Some ideas on Grisez’s position regarding political morality can be found in Living a Christian Life, 
chapter 11, Questions B-D: see especially Q. B part 2 (846-851), which discusses how the political 
common good both requires and limits political responsibility. The good o f religion is not treated there in 
any detail, apart from a brief treatment o f religious liberty (861-862) which shows that Grisez supports the 
point made in Dignitatis Humanae (and supported by Boyle and Finnis and George) that governments have 
the duty to show favour to the religious life of their citizens, for instance in supporting religious schools 
and hospitals.
213 “The Place o f Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups,” 23-24.
214 Ibid., 24.
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conclusions as George, particularly with regard to the good of religion as the ground for 
religious liberty and for providing a reason for the state to support religion by positive 
and fair policies and actions, though he is not as definite or as clear in the examples he 
gives of how a state can support religion or show favour to the religious life of its
0 1 S *citizens. His final remarks concern how a state that tries to respect religion and 
religious liberty is thereby participating in the good of religion as an intrinsic aspect of 
human fulfillment. Thus, Boyle ends up as he began, with religion as an intrinsically 
fulfilling end of human deliberation, choice and action.
Finnis has gone further than Boyle in giving some details of how the state ought to favour 
religion. He argues that the state is bound not to do certain things if it is to act with 
respect for the good of religion in a philosophically sound and morally upright manner.216 
It must not teach or imply by its actions or policies that no religion is true. Nor may it 
teach that any false religion is the true religion. Except in a small number of exceptional 
cases, the state may not impose any affirmative religious test for public offices or 
benefits. It may not seek to direct the true religion in that religion’s own governance. 
Finnis also argues that individuals may refer to their religious beliefs in voting or 
legislating, as long as these beliefs are capable of being defended publicly by way of 
philosophical and historical reasoning and knowledge (and the religion in question is
215 Like George, Boyle refers to the passage in Dignitatis Humanae in which the Fathers of Vatican II state 
that the right to religious liberty does not render it wrong for the state to show favour towards the religious 
life of its citizens, but in fact requires it: see “The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of 
Individuals and Groups,” 23, n. 19.
216 The following points are taken from Finnis’s conclusions in “Religion and State”, 128-130. Finnis 
nuances some of these points; for example, he insists that a religion may not rightly influence its members 
in voting or legislating by teaching beyond its own competence with regard to facts and predictions.
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willing, capable and acting to do so). Finally, Finnis makes the point that a people may 
rightly identify in their constitutional arrangements what they consider to be the true 
religion, as long as the principles above are followed and religious freedom is 
honoured.217
Clearly the area of how the public authorities ought to treat the good of religion is one 
part of Grisez’s theory that is being developed by his collaborators, with George, Boyle 
and Finnis taking similar, but distinct, approaches. It is an area in need o f further 
development.
7.5 Conclusion to the chapter
Finnis and Boyle have done important work regarding the philosophical aspects of the 
good of religion and its place in the moral theory they share with Grisez.218 They have 
shown how religion is a very broad good, one in which even agnostics and atheists can 
participate, to a very limited extent of course, insofar as they can appreciate and engage 
in the religious quest. They have also clarified the distinctiveness and irreducibility of the 
good of religion, whilst analysing its architectonic, or overarching, character and 
potential. They have brought out the limitations of practical reason and philosophy, and 
the openness of practical reason towards community, tradition, and divine revelation.
217 See ibid., 130. Finnis states that his six conclusions follow from his article in full.
218 Grisez has developed the theological aspects, as we have seen in chapters three, five, and six above.
Finnis has shown how deeply rooted in classical philosophy the basic goods moral theory 
is. He has analysed how human understanding has been considered a kind of “god-like” 
attribute, and how practical reasoning, or the natural law, has been understood as a 
sharing in divine wisdom and providence. Finnis has developed these thoughts to a great 
extent in his study of Aquinas, and has shown how supportive Aquinas is of the basic 
goods theory. In particular, Finnis has shown how religion can be understood to be a kind 
of assimilation and adherence to God, which begins in our practical reasonableness in this 
life, and is perfected by God in the next. Finnis has demonstrated a critical attitude 
towards aspects of Aquinas’ work, but overall he is more sympathetic than Grisez 
towards Aquinas’ thought. Perhaps Finnis shows how it might be possible to deal 
positively with the differences between Grisez’s and Aquinas’s approaches.
Finnis has developed a number of concepts that are related to religion and which clarify 
its meaning and potential, namely friendship, common good, and transparency. Religion 
is seen as a friendship with God, which has as its common good the flourishing of the self 
and others as God’s creatures whom he loves and wills to flourish. It also can include 
God’s “flourishing” as our friend, in an analogical sense. Religion is transparent for the 
full range of goods and persons, enabling us to see these goods and persons more clearly 
and love them more strongly. The good of religion illuminates the natural law.
Boyle presents the concept of “supervenient motive” to help us to understand how 
religion adds motivation to our love of the goods. A supervenient motive adds a further, 
overarching motive to one’s actions. Religion can do this by adding the motive of
avoiding sin, and/or o f doing God’s will, to all our other motives, thus strengthening 
these motives. Boyle has shown also how religion is irreducible, with its own distinctive 
and normative character. He has brought out the objective aspects of religion very well, 
showing how we are always bound morally and practically to search for religious truth. 
Finally, he and Finnis (and Robert George) have begun to develop a theory on how 
religion is to be treated in the public square, with an emphasis on religious freedom and 
also on how religion forms part o f the common good of society.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CRITICISMS
8.1 Russell Hittinger, A Critique o f the New Natural Law Theory [1987]1 
This was the first book-length analysis and criticism of Grisez’s moral theory. It was 
dismissive and critical in its tone and arguments and extremely negative in its 
conclusions. Grisez and some of his collaborators issued detailed replies to Hittinger’s 
criticisms soon after his book was published. These replies demonstrated that Hittinger’s 
work was inaccurate in many instances and unfair to Grisez’s theory.2 However, Hittinger 
brings to light some important matters, especially regarding religion, so it is worthwhile 
to look as constructively as we can at his criticisms.3
1 Russell Hittinger, A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 
1987). This book criticises what it calls “the Grisez-Finnis new natural law theory”, thus leaving out Joseph 
Boyle’s important contribution to the theory, and also reducing Grisez’s work to natural law theory. In the 
present chapter, the theory is often referred to as Grisez’s theory for simplicity and as he is the originator of 
the theory, and the one who has developed it theologically. Also he is the focus o f  this dissertation. Still, 
both Finnis’s and Boyle’s contributions to the theory are acknowledged by the present author and works of 
theirs have been treated in previous chapters.
2 See G. Grisez, “A Critique o f Russell Hittinger’s Book, A Critique o f  the New Natural Law”, New 
Scholasticism 62 (1988), 438-465; John Finnis, “Russell Hittinger’s Straw Man”, Fellowship o f  Catholic 
Scholars Newsletter, March 1989, 6-8; John Finnis, “Doctor Finnis Replies to Doctor Koterski”, 
Fellowship o f Catholic Scholars Newsletter (June 1989): 6-7; Robert P. George, “Recent Criticism of 
Natural Law Theory” (originally published 1988), in Robert P. George, In Defence o f  Natural Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31-82, at 59-82.
3 Rufus Black takes a different line on this matter. He considers the articles by Grisez and especially 
George to have answered Hittinger’s arguments sufficiently, and so he does not deal with them in any 
detail: see Rufus Black, Christian Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5, 9. Black also 
mentions some other criticisms o f Grisez’s moral theory by Ralph Mclnemy and Henry Veatch, and others, 
who take an approach similar to that o f Hittinger (and so we do not look at their specific criticisms 
separately here). Black’s mainly positive criticisms of Grisez’s theory is examined below in s. 8.3.
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Hittinger claims that Grisez’s moral theory has a seriously flawed foundation because it 
does not found itself upon a comprehensive philosophy of nature (8, 36, 171, 193).4 As a 
result of this, Grisez presents the basic human goods, including religion, as self-evident 
intuitions, grasped without any need for other knowledge, and so beyond debate or 
discussion or any rational evaluation or critique (34, 38, 41, 164f, 193).5 Therefore, 
Grisez’s theory cannot allow any effective reply to the objections of atheists or to those 
who point to the bewildering diversity of religions (47, 90, 95). Grisez’s philosophical 
approach to proving God’s existence and working out the nature o f this “God” is too 
narrow, confined to a via negativa that ends up with a deity that cannot be the object of 
the good of religion (99-104, 152). Therefore, there is no morally significant object for 
religion and so no naturally accessible rationale for our obligation to obey God’s will (20, 
90, 105, 122).
As there is thus no specifically religious benefit in the good of religion, it is reduced to 
the First Principle of Morality: to love all the (other) goods with an inclusivistic attitude 
(110, 142). Any possible motivational attractiveness for the good of religion becomes 
evident only in the light of divine revelation and Christian faith, which are the sole source 
of religion’s content and specificity and of certain knowledge of God as personal. Thus, 
Grisez’s moral theory is founded on a kind of fideism (20, 51, 88f, 90, 105, 113, 158,
4 The logical relationship between these criticisms is indicated here in the order o f their presentation in the 
following three paragraphs, which is not precisely Hittinger’s order. References to Hittinger’s book are 
given in brackets in the main text o f this section.
5 This idea, that the goods are self-evident intuitions, is held not only by Hittinger. For example, Jean 
Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory o f  the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, 
UK: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005) makes the same criticism (at 127, 129 and 150).
8.1.1 An outline o f Hittinger's criticisms o f Grisez ’s moral theory
167). Therefore, there are two kinds of “religion” in Grisez’s system: the natural law 
religion, which is unattractive and thus useless as a practical principle, and the Christian 
religion, which is attractive but available only to those with a faith seen as unsupported 
and irrational. This leads to two separate moral systems, and an incoherent moral theory 
(91, 122, 124, 184).
The basic human goods, including religion, have no transcendent dimension but are 
concerned with only the worldly good of the self: self-fulfillment and purely immanent 
goodness (42, 53-55, 65, 85, 153, 186). The basic human goods are isolated from each 
other, as they are incommensurable and irreducible to each other, and so religion cannot 
have any architectonic role for one’s life, nor can it be the pre-eminent virtue (51, 90, 
170f, 181). Grisez is subjectivist with regard to life plans: one can have no criteria for 
evaluating options with regard to life plans, which are therefore always merely matters of 
personal taste and/or convention (79-84, 153, 181). Finally, according to Hittinger, the 
obligation to pursue and respect the basic human goods, including religion, is presented 
by Grisez as a duty, but integral human fulfillment is seen as an unachievable ideal, thus 
reducing Grisez’s theory to a kind of Kantianism, especially as there is no overall telos 
for human life, nor any possible natural transcendence, that can be known prior to choice 
or faith (7, 53, 143f, 154, 168, 178, 186f).
Very concisely presented, such are the main substantive criticisms of Grisez’s (and 
Finnis’s) moral theory offered by Hittinger. An article6 by him in 1989 shows that he did
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6 Russell Hittinger, “A Response to the Exchange of Opinion,” Fellowship o f  Catholic Scholars Newsletter 
(June 1989): 7-8 and concluded on 23.
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not change his mind even after Grisez, Finnis and Boyle published their 1987 article 
“Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”; in fact, Hittinger seems to think 
that their attempts to clarify matters in the 1987 article shows that his criticisms had some 
cogency.7
8.1.2 The need fo r  a philosophy o f  nature and a philosophy o f  God
One of the most central claims in Hittinger’s criticism of Grisez is that a sound theory of
natural law must be founded on a comprehensive and accurate philosophy of nature, in
which man’s having his final end in God is acknowledged and has a foundational role to
play. Hittinger seems to consider Aquinas’s work as an example of this and a stark
contrast to Grisez in this regard.8 Hittinger claims that even though Grisez makes
reference to Aquinas’s treatment of religion as a natural virtue, (he cites Christian Moral
Principles, 124), he overlooks some very important characteristics of Aquinas’s
approach. According to Hittinger, Aquinas uses a
theoretical apparatus ... to justify the so-called natural good o f religion and its place 
in the natural law system. Not only is it presupposed that certain aspects of God’s 
being are demonstrable (such as excellence of being, governance of the world, and 
his status as final cause of human nature), but Aquinas’s discussion of religion 
likewise presupposes a philosophy of human nature -  in particular, a hierarchical 
and ideological account of the intellect and the will’s relation to objects and ends. 
Indeed, Aquinas argues that the virtue of religion is superior to the other natural
7 See ibid., 7. It seems that Hittinger has not changed his mind regarding Grisez. A more recent book by 
Hittinger, which contains chapters on natural law theory, does not even mention Grisez or Finnis: R. 
Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World (Wilmington, 
Delaware: ISI books, 2003). Without necessarily agreeing with all o f Hittinger’s criticisms, one has to 
agree that Grisez has made definite efforts since 1987 to clarify his theory, and that some o f these 
clarifications address matters raised by Hittinger (and others). In this, Grisez shows himself willing to 
develop his theory and answer critics.
8 Hittinger’s point is not that Grisez fails to be an accurate exegete of Aquinas, but that he fails to develop a 
theory as sound as that o f Aquinas.
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virtues precisely because it governs man more immediately with regard to his final 
end. It is not one categorical among others, but an architectonic virtue.9
Hittinger describes the foundational work that Aquinas had to do as a “massive amount of 
philosophical work necessary to establish this minimal toehold regarding the natural 
virtue of religion.”10 Grisez does not do this necessary, huge amount o f philosophical 
work, according to Hittinger, and so in Grisez’s theory the basic human goods, including 
religion, seem to be simply “pulled out of thin air”.11 Hittinger sees Grisez’s theory as a 
kind of intuitionism in which there is no real attempt to justify the existence of, and 
nature of, the basic goods.
Hittinger mentions the fact that Grisez engages in some dialectical arguments in favour of 
the goods, and points out some anthropological and psychological evidence for them, but 
Hittinger considers these to be weak arguments. For example, how could empirical 
evidence justify positing religion as a basic principle of practical reason, when the object 
of religion is beyond human sight?12 Further, such dialectical arguments or evidence are 
seen by Hittinger to be inconsistent with Grisez’s theory. Hittinger argues that Grisez’s 
presentation of the basic principles of practical reason as self-evident entails that it is 
unnecessary to argue for them.13 As far as Hittinger is concerned, Grisez simply posits 
this list of goods as intuited from human inclinations. Indeed, he claims that Grisez sees
9 A Critique o f the New Natural Law Theory, 171.
10 Ibid., 220, n. 23.
11 This is the phrase Hittinger uses on the first page of his short article mentioned in note 6 above.
12 See A Critique o f the New Natural Law Theory, 45.
13 See ibid., 44.
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the goods as identical with human inclinations.14 Grisez does not adequately explain or 
justify why he picks certain inclinations to specify the basic goods. Nor can he, because 
he does not work out an adequate philosophy of nature and man and God to be the 
foundation of the theory and to provide the rationale for the goods and virtues shaping the 
theory. In particular, and in contrast to Aquinas, Grisez does not show how man is 
naturally oriented towards God as his final end.15 Hittinger maintains that for Grisez 
“practical reason is not naturally ordained to an end that transcends” this-worldly goods 
here and now, and he also claims that “this represents a significant departure from the 
natural law theory as it has been explicated within the Augustinian-Thomistic nexus.”16
8.1.3 The issue o f  self-evident primary principles
If we understand the term “self-evident” to mean “intuitively picked out of thin air”, as 
Hittinger seems to understand the term, then Grisez’s theory will seem very weak. 
However, it is only fair to mention that Aquinas says that the primary principles of the
14 See ibid., 40. This is one o f Hittinger’s misreadings that Grisez points out in “A Critique of Russell 
Hittinger’s book,” 45If. There, Grisez says “ ... ‘tendencies’ and ‘inclinations’ are never used to refer to the 
goods (see Contraception and the Natural Law , 64-70, to which Hittinger makes several references, in the 
context o f 63). ‘Tendencies’ and ‘basic inclinations’ refer not to the goods, but to appetites which point to 
the goods. The goods are ends not appetites.” We might add here that the very first sentence on page 65 of 
Contraception and the Natural Law states explicitly: “The inclinations, simply as psychic facts, are not 
themselves principles o f practical reason.” See s. 2.1.3 above. Hittinger probably has confused Grisez’s list 
o f basic tendencies (ibid., 64) with Grisez’s list of basic goods and thus mixed up the two concepts. Note, 
however, that on page 31 o f A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, Hittinger acknowledges that Grisez 
does not equate the tendencies with natural law. Clearly, Hittinger contradicts himself on this matter.
15 See A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 20.
16 Ibid., 86.
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natural law are self-evident, and that Grisez is following him in this, so if Grisez’s theory 
is weak in this respect, so is Aquinas’s.17
Of course, it is very important that we are completely clear on what “self-evident” means
(and does not mean) and what exactly is claimed to be self-evident in Grisez’s theory. If
we understand Grisez’s theory to be saying that the fullness of the benefit in each and all
of the basic human goods is grasped in a purely intuitive manner simply by awareness of
our inclinations, then we will judge the theory to be inadequate as this does not make
sense or hold up to scrutiny. Hittinger thinks Grisez’s theory understands self-evidence in
this inadequate way, so it is no wonder that he is scathing towards any theorist (he is
clearly pointing to Grisez) who completely discounts the need for any philosophical
knowledge in practical reasoning or the moral life:
But what strains credibility is that one could purport to have a coherent theory of 
practical reason, even while disclaiming to know (in the strong sense o f the term to 
know) what it is to be human, whether human beings have ends, and how the 
overall setting of nature either orients or disorients human action. Credibility is 
further strained by one who would insist that the latter type of knowledge is 
unnecessary, even if one should have it.18
17 See Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, which was analysed in detail in a seminal article by Grisez: “The 
First Principle o f Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2 Question 94, Answer 2,” 
Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168-201. Hittinger mentions this article many times but does not seem to 
see his inconsistency in criticizing Grisez’s presentation of the primary principles as self-evident, whilst 
praising Aquinas’s natural law theory, which does so too. Kevin M. Staley, “New Natural Law, Old Natural 
Law, or the Same Natural Law?” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 38 (1993): 109-133, at 121 points out 
that Aquinas’ position on the primary principles of the natural law being self-evident is one reason why we 
should not consider him a eudaimonia foundationalist. In other words, Aquinas does not base the natural 
law on a theoretical understanding o f human happiness, which is not a self-evident principle or kind of 
knowledge, but on practical principles, which are self-evident. Only when one has grasped the primary self- 
evident principles o f normative natural law, can one understand what the purpose of life as whole is. In 
other words, the natural law is prior to eudaimonia (or happiness). Staley considers the good of religion in 
its architectonic role in Grisez’s moral theory to be similar to eudaimonia in Aristotle’s philosophy and to 
contemplation in Aquinas’ thought.
18 A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 193.
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Still, Hittinger raises important questions about self-evidence and the place of knowledge 
and philosophy in practical reasoning. He also raises the following interesting questions: 
What exactly is the foundation o f Grisez’s theory? What is the foundation o f the natural 
law? Are these the same foundation?
According to Grisez, the primary principles of the natural law are its foundation and are 
self-evident. This means that an ordinary person can “access” the natural law, at least its 
primary principles, without having any detailed or sophisticated theory of human nature 
or God. This seems to be a way of understanding morality and our natural grasp of it that 
is very much characteristic of natural law theory. The natural law is morality as 
reasonableness, as common sense, as graspable (in principle) by anyone who is willing to 
use his reason honestly.19 So one has to wonder why it is that Hittinger insists that every 
natural law theory must be founded on a comprehensively worked out philosophy of 
nature and God. Such a view would seem to imply that ordinary people, who generally 
lack any grasp of detailed philosophy or theory, are obliged to follow the natural law 
without having any knowledge of its foundational principles, which is surely not the case.
Perhaps Hittinger is merely claiming that the theorist needs to have a fully worked out 
accurate philosophy o f nature and God in order to have an adequate theory of natural law, 
even though the ordinary person is not expected or required to have such a theory (or 
even to know of it). This will not do, however, as we surely do not want to claim that the
19 See, for example, J. Budziszewski, What We C an’t Not Know (Dallas: Spence Publishing Company, 
2003). This book provides an interesting account o f the natural law as common sense. It also provides an 
example of a critic who has revised his earlier “uncharitable and imperceptive” criticisms o f Grisez’s moral 
theory (see ibid., 104-105). Budziszewski’s earlier criticisms were in his Written on the Heart: The Case 
fo r  Natural Law (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 198-201.
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ordinary person can have access to the primary principles o f the natural law without 
having a comprehensive philosophy of nature worked out, whilst the theorist has to have 
such a philosophy before he can grasp the primary principles. It is true that the theorist 
will need more than a grasp of the primary principles of the natural law if he is to fully 
understand the various aspects of morality and human life, and to expertly work out 
answers to difficult moral questions, (expert answers which the ordinary person can 
benefit from). In such theoretical (and practical) endeavours, the theorist will need an 
accurate and comprehensive philosophy of nature and God, but this philosophy is not 
needed before the theorist can grasp the primary principles: it can be developed only after 
he has grasped these primary principles.20 Hittinger seems to be confusing the basic 
principles of practical reason with the fullness of practical reason; only the former are
91self-evident.
8.1.4 Grisez’s philosophical notion o f God
Hittinger thinks that the ways o f proving God’s existence followed by Aquinas (the 
famous “five ways”) are adequate, and that we can come to know a morally significant 
amount of knowledge about God’s characteristics, though in a limited way, by unaided 
reason.22 He thinks Grisez’s argument for God’s existence, by contrast, is very narrowly
20 It should be added here that the “ordinary person” too can benefit from having a more detailed 
understanding of human nature and of human life -  this is not restricted only to the theorist! Grisez is 
perfectly happy that theorists and others ought to search for a more and more adequate understanding of 
human nature and human life, including theoretical study.
21 Hittinger is also confusing natural law theory with the natural law itself. The former is more complex and 
theoretical than the latter, which it presupposes. See s. 1.2 above.
22 See A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 103, where Hittinger complains that Grisez “has no use 
for the analogia entis and the anologia eminentiae'". Obviously, Hittinger considers these to be essential for 
coming to know about God naturally, and to have been used by Aquinas and his followers.
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focussed, comprising a via negativa that ends up saying very little about God. As such,
Grisez’s approach does not allow us to naturally know enough about God for us to be
motivated by the good of religion, understood as harmony between our wills and God’s
will. Grisez’s philosophical notion of God is too “thin”, so to speak, for his “thick” notion
of the good of religion.
[Grisez] rejects the soundness of any argument based upon design or telic order in 
nature or any other ‘way’ to God that would enable one to affirm a property of God 
other than obtains ... .23
Hittinger has put his finger on something that is quite noticeable about Grisez’s 
philosophical argument for God’s existence: Grisez is very strict about the fact that we 
cannot know what God is in himself. God is utterly incomprehensible in himself, a total 
mystery, not to be described as similar to anything in our experience (or, at least, not in 
any direct or literal manner).24 It is legitimate to ask if the God that Grisez thinks is 
naturally knowable could be the object of the basic good of religion, or whether divine 
revelation is necessary for this God to be understood, even minimally, as worth being in 
harmony with.
Grisez seems to be very negative about any argument from design for God’s existence 
and character. Hittinger is accurate in this respect.25 One might wonder if a natural law
23 Ibid., 102., with a footnote reference to Grisez, Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy o f  Religion (Notre 
Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1975), 301 and 12.
24 See ss. 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.1 and 6.1.2 above.
25 O f course, Hittinger cannot be expected to refer in any detail in his 1987 book to articles and books 
published after that date, so he could not have known about the developments in Grisez’s argument for 
God’s existence, which can be seen in “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” American 
Journal o f Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151, “Natural Law, Religion, God, and Human Fulfillment,”
theory can, and ought, to incorporate an argument from design, or whether the strict 
argument of Grisez’s is the only one to use. In his reply to Hittinger’s book, Grisez points 
out that he does acknowledge clearly in Beyond the New Theism that there are other kinds 
of argument for God’s existence that are different from his, but which “also yield definite 
descriptions of something which I would call ‘God’ without qualification”. Grisez 
mentions the moral argument as an example.26 Grisez also points to a section of Beyond 
the New Theism (85-87) which shows how many believers reason about God and his 
existence in a way that is religiously significant and is similar in kind to the reasoning he 
pursues in his strict cosmological argument from contingency.27 Still, one’s overall 
impression of Grisez’s approach, albeit probably against his intention, could very well be 
that it is a philosophical approach that ends up with a very austere and perhaps forbidding 
notion of God, one that does not easily evoke religious feelings. Without necessarily 
agreeing completely with Hittinger’s criticism of Grisez in this respect, we can agree that 
the main argument presented in Beyond the New Theism was too open to 
misunderstanding, and that its development by Grisez in subsequent years was welcome 
and helped to clarify matters. (And such development should continue.)28
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American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 3-36, and the new preface to the republished Beyond the 
New Theism, re-titled: God: A Philosophical Preface to Faith (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 
2005). In these, Grisez moves closer to acceptance of a kind o f moral argument for God’s existence, and 
maybe even towards a kind o f design argument. See ss. 4.2.2 and 6.1.4 -  6.1.6 above.
26 Beyond the New Theism, 90.
27 See “A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s book”, 461.
28 Staley, 131-132, argues that Grisez needs to develop his theoretical metaphysical foundations with regard 
to God and how we participate in God’s goodness by our virtuous actions, and not to rely only on theology. 
Perhaps some of what Finnis has done goes some of the way towards answering Staley: see ss. 7.1 -  7.3 
above.
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That said, Hittinger goes too far when he says that Grisez’s notion of God allows us to 
say nothing of him except that he ‘obtains’. This is to ignore most, if not all, of several 
chapters (fifteen to seventeen) of Beyond the New Theism in which Grisez writes about 
the various things that can be said of God philosophically, whether by noting what can be 
denied of God, or what “metapredicables” can be affirmed of God, and what things can 
be said of God as he exists in relation to us.29 Certainly, we are still left with a notion of 
God that is far from fully satisfying, but one might ask: so what? Is Hittinger arguing that 
our purely philosophical notion o f God ought to be fully satisfying and complete? Surely 
not, as if it were, what need would there be for divine revelation, faith, and theology?30
We can also mention here the fact that ordinary people’s grasp of the primary principles 
of the natural law, including their grasp of the principle directing us to pursue and 
instantiate the good of religion, is not dependent on their having any sophisticated 
philosophy of God, or even on knowing that such a philosophy exists. Even so, ordinary 
people will be helped in their pursuit and instantiation of the basic goods, especially 
religion, by avoiding false or inadequate ideas of God and his relationship to us and 
nature, and the natural law theorist will be helped in this respect too. So it is good to have 
an accurate philosophy o f God, including the kind of strict cosmological argument of 
Grisez’s, as well as other arguments and approaches.31 Nothing in Grisez’s theory
29 See also “A Critique o f Russell Hittinger’s book,” 443.
30 Actually, perhaps Hittinger is aware implicitly of the danger o f a philosophical foundation that goes too 
far and leaves no room for theology, for he briefly criticises Aquinas for over-determining his own 
philosophical foundations: see A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 163.
31 It should be noted that Grisez developed his argument for God’s existence at least partly to answer the 
sophisticated philosophical objections o f Hume, Kant, Hegel, and post-Hegelian relativists, (which is why 
he devotes so much space to them in his book), and that this shapes the kind of approach he takes. How we
discounts the usefulness and even necessity of good philosophical knowledge and 
understanding: he just denies that such knowledge and understanding is necessary for our 
grasp of the very first principles of practical thinking, the primary principles o f the 
natural law. Nor does Grisez deny that revelation is useful and necessary, even though it 
is not necessary for our grasp o f the basic principles of natural law.32 The basic principles 
of the natural law in Grisez’s theory are only starting points for practical thinking, not 
final, completely formed and comprehensively accurate understandings of the full reality 
of the basic goods. It is only these starting points (which point us towards the ends that 
are specified by the various basic goods) that are self-evident; to know more than just 
these starting points, we need to pursue the goods and attempt to instantiate them, and 
this pursuit and instantiation can make use of, and needs to make use of, many kinds of 
knowledge beyond the self-evident principles that start the whole process off and 
continue to motivate its open-ended progress.
8.1.5a Are the basic goods concerned only with immanent self-fulfillment?
One of the most critical claims of Hittinger is that Grisez presents the goods as concerned 
solely with self-fulfillment and that these goods lack any transcendent dimension. So, 
religion, to take the most pertinent example, is not concerned with our obeying, loving 
and worshipping God as an objective, transcendent reality that is supreme and ultimate 
and so worthy of our obedience, love and worship. Instead, the good of religion is
should understand God for other purposes, including the practical purposes o f  living a moral life and living 
the life of a believer, are dealt with to some extent in various chapters o f the book outside o f  the strict 
presentation o f the central argument itself.
32 On the place of accurate philosophical and theological knowledge in Grisez’s moral theory, see ss. 2.2.3; 
2.4.3; 2.5.1; 2.5.5b; 2.6.4; 2.6.5; 3.1.4; 3.1.7; 3.2.3; 3.2.4; 3.3.4; 3.4.1; 4.3.2; 4.5.6; 4.7.1; 4.9.2a; 5.1.1b; 
5.1.2e; 5.1.6a; 6.1.7b; and 6.2.2 above. Regarding his collaborators’ thoughts on this, see 7.1.10; 7.2.6; 
7.3.4; 7.3.5; 7.4.4b, 7.4.5a, 7.4.5b, and 7.4.7c above.
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concerned only with our following the First Principle of Morality, or, in other words, 
with having an inclusivistic attitude toward all the other basic goods. And these goods are 
concerned only with our own immanent fulfillment as individuals. Hittinger thinks that 
Grisez’s understanding of religion fails to see it as concerned with honouring God, 
bearing in mind his status as superior to us, but as using a concept of God to motivate us 
to honour the goods (and thus serve our own needs).33 Hittinger thinks that Grisez’s 
theory puts all the emphasis on goods and none on persons, including the person of God. 
Such an emphasis “virtually insures an ethico-religious positivism”34 in which God must 
lay down the law (our duty) extrinsically, because it is not clear how the human subject is 
open to transcendence. In Grisez’s system the moral subject is trapped in the immanent 
sphere. This also means, however, that there seems to be no specifically religions benefit 
in the good of religion, that it has no real religious meaning.
These criticisms of Hittinger are very harsh, and hardly seem to do justice to the basic 
goods as they have been presented by Grisez as part of his theory. Grisez presents these 
goods as essentially rationally grasped opportunities for fulfillment o f human beings as 
human beings, and so we can grasp them as worthy of pursuit and instantiation not only 
for ourselves as individuals but for others who are human like us.35 Further, friendship 
and religion are two goods that very clearly call us out of ourselves and can be pursued 
and instantiated well only when we go beyond ourselves and reach out to others. (The
33 Note Hittinger’s seventh question regarding religion, A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 91f.
34 Ibid., 187.
35 See, for example, ss. 2.1.6; 2.3.2; 2.4.4; 2.5.5c; 3.2.4a; 4.1.1; 4.5.2; 4.6.3; 5.1.3c; 5.3.6; 6.1.6b; 6.1.10; 
6.2.3d and 6.3.4.
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other goods too have their own important social aspects.) It could be the case that 
Hittinger has been confused by the fact that Grisez often adopts a style of writing, for the 
sake of simplicity, that uses the singular, when both singular and plural are included, and 
so he may have gotten the (wrong) impression that Grisez’s theory is mainly concerned 
with individuals acting for single basic goods for their own benefit as individuals.36 It is 
clear that nothing in Grisez’s theory need confine our interest in the goods to an 
exclusively selfish interest in one’s own fulfillment. Nor need one’s pursuit of the goods 
(or a group’s pursuit of them) be engaged in for only one basic good at a time: one, or 
many, persons can pursue one, or many, goods at the same time. In fact, Grisez explains 
frequently and explicitly in his writings that when one pursues the goods in a way that is 
narrowly selfish, one fails to pursue them well. If one is to act well, in a manner that is 
entirely practically reasonable (i.e. morally good), one’s will must be a will compatible 
with a will towards integral human fulfillment, which is a communal reality (although it 
includes individual’s fulfillment as part of it, o f course).37
36 See the introduction to “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” where Grisez (Finnis and 
Boyle) draw explicit attention to this and warn the reader not to be misled by it. Anyone reading Grisez’s 
works accurately cannot fail to notice how the social aspects of the basic goods are mentioned frequently. It 
is fair to say, however, that it is mainly in his theology that Grisez emphasises and details the social aspect 
of our pursuit of the goods and o f living a moral life, but this is surely because it is mainly in his theology 
that Grisez has developed a comprehensive account of moral life, especially with regard to religion. Still, it 
is also true that the social aspect o f  the basic goods and the natural law is clearly evident in the purely 
philosophical theory presented by Grisez (and Russell Shaw) in the various editions o f  Beyond the New 
Morality, especially the third (1988).
37 This point is not affected, except to be strengthened, by the new development o f Grisez’s theory in which 
he replaces “integral human fulfillment” with “integral communal fulfillment”. One o f the reasons for 
Grisez’s change o f theory is that he wishes to emphasise even more strongly the communal nature of the 
fulfillment for which we ought to intend all our choices and commitments. Grisez continues to define 
morally good choosing by its respect for the integral directiveness of the basic goods of all persons. See s. 
6.3 above.
Still, it is an interesting question whether Grisez’s account of the good of religion pays 
enough attention to its specifically religious benefit for us and its ‘benefit’ for God. 
Perhaps he emphasises too much the moral benefit for us to the exclusion of the religious 
benefit. What is wrong with Aztec sacrifice, demonology, or drug-induced religious 
trances, to mention the examples given by Hittinger?38 He thinks that Grisez’s system 
does not provide us with any criteria apart from moral criteria to judge if these kinds of 
religion are inadequate. But what, we may ask, would be wrong with a Hindu worshipper 
going to a temple in complete good faith (i.e. inculpably) to pray to Krishna?39 This 
individual is not failing in specifically moral goodness. Does Grisez’s moral theory offer 
any criteria to judge if this man is failing to instantiate the good of religion, if he is acting 
according to an inculpably erroneous conscience?
According to Hittinger’s construal o f Grisez’s theory, Grisez makes reference to divine 
revelation and Christian faith to give “religion” its content, and thus we could evaluate 
the Hindu worshipper only from the point of view of faith. But Hittinger thinks Grisez’s 
notion of faith is fideistic, as there is no attraction in the good of religion prior to faith 
that might enable us to choose to have faith. It is true that Grisez has not written a lot 
about religion from a purely philosophical point of view, and that he has written a lot of 
theology, so it is hardly surprising that he might criticise Hindu worship (or, at least, its
38 See A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 111.
39 This example is chosen here because, in contrast to the examples mentioned by Hittinger, there is no 
obvious moral fault in the Hindu worshipper: he is not sacrificing a human being, or abusing drugs, or 
worshipping the devil.
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8.1.5b The religious good and moral goodness
t
objective inadequacy) by reference to the Christian faith. Still, in some writings, Grisez 
has offered philosophical criticisms of religious positions, such as monism and 
polytheism.40 It is also wrong to say that Grisez’s notion of Christian faith is fideistic, as 
he clearly sees the act of faith as being motivated by our rational interest in the goods of 
religion and knowledge, and supported by reason and fact.41
8.1.5c Effective instantiation: more than just a moral issue?
Still, it could be argued that often Grisez’s treatment of free choice in pursuit of the 
goods emphasises the intransitive effect of these choices, their effect on the person 
choosing, rather than their effect on others, including God.42 Grisez frequently points out 
that moral goodness is not primarily about producing good effects, bringing about good 
states of affairs, but about choosing in a way that is fully open to all the basic human 
goods. This is entirely right, but it can have the unfortunate side-effect of making 
Grisez’s theory seem to be mainly, or even completely, uninterested in the effects of our 
actions on others (even including God, who cannot be affected by our actions, strictly 
speaking, but who can be honoured or dishonoured, or pleased or displeased, by them).
383
40 See ss. 6.1.7b above. Hittinger should have taken note that Grisez’s position in Beyond the New Theism 
obviously offers cogent and detailed criticisms of several inadequate theoretical and practical positions 
regarding God and religion, and from a purely philosophical point of view too.
41 See chapter twenty, questions B-E, in Christian Moral Principles and chapter one o f Living a Christian 
Life. Obviously, Grisez does not consider faith to be purely a matter o f reason and fact, nor purely a human 
act. See also ss. 3.4 and 5.1.2 above.
42 Perhaps Grisez does this because the intransitive effect o f free choices is an important aspect o f morality, 
one that tends to be overlooked or neglected by proportionalism, an approach to morality which Grisez 
considers incoherent, inadequate and mere rationalisation. See chapter six o f  Christian Moral Principles.
Thus, Hittinger can wonder: In Grisez’s system, is our tendency towards God “an 
efficacious tendency”?43 Or, as he puts it in another place, does Grisez’s approach 
provide us with anything “which would permit us to judge what truly satisfies this human 
good”?44 We could ask: Is there any criterion or criteria, other than the moral truth or 
goodness, that would enable us to judge if an instantiation of the good o f religion actually 
instantiated this good? Is acting with a good will enough to instantiate the good of 
religion fully?
It could be argued that Grisez’s theory is not fully clear in providing answers to these 
questions. Insofar as he focuses on moral goodness, it would seem that the main criterion 
for judging if a choice instantiates the good of religion is moral truth, which seems to 
reduce the good of religion to moral goodness. But, as the primary practical principle 
directing us to pursue and instantiate the good of religion is not in itself a moral principle, 
but a wider practical principle, it would seem that one should judge the efficacy of one’s 
attempts to instantiate this good by looking not only to whether one is acting in a morally 
good way, but also at whether one is acting in a way that is truly God’s will, in a way that 
is truly honouring, obeying, loving, and/or worshipping him, not just with a will that is 
good, but in actions that conform objectively to God’s plan.
One who chooses to instantiate the good of religion effectively will have to do so in a 
morally good way, but this is a way that is open fully to the substantive goods of
43 A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 106. Hittinger is confusing “tendency” with “good” here, but 
his question is still a useful one if  we replace “tendency” with “good”.
44 Ibid., 108, emphasis added.
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knowledge and work, which provide it with content.45 One who wishes to truly share in 
the religious benefit of religion will want to do so in a manner that is both truly in touch 
with reality (accurate knowledge) and is truly fit for the purpose of honouring, 
worshipping, obeying and loving God (excellent work and play). Even though one can 
pursue the good of religion in a morally good way without knowing the full truth about 
God or without any skill in ritual or religious practice, one will not choose to instantiate 
the good of religion in a morally good way unless one is willing to do whatever one can 
do to act in a way that is objectively true and fitting. Thus, it would seem that one always 
attempts simultaneously to instantiate the goods of knowledge, excellence in work/play, 
and religion in any morally good instantiation of religion. Therefore, one can fail, with no 
moral fault, to instantiate the good of religion if one’s effort to instantiate the good is 
lacking in the substantive goods of knowledge and excellence in work.46 It could be said 
that these two substantive goods (and maybe we could include the substantive good of 
life here too, as promoting health and life is necessary for us to pursue religion 
effectively) provide us with objective practical criteria, along with the objective criteria 
of moral goodness, to judge if any instantiation of religion is truly an instance of harmony 
with God, or fully an instance of harmony with God.
45 See s. 3.1.7 above on Grisez’s treatment in Christian Moral Principles o f the relationship between 
reflexive and substantive goods.
46 It should be noted here that we are concerned with the goods o f accurate knowledge and excellent 
work/play as instrumental goods rather than goods sought only for their intrinsic goodness. Still, there is no 
reason why one cannot pursue religion as an intrinsic (basic) human good, with knowledge and excellent 
work as instrumental goods to help one to pursue religion, and also intend to benefit from knowledge and 
work as basic goods too. It would seem that Grisez’s theory allows one to instantiate goods as both basic 
and instrumental simultaneously (at least de facto, if one is not consciously aware o f  it). See s. 7.2.6 above.
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Another possibility is to adapt Grisez’s characterisation of the good of religion as an 
existential good and to see it instead as both existential and substantive, much like the 
good of marriage, which has both existential and substantive aspects. This would have 
the effect of making it less likely for the unwary or hasty reader to mistake Grisez’s 
theory for a “full-blown”, but frustrated, existentialism.47 Grisez’s characterisation of 
religion as a good in the existential domain might be one o f the main reasons why 
Hittinger mistakenly thinks his theory is a kind of existentialism or intuitionism (and 
thus, a kind of Kantianism ultimately, insofar as it strives to emphasise obligations and 
moral absolutes). It is easy to misunderstand Grisez here as saying that religion is purely 
an existential concern, with no substantive aspects at all.
Grisez has not shown any tendency to see religion as both existential and substantive, 
however, perhaps because he does not view the basic human goods as “atomic wholes” as 
Hittinger does, and so he has no difficulty with seeing our choosing to pursue and 
instantiate religion as necessarily involving other goods too, including substantive 
goods.49 Therefore, all that may be required for us to avoid mistaking Grisez’s moral
47 See A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 73, where Hittinger accuses Grisez o f wanting to espouse 
a full blown existentialism in his account of the self in the context o f the four orders in Beyond the New 
Theism. Hittinger thinks Grisez’s existentialism is seen in his wanting to emphasise the existential order of 
reason (in which free choice and commitments are the essential categories) to the exclusion o f the other 
orders; but it is a frustrated existentialism insofar as Grisez actually says that none o f the orders is primary, 
and so each of them must be taken into account when understanding the self. However, it needs to be added 
here that, according to Grisez’s moral theory, one cannot make good and practical choices without 
reference to all the four orders; one is not advised or required to confine oneself to the existential order. 
Grisez is not an existentialist, not even a frustrated one. See ss. 2.6.3 - 2.6.5 above.
48 A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 51.
49 See Christian Moral Principles, 130-132, where Grisez explains how the reflexive and substantive goods 
are interrelated. This is a very important part o f Christian Moral Principles for our purposes in this work.
8.1.5d Is religion both an existential and substantive good?
theory for existentialism or Kantianism is an accurate grasp o f what he actually says 
about the basic human goods and about practical rationality itself, and especially what he 
says about the interrelationship between the existential and substantive goods, and how 
both are involved in our choices and actions.
8.1.6 Grisez’s specific replies to Hittinger
It is helpful to note even briefly what Grisez said in reply to the questions raised by
Hittinger about religion.50 Firstly, Grisez clearly states that “principles of practical
reasoning and morality” are not “sufficient [in themselves] to guide action to authentic
fulfillment” and that “parts of philosophy and theology [other than ethical theory and
moral theology], including philosophical anthropology, metaphysics, apologetics, and so
on” are necessary to provide us with criteria for assessing religious practices (and thus
specific religions).51 In reply to Hittinger’s question regarding how Grisez can make the
transition from moral philosophy to moral theology, Grisez explains that
in moral theology I assume the truth of the Catholic faith. Making this assumption, 
my work neither on ethical principles nor on moral theology deals with the many 
interesting and relevant questions which pertain to other fields.52
Grisez is here stressing the fact that his work provides only a part of what is necessary 
for one to make good moral judgements and choose actions that are truly effective in 
instantiating God’s will.
50 These questions are originally in A Critique o f the New Natural Law Theory , 89-90. Grisez’s replies are 
in “A Critique o f Russell Hittinger’s book,” 456-461.
51 Ibid, 456.
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52 Ibid., 457.
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Grisez also replies to Hittinger’s question concerning his theory’s supposed reliance on 
faith for recognising the good of religion, and in particular our awareness of our 
obligation to obey God, which Hittinger thinks ought to be a foundational obligation of 
religion available as part o f the natural law. Grisez points out that Hittinger has 
overlooked a category o f normative truth in his moral theory: “the category of moral 
norms derived from self-evident moral principles.”53 The obligation to obey God’s 
commands is derived from self-evident moral principles: it is neither self-evident itself 
nor based exclusively on faith.54 The basic principle here is that “only God is in a 
position to make certain decisions for the life we share with him.”55 In addition, God’s 
commands are always for our true good so it is reasonable to obey them.
Grisez does not insist that it is only with explicit faith that we can know something of 
God’s authority and providential plan. Even though faith clarifies the fact of God’s 
authority and providence, and is necessary in practice for certainty and rich 
understanding, it is possible for us to grasp some aspects of the truth about God’s 
authority and wisdom by our use of reason. Thus an “individual who does not already
53 Ibid. Hittinger seems to acknowledge only two kinds of norm in Grisez’s theory: self-evident norms and 
norms made accessible only by faith. Grisez’s point here is that this is a seriously incomplete version of his 
theory, which has a very important role for derived, naturally accessible moral norms.
54 Grisez makes reference to Christian Moral Principles, 278-279 in this regard. Surprisingly, Grisez does 
not ground our obligation to obey God in the self-evident good of religion. Surely if  harmony with God is a 
good to be pursued and instantiated it will include obeying God’s commands? That Grisez overlooks this is 
a sign perhaps that he has not integrated his thought on religion fully into his moral theory, and that he is 
somewhat unhappy with the idea o f obedience o f God being linked with the good o f religion (maybe as 
being too legalistic).
55 Ibid., 278. This is emphasised in the original.
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have faith, if confronted with a recognizable divine command, can (and should) judge on 
the basis of moral principles that the command ought to be obeyed.”56
Grisez emphasises too the fact that a person can participate in the good of religion, as 
with the other basic goods, more or less; it is not a matter of all or nothing, as Hittinger 
seems to think. Therefore, it is possible for someone to partially grasp with his human 
reason God’s authority and commandments, and our obligation to obey them, and for this 
partial grasp to be perfected and strengthened later by faith. Grisez criticises Hittinger’s 
treatment of Grisez’s supposed “definitions” of religion in his various works.57 Grisez 
does not consider these to be attempts at theoretical definition; they are “attempts at 
identification”.58 Also, he thinks that Hittinger has “overlooked explanations that the 
basic goods are not fully determinate conceptually, but unfold dialectically as human 
individuals and humankind as a whole pursue them”.59 Therefore it is not surprising that 
our initial grasp of religion, and our understanding of how to instantiate it, will develop 
and change, being enriched by faith, theology and experience.60
Another point emphasised by Grisez in his reply to Hittinger is that his (Grisez’s) theory
points beyond the human goods themselves to the Good in which they are participations.
56 “A Critique o f Russell Hittinger’s book,” 457. In this and the previous paragraph, points from Christian 
Moral Principles 278-279, are combined with the explicit points made by Grisez in “A Critique of Russell 
Hittinger’s book”.
51 See A Critique o f  the New Natural Law Theory, 106-118, for Hittinger’s original criticisms of Grisez’s 
“definitions” o f religion.
58 See “A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s book,” 457.
59 Ibid, with reference to Beyond the New Morality, 73-74 and Christian Moral Principles , 182.
60 See “A Critique of Russell Hittinger’s book,” 458.
He does not consider this point to be dependent on faith. Faith can enrich our natural 
understanding of how our good acts are a participation in the more-than-human source of 
meaning and value by letting us know that we can share in God himself, by his divine gift 
of a share in the divine nature, and so we can go further than participating in divine 
goodness naturally.61 Our sharing in divine goodness by participation is a natural 
possibility based on human nature’s “indefinite potentiality for fulfillment in human 
goods as participations in goodness itself”, but Grisez rules out the idea, which he finds 
in “Augustine’s restless heart [argument] and Aquinas’s argument that God is man’s final 
end by nature”, that there is or can be “a proportionality between human nature and 
fulfillment in divine goodness ... in itself'.62 So Grisez’s moral theory accepts the idea 
that participation in God’s goodness is naturally possible, and proportionate to human 
nature, and can form part of man’s final end as man, but that sharing in God’s divine life 
and in God himself is not possible except by God’s supernatural gift.63
8.1.7 Life Plans
Finally, we look at Hittinger’s criticism of Grisez that he is a subjectivist with regard to 
life plans.64 It should be obvious in light of the points made above that Grisez’s theory 
does not rule out the making of critical assessments of facts and possibilities and theories 
and so on. It is entirely in keeping with Grisez’s theory that a person can and should 
deliberate about what kind of life he should lead, what his personal vocation is, what is
61 See ibid., 459.
62 Ibid., emphasis in original.
63 See ss. 2.1.9; 2.3.4; 2.7; 3.1.3 -  3.1.5; 4.5.1 - 4.5.2; 4.7.2; 6.1.9; 6.3.3 and 6.3.6d above.
64 Grisez does not deal with this criticism in his reply to Hittinger.
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really God’s will for him, which religion he should believe in and follow, and such 
matters.65 It is not the case that such assessment is purely subjective or arbitrary because 
the basic goods are incommensurable and irreducible to each other. As we have seen in 
our analytic survey of Grisez’s theory as a whole, his theory requires us to not only to 
make morally good choices rather than bad ones (following moral norms and principles), 
but also to discern between good options, taking into account all the relevant factors, 
including our emotions and talents and the needs of others, and so on.66 Grisez does insist 
that the basic goods are incommensurable, but he does not deny that sensible goods are 
inferior to intelligible goods, for example; clearly a life plan organised around pursuit of 
merely sensible goods would be ruled out by Grisez’s theory.67 Matters would be similar 
with regard to instrumental goods, which are inferior to intelligible goods: once again, a 
life plan organised around instrumental goods would be ruled out. Hittinger is wrong to 
consider Grisez’s theory to be subjectivistic with regard to life plans.
65 It is important to remember that in Grisez’s theory religion ought to be the focus for one’s life plan, 
therefore all the criteria that one should follow in evaluating religion should apply to choosing one’s life 
plan. This point seems to apply even if  one takes “integral communal fulfillment” as the focus for one’s life 
plan, as integral communal fulfillment is adequately understood only when it is seen to be centred on God 
and his will. See s. 6.3.6 above.
65 On this matter o f the place o f discernment in Grisez’s theory, see Living a Christian Life, 291-193; on the 
matter o f the importance of being accurate regarding facts, see ibid., 268-270. The whole o f chapter five in 
Living a Christian Life is worth looking at to get a comprehensive idea of what is meant by “seeking moral 
truth” in Grisez’s moral theory, and how far it is from intuitionism or arbitrariness.
67 See “A Critique o f Russell Hittinger’s book,” 442. The sixth mode o f responsibility would rule out such a 
life plan: see Christian Moral Principles, 214-215.
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We turn now to a more recent book criticising Grisez’s moral theory from a Thomistic 
perspective similar to Hittinger’s. Di Blasi calls the moral theory of Grisez, Finnis and 
Boyle “the neo-classical” theory of natural law, maintaining that this is what these 
thinkers “explicitly” call their theory.69 It is clear from his use of this term, along with his 
criticisms of Grisez’s natural law theory and his presentation of his alternative, that Di 
Blasi considers Grisez’s theory70 to be a failed attempt to interpret Aquinas’s classical 
natural law theory. Di Blasi even describes Grisez’s early article (1965) in Natural Law 
Forum 10, commenting in detail on Summa Theologiae la Ilae, Q. 94, a. 2, as “the 
manifesto of the neoclassical school”,71 clearly acknowledging Grisez’s importance but 
also giving the mistaken impression that the theory of Grisez and Finnis is meant to be an 
interpretation of Aquinas and should be judged on its success in interpreting Aquinas. 
Finnis and, especially, Grisez have frequently denied that their moral theory is to be read 
and judged as an interpretation of Aquinas.72
8.2 Fulvio Di Blasi, God and the Natural Law [1998/2006] 68
68 Fulvio Di Blasi, God and the Natural Law: A Rereading o f  Thomas Aquinas, trans. David Thunder 
(South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 2006; original Italian edition, 1998). Di Blasi translated 
Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights into Italian and studied Finnis’s work, coming to very critical 
opinions of it, (see ibid., 6-10) and so his book refers more to Finnis than to Grisez, but he clearly 
acknowledges Grisez’s importance in the origin and development o f the theory: see ibid., 10 and 38. Di 
Blasi is a professor of philosophy o f law and human rights theory at the Libera Università in Palermo.
69 See ibid., 10. Di Blasi does not give any reference from the work o f Grisez, Finnis or Boyle to 
substantiate this claim or to back up his consistent use of the term “neo-classical” to describe their theory.
70 Di Blasi doesn’t exclusively target Grisez or link the theory exclusively to him; he also targets Finnis, 
and, to a much lesser extent, some other thinkers that he describes as similar modern interpreters of 
Aquinas. As our main focus here is Grisez, however, and it originated with him, the theory in the present 
work is treated mainly as a theory of Grisez’s. This is not to suggest or imply that it is only his theory.
71 Ibid., 38.
72 See, for example, “Practical Principles,” 99 and especially 148. Di Blasi refers to the first o f these but not 
the second, and fails to recognize and acknowledge the significance o f the fact that Grisez and his school 
present their work almost from the start as a moral theory in its own right and not as a Thomistic theory as 
such: see God and the Natural Law, 38, n. 1.
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Although Di Blasi’s criticisms are not as detailed or extensive as Hittinger’s, nor backed 
up with as many references to Grisez’s and Finnis’s work,73 Di Blasi’s book is worth our 
attention because it reiterates many of the criticisms o f Hittinger and others,74 and it 
develops in some detail an alternative natural law theory that purports to avoid the 
weaknesses in Grisez’s theory by a more accurate reading o f the natural law theory of 
Aquinas.
8.2.1 Di Blasi ’s criticisms o f  Grisez ’s moral theory15
According to Di Blasi, Grisez’s theory of natural law is “atheistic (that is, not ‘law’ 
properly speaking, since it does not depend on the will of God, and so is not produced by 
a Legislator)” (3; see also 16, 66, 67, 72, 74, 133 and 197). Therefore, Grisez’s moral 
theory presents an extreme version of autonomous ethics, with morality based on man’s 
will rather than on God’s will (38, 66, 85, 166-167). This means that, although God and 
his will might be significant at the level of grace and revelation, the will of God is
73 In fact, there are very few references to the works of Finnis and, especially, Grisez in Di Blasi’s book to 
back up his pointed criticisms o f their work. Also, although the English translation is dated 2006 and is 
presented by Di Blasi as an “revision” of his original Italian version (see ibid., xvii), there is no reference in 
God and the Natural Law to any work by Grisez beyond the year 1993 or by Finnis beyond 1998.
74 Di Blasi makes a couple o f very positive references to Hittinger’s 1987 book: see ibid., 7-8 and 203. It is 
worth noting that Di Blasi makes no reference to Grisez’s 1988 reply to Hittinger. He also explicitly links 
his own criticisms of Grisez and Finnis to those of Ralph Mclnerny, who wrote a very positive forward to 
the English translation o f  Di Blasi’s book, and who contributed to its arguments directly: see ibid., xx and 
203. Di Blasi’s criticisms are substantially the same as those of Stephen A. Long, another Thomist: see his 
“St. Thomas Aquinas Through the Analytical Looking-Glass,” The Thomist 65 (April 2001): 259-300, and 
“Natural Law or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New Natural Law Theory” in St. Thomas 
Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition, ed. J. Goyette, M.S. Latkovic and R.S. Myers (Washington D.C.: 
The Catholic University o f America Press, 2004): 165-193.
75 Again, as in the outline o f Hittinger’s criticisms above, references to pages in the original source are 
given in brackets in the main text in this section. Also, an attempt is made to indicate explicitly logical 
connections between Di Blasi’s criticism, which are only implicit in his text. Di Blasi aims his criticisms at 
what he calls the “neo-classical theory”, not Grisez in particular.
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irrelevant for ethics at the natural level (67). A major cause o f this lack o f relevance of 
God’s will in Grisez’s moral theory is that his argument for God’s existence is too 
narrowly confined to an overly austere via negativa, and thus he ends up with a God 
trapped in the metaphysical domain, with no role to play in the moral domain, as far as 
natural reason can discover (67, 72, 133, 138). Further, Grisez’s moral theory lacks any 
reference to man having an ultimate end, which is to know and love God, and resemble 
God in so doing (15, 22, 30, 61).
Di Blasi also claims that Grisez’s moral theory is a form of intuitionism, and thus lacks 
any reference to the importance of facts of nature, especially human nature, which are 
seen to be merely factual and of no ethical relevance (3, 13, 22, 29, 61, 62). Grisez’s 
moral theory is thus thoroughly subjectivistic, lacking any reference to an objective 
hierarchy of values (15, 173, 174). Finally, Grisez’s moral theory also suffers from 
“problems of consistency ... [and] argumentative gaps” (15). This leads to “incurable 
ethical conflict” in which free choice is impossible because, according to Grisez’s theory, 
all our free choices necessarily must intend damage to human goods (22, 30, 63, 64).76
Di Blasi’s criticisms are very similar to Hittinger’s and to other Thomists such as Ralph 
Mclnerny, Stephen A. Long, and Benedict M. Ashley.77 As such, the points made above
76 This criticism is not elaborated by Di Blasi in this book, and it does not directly concern us here. Here we 
will say only that it would seem that Di Blasi ignores Grisez’s action theory and its understanding of 
voluntariness, especially the place o f side-effects in our willing, a point that Grisez has explained and 
justified often: for example, see chapter nine o f Christian Moral Principles.
77 See notes 64 and 70 above. Mclnerny’s most recent criticisms o f Grisez’s natural law theory can be 
found in his piece “Grisez and Thomism,” in The Revival o f  Natural Law: Philosophical, theological and 
ethical responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, ed. N. Biggar and R. Black (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 
2000), 53-72. Ashley’s criticisms are to be found in his piece “What Is the End o f the Human Person?: The
regarding Hittinger apply to Di Blasi and these other Thomists too. Still, Di Blasi’s 
criticisms allow us to clarify some more aspects of Grisez’s work.
8.2.2a Is Grisez’s moral theory atheistic?
Di Blasi does not deny that Grisez’s theory acknowledges that God is “the ultimate 
source of moral duty”.78 His main point in accusing Grisez’s theory of being “atheistic”79 
is that, although this theory does admit that God is the creator and even the ultimate 
guarantor of the natural law, neither God nor his will has any significance or role in the 
detailed principles and directives of the natural law. God’s will is seen by Grisez’s theory
as just a fact, an is, and it is central to Grisez’s understanding of the natural law that one
• •  80 • cannot derive any ought from any is, even the is of God’s commands or will. Grisez’s
moral theory begins with human experience and human autonomy, rather than God’s will
(which Di Blasi holds to be the correct starting point of the natural law). Di Blasi
maintains that “according to [Aquinas], man is morally good only when he wants
something because he knows that God wants it.”81 Di Blasi claims that Grisez’s theory
presents the natural law as complete and sufficient without any reference to God or his
will, because people are obliged to do what is good purely for the sake of the basic
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Vision of God and Integral Human Fulfillment,” in Moral Truth and Moral Tradition, ed. L. Gormally 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), 68-96. Mclnemy and Ashley are less sharp and negative towards Grisez 
than are Hittinger, Di Blasi and Long.
78 God and the Natural Law, 72, emphasis added.
79 Ibid., 3, emphasis in original.
80 See ibid., 133.
81 Ibid., 73-74, emphasis added.
human goods, “simply because practical reason grasps them as goods”.82 Rather than 
putting the basic goods at the foundational level of the natural law, Di Blasi, following 
his rereading of Aquinas, wants to put God and his will there: “Knowledge and love of 
God ... are for Aquinas the most basic philosophical presuppositions o f the concept of 
natural law.”83
Di Blasi thinks that Grisez leaves God out of the foundational principles o f the natural 
law because the existence of God is not self-evident, whereas the primary principles of 
the natural law are self-evident.84 In contrast to this, Di Blasi maintains that God’s 
existence is known by everyone, even though, as Aquinas recognised, it is not self- 
evident. People know God in his creatures.85
At times, Di Blasi speaks of this knowledge of God and his will as if it were very clear 
and conscious, constituting an explicit and necessary basic motivation for all our acts.86 
In doing this, Di Blasi seems to claim that an explicit reference to God and his will, as 
constituting man’s primary obligation to pursue the ultimate good of obeying and loving
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82 Ibid., 15, emphasis in original. It is not clear exactly what Di Blasi means by this phrase, but, in light of 
his overall argument, it seems that it is a claim that Grisez understands the basic human goods to be “good” 
in a very narrow, subjectivistic way, because he does not see these goods as explicitly embodying the will 
o f God the supreme Legislator, but as good in their own right.
83 Ibid., 37.
84 See ibid., 74.
85 See ibid., 37.
86 See ibid, 133; also 1 and 78.
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throughout Di Blasi’s book. He claims that Grisez’s theory lacks this explicit reference to
God’s will as the basis of the natural law. Thus Di Blasi seems to hold (although he does
not use these terms) that the first principle of morality should be formulated only in
explicitly religious terms, rather than the philosophical terms used by Grisez and his
school. Di Blasi even goes as far as to seem to deny that an atheist can do anything good:
... in Thomas’s ethics, even were it possible for an atheist to do exactly what God 
wants (in a ‘material’ way), he and his actions would not thereby be morally good, 
that is, [in] conformity to the divine will.88
However, Di Blasi also speaks often as if the knowledge of God and his will necessary
for one’s acts to be morally good is only required to be implicit,89 For example, he says:
Aquinas’s demanding claim concerning the ethical role of God’s will can be 
justified only if the ultimate meaning of the moral good to which man aspires can 
somehow be seen to reside in obedience to God’s will, so that only an intentional 
reference to God can make (morally) good man’s pursuit of any other good. This 
position presupposes in Aquinas a concept of the natural knowledge of God so wide 
and pervasive that it can be applied to everyone -  even to someone who denies 
God’s existence or appears not to know Him.90
God, is the first premise of all natural law reasoning.87 This is to be a major theme
87 See ibid., 190, where Di Blasi outlines a syllogism showing the moral obligation to perform sensible acts 
of worship, in which the primary premise (which he claims saves the argument from the naturalistic 
fallacy) is “the natural normativity o f the ultimate end” . A similar primary premise is given for the 
syllogisms demonstrating the morality o f using things properly (191) and o f treating people properly (192). 
Di Blasi holds that in every instance of the natural law, our obligation to order our acts towards our 
ultimate end (i.e. God) is the primary premise of moral reasoning, a primary premise that is left out of 
Grisez’s theory, thus rendering it atheistic.
88 Ibid, 79.
89 See ibid, 86, 89-90, 98.
90 Ibid, 133, emphasis in original. Di Blasi seems to allow that the less-than-ultimate meaning o f the 
natural law can be grasped without reference to God and his will.
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Here, Di Blasi seems to acknowledge that an atheist can do what is truly good, and,
indeed, can even be said to know God and his will to some extent. Di Blasi does not
claim that everyone will be aware of their knowledge of God:
When we speak o f ‘natural knowledge’ of God, we are referring primarily to 
knowledge of first intention. Consequently, not everyone need fully realize 
reflectively what he knows and what exactly God means for him.91
Thus, it would seem that Di Blasi contradicts himself, in that he sometimes seems to 
require us strictly to have an explicit knowledge of God and his will in order for our 
actions to be morally good, but he also says that the necessary knowledge of God can be 
very minimal, indeed only implicit, and even below our level of consciousness.
Di Blasi’s insistence on the necessity of explicit reference to and knowledge of God’s 
will in natural law is central to his criticism of Grisez’s moral theory, which Di Blasi 
claims omits any reference to God’s will. However, Di Blasi’s claim that our natural 
knowledge of God’s will need only be implicit seems to be quite compatible with 
Grisez’s theory and its place for the good of religion as at least implicitly at stake in all 
our choices and commitments. Indeed, quite a lot of what Di Blasi has to say in his own 
constructive moral theory could, with some modifications, find a place in Grisez’s theory, 
once we get rid of his occasional insistences on an explicit reference to God’s will as 
required for any natural law to be grasped by man.92 In any case, Di Blasi’s approach is
91 Ibid., 99.
92 As an example o f a substantial part of Di Blasi’s theory that could find a place in Grisez’s own theory, 
see Di Blasi’s section on the elements of common human moral experience that point to our need for God, 
ibid., 139-142. The experiences outlined by Di Blasi include the human search for true and lasting 
happiness, the human desire for eternity, the human need for secure truth, the human need for ultimate 
justice, the human desire for importance, and the human experience o f objective duty. Such experiences of 
need could very easily be seen as grounding our grasp o f the good of religion.
incoherent in this respect, as it cannot seem to settle on whether our knowledge of 
morality as willed by God is required to be explicit or implicit.
8.2.2 b Di Blasi overlooks the role o f  religion in Grisez's theory
Di Blasi’s claim that Grisez’s theory has no place for God’s will seems very odd, in any 
case. Di Blasi seems to totally ignore the role of religion in Grisez’s natural law theory, a 
role treated in detail in previous chapters of this present work. If one can know or believe 
that God wills that one do a particular action (or avoid an action), this fact is certainly 
important practically, according to Grisez’s moral theory. One has then an additional 
motive, and a very powerful one, to do that good action (or avoid that evil action).93 As 
God is the source of the natural law, and indeed of all created reality, we can know that 
any action that we grasp naturally as morally good is willed by God. And it is clear that if 
we wish to be in harmony with the transcendent Source of meaning and value, and we 
ought to wish for this harmony whenever it is at stake, then we must choose to do what is 
compatible with the intentions of that Source, which we will most reasonably understand 
as a personal Being who desires our good. Thus, anyone who wishes to know and follow 
the natural law will wish, as an integral part o f  this, to pursue and instantiate the good of 
religion, which includes one’s love of God and his will, insofar as one can know God and 
his will naturally. O f course, Grisez holds that one’s knowledge and love of God will be 
hugely enhanced by one’s coming to know divine revelation and one’s acceptance of this 
revelation, and entering into a covenantal relationship with God, by Christian faith.94
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93 See, for example, ss. 2.4.6 ; 2.5.5c -  2.5.5d; 4.6; 6.1.5 -  6.1.6; 7.2.2 -  7.2.4 and 7.4.6 -  7.4.7 above.
94 See, for example, ss. 3.4 -  3.8 above.
Clearly, however, God’s will is not known and relevant only after one has made the act 
of faith. People without Christian faith can know something of God and his will naturally, 
and this knowledge can be a very significant aspect of their practical reasoning and moral 
life. Indeed, this natural knowledge of, and practical appreciation of, God and his will is a 
necessary motivational foundation for the freely chosen and reasonable human act of 
faith. Grisez’s moral theory is not atheistic in any way; his philosophy and theology are 
not sealed off from one another, but intrinsically linked, and both have a central place for 
the transcendent Source of all reality, meaning and value.
8.2.3 Does Grisez’s theory have a place fo r  God as a Legislator?
Di Blasi’s natural law theory emphasises God as Legislator o f the natural law in a way 
that seems quite different from Grisez’s theory. In Di Blasi’s view, the natural law is 
“produced by a Legislator” (i.e. God) and so “depends on God’s will”,95 but he claims 
that in Grisez’s theory the natural law is produced by man, and so is not really law as 
such, and is certainly not divine in any way. For Di Blasi, God promulgates the natural 
law through the creation of human nature, specifically the natural inclinations that point 
us towards the goods perfective of us, and, through them, to our ultimate end, which is 
God.96 We are obliged to follow the natural law precisely because it is God who is the 
lawgiver, and his will is truly wise and loving. Di Blasi seems to think that Grisez’s 
theory is quite different.
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95 Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 84-85.
96 See ibid., chapter 3, especially 176.
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Certainly, Grisez is anxious to avoid legalism, especially any suggestion that moral 
norms oblige us precisely and only because they are imposed on us by an all-powerful
97 * •God. Grisez emphasises that moral norms and principles are truths that guide us 
towards our good, truths that therefore motivate us with their intrinsic attractiveness; they 
are not to be reduced to rules imposed extrinsically by a powerful but arbitrary God. Di 
Blasi seems to agree with this point of Grisez’s, however, and says a number of things in 
this regard that could very easily find a place in Grisez’s moral theory.98 He clearly sees 
God’s will as wise and loving, and his creation of our human nature and the whole of 
nature as an act of love done for our good. Thus far, his approach is similar to Grisez’s.
However, Di Blasi tends to see the natural law as a means to an end, the ultimate end of 
our being like God, of our loving God, and to explain this in a manner that suggests that 
he is reducing the natural law to a kind of technical knowledge. It is almost as if the laws 
given by God in the natural law are a kind of ‘manual’ for us to get the best out of our 
‘equipment’, with sin being a matter of ignorance of how to act effectively in pursuit of a 
determinate end.99 Thus, Di Blasi uses the metaphor of looking after a car to describe the 
moral life:
Choosing particular goods in view of the ultimate end is like choosing, in view of 
the good overall condition o f a car, whether this is the best time to change the tires 
or to check the oil. Although tires and oil are in themselves different and 
incommensurable things, they nonetheless fall under a single criterion of choice,
97 See Christian Moral Principles, 12-13, 101-102 and 278-279.
98 Di Blasi notes that Grisez’s criticism of the neo-scholastic moral theology, which was legalistic and saw 
God’s will as extrinsically imposed on man, is “very well done” (God and the Natural Law, 60) and 
“certainly justified” (ibid., 61), although he claims that Grisez goes too far in his own theory by dividing 
practical from theoretical reason and knowledge (see ibid., 61-62).
99 See ibid., 206: “ ... moral evil may be characterized as an error concerning the ultimate end ...”.
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given the objective and partial functions that they fulfil in the car. The term ‘good’ 
is always relative to something or someone (in the sense that something is always 
good for something or someone).100
The problem with this, according to Grisez’s theory, is that it reduces the various basic
human goods to only one good, the good of a narrow “religion”, and it reduces morality
to a technical skill or set of skills (or to technical know-how).101 All the other basic goods
become merely means to the one good, harmony with God (which is perhaps understood
to include naturally the beatific vision too, thus confusing grace and nature). It is not
surprising, therefore, that Di Blasi, although he does acknowledge the various human
goods as having importance, tends to emphasise love of God as if it is an alternative to
love of self and love of the various human goods:
Moral duty, in fact, does not arise from the ‘desire of one’s own good,’ but 
precisely from the capacity to transcend it (or sacrifice it) for love of God. This 
love, furthermore, raises the natural love of self and of others to an ethical level, 
putting them on an equal footing (inasmuch as both are means to loving God, Who 
loves each person He has created in the same way), and removing from them the 
intentional motivation of concupiscence (‘I love myself and others, ultimately, 
because God loves everyone in the same way’).102
100 Ibid, 200. See also ib id , 82, 172-174.
101 This also reduces the third order (the existential) to the fourth order (of technical/artistic effectiveness, 
o f culture) -  see s. 2.6 above. P. Lee, “Germain Grisez’s Christian Humanism,” American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 137-151, explains Grisez’s approach nicely: “The relation o f  the morally good act 
to the end or ultimate good which measures it is not a means-end relation. Moral goodness is not the 
relation of effectiveness o f an external action to an external goal, even if that goal be the overall fulfilled 
human being. Rather, morality primarily concerns the will, and moral goodness consists in the relation of 
the act of will to all o f the basic goods of persons, both in oneself and in others. So the relation of the 
morally good act to its standard or criterion -  integral human fulfillment — must be one o f harmony or 
openness rather than one o f productivity or effectiveness... Thus, the difference between the morally good 
action and the morally bad action must be between the fullness o f being due the will and a falling short of 
that being.” (Ibid, 140).
102 God and the Natural Law, 152. See also ib id , 79, 147-152, 174, 196-197.
Grisez rejects the idea that we have to choose between loving God and loving the basic 
human goods o f ourselves and others; rather, he emphasises that we can, and ought to, 
choose to love both. Di Blasi does not totally disagree with Grisez, arguably, insofar as 
even Di Blasi seems to see at times that one’s love of the human goods is a way of loving 
God who is the creator of all goods, and who wills our good,103 but Grisez is much 
clearer in his insistence that the various human goods are intrinsically good, with a 
goodness that is created by God but which is not to be reduced to religion or to God.
8.2.4 Is Grisez’s theory merely intuitionism?
Like Hittinger, Di Blasi accuses Grisez’s theory of being a form of intuitionism, with the 
basic goods seen as merely elements of our minds disconnected from reality. Di Blasi is 
extreme in his criticisms in this regard, claiming that in Grisez’s moral theory “in ethical 
questions we must not refer in any way to nature”104, and saying that the neoclassical 
approach has “rejected any connection between the good known by practical reason and 
the facts of nature”.105 Then Di Blasi makes the following extraordinary point about the 
basic human goods: “Consequently, the only way to enhance our knowledge of them is to 
reflect on the intuitions themselves.”106
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103 See ib id , 188, where Di Blasi cites with approval Aquinas’s dictum that “We do not offend God except 
by doing something contrary to our own good”. Much o f Grisez’s moral theory is encapsulated in this 
saying: see Christian Moral Principles, 115-119 and 460-461.
104 God and the Natural Law, 29, emphasis added.
105 Ibid, 62, emphasis in original.
106 Ibid.
This claim completely ignores what Grisez has said about the first principles of natural 
law being starting points only, the knowledge of which needs to be developed and 
enhanced by sound reasoning and accurate knowledge, including theoretical
1 f l T  1 O Rknowledge. This point has been noted frequently here. The many pages of theology 
written by Grisez make no sense whatsoever if all one needs to know the meaning and 
value of religion is to think about one’s thoughts. Clearly, Grisez’s theory does not 
discount the importance of knowing the facts about ourselves, our capacities, our 
possibilities, our relationships, our history, our environment, our society, and our Creator, 
Redeemer, and Sanctifier. Knowledge is one of the basic goods, an essential aspect of our 
integral fulfillment, an essential principle of the natural law. Grisez’s theory does not 
envisage us as being stuck in our minds, relying on mere intuitions for our practical and 
moral knowledge and decision making. Di Blasi’s remark that according to Grisez’s 
moral theory we can enhance our knowledge of the basic principles of the natural law 
only by reflection on our thoughts shows how far he is from understanding Grisez’s 
position and approach.
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107 See, for example, “Practical Principles,” 111. It is also worth noting that in his book-length treatments of 
specific moral issues, such as abortion (1970), euthanasia (1979), and nuclear deterrence (1987), Grisez 
presents in great detail the factual aspects of the issue. A deep concern for facts is also evident in his 
treatment of specific moral issues and questions in volumes 2 and 3 o f The Way o f  the Lord Jesus.
108 See ss. 2.5.5b; 3.1.4; 3.2.4a; 3.3.4; 4.3; 4.5.6; 6.1,7b and 7.4.4 above.
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8.2.5a Di Blasi’s 2001 article: Many ultimate ends or just one?
Di Blasi criticised Grisez further in a 2001 article.109 His main criticism is that Grisez’s 
theory fails to acknowledge that there is only one ultimate end for man: the beatific 
vision of God by human beings as human. Instead, Grisez’s theory posits several natural 
ultimate ends for human beings precisely as human: the diverse and irreducible basic 
human goods. Di Blasi rejects the idea that there could be diverse and irreducible goods 
because the very fact that diverse things are “good” indicates that they are somehow 
unified.110 He claims that Grisez’s insistence that the basic human goods are irreducible 
and diverse categories of good is pure equivocation on the word “good”, as when one 
uses the word “bill” for “the beak of a duck and for the demand for payment”.111 When 
Grisez writes about basic human goods, the word “good” as applied to each of these 
goods does not refer to anything similar at all; these “goods” have nothing in common 
except the word “good”, just as the bill of a duck and the bill presented to me by my 
plumber have nothing in common except the word “bill”. Di Blasi insists that the word
109 F. Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude: A Critique o f Germain Grisez,” American 
Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 113-135. This article is a response to an article by Grisez in the same 
edition of the American Journal o f  Jurisprudence, which was analysed in detail above: see s. 6.1. It seems 
likely that Di Blasi wrote in response to an earlier version of Grisez’s article, and that Grisez was able to 
revise his final, published article in light o f Di Blasi’s response: see G.V. Bradley and J. Finnis, “Editorial 
Introduction,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 1-2, and also the final footnote in Grisez’s 
article. Once again, Di Blasi acknowledges the intellectual support of Ralph Mclnemy (see “Ultimate End, 
Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 113, n. 1) and refers positively to Hittinger’s critique o f  Grisez (see ibid, 
119, n. 26).
110 See ibid, 117, n. 17.
111 Ibid. Here, Di Blasi is quoting from Ralph Mclnerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington DC: The 
Catholic University o f America Press, 1996), 94. Although Mclnemy has been a sharp critic of Grisez’s 
natural law theory, the original reference here is not directed at Grisez.
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“good” must be applied univocally to the various types of goods; otherwise, one falls, as 
does Grisez, into equivocation and inconsistency.112
Di Blasi seems to have a point here. To call diverse goods “good”, as Grisez does, 
indicates that they have something in common, and are not totally diverse. Grisez’s 
emphasis on the incommensurability and diversity o f the basic human goods might lead 
readers to think that these goods are totally different from each other, and indeed, entirely 
separated from each other. This would be a weakness in his theory.
However, Grisez does explain that he uses the word “good” of the diverse categories of 
good “by analogy”.113 He clearly acknowledges that they have something in common: 
their goodness, the fact that they offer the human person opportunities to flourish, to be 
more, to participate in a some sort of benefit that fulfils us as human persons.114 As well 
as emphasising the fact that the goods are diverse and irreducible, Grisez refers also to 
how all intelligible goods share a kind of “community in intelligible goodness”, which is 
the “common aspect o f their directiveness [that] corresponds to the will’s natural 
openness to goodness” .115 The fact that the basic human goods have something in
112 Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 117, n. 17.
113 See “Practical Principles,” 110 and 120. Even though Grisez (along with his co-authors) uses the phrase 
“by analogy” here, and even though the book by Mclnerny quoted by Di Blasi is called Aquinas and 
Analogy (see note 108 above), Di Blasi overlooks analogy, and deals with the issue in terms of a choice 
between only equivocal or univocal uses o f a term. This is a false dichotomy.
114 See Christian Moral Principles, chapter five, question A, for Grisez’s understanding o f the terms 
“good” and “bad”. Although he does not use the term “by analogy” there, it is clear that he uses the term 
“good” precisely by analogy to indicate various types of fulfillment pertaining to the diverse domains of 
reality, including the existential.
115 “Practical Principles,” 135.
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common is indicated by the fact that they are all specifications of the first principle of 
practical reasonableness, which refers to “the good”.116 Di Blasi tends to overlook the 
role of the first principle of practical reasoning in Grisez’s theory, where it is 
foundational.117 Grisez does not seem to be speaking equivocally in referring to basic 
human goods.
However, neither is Grisez speaking univocally about them. He wishes to emphasise that 
there are diverse categories of goods, not just one overall, dominant good. If there was 
one overall dominant good, such as religion, for example, then we would not be able to 
choose to do wrong (or to do right). If our choices were always between alternatives that 
could be completely reduced to one type of (ultimate) good, then we would have to 
“choose” the alternative that offered the highest proportion o f this good, or the most 
intense embodiment of this good, or its most efficient instantiation, or its most satisfying 
realisation. Thus we would be proportionalists of a sort, but proportionalism is an 
incoherent way of treating free choice, as its method of evaluating choices renders free
116 See Christian Moral Principles, chapter seven, question C on the first principle o f practical reasoning.
117 Thus, Di Blasi fails to see that his understanding of “the ultimate end” as a formal principle, which he 
claims follows Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s views, (see Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and 
Beatitude,” 114-118) is not totally dissimilar to Grisez’s understanding of “the good” mentioned in the first 
principle o f practical reasoning. Grisez acknowledges that all our deliberate choices are for one end: the 
good (i.e. human fulfillment). He also acknowledges that our understanding o f the content o f this 
fulfillment can be very varied, and even mistaken, and always open to development. The oneness of “the 
good” is also acknowledged in the concept o f “integral communal fulfillment”: see s. 6.3 above. (“Integral 
human fulfillment” indicated this singularity o f willing too, but it is now superseded by integral communal 
fulfillment in Grisez’s theory.) Clearly, pace Di Blasi, Grisez recognises that there is a unity in all our 
willing. It is important to note, however, that Grisez does not consider that the ultimate end can or must 
fully satisfy the will, as Di Blasi claims Aristotle requires by his third criterion for the ultimate end 
formally considered: see ibid., 118 compared to Grisez, “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human 
Fulfillment” American Journal o f Jurisprudence 46 (2001), 28-35 and Grisez, “The True Ultimate End of 
Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone,” Theological Studies 69, no. 1 (March 2008): 46-53.
choice impossible.118 If all that matters in choice is ultimately the single good of religion, 
or God, for example, as Di Blasi frequently insists, we could not freely choose an option 
that offered less or none of this good, and freely ignore an option that offered more of it.
Here it is helpful to refer to the car metaphor, which Di Blasi uses once again in this 
article, as he did in his book.119 Using a car and its maintenance as a metaphor for the 
moral life, Di Blasi claims that we can and must commensurate the various goods at stake 
in choices just as we can commensurate the various parts of a car with respect to the 
overall good of the car. The problem is that it is impossible to render an account in the 
terms of this metaphor of how one can freely choose to do evil (and thus it is impossible 
to account adequately for how we can freely choose to do good). It would seem that the 
metaphor implies that one can do moral wrong only by being (technically) ignorant. How 
could one culpably fail to look after one’s car, if the only good that one can know about, 
and have an interest in, is the good of one’s car as a whole? What reason could one have 
to neglect to have the oil changed, for example, unless one has some other kind of good 
that can distract one from the good of one’s car as a whole, motivating one to pursue 
some other kind of good (the good of spending one’s money on health, for example, or on 
sport) even though one knows that one ought to look after the good of one’s car? One 
could spend too much money on tires and not enough on oil if  one was ignorant of the 
technical means o f looking after one’s car effectively, but how could one fail culpably to
118 See Christian Moral Principles, chapter six, especially 151-154. An implication o f what is said here is 
that Di Blasi tends towards a kind of proportionalism of sorts, at least insofar as he seems to reduce moral 
goodness to (technical) knowledge and immorality to ignorance, and to present morality as ultimately 
concerned with choosing the most effective means to an (ultimate) end, rather than as partially constitutive 
of our ultimate end.
1,9 See Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 116, and also n. 100 above.
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look after one’s car (i.e. knowing the technical requirements, but still failing to act 
accordingly) if only one’s car matters? By insisting on the ultimate end as the only real 
good at stake in free choices, (and by putting it as the first premise o f practical reasoning, 
as we saw in our analysis of his book above), Di Blasi is unable to account for the reality 
of free choice and human responsibility.
Grisez, by contrast, is able to account for free choice and human responsibility, because 
he acknowledges that there are several types of good that can offer us competing rational 
benefits, benefits that are incommensurable. One can freely choose to pursue a benefit, 
but one is not forced to do so by an awareness that only this benefit really matters. One 
remains able to choose another alternative, even if it is an immoral alternative, because 
the goods at stake are diverse. Even the good of moral goodness is not so dominant that 
we cannot freely choose immorally for some other good (i.e. for one or more of the basic 
human goods, considered in isolation from the whole set of basic human goods operating 
as an integral whole).120 The importance and reality of free choice provides one reason 
why Grisez insists that neither religion nor God can be, or must be, the ultimate 
efficacious reason why we make all our concrete choices. It is also a reason why he 
insists on the distinction between practical reason and moral reason, and why he 
considers the first principle of practical reason to mean by “good” not only moral good, 
but also all the diverse and irreducible kinds of good that can appeal rationally to us as 
human beings. One implication of this is the religion is not the only good at stake in our 
choices, nor graspable as the ultimate good ‘trumping’ all other human goods.
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120 See “Practical Principles,” 121-125.
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Di Blasi places so much emphasis on Grisez’s understanding of the basic human goods as 
ultimate ends that he overlooks completely what Grisez (along with Finnis and Boyle) 
had to say about other meanings of “ultimate end” in their 1987 article “Practical 
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”.121 In section X of that article, Grisez clearly 
pointed to three meanings for the term, not just one as Di Blasi seems to think.122 The 
second meaning referred to the fact that when we freely choose, our choices are for the 
sake of one or more basic human goods, which provide us with our final reasons (i.e. 
ultimate ends) for efficacious willing. Di Blasi seems to read into this the idea that Grisez 
thinks that a person’s life cannot have any single natural end of any sort, not even God or 
religion, but must have several ultimate ends, each of which is completely different from 
the others, and irreducible to any common factor. In fact, in section X of “Practical 
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, Grisez states that a human person can have
8.2.5b Grisez’s understanding o f “Ultimate End”
121 Di Blasi is not the only respondent to Grisez’s work in the same issue o f the American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence who overlooks the diverse meanings of “ultimate end” in Grisez’s theory. Scott McDonald, 
“Aquinas’s Ultimate Ends: A Reply to Grisez,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 37-49, does 
so too, but not to the same extent. McDonald recognises that there are diverse meanings for the term 
“ultimate end” (see 40), but insists that Aquinas meant it mainly in one way, as the final and totally 
fulfilling end that leaves nothing else to be wanted or desired (see 38-40). Grisez rejects the idea that our 
ultimate end must satisfy us so totally that nothing else can be wanted, and thus he disagrees with Aquinas 
and McDonald (and Di Blasi), but his understanding of “ultimate end” is more nuanced and rich than 
McDonald or Di Blasi give him credit for.
122 Section X of “Practical Principles, Moral truth, and Ultimate Ends,” American Journal o f Jurisprudence, 
32 (1987): 99-151, at 131, is called: “Ends Ultimate in Three Diverse Ways” (emphasis added), and is 
divided into three sections, the first dealing with integral human fulfillment, the second with the basic 
human goods, and the third with the happiness for which people settle. Section X o f the article begins Part 
III o f the article, focusing on “Ultimate Ends” as the third part of the title itself indicates. Di Blasi seems to 
have read only section X (b) and overlooks the rest of Section X, and indeed much o f the whole third part 
of the article, in which he would have found the answer to some o f his problems with Grisez’s theory. 
Obviously, he cannot have known about later development of Grisez’s theory, in which the concept of 
“integral communal fulfillment” is presented as what ought to be one’s single, concrete ultimate end in all 
one’s choices and commitments: see s. 6.3 above.
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a single ultimate natural end for his life as a whole, and indeed he argues at some length 
that a person should have a single ultimate natural end for his life.
What Grisez means by this is seen initially by examining the first and third meanings for 
“ultimate end”. The first meaning of “ultimate end” presented by Grisez and his co­
authors in 1987 was that of “integral human fulfillment”, an ultimate end which rectifies 
the will. Integral human fulfillment referred to an ideal, a perfect human community 
flourishing in all aspects (i.e. with respect to all the basic human goods). To the question 
of whether this ideal, perfect community can be “the ultimate natural end of all human 
persons and communities”, Grisez answers explicitly: “In a way it is.”123 We cannot 
effect fully such a perfect, all-embracing human community by our willing, but all our 
morally good willing wishes for such an ideal, and so is compatible with such an ideal, 
and thus integral human fulfillment can provide a single ultimate end for all our willing, 
an ideal end that morally rectifies our wills.
Grisez also mentions a third meaning for “ultimate end”, which again Di Blasi overlooks. 
This refers to “the happiness for which people settle” and it is closely related to integral 
human fulfillment. It approximates to integral human fulfillment, in that it is a reality that 
we can efficaciously will, as it is within our grasp, at least in principle. This “happiness 
for which people settle” is a more or less integrated whole life, and it ought to be a fully
123 Ibid., 132. See also the very last sentence of this section, at 133. Di Blasi discusses integral human 
fulfillment, and acknowledges that it is similar to what he sees, following Aristotle and Aquinas, as the 
formal aspect o f the ultimate end. Still, Di Blasi is put off by the fact that integral human fulfillment is an 
ideal, and thus he fails to see its practical relevance as an end. Arguably, this is because he fails to grasp the 
relationship between the first principle o f  practical reasoning and integral human fulfillment. He also fails 
to see how integral human fulfillment is related to “the happiness for which people settle”: see Di Blasi, 
“Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 122, n. 23.
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integrated, morally good life.124 As such, it can provide each person with a natural 
ultimate end for his life, one which enables him to conscientiously pursue all of his 
commitments effectively, and to enjoy a level of harmony in his life as a whole, and not 
only in his choices one by one. The unifying focus of such a life, and such a happiness, is 
the good of religion.125
So Grisez posited (prior to 2008) a single natural ultimate end for human life in two 
senses: one is the ideal of integral human fulfillment and the other is the practically 
achievable religiously integrated life. Nevertheless, his strong emphasis on the basic 
human goods as ultimate ends (of our choices and commitments) perhaps distracted 
readers from noticing that he acknowledged and promoted a single natural ultimate end in 
these two senses.126
However, most recently Grisez has presented a new development o f his moral theory, one 
in which “integral communal fulfillment” is presented as man’s concrete natural ultimate 
end.127 Perhaps he did this to respond to the criticism made by Di Blasi and others that he
124 See ibid., 136. Unfortunately for Grisez’s theory, the phrase “the happiness for which people settle” is a 
rather awkward one, and it does not stand out as clearly as “integral human fulfillment” or “the basic 
human goods” in his moral theory. Nevertheless, it is central to the argument o f the whole o f Part III of 
“Practical Principles”. Grisez’s new concept of “integral communal fulfillment” seems to replace “integral 
human fulfillment” and “the happiness for which people settle”, combining elements of both.
125 See ibid., 136, 139-141; see also, Grisez, “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 17, 
which is the article being criticised by Di Blasi (in its earlier version, presumably).
126 An example o f this is found in Di Blasi’s rather odd accusation that Grisez would consider playing 
baseball or civil marriage to be the ultimate end of someone’s life as a whole. Di Blasi is confusing the 
three meanings of “ultimate end” in Grisez’s theory: see Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and 
Beatitude,” 119.
127 See s. 6.3 above.
did not accept a concept of a concrete single ultimate end. His previous notion of religion 
as man’s concrete ultimate end was perhaps too open to misunderstanding to be fully 
adequate as a concept of man’s concrete ultimate end. He also seems to have been 
unhappy with the concepts of “integral human fulfillment” and “the happiness for which 
people settle” in his theory. Integral communal fulfillment takes their place.
Integral communal fulfillment is what the first principle of practical reasoning and all the 
other principles of the natural law direct us towards ultimately. It is a fulfillment that 
includes the full range of distinct and diverse human goods without reducing them to one 
“supergood”, such as religion or God. It includes God and human persons, and non­
human persons, in a flourishing community. It is a fulfillment that is openended, and not 
a static perfection leaving nothing else to be done or willed. Also, it is a concrete ultimate 
end that one ought to freely commit oneself to as one’s end, not one that is automatically 
sought in all one’s choices anyway.128
8.2.6a Natural and supernatural
Di Blasi thinks that Grisez makes too deep a break between our natural and supernatural 
ends.129 DI Blasi argues that the beatific vision will include all human goods, because it 
will be our loving contemplation of the God who is the source o f all goods, and so it will
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128 Thus, Grisez certainly rejects Di Blasi’s, and Aquinas’s, concept o f an ultimate end that completely 
satisfies the human will so that nothing else is ever to be wished for or done. And he rejects the concept of 
an ultimate end that is automatically willed in all our choices, rather than one that we have a choice about 
willing.
129 See “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 113.
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include and transcend all human goods.130 Also, Di Blasi argues that man has a natural 
capacity for seeing God, and a natural desire to do so, even though he is able to do so 
only with God’s direct supernatural grace.131 Thus, Di Blasi seems implicitly to call into 
question Grisez’s insistence that “religion” is only a human good and that it is distinct 
from the beatific vision, which is a specially given divine gift transcending our human 
nature.132
It is true that Grisez makes a very sharp distinction between the natural end of man and 
his supernatural end, to use Di Blasi and Aquinas’ terminology, but is it true that he 
proposes that they are totally separate, as the term “deep break”133 would suggest? Grisez 
distinguishes between our human fulfillment and our divine fulfillment to emphasise the 
transcendent nature o f our sharing in God’s life, and its gratuitousness as grace: we 
cannot effect this fulfillment, and it goes beyond our nature as humans. It would seem 
that he is following a definite theme in Catholic faith and theology in thus emphasising 
God’s grace as gratuitous and necessary for our salvation.134
130 See ibid., 128.
131 See ibid., 125. In all these arguments, Di Blasi sees himself as following Aquinas’ lead, which he thinks 
Grisez ought to do too rather than criticising Aquinas.
132 The term “implicitly” is used here because Di Blasi overlooks the explicit role o f religion in Grisez’s 
theory. This neglect o f religion vitiates much of Di Blasi’s critique, as the good of religion is central in 
Grisez’s moral theory, as this present work has argued.
133 Ibid., 113.
134 See Peter F. Ryan, “Fulfillment as Human in the Beatific Vision? Problems o f Fittingness and Gratuity,” 
American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 153-163, for a discussion o f how difficult it is to reconcile 
God’s grace as both gratuitous and fitting at the same time. Ryan sees Grisez as achieving this 
reconciliation by emphasising that our human interest in the good of religion gives us a reason to wish for 
the beatific vision even though this vision is not owed to us as human for our fulfillment (see especially 
ibid., 162).
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But Grisez also indicates how our own willing, choices and actions are related to this gift 
of God. The relationship is not one of cause to effect, but there is a dynamic relationship 
nonetheless. Grisez says that our sharing in God’s divine life is mediated by our human 
sharing in the good of religion specified by our Christian faith, by which we share 
humanly in friendship with Jesus and are interested in accepting all his gifts to us, 
including a share in God’s own life.135 Indeed, he says that the beatific vision 
consummates the good of religion.136
Di Blasi does not deny the necessity of grace. In fact, he emphasises, following Aquinas, 
our natural inability to see God in himself and our absolute need for God “both to make 
Himself present to our intellect and make our intellect similar to Him”.137 Although there 
are differences between Grisez’s approach and Di Blasi’s approach (and that of Aquinas), 
the differences are not quite so great as either of them seems to think. Surely Di Blasi in 
the quote just given goes very close to saying what Grisez says: that we must be given a 
share in the divine nature, as a gift of God’s grace, in order to be able to see God in 
himself. In addition, both Di Blasi and Grisez acknowledge that man desires to know God 
naturally and can know God naturally, albeit only to a very limited degree.138 It would 
seem that Di Blasi’s position is not hugely different from Grisez’s in every respect.
135 See “Practical Principles,” 147, and also “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 26-27, 
and s. 6.1.9c above.
136 See Grisez, “The Doctrine o f God and the Ultimate Meaning of Life”, 133, analysed at s. 6.2.3b above.
137 Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 125.
138 See ibid., 123-127 (for Di Blasi on these points). Di Blasi seems to deny that Grisez allows for man to 
have any natural desire to know God or any natural ability to do so, but, although Grisez does emphasise
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Di Blasi criticises Grisez also for what he sees as Grisez’s overly narrow understanding 
of the beatific vision. Di Blasi understands the beatific vision to be an ultimate end that 
includes and transcends all the various human goods. He does not think there is any need 
to distinguish between the beatific vision and some other kind o f fulfillment of the human 
person in heaven. He therefore rejects Grisez’s positing of two aspects of our fulfillment 
in heaven: integral human fulfillment and the beatific vision.139
8.2.6b The inclusive nature o f the beatific vision
Again, one wonders if the two approaches are fully contradictory. Are they not two 
different but, at least to some extent, complimentary ways of speaking about the same 
mysterious reality, a reality that we cannot fully comprehend? It is true that God is the 
source of all that is good, and so our loving contemplation of God can be understood to 
include, whilst transcending, our enjoyment and fulfillment in all the human goods. Thus, 
the beatific vision would include our bodily resurrection and the communion of the saints 
and angels. So, Di Blasi has a point.140 However, it is also true that an emphasis on the
our natural lack o f desire for the fullness o f knowledge of God in himself that is proper to the beatific 
vision, and our total lack o f any natural ability to achieve this vision, he does clearly recognise our natural 
desire to know God and to be in harmony with him, and our limited but real ability to do so. Hence the role 
of religion (along with the role o f knowledge) in Grisez’s moral philosophy and theology, as presented and 
analysed in the present work. Unfortunately, as Di Blasi ignores the role o f  religion in Grisez’s theory, he 
fails to see how his own understanding of the natural human way o f coming to “see” God (by our capacity 
of abstraction) is very similar to Grisez’s understanding of how we can know o f God: see ibid., 126 
compared to Grisez in Beyond the New Theism.
139 It is doubtful that the new development of Grisez’s theory, “integral communal fulfillment”, would 
change Di Blasi’s criticism in this respect, as Grisez still insists on both distinctly human and divine aspects 
to our fulfillment as persons in the kingdom. Still, maybe Grisez’s last paragraph of his 2008 article (“The 
True Ultimate End”) would give Di Blasi pause: see s. 6.3.6d above.
140 See Di Blasi, “Ultimate End, Human Freedom, and Beatitude,” 129-135.
beatific vision could be understood in a narrow way, which neglects and undervalues the 
full range of human goods, including bodily life and human communion, and which also 
renders free choice and commitment impossible. Grisez thinks that such a narrow 
understanding can be seen in Aquinas, though not without signs that Aquinas made 
efforts to avoid a too narrow understanding of the beatific vision.141 Di Blasi’s approach 
has its value in stressing the inclusive nature of the ultimate end which is God, who is the 
Source of all goodness, and who includes all the human goods in his own goodness, and 
who should be loved before all things and above all things; Grisez’s approach has its 
value in helping us to avoid merging or confusing the human and divine, or reducing the 
variety of human goods to a narrowly (mis)understood good o f religion, or good of 
contemplation (knowledge), or divine goodness. Perhaps Grisez’s approach can include 
Di Blasi’s (and Aquinas’s) once the distinctness and integrity of the various human goods 
are not reduced to religion, divine goodness or God.142
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6.3 Rufus Black, Christian M oral Realism  [2000]14j
We turn now to look at a non-Catholic and non-Thomistic critic o f Grisez’s moral theory, 
Rufus Black, who has examined Grisez’s work at book length.144 Black brings the moral
141 See Grisez, “Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” 27-36, especially 32, n. 65. See also 
John Finnis, Aquinas, 315-319, where he distinguishes between a narrow and a broad way of understanding 
Aquinas’s treatment o f the beatific vision, which was analysed above in s. 7.3.6.
142 See s. 6.3.6d below for Grisez’s most recent remarks on this matter.
143 R. Black, Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).
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theory of Grisez and his collaborators, most especially Finnis, into dialogue with those of 
Oliver O’Donovan and Stanley Hauerwas, two non-Catholic moral theologians who are 
strongly critical o f natural law theory in general, and Grisez’s ‘new natural law’ theory in 
particular. Black presents the criticisms of O’Donovan and Hauerwas and adds some of 
his own, but his approach is mainly a positive one, finding Grisez’s moral theory to be 
more than capable o f answering criticisms and meeting challenges from O’Donovan’s 
explicitly theological ethics and Hauerwas’s Christian narrative approach. Black 
considers Grisez’s approach to be a form o f ‘Christian moral realism’ which can be, and 
should be, integrated with the complimentary approaches of O’Donovan and Hauerwas.
8.3.1 O ’Donovan’s and Hauerwas’s criticisms o f  natural law
O' Donovan and Hauerwas take a very negative view of natural law theory because they 
do not think it leads to a Christian ethics, but prevents the development of such an 
ethic.145 This is particularly true of the approach of Grisez and Finnis in their insistence 
that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Hauerwas wonders how any such approach 
can present a morality with any place for theology “with all its claims about how reality
144 Black speaks often o f ‘the Grisez school’ (Grisez, Finnis and Boyle), and also refers to Grisez or Finnis 
individually when he treats aspects of their approaches that differ, but here the theory is referred to usually 
as simply Grisez’s. We have space here to deal with only some aspects o f Black’s very impressive 
constructive interpretation of Grisez’s theory. We do not deal with his treatment o f the modes, for example, 
nor with his analysis o f the relationship between narrative and principle.
145 See ibid., 7-9, where Black summarises O' Donovan’s and Hauerwas’s criticisms o f natural law 
generally and the theory o f Grisez and Finnis in particular. Black makes reference to S. Hauerwas, Vision 
and Virtue (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1974), 69-70, which criticises natural law theory in general and 
O. O' Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 2nd ed. (Leicester: Apollos, 1994), x, which criticises 
Finnis’ approach in particular. A further specific criticism by Hauerwas o f Grisez (and an article in which it 
is found) is mentioned in Christian Moral Realism, 61, in which Hauerwas seems to be say that specific 
moral norms are presented by Grisez as self-evident, but this is ably answered by Black (61ff), is off our 
point, and need not detain us here. Black also makes reference to S. Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom 
(Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1983) as another source o f sharp criticisms of natural law 
theory’s purported lack o f Christian foundations and distinctness: see Christian Moral Realism, 136.
‘is’”.146 O' Donovan argues that the approach of Finnis (and, we may presume, Grisez 
too) cannot be truly Christian as it seems it can allow no effective role for theoretical 
knowledge about God, the resurrection, the incarnation, eschatological matters, and other 
divinely revealed facts about reality, to shape how we are to live ethically.147 Black 
presents O' Donovan as taking a rather ‘scholastic’ approach to ethical theory in that he 
denies the truth of the claim that no ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’, and holds that 
the moral ‘ought’ for Christians must arise out of the ‘is’ of the order of creation, which 
is grasped by us in our theoretical knowledge of nature’s teleology and the fittingness of 
our acts to given realities.148
O' Donovan has raised also the objection to natural law ethics that, if it were true, then we 
would expect all people to know the contents of that law (i.e. all specific moral norms) 
clearly and easily. However, this is not the case, due to the Fall’s effect in causing wide­
spread and inescapable confusion, as can be seen in historical and contemporary moral 
disagreements, and so natural law theory is incorrect.149
The answers given in the two previous sections of this chapter also serve to answer O' 
Donovan’s and Hauerwas’s criticisms insofar as they are similar to those of Hittinger and
146 Christian Moral Realism, 7.
147 See ibid., 9. Black goes on to add the names o f Alasdair MacIntyre and Henry Veatch to those who raise 
criticisms about natural law theory’s supposed inability to recognise the importance o f facts about the 
human person and human nature: see ibid., n. 23. (MacIntyre and Veatch support natural law theory.)
148 See ibid., 119, making reference to O. O' Donovan, “Evangelicalism and the Foundation o f Ethics” in 
Evangelical Anglicans, ed. R.T. France and Alastair E. McGrath (London: SPCK, 1993), 99.
149 See Christian Moral Realism, 126, referring to O' Donovan, Resurrection, 85.
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Di Blasi. However, it is still worthwhile to look at what Black has to say from his own 
point of view in answering O' Donovan and Hauerwas, as he tries to show that Grisez’s 
approach is a realist approach that allows facts, especially religious facts, to play an 
important and necessary role in ethics. Black’s own criticisms of Grisez’s theory are 
looked at too, as is the fact that he misunderstands and overlooks the role of religion in 
that theory.
8.3.2a Theoretical knowledge is presupposed in ethical thinking
Black argues that Grisez’s understanding o f the basic principles of natural law as self- 
evident, and his distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, with ethics seen 
as primarily practical, do not lead necessarily to the conclusion that theoretical 
knowledge has no place in good ethical theory or in effective ethical practice. Grisez and 
Finnis have acknowledged clearly that our grasp of the self-evident first principles of 
practical reasoning presupposes experience and theoretical knowledge, or some kind of 
awareness of what is the case, as the data on which our practical insights work.150
We can apply this to religion. A person will not grasp the practical principle regarding 
religion without experiences such as that of feeling vulnerable and in need of more-than- 
human help and protection, or feeling guilt at one’s moral failings and the need for more-
420
150 See Christian Moral Realism, 48. Black refers to Finnis’s work in this regard, but we could also add 
reference to “Practical Principles,” 100, where Grisez, Finnis and Boyle state that their moral theory 
“presupposes many theses o f metaphysics and philosophical anthropology”, concerning free choice for 
example, and that “Just as theoretical knowledge, true opinion, and experience enhance the initial insight 
into the substantive goods, so they deepen understanding o f  the reflexive goods” (109).
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than-human forgiveness. In short, one will not be aware of the good of religion unless 
one feels tension with the more-than-human.151
Also, one will not grasp the good of religion, even at its most basic, without some 
knowledge or belief that it is possible, or might be possible (and, thus, worth at least 
trying), to pursue harmony with the transcendent principles o f reality.152 Perhaps we 
might say, more strictly, that one must at least not consider pursuit or instantiation of a 
basic good to be impossible if one is to grasp it as a basic good (for one’s own pursuit).
8.3.2b The binoculars analogy
Black concludes, noting the experience and knowledge/awareness presupposed by 
practical thinking, that ethics is not purely practical, but has a theoretical side too.153 This
151 See ss. 3.3.3; 4.1.2; 4.1.3; and 4.4 above. Such feelings presuppose frustrated actions for the sake of 
basic human goods other than religion.
152 See the recent article by J. Finnis, “Foundations of Practical Reasoning Revisited,” American Journal o f 
Jurisprudence 50 (2005): 109-131, at 123 and 129-130. Finnis clearly states there that theoretical and 
practical reason usually work together in human reasoning. So one who grasps the point of knowledge, for 
example, has already “the awareness not only of the urge (inclination) to question and also the experience 
of satisfaction when a question is answered, but also the ‘theoretical’ insight that knowledge is possible” 
(130). One needs natural inclinations but also knowledge o f possibilities if one is to grasp the basic goods. 
One’s knowledge o f possibilities can be deepened and enhanced when one follows through on one’s initial 
practical insight into the basic goods, and this will in turn enhance and deepen one’s understanding o f the 
worth o f the basic goods. Still, one needs at least some knowledge that it is possible to pursue a good if  one 
is to see any point in trying to do so. Grisez, too, acknowledges this in “Natural Law, God, Religion, and 
Human Fulfillment,” 3-36, at 10, where he points out the prior necessity of one’s “immediate intellectual 
awareness” of the following: spontaneous behaviour instantiating a good or goods; one’s inclination to do 
such things; the satisfaction experienced in its fulfillment; and one’s ability to engage in such behaviour 
and to find such fulfillment. Thus Grisez seems to agree with Finnis that one needs to be aware o f the real 
possibility of pursuit o f the goods before one can become aware of them as goods to be pursued freely (or, 
at least, at the same time as one becomes aware of them as goods). However, Grisez uses the phrase 
“immediate intellectual knowledge” rather than “theoretical knowledge”, as he seems to see this knowledge 
as distinct from reflective intellectual knowledge, whereas Finnis uses the phrase “theoretical knowledge” 
(though with the word “theoretical” initially in quotes, perhaps to indicate the same kind of distinction that 
Grisez makes).
153 See ibid., 49, making reference to Finnis, Fundamentals o f  Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1983), 2-3. Sometimes Black seems to confuse ethics with practical reasoning, or, in
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means not just that ethics can be studied as a theory, but that such theoretical study can 
enhance our understanding of ethics and also the goods that form the foundation for 
practical thinking itself. Thus ethics is not exclusively practical, though it is primarily 
practical. Black uses the image of a pair of binoculars to get across the idea that one 
needs to use both practical and theoretical knowledge, which correspond to the two lenses 
of a binoculars, to understand or see reality fully (and so to choose and act practically).154
Black’s use of the binoculars image, suggesting that correct and adequate human 
understanding is both practical and theoretical, is echoed in his comment on how we are 
to use the Bible in practical reasoning.155 We can read statements o f moral principle in 
the Bible either in a theoretical frame of mind or in a practical frame of mind, as these 
statements have both theoretical and practical truth. They can be read either as facts about 
ethics and reality (i.e. at the level of theory) or as moral norms directing the reader to 
choose in a certain way (i.e. at the level of practice). Read in a purely theoretical frame of
other words, to confuse natural law theory with the natural law itself. He tends to overlook the fact that 
ethics as a study is more properly theoretical than is the natural law itself.
154 See ibid., 60. Black also uses the parallel image o f a pair o f spotlights (one practical knowledge and the
other theoretical) at ibid., 178. He wishes to emphasise that practical and theoretical knowledge work 
together in unity, although they are distinct ways of knowing. We need both. Practical thinking does not 
work in isolation from theoretical thinking. We might add here that the good o f knowledge is an integral 
part of fully practical thinking, which is always to be done in a way that is in contact with reality. Another 
natural law theorist, Mark Murphy, takes independently a similar approach to analysing the natural law: see 
M.C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2001). Murphy 
develops a dialectical argument (see 20f and 42f) to support his list of basic goods, a list very similar to 
Grisez’s. This dialectical argument uses information concerning the correct functioning o f the human 
being, which Murphy identifies with its flourishing (21-33), to back up his identification o f various forms 
of flourishing that can be known by practical reason in its own distinctive manner (see 34-40 and 100-138). 
Murphy overlooks the fact that Grisez and Finnis too acknowledge the value o f dialectical arguments and 
use some themselves. He bases his own approach on what he calls “the real identity thesis”, which holds 
that theoretical statements and practical statements are essentially about the same states of affairs, 
considered from different points of view or with different aims in mind, and so theoretical knowledge can 
back up practical knowledge (see 40-45 and 137-138).
155 See Christian Moral Realism, 177-178.
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mind, such statements will not found a moral train of thought, but read in with practical 
principles inspiring and guiding one’s interpretation, moral precepts and examples in the 
Bible can specify one’s moral reasoning and choosing. Ideally, one should read Biblical 
statements with a concern for both their practical and theoretical truth.
8.3.2c Dialectical arguments can support and purify practical thinking 
Black points out Grisez’s acknowledgement that, although one’s primary grasp of 
practical principles is essentially practical, it is also possible to use dialectical theoretical 
arguments to provide evidence for the truth of practical knowledge as possible and 
universal.156 Dialectical arguments from anthropological studies and their findings about 
the basic inclinations o f human beings, and the very possibility of anthropological study 
itself, which presupposes that people act for intelligible goods in their human behaviour, 
help to support Grisez’s account of the basic goods, and thus “provide an additional 
reason for accepting”157 his account. Such studies easily indicate the universality of the 
good of religion, for example.158
Black goes further: “The Grisez school also uses theoretical reason to correct what they 
consider to be false accounts of practical reason.”159 He gives the example of body-self
156 See ibid., 52. Black states correctly that this aspect o f Grisez’s work “is often overlooked”, see n. 24.
157 Ibid., 54, emphasis in original.
158 This is not an application that Black makes. However, it is interesting that Black presents a table of 
basic human goods found in Grisez’s theory, in one column, and in O' Donovan’s approach, in the other, 
and religion features in both lists: see ibid., 53. Black mentions that O' Donovan arrives at his list o f goods 
from a more “theoretical direction” than Grisez: ibid., 51.
139 Ibid., 55, emphasis in original. O ’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, xii, notes this too, but thinks 
it proves that an ought can be deduced from an is. Black, on the other hand, considers practical thinking
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dualism, which prevents a person grasping the intrinsic good o f life. We can apply this to 
religion here and point out that a theoretically correct understanding of the spiritual 
aspect of human understanding and willing helps greatly in our attempts to grasp and 
pursue the good of religion, whereas a materialistic philosophy hampers or prevents this. 
We could say that Grisez’s theoretical work in Beyond the New Theism is a good example 
of how cogent and correct theoretical reasoning, which critically assesses and rejects 
incorrect and unsound reasoning, gives us knowledge that helps us to grasp the principle 
directing us to pursue the good of religion.160 It is necessary if a person is to grasp the 
good of religion as a real good fo r  him or herself that he or she is not prejudiced by 
radical empiricism.161 Thus, some theoretical knowledge is a necessary presupposition for 
one to form the primary principle regarding religion. Or, more strictly, we can say that it 
is necessary at least to be free of unsound or incorrect theoretical views, which good 
theoretical reasoning and knowledge corrects.
8.3.2d Theoretical knowledge assists practical thinking and action
Not only is theoretical knowledge presupposed by practical reasoning, and can support 
practical knowledge and correct false accounts of it, as we have seen, but knowledge of
and knowledge to be distinct from, though related to, theoretical thinking and knowledge, and to be 
properly basic, not derived.
160 See ss. 2.5 and 2.6 above.
161 Arguably, a radical, atheistic empiricist could still grasp what it is that other people pursue when they 
pursue religion, but he or she could not grasp religion as a potential benefit for him or herself, except in the 
most hypothetical or conditional way (i.e. “If there were a God or gods then it would be good for me to act 
in harmony with him or them . . .”).
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what is the case concerning human nature “can assist the task of practical knowledge”.162 
Knowledge of anthropological studies, and of our own personal inclinations at the 
individual level,163 can help us to grasp the range of basic human goods, or, in other 
words, the range of possibilities and opportunities for human flourishing that we can 
pursue and instantiate in and through our actions. Here, we can mention as a further 
example (of how factual knowledge assists good practical reasoning) Grisez’s extensive 
moral theology.164 It greatly helps people, individually and communally, in their efforts 
to pursue and instantiate harmony with God, to know by divine revelation that this God is 
a trinity of Persons reaching out towards man in various ways, offering redemption, 
reconciliation, covenant, and friendship to us. And that this God offers our own good 
works, which are ours but also his gift, as one way of being united with him.
Thus, Grisez’s theology is not something isolated from his ethics, from his natural law 
theory, but something that specifies it, giving it relevant content, as we have seen
162 Christian Moral Realism , 57, emphasis added. This is probably the main function o f theoretical 
knowledge in practical reasoning according to Black’s interpretation o f Grisez’s theory as a form of 
Christian moral realism.
163 Black lists a number o f examples o f human dispositions that ground each of the various principles 
directing towards the basic human goods. The only principle missing from his list is that concerning 
religion: see ibid., 58.
164 Black deals with Grisez’s theology mainly in chapter three of Christian Moral Realism, where he shows 
how the modes o f responsibility are transformed (or, in his preferred term, “transfigured”) into the modes 
of Christian response, and thus Grisez’s theory is not only a realist one but a thoroughly Christian realist 
one. Black seems, however, to overlook just how much of Grisez’s applied ethics is explicitly theological, 
arguing that Grisez has mainly engaged in a philosophical, creation-based natural law ethics rather than a 
Christian ethics, probably in order to address secular humanism on the urgent life-issues such as abortion: 
see ibid., 140. This hardly seems fair to the bulk of the treatments of ethical issues in vols. 2 and 3 o f The 
Way o f  the Lord Jesus. Still, it is not totally surprising that Black should criticise Grisez for this: see ss. 
5.1.1 and 5.3.9 above. A reviewer of Black’s book also was critical of Grisez’s lack of integration o f his 
theological ethics into his ethical analyses: G. Hass, “Review o f Christian Moral Realism,” Studies in 
Christian Ethics 16 (2003): 93-96, at 95.
frequently in our previous analyses of Grisez’s works.165 Black argues that the criticisms 
of O’Donovan and Hauerwas concerning the supposed lack of interest in religious facts 
besetting natural law theory are more than adequately answered when one realises that 
the principles o f natural law are specified, and need to be specified, by the factual truths 
of divine revelation.166
8.3.2e The basic human goods are grounded in given human nature 
Black sees no problem in recognising that in Grisez’s theory the basic goods are what 
they are because “of the given nature of the human person”.167 If human nature were 
different, the goods would be different.168 The basic human goods “define the nature and 
parameters of human flourishing or fulfillment.”169 Black argues strongly, therefore, that 
Grisez’s approach is a form of moral realism, in which the basic goods that form the 
foundation of practical thinking are aspects of objective reality, which can be known to 
be true, rather than mere subjective realities.
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165 See, e.g., ss. 3.1.4; 3.3.4; 3.4.1; 3.4.2; 3.5.4; 4.7; 4.9.2; 5.1.1b; 5.1.7; 5.3.7 and 6.1.9 above.
166 See his summary: Christian Moral Realism, 180-181. This is not to say that divine revelation is just a 
series of facts. Divine revelation appeals to both our theoretical and practical reason: see ss. 5.1.2 -  5.1.4 
above.
167 Ibid., 58. Perhaps Black is somewhat inaccurate in using the term “given” to describe human nature or 
nature in general as the foundation for ethical thinking, as he seems to overlook the strong emphasis in 
Grisez’s account o f human nature that this nature is not simply “given”, but open to development through 
free choice and action, not to mention his insistence that practical thinking is about what is potentially 
beneficial and to be developed through choice and action, not what is simply “given” : see, for example, 
Christian Moral Principles, 105 and 182-3, and “Practical Principles,” 116.
168 Black uses the example from science fiction (Star Trek) o f Vulcans who lack emotions, as a contrast to 
humans whose good naturally includes emotional peace and order: see Christian Moral Realism, 52.
169 Ibid., 50, emphasis added.
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8.3.2fDo we come to know moral realism by theoretical reason only?
However, Black seems to depart from Grisez when he says that we come to know this 
objective moral realism by theoretical reason and not practical reason.170 Practical reason 
identifies the goods as to be pursued and instantiated, but it is theoretical reason that 
considers and judges whether the goods are actually good, according to Black.
He thinks that the truth of the first principle of practical reasoning, for example, can be 
supported by an adaptation of the self-referential argument used by Finnis to argue 
(dialectically) for the truth of the goodness of knowledge. Thus, Black suggest, albeit 
briefly, that one who argues against the truth of the first principle of practical reasoning 
(“Good is to be done and pursued”) is engaging in a very impractical, pointless exercise, 
a self-defeating exercise, like a sceptic arguing against the good o f knowledge.171 This 
self-referential argument is undoubtedly true. However, it could be argued that for an 
argument from self-referential inconsistency to succeed, it must rely on the persons 
arguing to have already a practical grasp of the first principle of practical reasoning and 
its specifications (or, at least, some of them). In other words, one cannot rely first on an 
argument from self-referential inconsistency to establish or prove the truth of the first
170 See ibid., 58. It is not entirely clear from Black’s approach whether he means that it is not practical 
reason alone that can uncover the objective truth of the goods, or whether it is by theoretical knowledge 
alone what we come to know this truth. The binoculars and spotlights images suggest that we need both 
practical and theoretical knowledge to know truth fully, but Black also seems to say that it is theoretical 
knowledge o f the practical principles, added to other evidence, that enables us to know the truth of the 
basic human goods: see ibid., 59-60.
171 See ibid., 63-64. Black does not contradict himself later (88-89) when he says that “it has long been 
thought that moral sceptics have coherently dissented from” the first principle o f practical reasoning. This 
is said in the context of pointing out that the principle is not an analytic truth, which it would be illogical to 
dissent from. Self-referential inconsistency is not the same as logical inconsistency. On self-referential 
arguments, which characteristically show that an argument is self-defeating because of its inherent 
pointlessness, see J. Boyle, G. Grisez and O. Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122-138.
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principle of practical reasoning because one has to rely on that principle’s truth for the 
self-referential argument itself. A sceptic can realise that his scepticism about the truth of 
the first principle of practical reasonableness is unsound (because it is pointless to affirm 
it) only because he already knows the truth of the first principle of practical 
reasonableness. To put this in Grisez’s terms, one needs to draw the attention o f the 
sceptic to his natural, simple volition, which he, in affirming his scepticism, is somehow 
overlooking or denying, in order to show him that his scepticism contradicts his own 
willing, and is thus self-defeating and pointless. A dialectical argument o f this sort can 
clarify the truth of the first principle of practical reasonableness, but it does not establish 
it in the first place. So it is far from clear whether Black is right that one can know the 
truth of the first principle of practical reasonableness by theoretical reasoning alone, or 
even primarily by theoretical reasoning. Practical reason is presupposed in any self- 
referential argument, which is how one ought to argue for the first principle of practical 
reasonableness.172
8.3.2g The primary principles and theoretical reason
What about the specifications of the first principle of practical reasonableness, the eight 
primary principles directing us to pursue the basic human goods? Take the principle 
directing us to pursue and instantiate the good of religion, for example. Is it known to be 
true by theoretical reason, even whilst it is picked out precisely by practical reason as a
172 The point that one argues for the truth of the first principle o f practical reasonableness by self-referential 
argument is supported by the fact that this principle is similar but not identical to the theoretical principle of 
non-contradiction: see Summa Theologian I-II, 94, 2. Self-referential arguments uncover practical self- 
contradictions in the affirmation of certain theses that are theoretically not self-contradictory or absurd. 
Someone denying the first principle o f practical reasonableness is not saying something absurd but is doing 
something impractical.
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good to be pursued and instantiated? Black seems to think so.173 He draws on a 
distinction made by Grisez, Boyle and Finnis between two aspects of the purposes for 
which people make free choices to act, namely the intelligible benefit for which one acts 
(the good), and the concrete, imaginable aspect of the purpose of our action (the goal).114 
Black says:
Although the Grisez School does not bring this out explicitly, practical reason is 
concerned only with benefits and not with goals. As a logical operation, practical 
reason is concerned with reasons for action -  with the “intelligible aspect o f a basic 
purpose” -  and not with actual reality (the “concrete and imaginable”). Reality, on 
the other hand, is the subject of theoretical knowledge and theoretical reason. Every 
purpose, therefore, will necessarily involve both theoretical knowledge and 
practical reason.
Black seems to be inaccurate here. Surely it is incorrect to say that practical reason is not 
concerned with the concrete, imaginable aspects of our purpose in acting. Black is 
radically separating emotional motivation (which is concerned with the concrete, 
imaginable aspects of purposes, one’s goals) from rational motivation (which is practical 
reason, concerned with benefits or goods to be pursued and instantiated in or through 
one’s actions). However, Grisez’s theory holds that these two forms o f motivation, both 
of which are necessary for choice and action, are “dynamically united”176 in all our 
human actions. True, a person’s rational motivation is not concerned ultimately with 
having certain feelings, but with participating in an intelligible good or goods (i.e. with
173 Black does not treat religion in particular, but deals with the basic goods in general.
174 See “Practical Principles,” 104.
175 Christian Moral Realism , 97, emphasis in original. Black’s point here is similar to the view found in 
Jean Porter, Nature as Reason (see n. 5 above). Porter interprets Grisez to be saying that, once experienced, 
the goods are “immediately grasped by the intellect as good in themselves, apart from  their emotional 
appeal or their instrumental value” (37, emphasis added). Thus she ends up describing and criticising 
Grisez’s approach as Kantian (see 130f, 237 and 247). What is said in the following sections serves as a 
reply to Porter’s criticism as well as Black’s.
176 “Practical Principles,” 105.
intelligible benefit or benefits). And it is also true that rational motivation is not 
concerned ultimately with the unique and limited concrete aspects o f a purpose for 
acting: Rational motivation is intellectual understanding, which, characteristically, 
transcends the unique and concrete and particular. One’s understanding o f the goods is 
somewhat abstract in that it transcends the sentient aspects o f goals, projecting open- 
ended possibilities to be instantiated and pursued through action. However, it is not an 
accurate interpretation of Grisez’s theory to say that he considers rational motivation, 
which is based on understanding of good(s), to be concerned with intelligible goods in 
isolation from concrete specifics, and in isolation from emotional aspects o f a purpose.
Recall how Grisez explains the grounding in inclinations (emotional motivations) of our 
grasp of any primary practical principle directing us to pursue a substantive basic human 
good.177 One grasps a primary principle (directing towards a substantive good) only when 
one is immediately intellectually aware of at least some of the following: one’s natural 
inclination towards this good, one’s spontaneous action motivated by this inclination, 
one’s satisfaction found in acting thus, and the objective possibility of acting in this way 
that is shown in one’s action and its emotional fulfillment. Only in light of this immediate 
intellectual awareness (or what we might call our experience, which can be seen as
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177 See note 152 above and its reference to Grisez’s work. We are examining “simple willing” here, which 
is the most basic willing, the foundation or root of all practical reasoning. Black seems to overlook the 
place of simple willing as the foundation of practical reason, seeing Grisez’s whole approach as starting 
with choosing, rather than with simple willing (of the basic goods). Simple willing is not a choice; choice 
presupposes simple willing. Further, Black sometimes seems to confuse the theoretical development of 
ethics (which is concerned with willing, and so sometimes looks inwards) with practical reasoning itself 
(which is concerned with the goods, and so looks outwards). See Christian Moral Realism, 127.
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distinct from theoretical knowledge, which can be developed from it), can one grasp 
the practical insight that it would be good for one to pursue deliberately the substantive 
benefit or good that our natural inclination draws our attention towards. Insights into 
reflexive benefits or goods, in their turn, are dependent on our intellectual awareness 
(though perhaps not any developed theoretical knowledge, strictly speaking) o f insights 
into substantive goods and frustrated actions for their sake. Thus, practical knowledge is 
possible only in light o f emotional motivations. This much Black would agree with.
• 1 "70
We also need to bear in mind what Grisez says about the place of emotional pleasure in 
human fulfillment.179 Black seems to overlook this. Grisez holds that emotional 
satisfactions (which he calls “sentient goods”, which fulfill our sentient nature) are a part 
of our integral fulfillment as humans. Actions for only emotional satisfactions or for 
disordered emotional satisfactions are immoral because they disregard the good o f the
178 We should remember that Grisez is keen to deny that any theoretical knowledge is necessary for a 
person to have practical knowledge. This seems to mean that one need go no further than the “immediate 
intellectual awareness” that he speaks of here in order to grasp at a minimal level o f awareness the primary 
practical principle directing one to pursue a good. It does not seem to mean that one need have no 
knowledge of what is the case, which would render inexplicable how one could come to have practical 
knowledge, unless such knowledge is innate or purely intuitive, which Grisez denies. However, if one 
considers “theoretical knowledge” to include simple awareness of what is the case, then Grisez seems to be 
contradicting himself. On the one hand he seems to be saying that one needs no knowledge o f what is the 
case in order to know what is to be done (i.e. to have practical knowledge); on the other hand, he holds that 
some awareness o f what is the case is necessary in order to know what is to be done. This section seeks to 
clarify matters with regard to this issue, which has caused substantial difficulties both for the present author 
and Grisez’s critics. It seems that Grisez sees the “intellectual awareness of what is the case” that is 
presupposed by practical knowledge as distinct from “knowledge” as such, which Grisez understands as 
going beyond immediate intellectual awareness. Thus, immediate awareness of what is the case is not the 
same, according to Grisez’s moral theory, as theoretical knowledge o f what is the case.
179 Grisez deals with this in Christian Moral Principles, chapter five, q. B, chapter seven, q. G and chapter 
twenty-four, q. A. There can be a type of intellectual pleasure, which Grisez calls the “joy of 
accomplishment”, which is a kind of volitional satisfaction that adds to one’s fulfillment when one 
instantiates a good. This is why the term “emotional pleasure” is used here: to distinguish sentient 
satisfaction from intellectual satisfaction. Emotional pleasure is related directly to one’s achievement of 
one’s goals, to feeding one’s sentient appetite; intellectual pleasure is related to one’s instantiation of 
goods, to feeding one’s rational appetite. Grisez holds that the latter can include the former.
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whole person, or, in other words, our integral fulfillment as human persons. However, all 
actions, including all morally good actions, are done partially, though necessarily, for
emotional motivations, and emotional satisfaction can be understood (not just
• *  * 1 8 0  emotionally desired and expected) as part of the fulfillment willed in one’s action.
Emotional satisfactions, which are expected as part of one’s goals, are therefore willed as
part of one’s human fulfillment. One’s rational motivations can and should include one’s
emotional motivations.181
Thus, Black is wrong to say that practical reason is concerned with benefits but not with 
goals, with reasons for action but not with concrete and imaginable aspects of a purpose. 
A person can be concerned reasonably with emotional satisfactions arising out of 
achieving his goals as part of his whole fulfillment as a human person. Black is wrong to 
imply that Grisez’s theory separates emotional and rational motivations radically. He is 
also wrong to imply that practical reason is not concerned with reality, which Black 
seems to associate, or even identify, with concrete goals. Surely Grisez’s theory does 
consider practical reason to give us knowledge of the real, and does consider benefits to 
be real goods.
180 Any statement that emotional fulfillment is “only a part” of our integral fulfillment as human beings 
might distract one from the fact that they are nevertheless a necessary part o f  this integral fulfillment, 
insofar as it is truly integral, and we are partially sentient/emotional beings by nature.
181 Grisez says “sensible goods are only partial aspects o f the intelligible goods which fulfill a human 
person as a whole”, Christian Moral Principles, 120. Grisez, Boyle and Finnis put it like this: “Rational 
motives motivate toward some fulfillment of the person as a whole; emotional motives motivate toward 
some fulfillment o f the person’s sentient part. But although they are distinct from one another, emotional 
and rational motivations are dynamically united”, “Practical Principles,” 104-105. Usually, and perhaps 
unfortunately, Grisez and his collaborators make this kind of point in order to criticise approaches to 
morality that overemphasise acting according to emotional motivation. Here, we are doing the opposite: 
criticising approaches that under-emphasise or overlook the integral place o f  emotional motivation and 
fulfillment in practical and moral thinking. The most adequate treatment of emotions by Grisez is found in 
Difficult Moral Questions, Appendix 1.
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8.3.2h Practical reason is concerned with reality: anticipated reality 
Black seems to be correct, however, in saying that practical reason is not concerned 
directly with actual reality. Practical knowledge is not knowledge of actual reality but of 
anticipated reality. Practical knowledge is not knowledge o f what is the case, but 
knowledge of what is-to-be the case through or in one’s actions. Practical knowledge 
enables one to bring something into actual reality. Grisez’s theory clearly states all this. 
But it does not hold that reality is constituted only by actual reality; this would entail that 
only theoretical knowledge could be knowledge, and that precisely practical knowledge is 
impossible. The precise point of practical knowledge as practical is that it is concerned 
with bringing into actual reality (through or in one’s acting for the sake of some good) a 
real benefit that is initially grasped only as anticipating the actual reality.182 Once one has 
made one’s choice and carried out one’s action, one can then know the benefit as actual, 
and experience intellectual and emotional satisfaction as part of one’s fulfillment in that 
benefit. The benefit is not only real when it is actual; it is real, though in a particular 
sense, when it is anticipated. This is why one can have knowledge of the benefit in two 
ways: theoretically (as actual) and practically (as anticipated).
182 See "Practical Principles,” pt VI (at 115-119). One should remember that more than one good and more 
than one benefit can be at stake in any one choice, and that practical reason is also concerned with 
commitments and one’s whole life, not just with single choices. The main text here speaks in simplified 
terms, in terms of singulars. Another treatment of practical reason as bringing things into reality is found, 
following a somewhat different interpretation of Aquinas, in Josef Pieper, Living the Truth: The Truth o f  
All Things and Reality and the Good (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989).
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It follows from this that knowledge of the truth of any primary principle of the natural 
law, such as the principle directing us to pursue the good o f religion, can have two 
aspects: theoretical and practical. One knows theoretically the benefit of harmony with 
God as an actual benefit after one has instantiated it (by one’s deliberate choice), or after 
one becomes aware of another person or other persons instantiating it and being fulfilled 
by it. One knows practically the benefit of harmony with God as a potential benefit only 
when one anticipates it as a benefit to be pursued and instantiated in or through one’s 
own action. Grisez holds that the former knowledge (theoretical) is not a premise for 
deducing the latter. One can know theoretically that other people pursue religion as a 
good (for themselves, or for others through their own action), but one cannot know it as a 
practical matter fo r  oneself until one anticipates it as a benefit for oneself (or for others 
through one’s own action). Practical knowledge is necessarily anticipatory, and thus 
prescriptive. This is the necessary truth about existential reality that the first principle of 
practical reasonableness picks out. Practical knowledge is distinct from theoretical
183knowledge, which is necessarily contemplative and thus descriptive. Theoretical
*  • *  * *  • •  184knowledge is not prescriptive as it is not anticipatory.
8.3.2i Religion is an anticipated good that one can know as true
183 The word contemplative is used here in the sense o f observing, not in the exact sense o f the 
“contemplative” religious life. However, the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge, and 
the necessity o f both for human living and fulfillment o f human nature, are reasons why Grisez so strongly 
rejects Aquinas’s view of the beatific vision as our ultimate and completely fulfilling end as human beings. 
To hold this position is to collapse practical knowledge (and the fulfillment it enables in and through 
human action) into theoretical knowledge. In effect, it would be to make the strictly contemplative life the 
only worthwhile vocation for Christians and for all people. One would not be able in that case to discern 
correctly any other personal vocation for oneself, or freely and rightly choose any other way o f life.
184 This is overlooked by both Hittinger and Di Blasi, as we saw above in ss. 8.1 and 8.2. It remains true, of 
course, that one can have theoretical knowledge o f practical knowledge, but this is not the same thing as 
practical knowledge itself, and presupposes practical knowledge precisely as practical. This point is 
overlooked by J. Garcia, “Topics in the New Natural Law Theory,” American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 46 
(2001): 51-73, at 53-62 where he criticises Grisez’s position that ought cannot be deduced from is. Robert
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We could say then that practically grasping religion as a basic human good is what we do 
when we interpret our experience, or our immediate intellectual awareness, of tension 
with the transcendent (experienced emotionally) in a practical frame of mind shaped by 
the first principle of practical reasonableness. In this specific situation, in this specifically 
practical frame of mind, the first principle of practical reasonableness is specified by 
one’s practical reason as the primary natural law principle directing us to pursue and 
instantiate the good of religion (as an anticipated benefit to be realized progressively 
through and in our choices for its sake). One knows the goodness of religion to be 
practically true: one anticipates that it would be good for one to pursue it, and instantiate 
it (should that be possible). One does not yet know the good of religion as an actual 
benefit in which one actually is fulfilled (in or through one’s choosing for it) until after 
one makes some attempt to instantiate it. Thus practical knowledge is not known to be 
true in the same way as theoretical knowledge.
Black seems to think that the realism of Grisez’s moral theory must be shown by 
theoretical knowledge only. The argument presented here is that Grisez’s theory sees 
realism as having two aspects. One is theoretical realism, where one comes to know the 
truth of what is the case in the typically theoretical way. Dialectical arguments for the 
goodness of the basic human goods are of this kind. But the more basic kind of realism in
Sokolowski, “What is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural Ends,” Thomist 68 (2004): 507-529, at 
527-528, makes the related point that practical reasoning is primary and philosophy secondary, in that 
philosophy always has to work with what is first lived in practice (i.e. choices, actions, virtues, etc). Even 
with regard to theology, where there is a certain priority of theoretical knowledge over practical reason, the 
natural practical level is still assumed by grace (though healed and elevated by it).
436
Grisez’s moral theory is practical realism, by which one comes to know as real benefits, 
though potentially so, the various basic human goods that one grasps by distinctly 
practical insights when one forms the primary practical principles of the natural law in 
one’s practical thinking.
That a careful and sympathetic critic such as Black should be wrong in his interpretation 
of Grisez’s moral theory in this respect suggests that the dynamic unity of emotional and 
rational motivation is an aspect of Grisez’s work that has not been made clear enough, 
and needs development.
8.3.3 The argument against natural law from diversity
O’Donovan criticises natural law theory saying it is falsified by the fact that people do 
not agree on morality, whereas if natural law theory were true, we would expect there to 
be wide-spread agreement.185 Black offers a useful reply to this objection to natural law 
theory, making use of Grisez’s theory to do so.186
It is only to be expected that there will be a considerable amount of moral diversity 
historically and globally. One reason for this is that there is a range of basic, diverse, and 
incommensurable human goods and it is possible to organise life around such goods in a 
variety of ways. We ought not to expect that life will be lived exactly the same way, even
185 See n. 143 above.
186 See Christian Moral Realism, 107-114. Black offers his analysis as a reply to J.L. Mackie in particular, 
who has not criticised Grisez, but who is sceptical of realist, cognitive ethics. The objection to natural law 
based on moral pluralism or diversity is a common one, and Black’s reply based on Grisez’s moral theory 
offers a good response, which is only outlined here.
by people who agree on moral norms and who know the natural law accurately and 
confidently. How one lives in pursuit of the basic human goods will be affected by one’s 
circumstances and conditions, and these can vary from place to place and time to time. 
Further, not only are the basic human goods incommensurable, but many moral norms 
are non-absolute, so one need not expect to see absolute uniformity in the way that people 
judge right and wrong.
Added to this is the fact that Grisez’s moral theory, which is a natural law theory, does 
not discount the possibility, and even the probability, of moral error. This can occur due 
to bias and oversight, fanaticism for one of the goods to the detriment of the others, 
uncritical spontaneity, selfishness, and other moral weaknesses and failings. Such moral 
errors, which can be wide-spread, can be rationalised and embodied in cultural and social 
structures that affect how people think about morality. Thus, moral diversity arises 
partially from moral error, which natural law theory can account for easily.
Added to this is the reality of factual errors, such as scientific errors. In the past, for 
example, it was thought by many that there were witches, who could do preternatural 
evil, and who had therefore to be dealt with very harshly.187 We today do not believe that 
witches exist, and so we consider witch-hunting and killing to be wrong. We are not 
acting on new moral principles as such, but on the same principles as people long ago 
knew, applied differently in light of our factual knowledge. Wide-spread diversity in
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iS7 This is my own example.
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beliefs and opinions, which is not discounted by the natural law,188 will lead to diversity 
of moral applications of the basic principles of the natural law. The natural law does not 
guarantee that people will know the facts accurately or comprehensively, or apply the 
natural law soundly and wisely in all circumstances.
Thus it is not surprising that there is some diversity concerning the natural law. This is 
caused by the following: the incommensurability of the basic human goods; the diversity 
of historical, cultural, and geographical conditions within which people pursue the goods; 
moral errors of reasoning due to sin; and moral errors of application due to errors of fact 
and belief.189
8.3.4 Black’s treatment o f the good o f religion
Black mentions the good of religion only briefly, which is somewhat surprising, when 
one considers that the good of religion is a kind of ‘bridge’ between Grisez’s natural law
theory and his moral theology (as this present work has argued).
188 Black makes the point that the Fall has affected man’s knowledge of facts very substantially, even more 
than it has affected man’s awareness o f the primary principle o f the natural law. He thinks that O’Donovan 
goes too far in holding that the effects of the Fall have made it impossible for man to grasp the basics of the 
natural law: see ibid., 129-130.
189 Joseph Boyle, too, addresses the issue of moral diversity and whether it disproves the existence of a 
natural law: see J. Boyle, “Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions,” in Natural Law Theory: 
Contemporary Essays, ed. R.P. George (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1992), 3-30, at 18-28. Boyle does not 
mention the role o f errors o f fact or belief in contributing to moral pluralism. He does mention that natural 
law theorists hold that it is only the most basic principles that all people are expected to know and follow in 
their practical reasoning, and that people most often do so without any articulated or developed 
understanding of these principles. People can be expected to differ concerning the more derived and 
complex principles and norms and applications. There is a need, therefore, for sound moral philosophy 
(and, we might add, theology) and for sound dialectical arguments and theoretical knowledge if  people are 
to know the natural law fully, soundly, and confidently, and apply it wisely.
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In a couple of places, Black criticises Grisez’s theory for not adequately accounting for 
our moral obligation to respect the natural world, and to receive its ‘gifts’ with 
gratitude.190 Black suggests that a new basic good needs to be added to Grisez’s list: 
harmony with the natural world.191 In saying this, Black seems to overlook entirely the 
fact that Grisez has twice mentioned action to protect the natural world (to save an 
endangered species) as an instance of the good of religion.192 It is true that Grisez 
criticises pantheistic understandings of nature, as Black acknowledges,193 but Grisez does 
not consider pantheism as the only way of connecting the good of religion to the good of 
the natural world. Black acknowledges this latter point, and quotes from Grisez to show 
that he clearly recognises our moral obligation to respect nature as Christians,194 but he 
does not seem to see that Grisez’s philosophical understanding of the good of religion 
can include the good of harmony with nature. Black mentions the possibility that a 
religious understanding could help us to realise our responsibilities towards the natural 
world, but he seems to see this as possible only if we see this harmony as a kind of 
friendship, and so understand ‘religion’ in a clearly theistic manner. What Black
190 See Christian Moral Realism, 82 and 132-135.
191 Ibid., 134.
192 See Grisez, “A Contemporary Natural Law Ethics” in Moral Philosophy: Historical and Contemporary 
Essays, ed. William C. Starr and Richard C. Taylor (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989), 125- 
43, at 128, and J. Finnis, J.M. Boyle and G. Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 280. The role o f religion and its relevance for environmentalism is also completely 
overlooked in Michael Northcott, “The Moral Standing of Nature and the New Natural Law”, in The 
Revival o f Natural Law, 262-281.
193 See Christian Moral Realism, 131, with a reference to Grisez, Living a Christian Life, 772-4. In 
Christian Moral Realism, 132, Black states that Grisez considers a pantheistic attitude to lead to neglect of 
genuine human needs in favour of the ‘needs’ of nature seen as sacred, and that such an attitude is a result 
o f the Fall and consequent human lack of accurate and genuine belief in God.
194 See Christian Moral Realism, 133, quoting from Living a Christian Life, 779-780 and 775.
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overlooks is that Grisez’s philosophical moral theory can include and place a high value 
on the insights of natural theology, including a strong argument for the transcendent 
Source of meaning and value as personal (or quasi-personal, insofar as it will transcend 
what we understand as persons). Thus, even at the natural law level, Grisez’s moral 
theory can support our human obligation to respect nature and be grateful for its gifts as 
an aspect of our being directed by a primary principle of practical reason to pursue and 
instantiate the good of religion. Love and reverence for God and respect and gratitude for 
nature can and should go together, according to Grisez’s natural law theory and his moral 
theology.195
8.3.5 Personal vocation and religion
Black treats the topic of personal vocation in some detail, seeing it as a very positive 
aspect of Grisez’s approach. However, he sees it as a theological concept, with no 
“secular analogue” in Grisez’s natural law theory.196 Grisez has developed his moral 
theory recently, seeing personal vocation as something that reason unaided by faith can 
recognize, based on a philosophical acknowledgement and understanding of the 
transcendent Source of meaning and value. Such an acknowledgement and understanding 
could be more or less rich and sophisticated. Once we understand a more-than-human 
Source as the source of the natural law directing us to human fulfillment, and as the
195 See ss. 4.9.1, 5.1.6c and 5.3.8 above.
196 See Christian Moral Realism, 156 and 269. Black thinks that Finnis has a “secular analogue” to personal 
vocation, in his intermediate practical requirement that one have a coherent plan of life, but he treats 
Grisez’s understanding o f it as one that relies totally on revelation and faith. O f course, Black was not 
aware then (in 2000) of how Grisez would develop his understanding o f personal vocation in “Natural Law, 
Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment,” (2001) and subsequent writings, as examined in 
chapter six above, so it is perhaps not surprising that he treated personal vocation purely as theological.
source of this fulfillment’s very possibility, we can come to see that our personal, 
individual talents and opportunities are gifts from that Source, and can grasp our 
responsibility to discern, accept and carry out faithfully our personal vocation. Of course, 
Christian faith deepens our understanding of personal vocation, specifying it richly; but 
faith is not strictly necessary for us to recognize personal vocation as an important aspect 
of the natural law. As argued above, personal vocation is a specification of the good of 
religion.197 Because Black fails to adequately understand and appreciate the primary 
principle directing us to pursue religion as a foundational principle of the natural law, 
which is specified by Christian faith as a Christian understanding of personal vocation, he 
fails to see how the personal vocation aspects of Grisez’s Christian ethics flows from, and 
specifies, his philosophical ethical theory.
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8.4 Conclusion to the chapter
Grisez’s moral theory has been strongly criticised. It has been accused of being atheistic, 
in that it has no place for God as Legislator. Further, its philosophical understanding of 
God has been criticised as being too thin to form a motivating object for the good of 
religion. It has been accused of relying completely on revelation and faith to give religion 
content, and to give morality its foundation. Against this kind of criticism, we have 
pointed out that Grisez’s theory, even at the philosophical level, recognises God as the 
personal Source of meaning and value, the Source of the natural law itself, as well as the 
Source of all reality, including human fulfillment. Thus, anyone who grasps the good of
197 See s. 6.1.6 above.
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harmony with this Source will grasp the duty and happiness of obeying and loving God, 
whose will is wise and loving. Grisez’s theology specifies this in the light of divine 
revelation, but this is a revelation that specifies and develops our natural knowledge of 
God, rather than replacing or denying that knowledge.
Grisez’s theory has also been criticised for being a form of mere intuitionism, with no 
place for factual knowledge. This chapter has shown that this criticism is based on a 
misunderstanding of the place of self-evidence in Grisez’s theory. Grisez holds that in the 
natural law only the most basic practical principles are self-evident, as the starting points 
of practical thinking and action. These principles are grounded in human nature and are 
drawn to our attention by our immediate awareness of our spontaneous behaviour seeking 
substantive goods (including our inclinations towards these goods and our fulfilments in 
them). Grasping these principles is possible even for children, but our knowledge of them 
and how to instantiate the goods to which they direct us can be developed and needs to be 
developed. Theoretical knowledge plays a big role in this development, and so it is 
practically relevant, although it is not strictly the same as practical knowledge. Thus, the 
natural law and natural law theory have an essential place for theoretical philosophical 
reflection on human nature, on the purpose of life as a whole, on the ultimate end of man. 
They also have an essential place for divine revelation, faith and theology to purify and 
perfect our natural knowledge.
Grisez’s theory does not present the basic human goods as isolated from each other, or as 
concerned with self-fulfillment only, or as concerned with fulfillment in this world only.
The goods are necessarily interrelated. Religion can play an architectonic role unifying 
one’s life as a kind of cooperation with God, willing all that God wills, which includes 
not only one’s own fulfillment, but that of others too, as loved by God. Religion can also 
motivate our respect and gratitude for nature itself as God’s creation. Many, if not most, 
of Grisez’s critics have misunderstood or overlooked the nature and importance of 
religion in his moral theory.
Grisez’s most recent development of his theory clearly recognises that man can have and 
ought to have a single concrete ultimate end in all his choices and commitments: integral 
communal fulfillment. All one’s choices to pursue and instantiate the basic human goods 
ought to be made, at least implicitly, to contribute towards this ultimate end, which is a 
community of all persons flourishing in all their fundamental goods. Grisez has moved 
from presenting religion as unifying the moral life to presenting integral communal 
fulfillment as providing that unity. Whether or not this marks a complete change of 
trajectory in his theory’s development will be discussed in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter synthesises the main ideas presented and analysed in the previous chapters 
and answers the question: What is the role of religion as a basic human good in the moral 
theory of Germain Grisez? It also points out some aspects of Grisez’s theory that need to 
be developed. In particular, it discusses whether, and to what degree, Grisez has moved 
away from his previous understanding of the good of religion as an architectonic (i.e. 
overarching) and integrating good in his recent presentation of “integral communal 
fulfilment” as man’s concrete ultimate human end.
Grisez’s moral theory is a natural law theory. Its structure follows that of the natural law 
itself. Its foundations are those of the natural law: the basic forms of human flourishing 
that Grisez calls the basic human goods, towards which we are directed by the primary 
principles of the natural law. Religion is the object of one of these primary principles.
9.1 Religion as a basic human good
9.1.1 Religion is a field  o f human opportunity involving existential harmony
In Grisez’s moral theory, “the good of religion” refers to a kind of human fulfilment. 
Religion is a good, an intelligible benefit, a field of human opportunity. It is a way that a 
person or persons can be more. The kind of fulfilment {being more) that it refers to is a
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kind of harmony or peace. This harmony or peace is realised in one’s willing: one’s 
choices and/or commitments (and one’s disposition too). Thus the good of religion is a 
reflexive good, a good that bends back on itself, so to speak.1 Whenever one chooses to 
act for some good, including goods other than religion, one’s choice can either possess 
the quality of harmony/peace or lack this quality. One’s willing can be either peaceful 
and harmonious, or conflicted and discordant. The former is not only more pleasant and 
satisfying, but can be understood to be worth pursuing, promoting, protecting, 
cherishing.2
One’s will or choice cannot be in harmony with itself, but rather with something or 
someone else (plural or singular). There can be harmony between aspects within the self 
(particularly focussed on one’s emotions and one’s will): inner peace. There can be 
harmony between one’s judgements, choices, and actions: inner consistency. There can 
be harmony between human persons: social harmony. Beyond these forms of harmony, 
there can be harmony that reaches wider than the human. This is harmony between one’s 
own will/choices and the will or choices of the “more-than-human” Source or principle of 
reality. This last form of harmony constitutes the benefit sought in the good of religion. 
The four forms of harmony are interrelated: a person who violates one tends to violate 
the others, and a person who instantiates one tends to instantiate the others.
1 When one chooses to pursue a reflexive good, one chooses to choose, that is, one chooses in a manner 
conscious that one is choosing in a certain way (rather than in some other way).
2 For simplicity’s sake the term “pursuing” and its cognates are usually used here rather than continually 
referring to “pursuing and instantiating and protecting and . . .”. Also, often the singular is used, but it 
should be remembered that a good or goods can be pursued by an individual or individuals or groups. Note 
too that both emotional and intellectual motivation operate together in human motivation, and this is clearly 
acknowledged in Grisez’s moral theory. One’s motivation to pursue the good of religion is not cold and 
unemotional, but includes emotion (though it is not to be reduced to emotion or emotions that one simply 
happens to have). According to Grisez, emotions often operate beneath our consciousness.
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The good of harmony is an existential fulfilment. It fulfils us as beings who are able to 
make free choices and commitments. It enables us to flourish as “free choosers”,3 and is 
itself an intrinsic aspect of this very flourishing. Participating in harmony leads to further 
flourishing in harmony. It leads also to flourishing in other goods, substantive goods: 
life/health, knowledge/aesthetic experience, and work/play (and marriage too).4 Although 
they are intrinsically good, and so can be sought for themselves, existential goods are not 
sought necessarily for their own exclusive benefit as existential. At least implicitly, and 
often explicitly, they are distinctive and fulfilling aspects of one’s choosing to pursue 
substantive goods. Harmonious choosing, in which one flourishes with regard to 
existential/reflexive goods, is the only way that one can be fully reasonable and truly 
practical, participating in, promoting and enjoying the integral fulfilment of the human 
person.
At this stage, the good of religion is identified in very broad terms. These terms can and 
should be specified and made much more detailed. But it is possible to grasp the point of 
pursuing harmony with the more-than-human in very minimal terms. The principle 
directing one to pursue and instantiate the good of religion is a very simple principle. 
Religion can be instantiated more or less fully, more or less effectively. It is not a matter 
of either perfect instantiation or none at all. For example, questioning whether there is a 
more-than-human Source of reality, with a view to choosing in harmony with it if there is
3 As the following chapter makes clear, the term “free choosers” does not refer to arbitrary choosers, or 
indifferent choosers. Flourishing as a free chooser requires loving all the goods integrally and religiously.
4 This is another way o f saying that the existential order of reality is necessarily related to the other three 
orders: the physical, the logical and the cultural. See s. 2.6 above.
such a Source, is a minimal but real instantiation of the good of religion. At its most 
simple and minimal, willing the good of religion involves an openness, an aliveness, to 
the field of opportunity of harmony with the more-than-human.
The field of opportunity specified by “religion” is a distinct but openended one. In the life 
of each of us, it is not clear at first exactly what the good of religion involves. One’s 
understanding of how to participate in harmony with the more-than-human can and 
should develop as one’s knowledge and understanding of various aspects of reality 
grows. This will include knowledge and understanding of one’s self, one’s practical 
opportunities, the nature of the world in which one lives, and the nature of the more-than- 
human Source of reality. Not only individuals but groups and cultures can and do grow in 
this kind of understanding of religion. Though it is one’s individual responsibility, one 
ordinarily pursues religion as part of a group and culture.
It is also possible to make mistakes and errors with respect to religion, to go wrong in 
one’s development. This can happen at the individual and/or social or cultural levels. To 
pursue and instantiate the good of religion fully, to be fully practical and reasonable, one 
ought to avoid such mistakes and errors and seek religion in a way that is completely 
open to the good of knowledge and to true and lasting harmony with the more-than- 
human Source of reality. Although it can be pursued and instantiated imperfectly when it 
is pursued in a very subjective fashion, religion is not essentially a purely subjective 
reality, as it involves harmony with an objective reality beyond the self. Religion is not
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the same as inner peace or inner consistency; like social harmony, religion calls us to 
reach beyond the self.
9.1.2 Religion is the object o f a primary practical principle o f the natural law 
The natural law is not essentially about restrictive rules; its foundational principles direct 
us towards intelligible human goods. The natural law concerns how we are to be fully 
practical in our willing so that we might flourish. The most general and primary principle 
of the natural law is the first principle of practical reasonableness: The good is to be done 
and pursued and evil avoided. This principle shapes the whole natural law. All the 
precepts of the natural law are specifications of this most general principle.5
The primary principle directing us to pursue religion is one of the most basic 
specifications of the first principle of practical reasonableness. Thus: religion is to be 
done (instantiated or realised) and pursued, and lack of religion avoided.6 Practical 
principles are prescriptive rather than descriptive. They are directive truths. They direct 
towards fulfilments in or through our choices and actions. These fulfilments are 
intelligible and human; they can be understood as beneficial to us precisely as human 
persons. Thus, goods attract the will, which is our responsiveness to practical reasons.
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5 This is not to say that all the precepts of the natural law are derived or deduced from the first principle of 
practical reasonableness. This principle is not a premise from which one can deduce the other precepts, but 
operates somewhat like the principle of non-contradiction, which is not a premise for deduction, but the 
basis o f all deduction. Similarly, the first principle of practical reasonableness is the basis o f all practical 
reasoning, but not a premise for all practical derivations or norms.
6 Henceforth this will be called the religion practical principle.
Religion is not understood necessarily to be a fulfilment of only the self. One can grasp 
the point of others pursuing and participating in the good of religion; one could freely and 
happily choose to encourage or enable others to do this. Further, insofar as the good of 
religion involves willing in harmony with the more-than-human Source of meaning and 
value, a person who instantiates religion wills in line with this Source, and wills the good 
of others insofar as this Source wills their good. (Such a person also wills the good of the 
self insofar as the Source wills it.) Thus the good of others is directly linked to one’s own 
participation in the good of religion. Religion is part of a common good,7 not a merely 
private good.
The religion practical principle is a primary principle. It is self-evident: it is not derived 
or deduced from any other principle or truth. It marks a starting point of practical 
thinking concerning harmony with the more-than-human. It is a simple principle, 
although it can be specified in complex ways. Even a child could grasp the religion 
practical principle.8 However, one has to have experience before one can grasp this 
principle. It does not spring out of thin air; it is not innate; it is not a data-less intuition. It 
is a practical insight grounded in experience of tension with the more-than-human Source 
of reality.
The religion practical principle is not the only primary principle of the natural law. 
Religion is not the only basic human good. There are several primary practical principles,
7 Throughout this chapter, the term “common good” is not used to refer to a political reality, as it is often 
used in Catholic Social Teaching, but to refer to a wider reality: benefits or fulfilments that can be shared 
by persons.
8 This refers to a child past the age o f reason.
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directing towards several basic human goods. Each of these principles is a basic 
specification of the first principle of practical reasonableness. Each directs towards an 
irreducible and distinct form of human fulfilment, a benefit worth pursuing and 
instantiating in or through one’s actions. These basic human goods are incommensurable. 
One cannot reasonably argue that any one of them is in all ways better or worse than any 
other. Nor can one argue that they are equal to each other.9 They simply cannot be 
compared in that way. The word “good” is used analogously in Grisez’s moral theory to 
refer to several irreducible and diverse forms of human flourishing, united as “good” in 
that they are forms of human flourishing or good. (They are also united in that they are 
participations in the divine goodness of the Source of all reality, including all 
fulfilments.) Practical reason is concerned with pursuing more than one kind of human 
flourishing. Practical reason is not concerned with pursuing only religion, for example, or 
only existential goods, or only substantive goods, or only one of the substantive goods. 
Practical reason directs towards a range of forms of human flourishing, which correspond 
to the various aspects of human nature and potential.
It is worth emphasising how Grisez’s natural law theory clearly includes religion in its 
very foundations. According to him, the natural law is a religious law. Religion is not 
added at a later stage of practical reasoning of the natural law as a philosophically- 
derived truth or as a truth of faith, although both philosophy and faith serve to specify
9 This is an error often made. It can seem puzzling how Grisez can hold that play and religion, for example, 
are both basic goods and incommensurable with each other, if one assumes that this means that play is 
equally good to religion. However, “incommensurable” does not mean “equal”. Grisez does not claim that 
play and religion are equally good: he rejects the idea that one can commensurate them at all, whether to 
say that one is superior to the other in all respects, or to say that they are equal. His point is that they are 
both goods, and both basic goods, diverse and irreducible to one another (or to any other good or goods).
religion in necessary and valuable ways. Although Grisez does not present the natural law 
as an exclusively or narrowly religious law,10 he definitely sees it as a religious law. To 
be integrally practically reasonable is to be concerned with the more-than-human 
dimension of reality. This is so not only with regard to knowledge of this dimension, 
which is the concern of one of the substantive basic human goods (knowledge), but with 
practical concern to choose and act in harmony with it, which is the concern of an 
existential basic human good (religion). Grisez’s moral theory is not atheistic; his 
understanding of the natural law is not a narrowly secular one.11
9.1.3 The good o f religion is grounded in human nature and objective reality 
There is a range of diverse human goods because human nature is complex, and so 
human fulfilment is too. The basic human goods are grounded in human nature and are 
pointed to by human inclinations or tendencies. If humans were different, then their 
flourishing would be found in a different form or forms. Religion is a benefit for human 
persons because of what they are. In particular, religion is a benefit for human persons 
because they can make free choices concerning harmony with the more-than-human 
Source. If free choice was impossible for man, there could be no good of religion for him. 
Also, if there was no more-than-human Source of reality, or if there was no way of man 
knowing or guessing that this Source existed and that he could relate to this Source in
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10 In particular, Grisez rejects any notion of the natural law being a form of Divine Command ethics, where 
moral goodness and faith are reduced to blind obedience, or obedience motivated only by fear.
11 It is to be remembered too that Grisez, like Aquinas, sees the natural law as our participation in the 
eternal law. Arguably, Finnis has developed this aspect o f the theory more explicitly than Grisez has: see 
ss. 7.1 and 7.2 above.
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some way, then there would be no good of religion. Given reality provides the basis for 
all practical reasoning and all human fulfilment.
However, the good of religion is not deduced from human nature or from truths about the 
more-than-human Source. The good of religion is grasped in practical reasoning as a 
primary practical principle, interpreting experience in a precisely practical frame of 
mind. This practical frame of mind is not concerned with describing reality or 
understanding it theoretically; it is concerned with doing actions for the sake of a 
benefit/good.12 This benefit/good is anticipated by practical knowledge, which enables 
the person to bring the reality into being in or through his choices/actions. All that is 
needed as a condition for one to grasp practically the potential benefit of religion, at least 
at its most initial and minimal, is immediate awareness of simple experience.
The experience in question is that of tension with the more-than-human Source. This 
experience is virtually universal among humankind. We all experience tensions of some 
sort with a more-than-human dimension of reality. For example, we act for the sake of 
goods such as life and health and find ourselves failing and/or bound to fail, and in need 
of more-than-human help. And we find ourselves failing morally, feeling guilt and 
helplessness, and needing more-than-human forgiveness and healing. This moral failure 
is understood to be a letting down of self and other human persons, but also to be a letting
12 O f course, practical reasoning with regard to the good o f knowledge is concerned with description and 
understanding of given reality. Knowing and understanding objective reality is precisely what the good of 
knowledge instantiates. So it is true to say that this form o f practical thinking is concerned with theoretical 
knowledge as an intrinsic good. However, not all forms o f practical thinking are so concerned (although all 
practical thinking will usually be concerned with knowledge as an instrumental good enabling one to 
effectively instantiate whatever good one is interested in). Man is not essentially only an observer of 
reality; man is also a “doer” who can bring realities into being in and/or through choices and actions.
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down of reality in its more-than-human dimension. We understand ourselves to violate 
the law of nature and nature’s God.13 There are many ways of understanding what the 
more-than-human Source is, some more reasonable than others,14 but, virtually 
universally, man has been aware of the more-than-human Source of reality and of his 
responsibility to try to act in harmony with this Source in order to respect it, find 
forgiveness and peace, and achieve success in his own endeavours.
9.1.4 The religion practical principle and theoretical knowledge
However, some people might be unable to grasp the religion practical principle. Although 
no theoretical knowledge is necessary for one to be able to grasp the initial insight into 
the good of religion (and so even older children can and do grasp it), it is clear that some 
kinds of opinion and belief effectively block one’s ability to grasp the religion practical 
principle. People who believe in materialism or determinism, for example, will not be 
able (insofar as they are logical) to grasp the good of religion as a practical benefit for 
themselves. (They will be able perhaps to understand how others might consider religion 
to be a benefit for themselves. Obviously, they will consider such people to be in error.) 
Suppose such materialists or determinists were to object to Grisez’s theory and say that 
there is no such basic human good as religion and that the religion practical principle is 
not self-evident. What might be Grisez’s response?15
13 This echoes the American Declaration of Independence.
14 Clearly Grisez considers Christian faith to be the true religion, the most adequate way to understand the 
good of religion and the most effective way to pursue it. But to say this is not to overlook the value of 
inadequate but partially true understandings o f religion and instantiations of religion, often in institutional 
and cultural forms.
15 We ignore here the possibility that some materialists, might acknowledge a kind o f materialistic 
“religion” or “god”, focussed on scientific progress, or evolution, or civilisation, or some sort o f more-than-
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Grisez would not try to demonstrate from more basic principles that religion is a human 
good. Such a demonstration is impossible, as there are no more basic practical principles 
from which to demonstrate the goodness of religion;16 nor can the religion practical 
principle be deduced from theoretical truths. However, it is possible to argue soundly 
against materialism and determinism. In fact Grisez has already done so in some detail 
(in Beyond the New Theism and Free Choice, in 1975 and 1976 respectively). Thus we 
can say that Grisez would use self-referential and/or theoretical arguments against anyone 
who rejected the good of religion on the basis of a materialistic or determinist philosophy 
or worldview. If such arguments were effective, the person who initially could not grasp 
the religion practical principle because of theoretical errors in his thinking, would now be 
free of such errors and able to form the practical insight into the good of religion. In the 
cases of the materialist and determinist, sound theoretical knowledge is a condition for 
their being able to grasp the religion practical principle (at least, for their own good).
Thus, Grisez’s contention (following the lead of Aquinas) that the primary principles of 
the natural law are self-evident needs to be qualified. It is true that these principles are 
self-evident for people who have the necessary ordinary experiences and who do not
human ideal or dream. Perhaps many do. Sound theoretical knowledge helps such people not to grasp 
religion as such, but to grasp it accurately and effectively.
16 However, as the religion practical principle is a specification of the first principle o f practical 
reasonableness, one could argue using a self-referential argument for the truth of that principle as part of 
one’s dialectical argument for the truth of the religion practical principle. Such a self-referential argument 
would show that any affirmation of the falsity o f the first principle o f practical reasonableness would be 
impractical, pointless, fruitless -  and so it would necessarily defeat itself and confirm the truth of that 
principle. Thus, there is a certain kind of pointlessness in arguing that it is not worthwhile to pursue 
harmony with the more-than-human Source of reality. However, one would need to do more than offer this 
self-referential argument to convince a materialist that there really is a transcendent Source of reality.
suffer from relevant unsound opinions or beliefs; but it is not true that these primary 
principles are self-evident to people who suffer from relevant unsound opinions or 
beliefs. The latter need more than just immediate awareness of ordinary experience in 
order to grasp the primary practical principles (or at least some of these principles). For 
some people, theoretical knowledge is a necessary condition for grasping some or all of 
the basic human goods.17
It could also be said that in the context of developing or understanding natural law theory, 
it is often necessary to have sound theoretical knowledge in order to confidently grasp the 
primary practical principles as goods and to list them in a structured and comprehensive 
manner (as Grisez does). This is because, in the context of natural law theorising, one is 
often self-critical and open to considering doubts, difficulties, and objections to one’s 
theory, and so one needs sound theoretical knowledge (and one avoids unsound opinions 
and beliefs). By contrast, a person who is simply going about his ordinary practical life, 
in a non-theoretical context, will grasp the primary principles in a very simple manner, 
with perhaps little or even no reference to theory at all. It is this latter, thoroughly 
practical grasp of the natural law that is presupposed by all natural law theorising.
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17 This is one reason why there is moral diversity and why natural law theory can easily account for this 
diversity. People can be mistaken about theoretical concerns, and this affects their ability to grasp the 
natural law, even in its most basic principles, which are in principle self-evident.
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9.2.1 Specification o f religion by theoretical knowledge
There is another role for theoretical knowledge in Grisez’s natural law theory and in the 
natural law itself: specification. The concept of specification is central in Grisez’s moral 
theory. It refers to the process or action whereby a general principle or truth is made more 
specific, given a more detailed character, identity, and/or application.18 It has already 
been pointed out how the religion practical principle is a specification of the more general 
first principle of practical reasonableness (as are the other primary practical principles 
directing towards the other basic human goods). The religion practical principle in its turn 
needs to be specified by theoretical knowledge if one is to pursue and instantiate it 
effectively in concrete circumstances.19 When one initially grasps the good of pursuing 
harmony with the more-than-human Source of reality, one usually knows very little about 
how to go about this pursuit. The good of religion motivates one to find out more and 
more about religion and how to instantiate it effectively, including finding out the 
objective truth concerning the more-than-human Source of reality. This can involve 
philosophical knowledge and natural theology, and/or the religious teachings or opinions 
(and rituals and practices) found in a particular religion. Such opinion and belief (and 
practice) can be more or less adequate, more or less objectively true, but one rightly
9.2 Specifications of religion
18 Grisez does not define the concept of specification. The definition used here draws from Grisez’s use of 
the term and from definitions found in several online dictionaries: see the website “dictionary.com” at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/ [accessed on 20th August 2008].
19 One can be alive to the good of religion in a general kind of way, with no concrete option or options in 
mind, but often one is interested in the good o f religion with a concrete option or options in mind. Although 
it can seem somewhat abstract in moral theory, the religion practical principle is a very concretely operative 
truth in practice. It involves memory, perception and imagination regarding goals that are emotionally 
desired, as well as intellectual understanding of the fulfilments possible through pursuing these goals.
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settles only for what one honestly considers the most adequate opinions or beliefs. Thus, 
there is a “thrust towards objectivity” built into the good of religion, so to speak.
Clearly Grisez holds that Christian faith in divine revelation is the richest and truest 
specification of the good of religion (and the good of knowledge in relation to the good of 
religion).20 Unlike the initial grasp of the good of religion at its most general, the truth of 
Christian faith is not self-evident, however, but something that can be argued for and 
demonstrated (within limits, of course).21 One offering such arguments or demonstrations 
hopes that his listeners will be motivated, by their practical insights into the basic human 
goods, to attend to the arguments and respond positively. The most obvious good in this 
respect is knowledge, but, as this work has shown, knowledge is not the only good, and 
religion is also relevant here, as are other basic human goods. For example, the fact that 
Grisez puts aesthetic experience in with knowledge as one of the basic human goods 
suggests that one can be motivated by love of beauty along with one’s love of truth22 -  
and one’s love of both beauty and truth can work alongside one’s motivation to pursue
20 We might add here that one needs also the good of excellence in work and play to be specified in relation 
to the good of religion. One needs to know what kinds o f activity are effectively productive o f harmony 
with God and what kinds o f activity are in themselves worthwhile as embodiments o f harmony with God. 
Good planning of liturgy, for example, aims at the goods of work and play with regard to religion.
21 The point here is not that one can demonstrate faith to be true, but one can show that it is reasonable and 
can deal with various objections and doubts regarding specific difficulties (such as the historical reliability 
of the Gospels, the possibility o f miracles, the nature of papal infallibility, and so on).
22 The point that one can be motivated by love of beauty as well as truth is not always as clear in Grisez’s 
moral theory as one might wish, but it is compatible with it and suggested by it. It is more clearly found in 
other philosophical and theological approaches, however, which compliment Grisez’s approach. An 
example is the approach of Pope Benedict XVI. See his talk to priests, deacons and seminarians in 
Bressanone, Italy, 6th August 2008, “Reason needs beauty, says Pontiff,” online at zenit.com, at 
http://www.zenit.org/article-234097UEnglish [accessed 21st August 2008]. The original text o f this talk (Q 
and A) by the Pope is found in full on the Holy See website, as “Meeting o f the Holy Father Benedict XVI 
with the Clergy o f  the Diocese o f Bolzano-Bressanone,” (complied by Libreria Editrice Vaticana), at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/august/documents/hf_ben- 
xvi_spe_20080806_clero-bressanone_en.html [accessed 21st August 2008].
harmony with God. One of the most important truths in Grisez’s moral theory is that the 
basic human goods work in an interrelated way, not in isolation from one another. Or at 
least they do when one is thinking fully practically and morally.
9.2.2 Specification by moral truth
This leads us to acknowledge another kind of specification of the good of religion: its 
being specified by moral truth. Pursuing the good of religion simply as one basic human 
good is not sufficient if people are to be fully reasonable, fully practical, completely 
fulfilled. One must pursue the good of religion integrally, that is, with integrity, with a 
love of not only the good of religion but all the goods of persons. This means, for 
example, that one must not reduce the good of religion to the good of inner consistency 
and consider it sufficient to be merely sincere and authentic in one’s pursuit of religion. 
No, one must be open to the good of knowledge too, as was emphasised in the previous 
section. Moral truth is found in the integrity with which one pursues the good. One is 
morally and practically required to understand and pursue and instantiate religion in a 
manner consistent with all the modes of responsibility, or, in other words, in a manner 
consistent with right reason, with prudence. With regard to the morally good 
understanding and pursuit of religion, one must avoid laziness and inertia, over­
enthusiasm and impatience and narrow individualism, greed and lust and other inordinate 
desires, unreasonable fear, partiality towards oneself or others, superficiality, revenge and 
hatred, and any fanaticism or desire to do evil for the sake of good.23 Any instantiation of 
religion will be imperfect when it is marred by such disordered emotions or tendencies. 
Pursuit of religion needs to be fully reasonable if it is to be true and lasting participation
23 See Appendix two for a list of the modes o f responsibility, which are referred to here.
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in this good. Although the good of religion is seen in Grisez’s moral theory (and, he 
holds, in the natural law itself) as something distinct and irreducible to other goods (and 
therefore incommensurable with them), it is wrong to focus exclusively on religion or to 
consider it sufficient to pursue it as a single good in isolation from the rest. Religion is 
one good among others; it is part of an integral whole.
9.3 Integrality and religion as an architectonic good
Thus, integrality is a central concept in Grisez’s moral theory (and in the natural law 
itself). Attention to the very nature of the good of religion helps to highlight this concept. 
For religion is concerned with harmony with the transcendent Source of reality, meaning 
and value. And this Source can be understood, and should be understood, even at the 
philosophical level, as personal and as willing human fulfilment for us (insofar as this 
Source is the source of the natural law itself, including the primary principles directing us 
towards our fulfilments, and the source of those very fulfilments themselves). Divine 
revelation supports this philosophical understanding, and develops it. To be in harmony 
with God who creates all things so that they can flourish as parts of his creation, and who 
wills the fulfilment of all things in Jesus Christ, is to be alive to the integrality of all the 
goods (as parts of a created whole). When one wills as God wills, one wills the full range 
of basic human goods for all the persons one can benefit (or, at least, one avoids willing 
directly against any good and to the detriment of any person). This is why a fully 
reasonable and practical pursuit of the good of religion must be specified by moral truth, 
which is characterised by integrity, and must be as objective as possible, specified by the
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substantive goods, including theoretical knowledge. One cannot pursue or instantiate 
harmony with God if one pursues religion as an isolated good. Religion necessarily opens 
out towards the other goods because God is the Source of all goods, the Source of 
practical reason itself, and the Source of all fulfilments (which are various forms of 
fullness o f being).
This is the main reason why religion is not just a distinct good in its own right, so to 
speak, and worth pursuing for its own sake, but also, precisely in being the good that it is, 
can function as an overarching good, an architectonic commitment that unifies one’s 
whole life, integrating it around harmony with God in a way that is fully alive to the 
goodness of the “non-religious” goods.24 Various terms can be used to express this 
character of the good of religion. It can be said to provide a superordinate or 
supervenient motivation in addition to the more direct motivations provided by the non­
religious goods. Thus, for example, one can have more than one reason to promote the 
good of life: the intrinsic good of life in itself, plus the good of willing as God wills and 
thus instantiating harmony with the God of life.25 Religion can be said to pervade or 
suffuse one’s whole life as an interest at stake in all one’s choices. Religion can be said to 
be transparent for the other goods, both the basic human goods and moral goodness. 
Thus a person who instantiates the good of religion has an added facility in understanding 
the goodness of other instantiations of goods, and is less likely to overlook or ignore their
24 The word non-religious is placed in quotes here to indicate that there are no truly or fully non-religious 
goods as such, as this whole argument entails, even though diverse goods are good in their own distinctive 
way, and so should not be reduced narrowly to religion.
25 Obviously, one can have more than two motives for promoting the good o f life. The other goods can 
provide motives too, especially the other existential goods.
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goodness. Religion can also be understood to be concerned with the common good o f 
friendship with God, a common good that includes and cherishes all forms of goodness 
for all persons. This understanding of religion is probably only fully available to the eyes 
of faith, as philosophical understanding is limited with regard to friendship with God. But 
even philosophically it is possible to approach towards an understanding of religion as a 
kind of friendship with the more-than-human.
In coming to understand one’s life as friendship with God, one comes to see that all one’s 
choices and commitments can and should express one’s friendship with him. One should 
always act in a way that promotes the common good of one’s friendship. One 
understands life to be cooperation with God, embodying love of God in all one’s choices 
and commitments. There is no part of life that is non-religious, no choice in which 
religion is not at least implicitly at stake.
Thus religion can unify life, providing it with an overall harmony that is itself a good 
worth pursuing and instantiating. The good of religion as architectonic makes clear the 
fact that Grisez’s moral theory (and the natural law itself) is not concerned just with 
single acts as right or wrong. It is also concerned with commitments, including the 
overall commitment of one’s life as a whole to always be in harmony with God and avoid 
sin. It is possible to live out such a religious commitment in many diverse ways.26 What 
is important is that one makes the commitment to live out one’s whole life in harmony
26 This is another reason why there is moral diversity and why natural law theory can account for this 
diversity. Some moral diversity is legitimate and coherent. However, one has to advert also to factual errors 
and errors in moral reasoning and application to account fully for moral diversity, and natural law theory 
can do this with no difficulty. Illegitimate moral diversity, and its causes and effects, provides one reason 
why the natural law needs divine revelation and grace to support, clarify, extend and perfect it.
with God in a way that fully respects God as the transcendent Source of reality, meaning 
and value. This can be understood to include not only following the natural law in all 
one’s choices, but also discerning, accepting and carrying out faithfully one’s personal 
vocation. This concept has an important place in Grisez’s moral theory, and it is closely 
related to religion. It involves discerning how one can live harmoniously with God by 
using one’s unique talents, interests and opportunities to the best of one’s ability to serve 
the good of oneself and others, and to honour and love God. Again, this is a concept that 
can be known to an extent by philosophy, but is most clear in the light of faith.
9.4.Christian faith specifies the natural law
Much of Grisez’s work is moral theology. This is a further specification of the natural 
law, of practical reasoning. In light of divine revelation, accepted in faith and hope and 
love, by which one enters into the new covenant, into friendship with Jesus and 
membership of his body, the Church, one is able to understand and appreciate and live by 
the natural law in a new way. One is able to grasp the attraction of the basic human goods 
in a more hopeful and sustained manner, and thus one’s will is strengthened. One is given 
an eternal perspective on things, a “God’s eye perspective”. One has the benefit of the 
grace of the scriptures and tradition, prayer, the sacraments, and the Christian community 
(especially the saints), through which God reaches out to help us on the way.
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Because man lives in a sinful condition, he needs divine revelation and living faith in 
order to know the good and to live by it.27 The bare natural law is not enough in practice: 
it calls out, so to speak, for a specification relevant to reality. Although reason can know 
the basics of the natural law, which is a law constituted by right reason directing towards 
integral fulfilment of human persons, this is a reason that opens out towards the 
specification to be found in the Christian faith. Natural law theory opens out towards 
moral theology (or Christian ethics, as it is sometimes called), which supports, purifies, 
heals, extends and perfects the natural law.
This means that every element of Christian ethics has a natural basis, a more general 
natural law aspect that is specified in the light of revelation and the new covenant. (And 
vice versa: every element of the natural law is specified by faith.)28 The good of religion 
is found in Christian ethics too, but in a specified form. It is essentially human friendship 
with Jesus. It involves following “the way of the Lord Jesus” as the common good of our 
friendship with Jesus, who is both man and God. The modes of responsibility of the 
natural law are specified as the modes of Christian response.29 The primary principle of 
Christian life is love, which disposes us to make all our choices in union with Jesus’ 
choices, to cooperate with him, and the Father and Spirit, in their work of redemption and 
sanctification (and re-creation). In all their choices, Christians intend (in hope) the
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27 It should also be said that Christians need God’s grace of forgiveness and reconciliation when they fail to 
live by faith and by the natural law, as so often is the case.
28 This is one aspect o f the saying: grace builds on nature.
29 See Appendix Three below for a list of the modes of Christian response.
kingdom of God. The Christian finds harmony with God, the good of religion, in human 
unity with Jesus, through the theological virtues of faith, hope and love.
Grisez also maintains that there is a further dimension to the gift of God’s love. It not 
only motivates us to be morally good in a new, more hopeful and realistic way (in light of 
revealed truth), but it offers us a share in the divine nature. This special gift of grace 
(which is additional to the other, natural gifts of grace, so to speak) transcends human 
choices, acts, and fulfilments, and unites us with God in a special, transcendent manner, 
which is perfected in the beatific vision in heaven. This divine fulfilment is beyond the 
human fulfilments of the natural law, beyond basic human goods, including religion. 
Still, religion plays an important role in helping man to desire this divine fulfilment and 
to act, albeit indirectly, for it. By our friendship with Jesus, which is the richest 
instantiation of religion possible, and is itself God’s gift to us, we are humanly fulfilled 
but also we are interested in accepting the special further gift offered to us by Jesus: our 
adoption as sons and daughters of God (in Christ) and our sharing in the divine life and 
love. Religion thus mediates our fulfilment in divine goodness, a fulfilment that 
transcends our merely human participation in divine goodness. This is a controversial and 
challenging aspect of Grisez’s moral theology.
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9.5.1 The relationship o f the natural and the supernatural
Several aspects of Grisez’s moral theory need development. Two have already been 
mentioned: the role of theoretical knowledge in helping some people to grasp the primary 
practical principles30 and the importance of beauty as a compliment to truth.31 Another 
area was mentioned in the previous section. This concerns Grisez’s treatment of the 
relationship between the natural and the supernatural, or, in other words, between nature 
and grace. This is a difficult area of theology and has challenged theologians over the 
centuries, with no fully clear and coherent understanding achieved yet (and, perhaps, 
ever). So it is hardly surprising that Grisez’s theology is somewhat incomplete and even 
incoherent in this regard. We can discuss these difficulties in his theology with reference 
to religion, as it is at the heart of his theology.
Religion is seen by Grisez as a human good, a humanly fulfilling benefit, which we can 
pursue and instantiate in and/or through our human choices, acts and commitments (albeit 
only with God’s constant direction and help). Our divine, supernatural fulfilment, which 
is our sharing in God’s own life and love, is seen by Grisez as quite distinct from any 
human fulfilment, including religion even at its most richly specified (i.e. as human 
friendship with Jesus). Human persons’ fulfilment includes both human fulfilment and 
(as a special gift beyond our natural potential and nature) divine fulfilment. This two-fold
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9.5 Areas of Grisez’s moral theory that need to be developed
30 See s. 9.1.4 above.
31 See n. 22 above.
fulfilment32 is found ultimately in the kingdom of God. What is the relationship between 
the two kinds of fulfilment? Is our divine fulfilment intrinsically related to our human 
fulfilment? Or is the relationship an extrinsic one?
An extrinsic relationship is suggested by parts of what Grisez writes. He treats our divine 
fulfilment as very different from our human fulfilment, and insists that we cannot act for 
this divine fulfilment, except to receive it as a pure gift from God. Our divine fulfilment 
is not the actuation of any human potential, nor the fulfilment or perfection of our human 
nature. Thus it is not, for example, the perfection of the good of religion.
One sound implication of this is that divine fulfilment is not to be thought of as replacing 
human fulfilment or as an alternative to it. Thus, Grisez rightly seeks to safeguard the 
integrity and intrinsic goodness of the various human goods and integral fulfilment of 
human persons This is one reason why he criticises Aquinas’s views on our ultimate end 
being the beatific vision understood (narrowly) as a perfection of our intellects (i.e. the 
good of knowledge). Grisez wants all good aspects of our humanity to be given the 
proper attention in Christian ethics. Thus he insists that heaven will include rich and 
varied human fulfilment, including bodily resurrection and the communion of saints and 
angels, purified of all sin and freed from all decay and death.
But heaven will include more than that: it will include the beatific vision too. Grisez 
understands the beatific vision to be a fulfilment that transcends any human fulfilment. 
We are interested in the beatific vision only because of our friendship with Jesus who
32 This term is not used by Grisez, except in relation to Aquinas’s views on human fulfilment.
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offers us this gift in offering us a share in the divine life and love (i.e. because of the 
good of “religion-mediating-divine-love”, so to speak). With Grisez presenting the 
beatific vision as utterly non-human, however, it would seem that our acceptance of this 
gift is the acceptance of an extrinsic gift, one that is not connected in any way with our 
human fulfilment, except accidently as one gift that Jesus happens to offer us (as an 
aspect of our friendship with him, or, in other words, as an aspect of the good of religion 
specified by living faith).
But elements of Grisez’s moral theology seem to contradict this extrinsic concept of the 
beatific vision. Grisez holds that good human acts, in particular our act of faith, but also 
our general disposition to moral goodness, are required for us to receive God’s grace. 
With God’s constant help, we cooperate in our own salvation and sanctification.33 
Further, Grisez holds that the gift of God’s love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, 
which is the beginning of our divine fulfilment, also has a humanly intelligible effect on 
our human acts. God’s love, by which we are united with God, enables us to be alive to 
the basic human goods and to pursue moral goodness in a new and better way. We are 
able to see as God sees, rising above merely human and sinful limitations and 
weaknesses, and thus able to pursue and instantiate the goods more effectively and 
integrally. This all suggests that the beatific vision is intrinsically related to human goods 
and fulfilment.
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33 In this Grisez is following the traditional teaching o f the Church on grace.
4 6 8
In addition, it is difficult to see how the good of religion, which involves harmony with 
God and at its best, friendship with God, is not related intrinsically to love of God, which 
involves unity with God. Surely the latter is a perfection of the former?34 Certainly there 
is a strong element of discontinuity between the two kinds of fulfilment. One participates 
in the good of religion through and in human choices and acts, whereas God’s love 
(fulfilment in divine goodness) is a special gift to us, which we cannot achieve or 
instantiate by or in our own human actions. We need God’s help for even our human 
actions and fulfilments, but we need extra help, so to speak, help beyond what we are 
naturally capable of doing or accepting, to be able to live in God’s love, sharing in divine 
intimacy. Thus divine fulfilment is supernatural, not natural, grace, not nature. But, 
nevertheless, it does seem reasonable and necessary to think of our divine fulfilment by 
analogy with human fulfilments, as in the Bible: perfect vision, divine-human marriage,35 
a kingdom of peace and love, eternal life, dwelling in everlasting light, the heavenly 
Jerusalem, and so on. Grisez himself even speaks of it as a “consummation” of the
34 Grisez makes the point that the apostles’ vision of Jesus (by which they saw the Father -  cf. Jn 14. 9-10) 
was not the same as the beatific vision. Rather, it corresponded to the human good o f religion. This is true, 
but isn’t it also true that the apostles’ seeing Jesus (and thus the Father) is intrinsically related to their 
seeing God in the beatific vision? Isn’t the latter a perfection o f the former (by God’s special grace)? To 
say this is not to deny that there is discontinuity between the two types o f vision, but it is to deny that the 
two types of vision are only accidently or extrinsically related. See Grisez, “Natural Law, God, Religion, 
and Human Fulfilment,” American Journal o f Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 3-36, at 26.
35 In relation to this biblical analogy o f marriage, we might offer the following tentative suggestion. Just as 
marriage marks a difference in quality and not just in degree compared to the pre-marriage love of the man 
and woman, so too the beatific vision is qualitatively different from human fulfilment. However, marriage 
is still a perfection o f pre-marriage love, and is intrinsically related to it, although it is discontinuous from it 
too. So too perhaps we might consider our divine fulfilment in the beatific vision to be a perfection of our 
human fulfilment, even though it is qualitatively different from it. This perfection is not a perfection of our 
intellects only (as Grisez rightly insists) but a perfection o f our full humanity that is integral and 
comprehensive, and includes the bodily goods. Also, we might say that this perfection transcends our 
merely human imagination and understanding, whilst not being radically discontinuous with them. If we 
see that beatific vision as totally discontinuous with our human imagination and understanding, it would 
seem impossible to grasp why Jesus would offer such a gift to us. Such a gift would be unintelligible and 
would not be an aspect of our human friendship with Jesus. Accepting it would be a kind o f blind faith, not 
a reasonable human choice.
natural, human friendship we have with Jesus.36 So it seems that there is an intrinsic 
relationship between our human fulfilment and our divine fulfilment. Perhaps the best we 
can do is to say that this is an area of mystery, in which there are elements of continuity 
and discontinuity, and so the natural and supernatural aspects of Grisez’s moral theology 
are both intrinsically and extrinsically related. What is necessary is to avoid any moral 
theology that holds that grace and nature are entirely intrinsically or entirely extrinsically 
related. Grisez’s moral theology avoids these two extremes, but perhaps at times he 
seems to veer too strongly towards the extrinsic extreme. Perhaps he might clarify his 
theory in this area. In doing so, it could be that he will find that his moral theory, whilst 
not exactly the same as that of Aquinas, is more like it than he seems to think at present.37
9.5.2 Religion as a virtue and virtue ethics in general
Another aspect of Grisez’s moral theory which could be expressed in a manner more like 
that of Aquinas, with no loss to Grisez’s distinctive approach, is virtue. Here is more 
accurate to speak of ambivalence and incompleteness, rather than incoherence as such. 
Grisez says many positive things about virtue and virtues and their importance in the 
moral life. His presentation of the modes of responsibility, for example, mentions moral 
virtues frequently, as embodying the modes in various ways (i.e. as embodying moral 
goodness or right reason).38 Grisez clearly values virtue and the virtues.
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36 See s. 6.2.3b above.
37 And so Grisez’s theory would be more like Finnis’s, as seen in s. 7.3.6 above.
38 See Appendix Four below. Grisez does something similar in the chapter on the Christian modes of 
response, in which the natural virtues are specified by faith: see Christian Moral Principles, chapter 
twenty-six.
However, Grisez does not see virtues as the foundational principles of morality; instead, 
the first principle of practical reasonableness, the principles directing towards the basic 
human goods, the first principle of morality, and the modes of responsibility are these 
foundational principles. Also Grisez is clearly worried about any reduction of the 
Christian moral life to the cultivation of virtues viewed as mere self-perfections, or a 
reduction of the Christian life to personal achievement of perfections in isolation from 
seeking the kingdom in faith, hope and love. It seems clear too that the various writers in 
what we might call the “Grisez school” are concerned about a reductive or narrow virtue 
ethics. In this reductive virtue ethics, prudence is allowed a role whereby moral absolutes 
are rendered null and void due to a supposed ability of prudence to creatively discern 
how to live a morally good life by a sort of moral instinct or aesthetic evaluation, without 
principles or rules or law.39 These are reasonable concerns.
But still, especially in the recent works of Grisez himself, there seems to be too negative 
a tone concerning virtue and virtues, which is out of place in his moral theory. Also this 
negative tone unnecessarily makes it more difficult to harmonise Grisez’s moral theory 
with other approaches, and perhaps puts off people who are positively inclined towards a 
virtue ethics approach (that includes the natural law). One sign of this ambivalence 
towards virtue in Grisez’s approach is his (and Finnis’s) lack of attention to religion as a 
virtue as treated by Aquinas in some detail. So one area where Grisez’s moral theory 
might be usefully developed is by integrating Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of 
religion into Grisez’s theory. Another thing Grisez might think of doing is to revise his
39 See John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1991), 101-105.
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opinion that attention to virtue ethics and the psychology of virtue development is not 
useful with regard to moral theory and practice. Such a negative appraisal seems 
unnecessary and overly exclusive. Surely Grisez could easily integrate a concern with 
virtues as shaping how we live the moral life into his theory. One thing that is necessary 
in this regard is for Grisez to more clearly deal with a form of voluntariness that is 
operative in virtuous living: habitual willing that is “determined” by one’s freely shaped 
character.40 To acknowledge this would not be to overlook or deny the importance of free 
choice as a basic principle of morality.
9.5.3 The design argument
There is a third area in which Grisez might draw closer to Aquinas and to various other 
moral theologians and philosophers. This concerns the design argument. In his 1976 book 
Beyond the New Theism, Grisez developed a very strict cosmological argument for the 
obtaining/existence of God. This led to a very austere concept of God, which was only 
speculatively a personal concept. Grisez did not fully exclude other approaches to 
demonstrating God’s existence in this book, but he was certainly not very warm towards 
them. In later works, beginning with “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate 
Ends” (1987), Grisez developed an extension of this cosmological argument in which 
God was more confidently to be understood as a person (or like a person). This argument 
involved seeing God as the Source of not only the existence of the natural law but also of 
its directiveness towards human fulfilment. This new development of Grisez’s argument
40 This form of willing is similar if  not identical to what Grisez calls “executive willing” in Christian Moral 
Principles, chapter nine (241-243). My point is that Grisez ought to give more attention to the forms of 
willing or voluntariness other than free choice, such as simple willing/aliveness to goods, disposition, 
interest, habitual willing, and “executive willing”. (The latter is a rather ugly phrase of Grisez’s, but it is 
difficult to think o f a short alternative.)
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was never presented by him or any other of the Grisez school in any detail, certainly not 
compared to his original cosmological argument. So this is one area that could be 
usefully developed now. In particular, it could be investigated whether and to what extent 
the new development is a kind of design argument (supplementing the original 
cosmological argument). Grisez has not presented it as a design argument, but it seems to 
be one. To argue from the existence of the natural law would be a cosmological 
argument, but to argue from the character of the natural law (i.e. as directive towards 
fulfilment) is a design argument, in my opinion. Thus, Grisez seems to have moved 
closer to accepting Aquinas’s five ways, in which elements of a design argument 
approach can be found in the fourth and fifth ways.41 To investigate this area of Grisez’s 
moral theory would help to develop understanding of how natural law theory is related to 
the design argument. Another aspect of this is that how one is to understand 
philosophically the good of religion, which is closely bound up with Grisez’s “design 
development” of his cosmological argument, would be clarified by such an investigation.
9.5.4 Integral communal fulfilment and religion
Finally, we come to the question of whether Grisez has repudiated his early thoughts on 
religion, which have been presented and analysed in the present work. We have already 
discussed this,42 but we look briefly at it once again here because it might seem to be a 
question mark hanging over this whole present work.
41 See ss. 7.3.6a and 7.3.6b above, where Finnis’s treatment o f Aquinas in this regard is analysed briefly. 
My point here is not that Grisez agrees with everything that Aquinas says in his five ways, but that he is 
closer to Aquinas than he thinks.
42 See ss. 6.3.5 and 6.3.6 above. The work in question is G. Grisez, “The True Ultimate End o f Human 
Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone,” Theological Studies 69, no. 1 (March 2008): 38-61.
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Grisez does not repudiate his understanding of religion as an architectonic good (i.e. a 
good providing an unifying and enriching overarching commitment shaping one’s life as 
a whole). Our whole lives can be “marked by cooperation with God” when we “give God 
his due” by praising and thanking him, and also discern, accept, and carry out our 
personal vocations (consistent with the general guidance of the natural law).43 These two 
aspects of the good of religion seem to correspond, at least partially, to the specific, 
explicit and more narrow concept of “religion” (centred in prayer and worship) and the 
wider, more implicit concept (centred in doing all one’s actions for a supervenient 
religious motive).44 Grisez definitely does not restrict the meaning of religion to a narrow 
concept of worship and explicitly conventional religious acts. The good of religion is 
specified in one’s personal vocation (consistent with the natural law), which is one’s 
unique and personal way of cooperating with God. Cooperating with God necessarily 
involves willing in harmony with him. What is it that both the self and God wills in this 
cooperation, this pursuit and instantiation of religion? Grisez’s new answer is “integral 
communal fulfillment”.45
43 Ibid., 55.
44 This correspondence is not exact, however. One can give God his due by cooperating with him in one’s 
whole life, not just by explicit prayer and worship. Prayer and worship embody cooperation with God. And 
also one can explicitly cooperate with God, rather than just implicitly doing so.
45 See ibid., 55-57.
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Integral communal fulfilment is the common good willed by God and all persons who 
will the good of religion.46 Grisez now presents integral communal fulfilment as the 
ultimate concrete end that people ought to intend in all their choices. He no longer 
presents religion as the ultimate concrete end of man.47 However, as integral communal 
fulfilment is the common good intended whenever one participates in the good of religion 
as an architectonic good, it does not seem that Grisez has repudiated his earlier 
understanding of religion. What he has done is added to it. One is still called to unify 
one’s whole life within a religious perspective, by willing as God wills, cooperating with 
God in friendship and harmony. However, what one wills in this overall religious 
commitment is not just the good of religion, but integral communal fulfilment.48 We 
could say that one intends integral communal fulfilment through the good of religion 
(which is thus transparent for integral communal fulfilment). Therefore, integral 
communal fulfilment does not fully replace religion as the overarching commitment of 
one’s life. Grisez’s use of the concept of integral communal fulfilment emphasises that 
the good of religion is not a narrow good excluding the various and diverse goods of 
other persons.49 Grisez seems wary now of presenting religion as the ultimate end we 
should intend in all our choices and commitments because this might suggest that the 
other goods are somehow not important or permanently valuable. In a sense, Grisez
46 This linkage between the good o f religion and integral communal fulfilment is present only implicitly in
Grisez’s work.
47 See ibid., 57, n. 58.
48 Of course, Grisez never claimed that one was to pursue the good of religion in isolation from the other 
goods. What his new concept of our ultimate end does is to make this even more clear.
49 We should remember that Grisez now includes more than human persons in our ultimate end: we are to 
intend the good of other humans, but also other created persons such as angels, and the person of God too 
(insofar as we can cooperate with him, honour him, please him, and manifest his glory).
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seems to be worried that putting religion to the fore might lead to God “swallowing up” 
distinct created goods and persons. This is also a reason why Grisez rejects the idea that 
our total happiness, which quenches all our desires and willing, is found in God alone (in 
the beatific vision). Grisez wishes to emphasise that our ultimate human happiness, a 
happiness that is perfect but ongoing and developing, is found in created goods and in 
community, distinct from, though somehow within, our “joyful intimacy with the divine 
Persons”.50
The term “communal” in integral communal fulfilment refers to a community that 
includes God. We cannot intend God’s fulfilment in a simple and direct way, because 
God is perfect. However, analogously and by relational predication, we can understand 
our actions to “benefit” God by carrying out his will, pleasing and honouring him, 
benefitting his creatures (including ourselves) and so manifesting his glory. Intending 
integral communal fulfilment necessarily includes loving God as well as loving our 
neighbour.51
Although God is included in the community of integral communal fulfilment, the phrase 
itself does not directly mention God, and it could be read in a secular or non-religious 
way. The other two terms, however, clearly state that the community in view is to be 
integrally fulfilled. And integral fulfilment includes the good of religion, which is, at its
50 Ibid., 61, final sentence o f the article.
51 It also includes caring for the environment, which could be thought to be part of the community that God 
is to fulfil ultimately in the new heavens and new earth, see ibid., 60. See also ibid., 58: “Resurrection will 
be both communal and cosmic”. This is another area of Grisez’s theology to be developed.
best, a friendship with God in which one wills God’s good: his name being hallowed, his 
kingdom coming, his will being done on earth as in heaven. By keeping in mind the rich 
meaning of religion and its important role in Grisez’s moral theory, and in the natural law 
itself, we can avoid reading Grisez’s new emphasis on integral communal fulfilment as 
the ultimate end of man as in any way being a secular or atheistic version of 
philosophical ethics. As long as religion is accorded the kind of important role that this 
present work examining Grisez’s moral theory has analysed and presented, then it will be 
clear that integral communal fulfilment finds its transcendent Source in God, who is the 
creator and Lord of the community of persons to be fulfilled. Also, we will more clearly 
see then the relationship between integral communal fulfilment and the kingdom o f God, 
which is a wonderful and rich specification of the integral communal fulfilment that God 
offers to us when we follow, implicitly or explicitly, the way of the Lord Jesus.52
52 So it could be said that highlighting the role of religion is necessary if  integral communal fulfilment is to 
be understood in a way that reflects how the natural law opens out towards being specified as a 
Christocentric ethics, centred on Jesus who followed a religious personal vocation and who calls each one 
of us to do the same in union with him.
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First Principle of Practical Reasonableness:
The good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.
The Specifications of the First Principle of Practical Reasonableness: 
Regarding the substantive basic human goods:
1. Life and health are to be instantiated and pursued, and their privation avoided.
2. Knowledge and aesthetic experience are to be instantiated and pursued, and their 
privation avoided.
3. Work and play are to be instantiated and pursued, and their privation avoided.
Regarding the reflexive/existential basic human goods:
4. Inner peace is to be instantiated and pursued, and its privation avoided.
5. Inner consistency is to be instantiated and pursued, and its privation avoided.
6. Social harmony is to be instantiated and pursued, and its privation avoided.
7. Religion is to be instantiated and pursued, and its privation avoided.
Regarding a basic human good that is both substantive and reflexive:
8. Marriage is to be instantiated and pursued, and its privation avoided.
These are the foundational principles of the natural law, referring to the basic human 
goods that are to be pursued and instantiated in and/or through our choices and actions.
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The First Principle of Morality:
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought 
to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is 
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment.
[Grisez has replaced “integral human fulfillment” with “integral communal fulfillment” 
in recent development of his theory. So a new formulation of the first principle of 
morality might read:
Always choose in a way that intends integral communal fulfilment.]
The Modes of Responsibility:1
1. One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods.
2. One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act individualistically for  
intelligible goods.
3. One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part o f one’s pursuit 
and/or attainment o f an intelligible good other than the satisfaction o f the desire itself.
4. One should not choose to act out o f an emotional aversion except as part o f one’s 
avoidance o f an intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that 
aversion.
5. One should not, in response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly 
proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible 
goods themselves.
6. One should not choose on the basis o f emotions which bear upon empirical aspects o f 
intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the 
good or avoidance o f the bad.
7. One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction, 
damaging or impeding o f any intelligible human good.
8. One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance o f an intelligible good 
to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage or impede some other instance o f an 
intelligible good.
1 These are the modes as listed in Christian Moral Principles. In Difficult Moral Questions, Grisez 
modified this list somewhat, adding a mode requiring us not to act unreasonably from mixed motives, and 
suggesting that some of these modes might be reducible to others (number six to number five, for example). 
However, the substance o f the original modes has not been changed and they still serve as a useful and 
concise outline of Grisez’s understanding of the basic moral principles of the natural law.
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The First Principle of Christian Ethics:
One ought to will those and only those possibilities which contribute to the integral 
human fulfillment being realized in the fulfillment o f all things in Jesus.
[Grisez would probably amend this now to replace “integral human fulfillment” with 
“integral communal fulfillment”.
A shorter biblical formulation used by Grisez : Seek first the Kingdom o f  God.]
Specifications of the First Principle of Christian Ethics: 
The modes of Christian Response.
1. To expect and accept all good, including the good fruits o f  one’s own work, as 
God’s gift.
2. To accept one’s limited role in the Body o f  Christ and fulfill it.
3. To put aside or avoid everything which is not necessary or useful in the fulfillment 
o f one’s personal vocation.
4. To endure fearlessly whatever is necessary or useful fo r the fulfillment o f  one’s 
personal vocation.
5. To be merciful according to the universal and perfect measure o f  mercy which God 
has revealed in Jesus.
6. To strive to conform one’s whole se lf to living faith, and purge anything which does 
not meet this standard.
7. To respond to evil with good, not with resistance, much less with destructive action.
8. To do no evil that good might come o f it, but suffer evil together with Jesus in 
cooperation with God’s redeeming love.
The First Principle of Morality:
In voluntary acting fo r  human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is 
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfilment.
The Modes of
Responsibility
Philosophical statement of them 
(from Christian M oral Principles)
Associated virtues Associated vices
1st One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for 
intelligible goods.
ambition, energy, diligence, enthusiasm, 
industriousness
laziness, sluggishness, sloth, 
dilatoriness
One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act 
individualistically for intelligible goods.
team spirit; being co-opefative; 
having a well-integrated set of 
commitments
going it alone;
having a star complex; being over­
committed
3 rd One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except 
as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible 
good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself.
self-control, temperance, modesty, 
chastity, simplicity, discipline
lust, gluttony, greed, jealousy, envy, 
short-sightedness, impetuosity
4th One should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one’s avoidance o f an intelligible evil other 
than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion.
courage, mettle, fortitude, resolution, 
tenacity, backbone, perseverance, guts
cowardice, squeamishness, 
irresolution, being a quitter, being a 
worrier
5th
One should not, in response to different feelings toward 
different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for 
anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible goods 
themselves.
fairness, disinterestedness, impartiality, 
unselfishness, justice (but it is a wider 
concept in its fullness)
unfairness, bias, partiality, selfishness, 
favouritism, prejudice
6th
One should not choose on the basis o f emotions which bear 
upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a 
way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good 
or avoidance of the bad.
having a sound set of values, sincerity, 
seriousness, clearheadedness, practical 
wisdom
self-deception, superficiality, 
insincerity, lacking a sense of values, 
frivolity, childishness
t^h One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or 
choose the destruction, damaging or impeding of any 
intelligible human good.
forbearance, patience, longsuffering, 
forgiveness, being easygoing, gentleness
vengefulness, vindictiveness, 
spitefulness, impatience, resentfulness, 
grudging, unforgiving
8*
One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one 
instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to 
destroy, damage or impede some other instance of an 
intelligible good.
reverence craftiness, pragmatism, 
Machiavellianism, amoral expediency
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